

**THE BOLSHEVIK
PARTY'S
STRUGGLE
AGAINST
TROTSKYISM**

**IN THE POST-OCTOBER
PERIOD**

2.50

**THE BOLSHEVIK PARTY'S STRUGGLE
AGAINST TROTSKYISM
IN THE POST-OCTOBER PERIOD**



**PROGRESS PUBLISHERS
MOSCOW**

Editor-in-Chief:
Professor V. L. Ignatyev, Dr. Sc. (Hist.)

Introduction and Conclusion were written
by V. L. Ignatyev; Chapter I by N. A. Slami-
khin; Chapter II by F. B. Yesiyeva; Chapter
III by V. V. Mezenov and Chapter IV by
V. L. Ignatyev and K. D. Shalagin.

БОРЬБА ПАРТИИ БОЛЬШЕВИКОВ ПРОТИВ ТРОЦКИЗМА
* В ПОСЛЕОКТЯБРЬСКИЙ ПЕРИОД

На английском языке

Printed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

CONTENTS

	Page
INTRODUCTION	5
Chapter I. THE BOLSHEVIK PARTY'S STRUGGLE AGAINST TROTSKYISM DURING THE PEACE TALKS AT BREST-LITOVSK	11
Exposure of Trotsky's Anti-Leninist Stand on Theoretical and Tactical Questions of the Socialist Revolution.	11
The Party's Efforts to Conclude the Peace of Brest-Litovsk . . .	30
Chapter II. THE PARTY'S STRUGGLE AGAINST TROTS- KYISM IN THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION FROM WAR TO PEACEFUL ECONOMIC CONSTRUCTION (1920-1921)	49
The Party's Exposure of the Factional Activity of the Trotskyites and Other Opposition Groups. The Trade-Union Discussion . . .	49
Lenin's Criticism of the Trotskyites' Anti-Marxist Views on the State of the Proletarian Dictatorship	79
Chapter III. THE BOLSHEVIK PARTY'S STRUGGLE FOR LENINISM, AGAINST TROTSKYISM (AUTUMN OF 1923-JANUARY 1925)	103
The Party Exposes the Trotskyite Revision of Leninism on Inner Party Democracy and Economic Policy	103
Strengthening Party Unity on the Basis of the Thirteenth Con- ference and the Thirteenth Congress of the RCP(B) Decisions . .	135
Trotskyism's Ideological Defeat in the Inner Party Discussion in Late 1924. Failure of Trotsky's Attempt to Substitute Trots- kyism for Leninism	151
Chapter IV. THE TOTAL DEFEAT OF THE TROTS- KYITE-ZINOVIEVITE ANTI-PARTY BLOC	165
Trotskyism—the Main Danger in the Party During the Switch to Socialist Industrialisation	165

The Main Plank of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite Anti-Party Bloc Platform: Denial of Socialist Victory in One Country . . .	171
Exposure of the Opposition Bloc's Platform on the Party's Home Policy	183
The Party's Struggle Against the Trotskyite-Zinovievite Bloc's Adventurist Platform on International Relations and Soviet Foreign Policy	208
The Main Stages in the Party's Struggle Against the Trotskyite- Zinovievite Bloc. Its Ideological, Political and Organisational Defeat	222
CONCLUSION	256

INTRODUCTION

Over a period of several decades, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has been carrying on a sharp and implacable struggle against Trotskyism. Let us recall that it began at the Party's Second Congress in 1903,¹ when Leon Trotsky (Bronstein) criticised some basic planks in the Party's Programme and Rules. He tried to get the working class of Russia and its vanguard to travel the beaten track of the Social-Democratic parties of Western Europe, in which the opportunists were by then in the ascendant.² Trotsky acted openly as the worst enemy of Leninism. The trend he led, while remaining Menshevik, was in fact Russia's brand of international Centristism.

In the imperialist epoch, with a fierce class struggle in progress, Centristism strove to prevent Social-Democratic workers who were disillusioned with the behaviour of the opportunist leaders of the Social-Democratic parties from going over to the revolutionary Marxists. To keep the workers from leaving the Mensheviks, the Centrists resorted to ultra-revolutionary talk and did not scruple to refer to the authority of Marx and Engels or to exploit the workers' noble urge for the unity of their class, of their Party on the basis of Marxist-Leninist principles.

¹ A sharp struggle between consistent Marxist revolutionaries led by V. I. Lenin against the opportunists developed at the Second Congress of the Party (which was then called the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, RSDLP). Lenin and his followers, who won a majority in the elections to the Central Party bodies, came to be known as Bolsheviks (Russian: *bolshinstvo*—majority), and the opportunist elements, as Mensheviks (Russian: *menshinstvo*—minority). At the Sixth (Prague) Conference (1912) the opportunists were expelled from the Party.

² For details see V. A. Grinko, N. A. Mitkin, Y. F. Sopin, S. S. Shaumyan, *Borba partii bolshevikov protiv trotskizma (1909-fevral 1917 g.)* (The Bolshevik Party's Struggle Against Trotskyism [1903-February 1917]), Moscow, 1969.

The Trotskyites, constituting Russia's brand of Centrism, set themselves the task of uniting the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks in one Party, with the revolutionaries subordinate to the opportunists. In practice, this would have meant the elimination of the Bolsheviks as a new type of party. Thus, Trotsky and his followers were acting as splitters of the Party, trying to knock together an assemblage of opportunist elements as a counterweight to the Party. Later, when the dictatorship of the proletariat was established in the country, the Trotskyites once again set about trying to eliminate the Bolshevik Party, without whose leadership it was impossible either to maintain and strengthen the dictatorship of the working class or to build socialism and communism. They demanded freedom to set up factions and groupings, a practice that would have ruined the Party.

This book examines the Communist Party's struggle against Trotskyism in the post-October period, ending with 1927, when Trotsky was expelled from the Party, and took up an out-and-out anti-Soviet stand, converting Trotskyism into a hanger-on of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie. Trotsky joined the Party as a Menshevik who had not laid down his arms, who denied the possibility of socialism winning out in the USSR, and who strove to send the country along a bourgeois parliamentary way.

The Party's struggle against Trotskyism became most acute and bitter after the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, when the theoretical differences on the possibility of building socialism first in one, separate country were compounded by fundamental contradictions over the Party's policy of socialist construction. The Trotskyites always clothed their attacks on the Party in loud statements about defending the interests of the world proletarian revolution and socialism, charging that the Bolshevik Party was narrow-mindedly national and that it had either forgotten or betrayed the interests of the international proletariat. Actually, however, they fully shared the views of the reformist leaders of international Social-Democracy, who had abandoned the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat and socialism. Trotsky and his followers tried to spread among the Soviet working class scepticism about the success of socialist construction and to minimise in the eyes of the international proletariat the Soviet Union's great liberatory role. They were given considerable assistance in

their efforts by the small groups of followers which Trotsky had set up in the Communist Parties of the capitalist countries, where they purveyed anti-communist ideas and anti-Soviet slander.

Day in day out torrents of filth were poured on the Communist Party and the Soviet Union by the West European Social-Democratic press and the newspapers and magazines of renegades from communism while Trotsky was variously celebrated as a "fighter for the working-class cause". It was necessary completely to expose these lies and to show that Trotskyism had nothing in common with Marxism-Leninism, or with the interests of the working class and its tasks in the struggle for emancipation, and that, despite its subtle disguise, it was aimed against the socialist revolution and was acting as an advocate of capitalism.

The various anti-Party elements, including the Trotskyite opposition, were usually galvanised into action at the turning points of the revolution and socialist construction, when the Communist Party was faced with numerous difficulties. In these periods, the unsteady elements, lacking the Marxist-Leninist seasoning and political steadfastness, and feeling pressure from the petty-bourgeois sections which shun proletarian organisation, self-control and discipline, begin to vacillate and express doubts about the correctness of the Party's policy. Let us recall that in the first ten years of the Soviet power, the Party had to engage in a number of discussions with the Trotskyites on issues crucial to the country's future.

The most acute question after the October Revolution, on which depended not only the existence of the young Soviet Republic, but the fate of the world proletarian revolution, was the immediate conclusion of peace with Germany and her allies.¹ The "neither peace nor war" formula, which Trotsky put forward at the time, virtually played into the hands of the German imperialists, who were seeking a pretext for stamping out the Soviet power. The statements issued by Trotsky and his followers on the conclusion of a peace treaty ran counter to the will and desires of the broad masses of working people, the peasants above all, who were exhausted by the protracted imperialist war.

¹ The peace treaty was concluded between the RSFSR and the German bloc (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria) at Brest-Litovsk on March 3, 1918. It was annulled by the Soviet Government on November 13, 1918.—Ed.

The trade-union discussion, which the Trotskyites forced on the Party, got underway in late 1920 and early 1921, coinciding with the grave economic, social and political crisis through which the country was going as it switched from War Communism to the New Economic Policy (NEP). At the time, keeping the Party united and further consolidating the alliance of the working class and the peasantry were the most acute issues. What was in fact involved, said a resolution of the January (1925) Plenary Meeting of the RCP(B) Central Committee, was "the attitude to the peasantry, which was rising against War Communism, the attitude to the mass of non-Party workers, and the Party's approach in general to the masses at a time when the Civil War was already at an end".¹

The next discussion with the Trotskyites was held in the autumn of 1923, when the country was again faced with big economic difficulties and when there appeared a wide spread between industrial and farm prices. The excessively high prices of durables made them prohibitive for the peasants, and the middle peasantry began to voice its dissatisfaction over this state of affairs. That is precisely when Trotsky and his followers forced a discussion on the Party about the "Party apparatus", the "plan", the CC's alleged "peasant deviation", and the "conflict of generations". The point at issue was in fact again the alliance of the proletariat and the peasantry, the prices policy, the monetary reform, the preservation of the Party's leading role in economic construction and state organs, the fight against freedom to set up factions and groupings—the issue was, in short, the maintenance of the Party's Leninist line during the NEP period.

All of Trotsky's attacks on the Party's general line from 1918 to 1924 sprang from his semi-Menshevik view of the proletariat's attitude to the non-proletarian and semi-proletarian sections of the working people, his belittling of the Party's role in the revolution and socialist construction, and his denial of the need for true ideological and organisational unity of the Party's ranks.

The discussion in the autumn of 1924 showed the differences between the Trotskyites and the Bolshevik Party to be

¹ KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh syezdov, Konferentsii i plenumov TsK (CPSU in the Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and CC Plenums), Part II, Moscow, 1954, p. 108 (hereafter —CPSU in the Resolutions and Decisions...).

even more serious. The discussion was sparked off by Trotsky's slanderous article, "The Lessons of October", which he wrote as a foreword to his book 1917. He rejected out of hand Lenin's doctrine of the motive forces of the Russian revolution and, in contrast to Lenin's evaluation of the October Revolution, put forward his own old theory of "permanent revolution", despite the fact that it had been totally refuted by the practice of three Russian revolutions. At the same time, Trotsky strove to convince the Party that even before the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, Bolshevism had "ideologically re-armed itself", that is, it had taken the Trotskyite way, adopting the "permanent revolution" theory as its theoretical weapon.

That was a distortion of the actual preparation for and victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, and a denial of the leading role played in the revolution by the Bolshevik Party and its Central Committee, headed by Lenin. That was ascribing to Trotsky himself a special role in the revolution. A resolution adopted by the January (1925) Plenary Meeting of the RCP(B) Central Committee and Central Control Commission described this article of Trotsky's as a revision of Bolshevism and said: "Present-day Trotskyism is essentially a falsification of communism in the spirit of identification with the 'European' models of pseudo-Marxism, i.e., ultimately in the spirit of 'European' Social-Democracy."¹

The four successive discussions forced by Trotsky on the Bolshevik Party showed that the cleavage between him and the Party widened from year to year, as they bore on the basic questions of the Marxist-Leninist outlook and the Party's policy, tactics and organisational principles. Because Trotsky's half-baked ideas were essentially Menshevik they were instantly adopted by the opportunist leaders of the Social-Democratic parties of the Second International, renegades from communism who strove to denigrate Leninism, the Russian revolution and the Communist International in the eyes of the workers of Europe so as to have them side with the bourgeoisie. That was why the renegade Paul Levi published Trotsky's article, "The Lessons of October", in German with an introduction of his own, while the German Social-Democratic leadership undertook to circulate it.

The authors of this book give a detailed analysis of the Party's struggle against Trotskyism in the Soviet period,

¹ CPSU in the Resolutions and Decisions..., Part II, p. 108.

exposing the ideas and acts of Trotsky and his followers, which were erroneous and harmful for the dictatorship of the working class. Reading the book helps one to see how the Trotskyites came to a final break with Marxism-Leninism as early as the 1925-1927 period, sliding down to anti-Sovietism and starting to organise an anti-Soviet party, which carried them into the camp of the counter-revolution.

The authors present a great body of facts to show that the fight carried on by Trotsky and his followers against the Bolshevik Party was not the result of temporary mistakes or delusions, but of deliberately hostile activity, which naturally led him into the counter-revolutionary camp.

In its struggle against Trotskyism, the Communist Party was implacable and displayed a high sense of principle. This was a life-and-death issue for the young Soviet Republic, involving the historical destiny of the country and the whole of mankind, and bearing on the fundamental problems of Marxist-Leninist ideology, and the programme, strategy, tactics and organisational principles of the new type of party. In these circumstances, the Party's Central Committee not only safeguarded the Leninist doctrine from Trotskyite revision, but also further developed it, upheld the policy of working for the victory of socialism, and secured its implementation.

The writing of a scientific history of the Party's struggle against Trotskyism is also highly meaningful today, when the bourgeois falsifiers of history are singing Trotsky's praises in an effort to revive the rotten corpse of Trotskyism. Today, the bourgeoisie regards Trotskyism as its advocate in the fight against revolutionary Marxism, and its ideologists have been trying to sell a refurbished version of it to the working class and communist movement and to redeem Trotskyism in the eyes of the fighters against imperialism. It has been assigned the role of a "fifth column" within the revolutionary movement, in the fight against communism.

Present-day Trotskyites have been treading in the steps of their master, like him betraying the interests of the working class and acting as agents of imperialism in the working-class movement. That is why it is a most important and pressing task to study the experience of the Communist Party's struggle against Trotskyism, to expose the slanderous statements by Trotsky's present-day followers in some countries, and to show the masses their splitting activity in the working-class movement.

Chapter I

THE BOLSHEVIK PARTY'S STRUGGLE AGAINST TROTSKYISM DURING THE PEACE TALKS AT BREST-LITOVSK

Exposure of Trotsky's Anti-Leninist Stand on Theoretical and Tactical Questions of the Socialist Revolution

The establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia led to a change in the world balance of class forces, and opened up broad prospects for deepening and extending the anti-imperialist movement. This gave rise to the need for a profound analysis of the socio-economic and political changes in the Soviet Republic, and determination of the ways and concrete tasks of socialist construction.

Lenin summed up the world historical significance of the October Revolution and showed that henceforth the contradiction between socialism and capitalism was the principal one, which determined the character and content of the new epoch in world history. All the political developments in the world, he said, were henceforth concentrated on the central issue—the imperialist fight against the Soviet Republic.¹

A correct understanding of the processes going forward throughout the world hinged on the comprehension of the international significance of the October Revolution and the part Soviet Russia had to play in the struggle for liberation of all nations. Let us recall that during the First World War Lenin had analysed the specific manifestations of the law of the uneven economic and political development of the capitalist countries under imperialism, and predicted that the socialist revolution could win out initially in a few or even in one single country. The subsequent course of historical events showed that Lenin's prediction had been scientific and correct.

In the post-October period, Lenin further elaborated this

¹ See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 241.

proposition in the light of the prospects of the socialist construction which had started in Soviet Russia. The very next day after the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, he declared that the country was entering a new phase of historical development and that the third revolution in Russia was ultimately bound to lead to the victory of socialism.¹

Under Lenin's guidance, the Party started to organise the socialist state. Overcoming the resistance of the bourgeoisie, the Soviet power began to hand over factories, plants, power stations and mines into the hands of the people. At the end of 1917 and in the first half of 1918, the Council of People's Commissars² and the All-Russia Central Executive Committee of the Soviets³ issued decrees nationalising the banks and separate enterprises and then the whole of large-scale industry, and cancelling the external loans contracted by the tsar and the Provisional Government. Workers' control over the production and distribution of commodities was instituted throughout the country. For all practical purposes, land was nationalised. These measures of the Soviet Government cut the economic ground from under the exploiting classes and laid the foundations of the socialist system.

Lenin believed that it was necessary and possible to carry the revolution in Russia to a complete transformation of economic and political life along socialist lines.

Trotsky took the opposite stand. He still clung to his "permanent revolution" theory and insisted that the Soviet Republic would find itself in a desperate state, unless there was an instant victorious revolution in Europe. He flatly denied the possibility of socialism winning out in one country, and told the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets: "Unless the insurgent peoples of Europe crush imperialism, we ourselves shall be crushed; that is indubitable."⁴

The first major clash with Trotsky in the post-October period was over the conclusion of the Peace Treaty of Brest-

Litovsk. Soviet Russia was then going through a tense and difficult time. The Communist Party's most urgent task was to stop the war and secure a breathing space so as to safeguard the gains of the October Revolution, consolidate the Soviet power, organise the forces to beat back any possible imperialist attack and create favourable conditions for socialist construction. Lenin said: "From the very beginning of the October Revolution, foreign policy and international relations have been the main questions facing us."¹

Lenin's Decree on Peace, adopted by the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets, branded the imperialist war as the most heinous crime against humanity; the world's first workers' and peasants' state called on all the belligerent countries and their governments to stop the slaughter and to conclude a general peace on democratic terms.

Soviet Russia's peace initiative was rejected by the governments of Britain, France and the USA, who had a stake in continuing the imperialist war. A few days after the publication of the Decree on Peace, the mood of the reactionary circles of the imperialist powers was expressed by the French Prime Minister Clemenceau when he declared: "I am at war."²

The governments of the imperialist states realised that once Soviet Russia was out of the war she would increase her influence on the revolutionary struggle of the working people of the world. That is why, as soon as the workers' and peasants' state was established, they started a broad campaign designed to discredit its policy of peace. In their efforts to implement their perfidious schemes, the reactionary circles of the capitalist countries resorted to the most subtle methods in blocking the conclusion of peace, and did not scruple to violate the elementary rules of relations between states. They strove to frustrate the Soviet Government's peace initiative by all manner of means, including open threats against the Soviet Republic, attempts to knock together an anti-Soviet centre at the Russian army's GHQ, the weaving of a web of plots and conspiracies, and open support for the counter-revolutionary forces inside the country.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol. 26, p. 239.

² CPC—the earlier name of the Soviet Government.—Ed.

³ All-Russia CEC—the supreme legislative, administrative and control organ of the RSFSR.—Ed.

⁴ *Utoroi Userossiiskii Syezd Sovietov R. i S. D.* (Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies), Moscow-Leningrad, 1928, p. 29.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 28, p. 151.

² Jacques Duclos, *Octobre 17 vu de France*, Editions Sociales, Paris, 1967, p. 103.

In November 1917, in view of the refusal of the Entente countries to negotiate peace, the Soviet Government began peace talks at Brest-Litovsk with Germany and her allies, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey. At the peace talks, the Soviet delegation upheld a programme of general democratic peace, championed the right of all nations to self-determination, and demanded a withdrawal of troops occupying the territories of other countries, renunciation of annexations and indemnities and the granting of political independence to colonial peoples.

However, at the end of December 1917, the German Government came to be dominated by a military clique which openly advocated the seizure and annexation of foreign territories. On December 29, 1917, the German delegation at Brest-Litovsk made a set of territorial claims, flatly demanding acceptance of its terms. The Soviet Government was faced with this alternative: either an onerous peace with the Quadripartite Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria) or war. There was essentially no other way out, Lenin said at that time.¹

In view of the complicated internal and international position of the Soviet Republic, Lenin came out in favour of signing an annexationist peace with Germany and her allies. Lenin was opposed by the Mensheviks, Cadets,² anarchists and SRs³, who tried to prevent the establishment of peace by loud talk about the need to go on fighting "to a victorious end", and made desperate efforts to push the Soviet Republic into a disastrous war against the other states.

At that precarious moment Trotsky launched an attack within the Party against Lenin's strategy and tactics on the war-or-peace issue. He came out with his "neither peace, nor war" formula, which meant: no signing of peace, no waging of war, and demobilising the army. The conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty was also opposed by the "Left Communists" headed by Bukharin, who proposed a so-called revolutionary war against the imperialists. Trotsky argued that "no matter how subtle we are, no matter what

kind of tactics we contrive, only a European revolution, in the full sense of the word, can save us".¹

As before, so after the revolution, Trotsky refused to understand the nature of imperialist contradictions and the tendencies in the development of monopoly capitalism. In antithesis to Lenin's conclusion that the uneven economic and political development of the imperialist countries was becoming ever more acute, he held that their development was levelling off. From this it followed that in the 20th century the conditions of the class struggle in the various countries were "levelling off" so that Europe as a whole was ripe for instant revolution. At the same time, Trotsky spread the theory that capitalism was "stagnating", implying that from the First World War on it had entered into a period of "absolute stagnation and breakdown".

The October Revolution showed Trotsky's inventions about the prospects of a collapse of imperialism to be utterly groundless, but even after October 1917 Trotsky and his followers continued to distort the dialectical interconnection and character of the proletariat's class struggle in each country and on a world scale. They invented all kinds of abstract constructions, engaged in tenuous calculations about an instant victory of the revolution in the West European countries, and tried in every way to minimise the international importance of the October Revolution and to distort Soviet Russia's place and role in the world-wide movement for liberation.

Trotsky regarded the October Revolution not as a component part of the emancipation struggle of the international working class but only as a match that would instantly set alight a world conflagration. He held that only the collapse of the whole imperialist system would make possible the Soviet Republic's existence and give it meaning. That was a petty-bourgeois revolutionist attitude, a Left-wing opportunist approach to the theory and tactics of the class struggle.

The Trotskyites' negligent attitude to the fortunes of the October Revolution was a corollary of this kind of reason-

¹ See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 26, p. 444.

² *Cadets*—members of the Constitutional-Democratic Party, the leading party of the imperialist bourgeoisie in Russia, founded in 1905.—Ed.

³ *SRs (Socialist-Revolutionaries)*—members of a petty-bourgeois party which emerged in Russia in 1902. After the October Revolution the SRs actively fought the Soviet power.—Ed.

¹ *Sedmoi ekstremny s'ezd RKP(B). Stenografichesky otchet* (Seventh Extraordinary Congress of the RCP(B), Verbatim Report), Moscow, 1962, p. 65 (hereafter—*Seventh Extraordinary Congress of the RCP(B)...*).

ing. They denied the need to defend and maintain the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia on the plea that it tended to slow down the collapse of world imperialism. The "Left Communists", the SRs and other petty-bourgeois adventurists took the same attitude.

Lenin resolutely opposed the Trotskyite attempts to minimise the international importance of the October Revolution and gave profound theoretical backing for the idea that it was natural and necessary for the working class of Russia and its Party to defend their proletarian country as the chief international duty. In further developing the Marxist doctrine, Lenin proved that the division of spheres of influence between imperialist alliances could result in agreement between them and in an interweaving of the interests of different imperialist countries. The overthrow of bourgeois domination in this or that country deals a heavy blow at the system of imperialism. That is why the victory of socialism in one country is a component part of the world revolutionary process and a most important stage on the way to the final elimination of exploiting classes.

The October Revolution not only dealt a powerful blow at the bourgeoisie of Russia, but also shook the imperialist system as a whole. It sparked off revolutionary initiatives by other contingents of the world proletarian army, brought about a considerable increase in their activity and helped to consolidate and strengthen their ranks. Under its direct impact, revolutions took place in Finland and Germany as early as 1918, while the liberation movement grew in the colonial and dependent countries of Asia, Africa and America. Emphasising the interconnection between the revolutionary changes in Russia and the anti-imperialist struggle of the proletariat of other countries, Lenin said that in October 1917 the working class of Russia had given tremendous assistance to the world liberation movement by raising the banner of socialist revolution.¹ This is something the Trotskyites totally discounted.

The historical importance of the October Revolution was not limited to its direct influence in accelerating the class struggle in other countries. Lenin said that it determined the main lines of the world's revolutionary renovation, and expressed regularities of the class struggle which were bound

¹ See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, p. 188.

to recur in other countries. There was profound international significance in Lenin's conclusions about the leading role of the new-type party, the hegemony of the proletariat and the alliance of the working class and the peasantry, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the need to eliminate private property and establish social property in the means of production, the need to organise the defence of the revolutionary gains against internal and external enemies, about the friendship of nations, and the international solidarity of the working people, conclusions which were all confirmed in the course of the proletarian revolution in Russia.

Countering the Trotskyite prophecies, Lenin set before the working-class Party and all the working people of Russia the main task of safeguarding the Soviet Republic as the bastion and mainstay of the world liberation movement, and of defending the gains of the dictatorship of the proletariat because "today the cause of socialism could suffer no heavier blow than the collapse of the Soviet power in Russia".¹ The fortunes of the revolutionary struggle depended on whether the working class and all the working people of Russia were able to preserve their revolutionary gains.

Lenin exposed the defeatist approach of Trotsky and other opportunists and emphasised that, with the emergence of the Soviet Republic, "the preservation of the republic that has already begun the socialist revolution is most important to us and to the *international socialist movement*".² That was precisely the basis of Lenin's strategy and tactics designed to conclude the enforced annexationist peace with the Austro-German bloc, so as to preserve and consolidate the workers' and peasants' state.

One characteristic feature of Trotskyism—the urge to fall back on dubious analogies so as to twist the meaning of historical events—was clearly brought out during the struggle over the conclusion of the peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk. It was most pronounced in the artificial antithesis between the Paris Commune and the October Revolution.

In seeking to justify his defeatist line, Trotsky asserted in 1918 that the Paris Commune had been the revolutionary vanguard of the Europe of its day, whereas Soviet Russia was nothing of the kind, and that "the European proletariat

¹ See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, p. 61.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. 26, p. 452.

is more mature for socialism than we are. Even if we are crushed, there is still absolutely no doubt at all that there cannot ensue a historical failure of the kind that occurred after the Paris Commune".¹

That was fundamentally at variance with Lenin's characteristic of the October Revolution. Let us recall that Lenin put a high value on the experience of the Paris Commune for the subsequent development of the socialist movement. In his works, *Fear of the Collapse of the Old and the Fight for the New*, *How to Organise Competition*, *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky*, and other writings, Lenin analysed the programme of the Paris Commune, its essence and weaknesses, which led to the defeat of the first harbinger of the proletarian revolution.

Lenin countered Trotsky's inventions by showing the historical continuity between the Paris Commune and the Soviet Republic, which he regarded as links in the same chain of proletarian class struggle.² But Lenin also characterised the Commune as the embryo of the Soviet power, adding that the Soviet Republic was a higher type of proletarian state than the Commune.

Lenin sharply criticised the Trotskyites and other "Left" opportunists for their failure to understand the actual relation of forces, and emphasised that destruction of the Soviet Republic, far from carrying the proletariat closer to its revolutionary goal, would, in fact, weaken the growing international ties and have a grave effect on the working-class struggle against imperialist oppression. Lenin referred to the lessons of past class battles, especially that of the Paris Commune and of the Russian revolution of 1905-1907, and anticipated an inevitable offensive by reaction if revolutionary Russia were defeated. He stressed that if the Soviet power were to go down, the chain of imperialism breached by the October Revolution would once again be joined, and the shaken imperialist positions strengthened.

The provocative line taken by Trotsky and his followers echoed the aims of the aggressive circles of imperialism and the bourgeois-landowner counter-revolutionaries, who were nursing the hope of destroying Soviet Russia, weakening the revolutionary forces, and preserving and consolidating the

¹ *Seventh Extraordinary Congress of the RCP(B)*... p. 71.

² See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 28, p. 431.

positions of monopoly capitalism. A characteristic feature of Trotsky's behaviour during the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty was his striving to cover up his reckless orientation with declamatory statements, on which he almost at once reneged. This was most pronounced in his attitude to the revolutionary war slogan.

The demand for an instant revolutionary war against the bourgeoisie of Germany and "the whole world" was advanced by the "Left" opportunists immediately after the October Revolution. At the Seventh Congress of the RCP(B), this slogan was the basis of speeches by Bukharin and his followers, who saw only two extreme alternatives: a revolutionary war, to be started right away, or surrender to the enemy and renunciation of the dictatorship of the proletariat. At the Congress, Bukharin argued that despite the prospect of a series of defeats there should be no compromise with the bourgeoisie, because "we can accept the prospect of instant war against the imperialists".¹ Refusal to fight a revolutionary war, he declared, meant that "there is no prospect at all", and the only thing to do is to "knit oneself a stomach and sit by the fire".² The "Left" phrasemongers accused the Communist Party of deviating towards opportunism and refusing to wage a revolutionary war against imperialism.

In the early stages of the discussion, Trotsky appeared to take a dim view of the idea of instant revolutionary war and even said on several occasions that it was impossible.³

Today, bourgeois historians fall back on this fact in their distorted descriptions of the period of struggle for the peace treaty. They seek to create the impression that in that period there were no differences between Lenin and Trotsky. Leonard Schapiro, for instance, claims that in 1917 and 1918 Trotsky together with Lenin "dismissed the alternative of revolutionary war out of hand".⁴ Werner Scharndorff distorts the Party's policy in that period in the same way.⁵

This view of the record of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty is totally at variance with the actual course of events. In

¹ *Seventh Extraordinary Congress of the RCP(B)*... p. 26.

² *Ibid.*, p. 33.

³ See *Protokoly Tsentralnogo Komiteta RSDRP(B)* (Minutes of the Central Committee of the RSDLP(B)), Moscow, 1958, p. 211.

⁴ L. Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, London, 1960, p. 184.

⁵ See W. Scharndorff, *Die Geschichte der KPdSU*, München, 1961, S. 35.

fact, on the fundamental issues of war, peace and revolution Trotsky then took a stand which was the very opposite of Lenin's. His occasional statements at the early stages of the discussion about war being inexpedient, really served to cover up the substance of the matter. The whole tenor of Trotsky's views and attitudes impelled him into the arms of those who advocated a revolutionary war, those whose platform he soon openly adopted.

Trotsky told the Seventh Congress of the RCP(B) that the advocates of war took the most correct view. He saw as the only obstacle to his issuing a call for a revolutionary war the unwillingness of the majority of the Party, led by Lenin, to support such a call.¹ Trotsky justified the splitting activity of the "Left Communists",² declaring that "it was their duty, over-riding formal Party considerations, to make an issue of the matter", inasmuch as they believed that instant revolutionary war against imperialism was "the only solution and the sole salvation".³

Lenin subjected the attitude of the advocates of revolutionary war to devastating criticism, and proved that in the concrete situation of 1918 it was quite untenable. But let us note that the Bolsheviks nowhere in principle denied the revolutionary war slogan but, on the contrary, accepted it, depending on whether it would serve the purposes of the revolution. During the bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1905-1907, Lenin emphasised that there was historical experience to show that under capitalism revolutionary wars were not only possible but showed in fact a positive trend, which is why the proletariat should never forswear participation in such wars and should regard them as just.⁴

During the First World War, Lenin said that the proletariat would use arms to fight against any attempt to "export" counter-revolution. That would be a just and legitimate war. In this context, the Party saw participation in a revolutionary war in close connection with its struggle against abstract pacifism, defensism and the denial of the defence-of-one's-country slogan.

¹ *Seventh Extraordinary Congress of the RCP(B)*... pp. 65, 66, 72, 129.

² "Left Communists"—an anti-Party factional group which took shape within the RCP(B) in early 1918 over the differences on the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty.

³ *Seventh Extraordinary Congress of the RCP(B)*... p. 69.

⁴ See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 13, p. 80.

In the April Theses¹ and his speech at the First All-Russia Congress of Soviets, Lenin once again stressed that the Marxists of Russia regarded the demand of a revolutionary war as being subordinate to the interests of the proletariat's class struggle, which is why they would agree to one only if power was in the hands of the working class and the poor peasantry. To repudiate the revolutionary-war slogan would mean deviating towards pacifism.²

Despite the demagogic declarations of Trotsky and his followers, the Bolsheviks did not, after October 1917, repudiate the revolutionary-war slogan. In the post-October period, Lenin repeatedly said that a war was possible and preparations should be made for one, considering that the imperialist aggressors would try to destroy the world's first workers' and peasants' state. Lenin said the Trotskyites were making a mistake by taking an abstract approach to the question of a revolutionary war, ignoring the balance of class forces inside the country and in the international arena.³

The demand for instant revolutionary war just after the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat was untenable primarily because of Soviet Russia's grave economic situation. The rule of the tsar and the landowners, the Provisional Government's anti-popular policy and the devastating imperialist war had brought the country's economy to a disastrous state. Production in the leading industries had dropped sharply. In 1917, large-scale industry was producing at 77 per cent of the prewar level;⁴ 44 blast furnaces out of 177 were idle and the rest were operating below capacity. Many enterprises were being closed down because of lack of metal, fuel and raw materials. There was an acute shortage of food. Lenin wrote: "A country of small peasants, hungry and tormented by war, only just beginning to heal its wounds, opposed to technically and organisationally higher productivity of labour—such is the objective situation at the beginning of 1918."⁵ The reduction in industrial output, the crisis in agriculture, and the fuel shortage insistently

¹ A reference to Lenin's Theses, "On the Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution", which he made public at a Bolshevik meeting in Petrograd (now Leningrad) on April 4(11), 1917.

² See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 25, p. 39.

³ Ibid., Vol. 27, p. 48.

⁴ See *Istoriya SSSR* (History of the USSR), No. 4, 1957, p. 27.

⁵ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, p. 22.

demanding a breathing space, however short, in order to get the ruined economy going again.

The workers and peasants were exhausted and had no desire to fight, and that was one of the most important factors which made a revolutionary war in those conditions impossible. Let us recall that the overwhelming majority of the workers', soldiers' and peasants' deputies attending the Third All-Russia Congress of Soviets came out against the war and approved Lenin's policy of concluding peace and ensuring the conditions for socialist construction. Polls of gubernia, volost and uyezd Soviets, taken on Lenin's orders in February and March 1918, showed that broad sections of the people supported the Soviet Government's peace policy. Of the 173 uyezd Soviets 88 came out for peace.¹ The reports coming in from the localities also provided evidence that the calls for a revolutionary war were baseless. Of the 31 telegrams received by the Fourth All-Russia Congress of Soviets from volost Soviets, 22, or 71 per cent, contained calls for peace.

The fact that the Soviet Republic lacked the military force to defend the gains of the October Revolution also made the immediate conclusion of peace an urgent necessity. Having made a thorough study of the concrete situation, the reports from the front and letters from soldiers, Lenin arrived at the conclusion that the old army had disintegrated and had lost its fighting efficiency. It was a diseased organism wasted by the long imperialist carnage.² A spontaneous demobilisation had begun at the front, with the soldiers leaving their units en masse.

With the imperialist war still on, the Soviet state found itself in a highly dangerous situation because the old Russian army was totally unfit to fight and a new, workers' and peasants' army was still to be arrayed. In these circumstances, the preaching of a revolutionary war against imperialism amounted to a reckless and criminal gamble over the future of the Soviet Republic.

Having made a comprehensive analysis of the real facts, Lenin drew the conclusion that "the muzhik will not have a revolutionary war", and that in those conditions the working people were quite unable to fight a war.³ The Party had

¹ See *Lenin Miscellany XI*, p. 60 (in Russian).

² See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, pp. 96-97.

³ *Ibid.*, Vol. 26, p. 523, Vol. 27, p. 46.

to reckon with the mood of the broad masses. Lenin's policy—to withdraw from the war and secure a breathing space by concluding a separate annexationist peace—expressed the working people's will and true interests.

The Trotskyites and other "Left-wing" phrasemongers took a different approach. A characteristic feature of their behaviour was refusal to reckon with the opinions, feelings and demands of the masses. They revised the fundamental tenet of Marxism on the decisive role of the masses in history. The Trotskyites believed that it was not the people but they themselves that shaped the course of history.

Trotsky clearly displayed his petty-bourgeois adventurist nature in the first year of the proletarian dictatorship in Russia. At the Party's Seventh Congress he poured scorn on the inertness of the "broad masses of backward people", who refused to "fight the war against the Germans and against our bourgeoisie".¹ At the same time, the opponents of the Leninist line called for "pressure on the masses", arguing that in that way "we shall have a real holy war".²

Historical experience shows that it is not groundless calls, to say nothing of coercion, that generate revolutionary enthusiasm among the masses. The working people must draw conviction from their own experience that a revolutionary war is necessary. Countering the calls of the "Left-wing" opposition, Lenin emphasised that a revolutionary war would generate energy and a capacity to work miracles only when the working people took an interest in it, so that they knew what they were doing and what they were fighting for.³ But the Trotskyites wanted an instant revolutionary war at a time when the bulk of Soviet Russia's population was opposed to war. Theirs was a stand which threatened to bring down the dictatorship of the proletariat. Lenin attacked the advocates of a revolutionary war and stressed: "The Soviet Socialist Republic cannot wage a war when the obviously overwhelming majority of the masses of workers, peasants and soldiers who elect deputies to the Soviets are against the war."⁴

Lenin showed that the Trotskyite approach to the question of a revolutionary war was also unsound in the light

¹ *Seventh Extraordinary Congress of the RCP(B)*..., p. 66.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 106, 107.

³ See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 30, p. 153.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Vol. 27, p. 59.

of the aims and the purposes of the proletariat's class struggle. The incongruous Trotskyite calls for Soviet Russia's instant attack on imperialism were based on the anti-Marxist thesis that the declaration of a revolutionary war against the capitalist world would result in instant world revolution.

In attacking Lenin's stand, Trotsky insisted that renunciation of peace with Germany would make it possible "to exert a revolutionising effect on the German proletariat".¹ This Trotskyite idea was even more clearly expressed by the "Left Communists", who asserted that a revolutionary war, fought as it would be against technically well-equipped states, would promote a revolution in the West and speed it up.²

The "Left-wing" phrasemongers tried to reinforce their stand by asserting that in the West European countries revolution was rapidly coming to a head. They exaggerated the role of the strikes which had broken out in Germany and Austria, and from January to March 1918 kept saying that a revolution had started in Western Europe, that the government of Wilhelm II was about to collapse, and that Liebknecht would be "installed in power" within a few days. The Trotskyites even tried to predict the exact date of the total collapse of the imperialist system and to set deadlines for the outbreak of revolutions in other countries. This kind of reasoning was based on the anti-Marxist idea that war could give world revolution "a push" and bring on the destruction of the imperialist system.

In their lifetime Marx and Engels, exposing petty-bourgeois conspirators, dubbed them alchemists of revolution, because they did not set themselves the task of organising massive revolutionary struggle but relied on a forcible acceleration of the revolutionary process through action by lone-wolf individuals, "artificially pushing it into crisis and staging extempore revolutions, without the necessary conditions being there".³

In the new historical situation, the Trotskyites sought to revive the old petty-bourgeois views and to have them accepted as a "policy platform" for working out and imple-

menting the foreign policy of the Soviet state, and the Party's strategy and tactics in the international arena.

Lenin sharply criticised this ultra-Leftist attitude, showing it to be totally untenable in the light both of the general principles of the Marxist doctrine of the proletariat's class struggle and of the concrete revolutionary developments after the October Revolution.

Summing up the experience in the struggle of the proletariat of Russia and the world, Lenin pointed out that revolutions cannot be "impelled" from outside to originate and develop, but must result from the maturing of the contradictions in a given society. Revolutions depend on deep-going objective processes and cannot arise without a revolutionary situation. Lenin categorically rejected any attempt at forcibly implanting socialism in other countries, and reckless strivings to start a war "to spark off" the flames of revolution in the West. In an article, entitled "Strange and Monstrous", he declared the idea of giving world revolution "a push" to be anti-Marxist.

When exposing Trotsky's unsound and harmful stand, Lenin repeatedly urged the need for a scientifically grounded consideration of the extent to which the revolution had matured, and warned against groundless prognostications and childish and thoughtless attempts to get ahead of events. He underlined the harm of haste in assessing the prospects and course of the proletariat's class struggle. Lenin said that the "Left-wing" phrasemongers were engaging in wishful thinking because the revolution in the West was maturing but had not yet matured,¹ and it would be inexcusable adventurism to try to "give it a push" by means of war. Risking an armed fight with capitalism and jeopardising the very existence of the Soviet government would not in fact help but hinder the maturing of the revolution, because it could result in the destruction of its main base. That is why Lenin said the attempts by the "Left-wing" opportunists to base their tactics on an expectation of faster revolutionary developments in Western Europe were adventurism and phrasemongering.

Lenin repeatedly subjected the "Left-wing" doctrinaires to sharp criticism for their sectarian and voluntarist approach to the problems of the anti-imperialist movement,

¹ *Seventh Extraordinary Congress of the RCP(B)*..., p. 68.

² See *Sotsial-Demokrat*, February 23 (March 8), 1918.

³ Marx/Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 7, Berlin, 1960, S. 273.

¹ See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, pp. 24, 95-96.

and for their refusal to take strict account of the degree to which the subjective and objective factors in a socialist revolution had matured.

Lenin said the calls to impose socialism on other countries by force of arms amounted to a complete break with Marxist doctrine and a denial of the regularities of the proletariat's class struggle.¹ He rejected the idea that it was possible to overthrow the government of Wilhelm II and the Wilson Administration through war, and added: "We cannot overthrow them by a war from without. But we can speed up their *internal* disintegration. We have achieved that on an *immense* scale by the Soviet, proletarian revolution."²

Consequently, Lenin's critique of the theory of giving the world revolutionary process a "push" was comprehensive. Lenin showed this conception to be unscientific because it ignored the internal objective factors and the relation of class forces. He rejected the idea that a war between the Soviet state and capitalism would increase the pace of world revolutionary development, and showed the true face of those who were advocating this theory as having taken the way of revising Marxism and so doing the imperialists a real favour.

The petty-bourgeois essence of the anti-Marxist thesis of giving the revolution a "push" was also revealed in the fact that its advocates had forgotten about the conditions in which forcible methods could be applied. Lenin condemned the "Left-wing" doctrinaires for turning armed force into an absolute and regarding it as virtually the only motive force behind historical progress. They discarded the key tenet of creative Marxism that not every revolutionary task could be solved by the use of force, by means of armed struggle.

In itself, force has a great part to play in revolution, for it is the midwife of the old society when it is pregnant with the new, to use Marx's expression. In elaborating this Marxist proposition, Lenin made the point that armed force had been a necessary and legitimate method in revolution only at definite moments of its development, when the class struggle presented special conditions. Indeed, organisation of the proletariat and broad sections of the working people was a

much more profound and constant aspect of the proletarian revolution and a most important condition for its victory.¹

The classics of Marxism-Leninism said on many occasions that the policy and tactics of the working class and of its Party proceeded from the purposes of revolutionary humanism and had the task of overthrowing capitalist rule in a way that would cause the people the least suffering and sacrifices. The proletariat has a stake in the peaceful way of revolution, wherever the objective conditions and premises exist.

Meanwhile, the Trotskyites and the "Left Communists" advocated nothing but armed struggle against imperialism. Lenin sharply criticised them for making a fetish of violent methods in the class struggle, something that could deprive the working class of the possibility of using flexible tactics and that could ultimately slow down the solution of revolutionary tasks.

The revolutionary class, waging its struggle against the forces and traditions of the old society, can succeed only if it wields every form of struggle—peaceful and non-peaceful, parliamentary and extra-parliamentary—and learns to apply each skilfully, depending on the circumstances. Let us note that at the Party's Seventh Congress Lenin strongly objected to a proposal that the Party's Programme should not mention the possibility of using parliamentary forms of struggle. He said: "We ought not in any way to give the impression that we attach absolutely no value to bourgeois parliamentary institutions. They are a huge advance on what preceded them. . . . We cannot leave the way open for a purely anarchist denial of bourgeois parliamentarism."²

It was Lenin's opinion that the Communists had a revolutionary duty of making use—after taking stock of the situation, the balance of forces, the sharpness of the class struggle within the country and in the international arena—of the slightest possibility of rallying under their leadership the overwhelming majority of the people in order to isolate the ruling groups of the monopoly bourgeoisie and the social-conciliators who were helping it. Lenin believed that the use of bourgeois parliamentary institutions was one of the possible and permissible means which helped to achieve

¹ See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, pp. 71-72.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. 28, pp. 112-13.

¹ See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, pp. 89-90.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. 27, p. 146.

these aims. He censured any sort of semi-anarchist attitude to the possibility of the revolution running a peaceful course, and taught the Party to make a creative analysis of the situation that was taking shape, and to determine the ways and means of bringing about the revolution on the strength of the realities and the proletariat's class tasks. Only then could the Party head the working-class and democratic movement and display firmness, courage and confidence in leading it to a victorious socialist revolution.

Lenin also sharply objected to the "Left-wingers" stereotyping the conditions of the anti-imperialist struggle in the various countries, and their striving to make a mechanical application of the tactics used in the October Revolution to the world liberation movement. The Trotskyites were captive to their illusory scheme of the collapse of the capitalist world and refused to see the point that while the basic features of the October Revolution would inevitably recur on an international scale, there was no implication that other contingents of the proletariat would automatically borrow Bolshevik tactics without due consideration of local conditions and the sharpness of the class struggle. Let us note that in his polemic against the "Leftists" at the Seventh Congress of the RCP(B), Lenin specifically stressed that it was wrong to make a stereotyped application elsewhere of the tactics used to fight the bourgeoisie in Russia.¹ Genuine internationalism does not consist in standardising the ways and means of struggle, as the Trotskyites claimed, but in obtaining a scientific understanding of the general regularities of the revolutionary transformation of the world, and of the various specific ways in which these are expressed in each country.

While emphasising that the destruction of imperialism was objectively inevitable, Lenin pointed out that the way to it would be long, hard and labyrinthine. He resolutely rejected the groundless reasoning of the "Left-wing" dogmatists, who took the Trotskyite view and sought to present an unreal picture of an easy and early victory over international capitalism. Lenin urged the Communists to make a deep study of the experience of the October Revolution, of Bolshevik strategy and tactics, and to apply them creatively in each country.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, p. 103.

In his works in the Soviet period, Lenin proved that the victory of the working class in Russia in October 1917 had been a law-governed necessity, but went on to point out all the specific conditions which had made it easier for the proletariat to establish its dictatorship in Russia. Of these, he believed the main ones to be the existence of the tsarist monarchy, which gave exceptionally strong impetus to the people's attack; the fusion of the proletariat's struggle against the bourgeoisie with the peasant movement against the landowners; the vast political experience the workers and peasants of Russia had accumulated in their class battles, especially during the first Russian revolution; the favourable geographical situation; the emergence of the Soviets, a new form of proletarian revolutionary organisation; and so on.¹

All these specific features lent an unprecedented edge to the socio-economic contradictions, giving powerful scope to the class struggle of the proletariat and toiling peasantry of Russia, which is why the chain of imperialism was breached in Russia, its weakest link. The conjunction of class antagonisms at home with a favourable international situation—the imperialists were fighting each other and were unable to give sufficient help to the Russian bourgeoisie—likewise made it relatively easier to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia.

On the strength of his concrete analysis, Lenin drew the conclusion that it was much harder for the proletariat of western Europe to start a socialist revolution than it had been for the proletariat of Russia.² He stressed that the revolutionary struggle of the West European working class was seriously complicated by the existence of an economically and politically strong bourgeoisie; the use by monopoly capital of the means of military dictatorship against the proletariat; a sizable labour aristocracy, and in consequence, the strong influence of bourgeois chauvinistic ideology; and the activity of conciliatory petty-bourgeois parties. In this connection, he advised West European Communists to make a thoughtful approach to various aspects of leadership of the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat and the working people, to take a realistic view of the domestic and

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, pp. 310-11.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. 31, p. 64.

the international balance of class forces, and to give their policy, strategy and tactics a sound scientific basis.

While exposing the untenable stand taken by Trotsky and other "Left-wing" opportunists and their abstract, scholastic approach to questions of the theory and practice of the class struggle, Lenin set before the Communist and Workers' Parties, the vanguard of the international proletariat, the task of finding ways leading the broad masses of the working people to socialist revolution and discovering what was specifically national for each country.

At the same time, Lenin took an implacable stand against any display by the "Left Communists", Trotskyites, anarchists and Left-wing SRs of scepticism over the revolutionary strength of the international proletariat. At a sitting of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on April 29, 1918, he sharply attacked anarchist assertions that the proletariat in Germany was "spoiled" and "infected with the plague". He said: "The proletariat in Europe is not one bit more unclean than in Russia, but to start a revolution there is more difficult because the people in power are not idiots like Romanov or boasters like Kerensky but serious leaders of capitalism, which was not the case in Russia."¹ Lenin qualified as nationalism any talk about the proletariat of Europe being insufficiently active.

The objective regularities which caused the October Revolution were also operating in other countries and constituting an iron necessity that made proletarian revolutions inexorable. The essence of the Communist Party's internationalist policy, as Lenin saw it, was not to start a revolutionary war against imperialism right away but to support the working-class and democratic movement in capitalist, colonial and dependent countries, and to exert an influence on the nature and pace of historical progress through the force of example and economic achievement.

The Party's Efforts to Conclude the Peace of Brest-Litovsk

Soviet Russia's withdrawal from the war and the winning of a breathing space were the main prerequisites for a successful solution of her economic tasks. That is why Lenin's

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, p. 307.

efforts to conclude a peace with Germany and her allies were of primary importance for consolidating the Soviet power and strengthening the world's first workers' and peasants' state.

There were two basically absurd premises underlying Trotsky's "neither peace, nor war" formula. The Trotskyites' stereotyped and oversimplified view of Soviet Russia's relations with the capitalist countries sprang from their anti-Leninist assessment of the essence of imperialism and their denial of the objective law of its uneven economic and political development.

They ignored the need to make use of the contradictions between the imperialist countries and their division into hostile alignments. Trotsky insisted that there was no need to "conclude the peace so as to secure the figment of a breathing space" and that it was not right to retreat in face of Germany "for the sake of a breathing space with an indefinite prospect".¹ Trotsky's nihilism over the Soviet Republic's securing a breathing space sprang directly from his thesis that socialism could not initially win out in one separate country.

At the same time, the Trotskyites put forward and stubbornly backed up the idea that peace with the Austro-German bloc would mean betrayal of the principle of internationalism and carried the risk of the Soviet Republic's losing the sympathy of the international proletariat, in addition to being a betrayal of the Ukrainian and Finnish peoples, who would fall into the clutches of German imperialism.² The same attitude was taken by the "Left Communists" and Left-wing SRs, who were in fact acting in a united front against the Communist Party's Leninist policy in the period when the Soviet power was being consolidated.

In his "Theses on the Question of the Immediate Conclusion of a Separate and Annexationist Peace", Lenin gave the fundamental reasons for the vital need to conclude the Peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk; he showed the idea of instant revolutionary war to be quite absurd, and Trotsky's "neither peace, nor war" slogan defective. In his polemics with the "Left-wing" opportunists, Lenin gave irrefutable proof that the foreign policy of the Soviet state was scientifically based

¹ *Seventh Extraordinary Congress of the RCP(B)*..., pp. 69, 71.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 67, 72.

and viable, showed the need for making skilful use of inter-imperialist contradictions to promote the interests of the proletarian dictatorship, and explained where, when and how the working class should resort to compromises and agreements in its struggle for socialism.

Lenin proved above all the objective inevitability of revolutionary compromises and agreements which were made necessary by the complex situation of the liberation struggle. He said that the revolutionary transformation of the old world could not proceed in a straight line, without zigzags and temporary retreats. The revolutionary Marxists would succeed only if they reckoned with the turns events took, elaborated and applied flexible tactics in working for the proletariat's ultimate aims, and learned how to avoid fighting against the enemy when they were at a disadvantage.

But while resorting to temporary compromises, the Bolsheviks never stopped their ideological and political struggle for the unity of all revolutionary forces and the purity of Marxism-Leninism. Before the Great October Revolution, the Party resorted to compromises and agreements to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat, and once it was established, to promote the successful implementation of socialist change.

The Trotskyites and other petty-bourgeois deviationists ignored the fact that ahead of the Soviet Republic lay a long and intense fight against the bourgeoisie not only inside the country but also in the international arena. This required the greatest effort and the skilful use of the contradictions between the capitalist powers and also between the various groups of the bourgeoisie in Russia herself. Those who denied this patent truth failed "to understand even the smallest grain of Marxism, of modern scientific socialism *in general*."¹

The Party's foreign-policy line—to secure, through an agreement with the Austro-German bloc, a breathing space to get the country's economy going and increase its defence capacity—was not an abstract theoretical proposition, not a set of tactics with an "indefinite prospect", as Trotsky asserted, but a definite step which an analysis of the objective conditions proved to be right.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 71.

Two main tendencies appeared in the policy of the imperialist powers after the October Revolution. On the one hand, they strove to band together in an alliance against Soviet Russia, and were impelled to do so by the common economic interests of the monopolies intent on plundering other nations and stamping out the revolutionary movement. On the other hand, because of various contradictions they were divided into warring groups and coalitions, and this made joint action against the Soviet Republic much harder and often altogether impossible. That is why Lenin said that while the imperialist class alliance continued to be the main economic tendency within the capitalist system, it "is not the moving force of politics".¹ The clash between these two tendencies not only determined international relations, but also created an objective possibility of exploiting the inter-imperialist contradictions in order to safeguard and consolidate the proletarian dictatorship in Russia and lay the foundations of a socialist economy.

Another Trotskyite thesis that Lenin exposed was that the conclusion of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk signified a deal with imperialism and an abandonment of proletarian internationalism.

Summing up the Communist Party's experience in its efforts to secure a breathing space, Lenin wrote that one of the most difficult aspects of the socialist revolution in Russia was that the proletariat's class-conscious vanguard had to pass through a phase in which its views sharply clashed with the sense of patriotism of the petty-bourgeois elements, who refused to recognise anything but their country's immediate advantages in the old sense.² Their ideology was petty-bourgeois nationalism, which paid lip service to the equality of nations, to internationalism, while surrendering nothing of national egoism. However hard they pretended to be "internationalists" and "patriots", they were nevertheless impelled to action by nationalistic preconceptions, which conflicted with the proletarian outlook. When the petty bourgeois held forth on patriotism what was uppermost in his mind was his own advantage, and he went into convulsions over any slight of his national feelings.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, p. 366.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. 28, pp. 111-12.

The petty-bourgeois parties saw the peace of Brest-Litovsk only as an unwarranted sacrifice and humiliation. Hence, their lamentations over the "ignominy" of Brest-Litovsk, their insistence that concessions to the enemy were intolerable, and their calls for a fight for "total victory". Actually, this petty-bourgeois attitude was pseudo-patriotic, and not only ran counter to the interests of the working people of the world, but was ultimately aimed against the people of Russia.

The Trotskyites' stand was a reflection of this pressure from petty-bourgeois fanaticism, with its aloof utopian ideas about the ways and means of fighting world capitalism. They distorted the prospects of the development of the world socialist revolution and Soviet Russia's place and role in the liberation movement, also taking the wrong view of the internationalist duty of the proletariat of Russia. Their error was rooted in the fact that they altogether failed to make any distinction between a revolutionary agreement and a reactionary compromise. In other words, the spinners of "Leftist" words took any compromise with the bourgeoisie to be a sliding down into the bog of opportunism and an abandonment of revolutionary Marxism.

Lenin criticised the "Left-wing" factionalists and said that only "mincing young ladies" and "affected youths", together with those who were infected with the "itch" of the revolutionary phrase, could regard any compromise settlement of issues as being "dirty" or as an anti-revolutionary act.¹ The Communists must learn to draw a distinction between reactionary compromises with the capitalists concluded by those who betrayed the interests of the working class, and compromises which sprang from the objective course of the class struggle in defence of revolutionary aims.

While the opportunists sacrificed the working class's vital interests for the sake of temporary and partial advantages, real revolutionaries would allow temporary sacrifices, which were secondary from the standpoint of socialism, in order to preserve and consolidate the gains of the revolution. Therein lay the fundamental distinction between the Party's policy and the line taken by the opportunists on the peace of Brest-Litovsk. Acceptance of the German ultimatum was in no

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, p. 38.

sense a breach of proletarian internationalism. It was, Lenin said, a sound view of the balance of forces.¹

The "Left-wing" doctrinaires disregarded the fact that the Party was accepting a compromise with imperialism for the sake of the vital interests of the proletarian dictatorship. While doing so, it not only maintained all the planks of its platform, but also consolidated the Soviet power in Russia. Lenin said that in signing the Peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk "we did not conclude a bloc of any kind; we nowhere exceeded the borderline that would undermine or defame the socialist state; we simply took advantage of the conflict between the two imperialisms in such a way that both were ultimately the losers".² Contrary to Trotsky's predictions, the conclusion of the peace treaty did not lead, and in fact could not have led, to any further concessions to imperialism.

Trotsky's petty-bourgeois, nationalistic stand was also expressed in his assertion that the conclusion of the peace treaty allegedly signified a betrayal of the working people's interests in the Ukraine, Latvia, Poland and Lithuania. This was an untenable stand because it was based on a false view of the relations between the working class's national and international interests, and on an anti-Marxist approach to the balance to be struck between the tasks of socialist revolution and the right of nations to self-determination.³

By concluding the peace of Brest-Litovsk, the Party subordinated the interests of the proletarian struggle in one country to those of the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism on a world scale. Lenin saw the working class of the Soviet Republic as a contingent of the world army of socialism, and the proletarian revolution in Russia as a component part of the world-wide liberation movement of the working people. Accordingly, he urged on the whole Party the need to tackle national tasks in the context of the main and overall goal of the anti-imperialist struggle.

During the period of effort to conclude the peace of Brest-Litovsk, Lenin set out the fundamental arguments for the paramount requirement of proletarian internationalism:

¹ See *Lenin Miscellany XI*, p. 69 (in Russian).

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 440.

³ *Ibid.*, Vol. 27, pp. 30-33.

readiness on the part of the working class in power to make national sacrifices, wherever necessary, for the sake of the common interests of the international proletariat. He regarded the peace treaty as an enforced concession to imperialism, which at the time was stronger than socialism, and as a temporary retreat in order to secure the gains of the revolution and muster its forces. He explained that the objective cause of the retreat was that revolutions did not mature in all countries simultaneously, and that the development of the socialist revolution in any country was nothing at all like a smooth triumphal procession. He wrote: "The waves of revolution follow one upon the other not smoothly, not evenly, not all in the same way."¹

Lenin was sure that the international proletariat's revolutionary struggle would thwart the insidious schemes of the imperialist governments and scrap the Peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which had been forced on the Soviet Republic. That is exactly what happened.

Lenin had to carry on a highly intense struggle to take Soviet Russia out of the war and secure a breathing space.

To all intents and purposes, at the end of December 1917 Germany had served an ultimatum on the Soviet Republic, and the powers of the Austro-German bloc strove to exploit the whole period until the peace treaty was signed. On December 13 (26), 1917, they sent a telegram to the counter-revolutionary Ukrainian Rada inviting it to send its representatives to Brest-Litovsk. When they informed the Soviet delegation of this the following day, its head, Trotsky, agreed to the Rada's participation in the talks.² This suited the Austro-German coalition very well, for they hoped to do a deal with those who were betraying the Ukrainian people's cause. On December 28, 1917 (January 10, 1918), the Ukrainian Rada delegation issued a declaration demanding dismemberment of Russia and recognition of an independent say for the Rada on international issues. It also announced its non-recognition of the Soviet Government.

A conference held in Berlin on February 3, 1918, decided to send the Soviet Republic an ultimatum on the peace

terms. It also determined the terms of a treaty with the Ukrainian Rada.¹ On February 9, 1918, just after the Ukrainian Rada had treacherously signed the treaty, Germany and her allies made a peremptory demand on the Soviet Republic that it accept their terms without demur.

Lenin recalled that before Trotsky had left for Brest-Litovsk, it had been agreed "between us that we would hold out until the Germans presented an ultimatum, and then we would give way."² But acting in bad faith, Trotsky went back on the understanding and countered the German ultimatum of January 27 (February 9), 1918, with a declaration saying that, while refusing to sign the annexationist peace treaty, Russia declared the state of war with Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria to be at an end. Simultaneously, Trotsky sent the Commander-in-Chief, N. V. Krylenko, a telegram demanding that he issue an order demobilising the army. When Lenin learnt of this, he countermanded Trotsky's arbitrary orders.³

New documents recently discovered in the USSR Foreign Policy Archives show that the German delegates at Brest-Litovsk had permission to delay with the presentation of an ultimatum in the expectation that the Soviet delegation would display impatience, giving them the pretext to break off the negotiations. Kaiser Wilhelm's government tried hard to cover up its aggressive aspirations, to delude the working people about the nature and content of the peace talks, and to blame the Soviet Republic for their failure. By virtually taking the initiative in torpedoing the talks, Trotsky helped the most aggressive circles of imperialism to realise their aims.

The consequences of Trotsky's step for the Soviet Republic were exceptionally grave. Immediately following his declaration, the peace talks were broken off and on February 16 Germany announced that she was resuming military operations on February 18. This was in patent breach of the armistice, which contained a provision that its repudiation required seven day's notice.

On February 17, 1918, the Party's Central Committee dis-

¹ See Erich Ludendorff, *Meine Kriegserinnerungen 1914-1918*, Berlin, 1919, S. 444-45.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, p. 113.

³ See M. D. Bonch-Bruyevich, *Usya vlast' Sovietam. Vospominaniya* (All Power to the Soviets. Reminiscences), Moscow, 1958, p. 239.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 36, p. 461.

² See *Mirniye peregovory v Brest-Litovske* (The Peace Talks at Brest-Litovsk), Vol. 1, Moscow, 1920, pp. 32, 49-53.

cussed the announcement by the German Command. Lenin insisted that Germany should at once be invited to enter into fresh negotiations on a peace treaty, without waiting for her to resume military operations. However, it was rejected by six votes to five. Trotsky, Bukharin and the other oppositionists got through a decision to delay a resumption of the peace talks until the German offensive became sufficiently "apparent" and until its effect on the working-class movement became clear.¹

The following morning, the Central Committee met again to discuss the telegraphing of an offer of peace. "Not an hour must be lost", Lenin said, demanding that the Germans should be offered peace without delay. His proposal for a resumption of the peace talks won six votes as against the seven for Trotsky and Bukharin.² The business manager of the Council of People's Commissars, Bonch-Bruyevich, later recalled: "Lenin appeared to be bursting with energy. He was in a state of incredible tension. He clearly felt that everything was at stake. With the slightest delay, the Soviet power, not yet well established, not yet on its feet, could be wiped off the face of the earth. And so he let everything go and threw all his energy behind this most important issue."³

Trotsky and his supporters tried to justify their anti-Party stand, which had led to the breakdown of the Brest-Litovsk talks, insisting that the German troops "cannot attack" the Soviet Republic because they would be prevented from doing so by a German revolution.⁴ This was tantamount to saying: "We know that the German Government will be overthrown *within the next few weeks*." However, it was quite impossible to set a deadline for the outbreak of the revolution in Germany and, Lenin said, "all such attempts, objectively speaking, would be nothing but a blind gamble".⁵ That is why Lenin branded the Trotskyite

¹ See *Protokoly Tsentralnogo Komiteta RSDRP(B)* (Proceedings of the Central Committee of the RSDLP (B)), pp. 194-95.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 197-99.

³ V. Bonch-Bruyevich, *Na boyevykh postakh fevral'skoi i oktyabr'skoi revolyutsii* (At the Action Stations of the February and October Revolutions), Moscow, 1930, p. 267.

⁴ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, p. 22; see also *Seventh Extraordinary Congress...*, p. 67.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Vol. 27, p. 23; Vol. 26, p. 444.

declarations as loud talk by people who were completely out of touch with reality.

The revolution in Germany, Lenin said, was undoubtedly coming to a head, but there was much history to show that it took more than a revolutionary crisis to stop a war. Lenin warned the "Left-wing" factionalists that refusal to conclude a peace treaty would lead to a resumption of military operations along the front, and that Russia would be forced to accept very much more onerous terms. Subsequent events showed that Lenin was quite right.

On February 18, 1918, the German troops started an offensive all along the front. Lenin's warnings, which the Trotskyites had ignored, were borne out. The German Commander-in-Chief ordered his troops to take Kiev, Moscow and Petrograd. Germany's ruling circles, anticipating an easy victory, were already engaged in sharing out the territory of Russia: Emperor Wilhelm wanted to turn the Duchy of Kurland into one of his estates; Prince Friedrich-Karl of Hessen, the Emperor's brother-in-law, yearned to wear the crown of Finland; von Urach, the Duke of Wurtemberg, wished to become King of Lithuania.¹ The German imperialists expected their offensive to topple the Soviet Government, allowing them to conclude a peace treaty with a non-Bolshevik government.

The proletarian Republic found itself in a critical situation. Lenin wrote: "The week from February 18 to 24, 1918, has been one that will be remembered as a great turning-point in the history of the Russian—and the international—revolution".² That week's events showed that the young Soviet state was incapable of fighting a war. The headquarters set up at the time to direct the country's revolutionary defence was receiving reports that units of the old army not yet demobilised were refusing to hold their defences. The soldiers were in massive flight from the front, failing to carry out orders to burn and destroy everything behind them, and even sweeping along with them the newly formed Red Army units.³

Despite the terrible danger, the Trotskyites insisted on the continuation of the war. When news had come in of the

¹ See Bernhard Bülow, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, Band III, Berlin, 1931, S. 275.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, p. 62.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

German offensive, Bukharin declared at the evening sitting of the Central Committee on February 18, that "there is now no possibility of putting off the battle" and proposed that the "muzhiks should be set on the Germans". Bukharin was supported by Lomov, who proposed that the country should wait until the German workers came to feel the "effect" of the German offensive. That day, which was crucial for the revolution, Trotsky ran true to form as a political adventurer. At the morning and evening sittings of the Central Committee he urged that it "should await the effect" of the German offensive, arguing that the conclusion of a peace treaty would "merely throw our ranks into confusion". Instead of taking immediate measures to stop the German offensive and save the Soviet Republic, Trotsky proposed that the Germans should be "probed" by having Berlin and Vienna formulate their demands.

That day Lenin spoke twice and gave a rebuttal to all the arguments put forward by Trotsky and the "Left Communists". Lenin said that to procrastinate now meant consigning the Russian revolution to the scrap heap. It was too late to "probe" the Germans, because the facts had proved that they were capable of mounting an offensive which could not be halted by the writing of papers. He added: "The muzhik will not have a revolutionary war, and will overthrow anyone who openly calls for one."¹ Lenin was supported by Y. M. Sverdlov, J. V. Stalin, and I. T. Smilga, among the others. As a result, the Central Committee adopted, by seven votes to five, a decision to ask the German Government to conclude a peace treaty right away.

Simultaneously, the Soviet Government, under Lenin's leadership, took a number of measures designed to organise and strengthen the Red Army and enhance the country's defence capacity. A meeting of the Council of People's Commissars on February 19 instructed its Military Commission to work out measures to organise the defence of the Soviet Republic within 24 hours. The following day, the Council again examined matters connected with the country's defences, and decided to issue an appeal to the population and take steps to organise resistance to the invaders.

In its appeal over the German offensive, the Soviet Government urged the local Soviets to do everything to streng-

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 26, p. 523.

then the Red Army. All workers and peasants not engaged in production were to join its ranks. The appeal said: "Workers, peasants and soldiers! Let us drive home to our enemies—here and abroad—that we are prepared to defend the gains of the revolution to the last drop of our blood."¹ A headquarters, consisting of military specialists, headed by General M. D. Bonch-Bruyevich, which operated under Lenin's direct guidance, was set up to organise the defence of Petrograd. Urgent measures were taken to form and train Red Guard units.

The Revolutionary Defence Committee was set up in Petrograd on February 21, and issued a general call to arms. The Baltic Fleet announced a revolutionary mobilisation. A meeting at the Putilov Works decided that all workers from 18 to 47 years were to join the Red Army.² Almost 60,000 volunteers came from the districts of Petrograd. On February 22, a general meeting of the RSDLP(B) members of the Second City District unanimously decided that all Party members should join the Red Army to fight in defence of the Russian and international revolution. A similar decision was adopted by a general meeting of the RSDLP(B) members of the Kolpino District of Petrograd Gubernia. It called on all Party members capable of bearing arms to fight in defence of the revolution.

A meeting of workers at the Langesippen Works passed a resolution which said: "While fully sharing Comrade Lenin's view on the question of peace, we believe it necessary to give a rebuff to the attacking whiteguards of international capital, who are fighting against the Soviet power and socialism." The meeting decided to mobilise all industrial and office workers from 18 to 50 years, each undergoing two hours of military training a day.

At the time, a great deal was being done at the Moscow plants to form units for the Red Army. On February 22, 1918, the first Red Army contingent was formed in Moscow and sent to the front, and by mid-May more than 15,000 men had already joined the Red Army. Over 40,000 men were enlisted in the reserve units. During the people's revolutionary mobilisation to give the German invaders a crushing rebuff the Red Army units fought their first battles.

¹ *Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR* (Documents of USSR Foreign Policy), Vol. 1, Moscow, 1957, p. 109.

² *Izvestia UTsIK*, February 27, 1918.

Despite the message sent by the Council of People's Commissars to the German Government on the question of peace, the German troops continued their offensive. The German Government replied to the Soviet Government's note of February 19, 1918, only on the morning of February 23 and offered even harsher terms for peace. It demanded in addition a transfer to Turkey of Kars, Ardagan and Batum, and to Germany herself of a number of regions in Latvia and Estonia; conclusion of a peace treaty with the Ukrainian Rada; withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Ukraine and Finland; payment to Germany of an immense indemnity, and demobilisation of the army. It demanded acceptance of the German ultimatum within 48 hours. It said the Soviet delegation should go to Brest-Litovsk at once and there, within three days, sign a peace treaty that was to be ratified within a fortnight.

This fresh German Government ultimatum was discussed by the Central Committee on February 23, 1918. The situation was extremely tense. Trotsky, Bukharin and their supporters once again attacked Lenin's line, trying hard to frustrate the conclusion of a peace treaty. Trotsky alleged that the conclusion of a peace treaty clashed with the internationalist approach and would inevitably dissipate support among the advanced elements of the proletariat. He asserted that the war could have been carried on if the Party were united, that is, if Lenin and his followers changed their stand. Trotsky thought it would be all right to surrender Petrograd and Moscow to the Germans, as this would "keep the whole world in a state of tension".¹

At that meeting, Lenin spoke eight times, arguing the need to accept the new peace terms so as to save the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia. He was forced to issue a warning that if the "revolutionary talk" policy should continue to block the conclusion of a peace treaty, he would "withdraw from the government and the CC". In an article entitled "Peace or War?" on February 23, 1918, Lenin wrote: "Under such conditions, only unrestrained phrase-making is capable of pushing Russia into war at the present time and I personally, of course, would not remain for a second either in the government or in the Central Committee of our Party if the policy of phrase-making were to gain

¹ *Proceedings of the Central Committee of the RSDLP(B)*, p. 212.

the upper hand."¹ Following a heated discussion, the Central Committee adopted Lenin's motion for peace by seven votes to four, with four abstentions.

On the night of February 24, there was a sharp discussion on the peace treaty at a sitting of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. In a fierce fight against Right- and Left-wing SRs, Mensheviks and anarchists, who also opposed the conclusion of a peace treaty, Lenin secured approval for the policy of the Party's CC on the war-or-peace issue. On February 24, the Soviet Government informed the Austro-German bloc countries of its acceptance of the ultimatum.

On March 3, a Soviet delegation, consisting of G. Y. Sokolnikov, L. M. Karakhan, G. I. Petrovsky and G. V. Chicherin, signed the treaty of Brest-Litovsk without any discussion, in order to emphasise its enforced and plunderous nature.

Consequently, the course of the struggle within the Party fully confirmed that Lenin had been right and showed that the attitudes taken by Trotsky and the other "Left-wing" opportunists and factionalists were groundless and untenable. Lenin said the events of those few days were a lesson that was bitter, mortifying, and harsh, but useful and necessary.²

One would think that reality itself would have forced the "Left-wing" opportunists to admit that they had been wrong, but they persisted in their erroneous attitude. This became quite clear at the Seventh, Extraordinary, Congress of the RCP(B), which was called in March 1918 to decide on the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty. Trotsky, Bukharin and other "Left-wing" oppositionists acted in a common front against Lenin's policy on the questions of war, peace and revolution.

With the support of N. Krestinsky, K. Radek and other oppositionists, Trotsky sought the Congress's approval of his reckless line. He fell back on his famous "permanent revolution" theory, insisting that socialism could not win in one country, that conclusion of a peace treaty was intolerable, and that compromises with the bourgeoisie were harmful. He resorted to downright fraud, claiming the torpedoing of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations to be virtually the line adopted by the whole Party.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, p. 41.

² *Ibid.*, p. 63.

In his report and in concluding speech, Lenin showed that the tactical line followed by Trotsky and the "Left Communists" was incongruous, and exposed the rash attitudes of those who opposed the conclusion of a peace with Germany and called for instant revolutionary war. He gave a profound scientific analysis of the development of the socialist revolution in Russia and described the difficulties facing the Party and the country in socialist economic construction. These difficulties sprang from the fact that the Soviet power had to build socialism in a hostile capitalist encirclement aimed at restoring the bourgeois order in the country. The domestic and the international situation demanded the mobilisation of all resources and the conduct of a flexible foreign policy aimed at preventing the capitalist countries from uniting in their fight against the Soviet Republic.

In his report, Lenin gave conclusive proof that it was an urgent necessity to conclude the peace treaty in order to safeguard the gains of the October Revolution and to obtain a breathing space in which to consolidate the workers' and peasants' state. The idea that ran right through his report was the need to make sure of the breathing space and to turn it into a long peace in which firmly to establish and extend the socialist transformations and create an efficient army and a strong rear. Lenin said: "Grasp even an hour's respite if it is given you, in order to maintain contact with the remote rear and there create new armies. Abandon illusions for which real events have punished you and will punish you more severely in the future. An epoch of most grievous defeats is ahead of us, it is with us now, we must be able to reckon with it. . . . If we are able to act in this way, then, in spite of defeats, we shall be able to say with absolute certainty—victory will be ours."¹

Lenin tore off Trotsky's pseudo-revolutionary mask, revealing the grave consequences of his vile tactics: the "Left" opportunists' splitting activity had made the peace terms very much worse.

At the Congress, Lenin was supported by Y. M. Sverdlov, F. A. Sergeyev (Artyom), K. Shelavin, a Petrograd workers' delegate, and others. In their speeches they gave a fitting rebuff to Trotsky, Bukharin and their followers, and exposed the petty-bourgeois essence of Trotsky's revolu-

tionary war conceptions. The "Leftists" got nothing out of their attempts to speculate on the massive indignation at the piratical peace terms.

The working people soon found their bearings and gave support to Lenin's policy. This change in the popular mood was clearly expressed at the Congress by Shelavin, who declared: "What had happened in Moscow and throughout the country has now happened in the working-class districts of Petrograd. The workers came up one by one and declared: 'A fortnight ago I said this, now I see things in a different light.'¹ Y. S. Maskov-Yaremchuk, a delegate from the Third Urals Regional Conference, declared: "On my way here from the Urals, I had more explosive material than Ryazanov's, but I began to lose it as I neared Petrograd. The greatest danger for us at this difficult time is a crack in our Party's building at the top. . . . We should have long ago concluded peace and started to organise the masses."²

The idea that Trotsky and the "Left Communists" had no real understanding of the situation and took a haughty and negligent attitude towards the working people was emphasised by Y. M. Sverdlov, who sharply condemned the behaviour of those who opposed the peace treaty and pushed the Party on to the fatal road of war against imperialism. He declared: "We are, in any case, unable to wage any revolutionary war, not only because we have no army or because we are in a phase of extreme dislocation, but also because the broad masses of the people do not want war."³ Sverdlov urged the Congress to use the breathing space to strengthen the Soviet state, to start organisational work among the masses, and to prepare for the coming battle for the triumph of socialism.

At the Congress, the Trotskyite oppositionists were exposed as splitters, whose pseudo-revolutionary pronouncements in fact dovetailed with the SR, Menshevik and Cadet agitation for war against the "aliens". The speech by O. I. Rozanova, a delegate from the Yaroslavl city organisation, is highly indicative in this connection. She said that in Yaroslavl the Cadets were urging the peasants to reject the peace treaty with Germany and to prepare for war. It turned out

¹ *Seventh Extraordinary Congress of the RCP(B)* . . . , p. 89.

² *Ibid.*, p. 99.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 78.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, pp. 108-09.

that the Cadets had joined the Trotskyites and "Left Communists" in urging a "revolutionary war". Rozanova declared that the speeches of those who opposed Lenin's policy of peace were "grist to the bourgeoisie's mill".¹

As a result, the Congress adopted, by 30 votes to 12, with four abstentions, Lenin's resolution "On War and Peace", and recognised the necessity of ratifying the peace treaty signed with Germany and her allies. This expressed the will of the majority of the Party to get Soviet Russia out of the war at once and to secure a breathing space so as to preserve the workers' and peasants' state.

However, even then the Trotskyites did not cease their factional activity. In an attempt to create tension, Trotsky announced that because the Congress had rejected his policy at Brest-Litovsk, he was resigning from all his posts. Krestinsky and Joffe, who supported Trotsky, tabled a motion endorsing the tactics of the Soviet delegation at Brest-Litovsk. That was a fresh attempt to vindicate Trotsky's treacherous behaviour during the negotiations, and it sparked off another acute discussion at the Congress.

Most delegates took the view that Trotsky and his supporters had behaved as splitters, seeking to undermine the Party's unity just when the Soviet Republic was in a predicament.² The "Left-wing" factionalists failed in their efforts to exonerate Trotsky's treasonable tactics at Brest-Litovsk. On Lenin's motion, the Congress censured Trotsky's importuning for endorsement of his refusal to sign the peace treaty.³

The Fourth, Extraordinary, All-Russia Congress of Soviets met from March 14 to 16, 1918, to decide on the ratification of the Brest-Litovsk treaty. Its composition was highly diverse: of the 1,172 delegates, 814 were Bolsheviks, 238 Left-wing SRs, 15 Right-wing SRs, 14 anarchists, 16 internationalist Mensheviks, 3 Ukrainian Mensheviks and 18 non-Party delegates. This naturally led to a sharp struggle at the Congress.

In his report, Lenin explained the most important aspects of the Bolshevik strategy and tactics in the struggle for peace, exposed the sham pretensions of those who opposed

the Soviet Republic's foreign policy and wanted a revolutionary war, and urged the delegates to ratify the peace treaty.

Once again the petty-bourgeois and anti-Bolshevik groups resorted to slander and insinuations in an effort to split the Congress and to prevent ratification of the peace treaty. The Left-wing SRs, Kamkov and Steinberg, the Menshevik Martov and the Right-wing SR Likhach, the anarchist Ghe and the SR-maximalist Ryvkin raised a hysterical wail about the peace treaty being a disgrace; they tried to prove that the breathing space was futile and in fact harmful, and laboured their point that the Soviet Republic had "betrayed" the cause of world revolution.

At the Fourth Congress of Soviets, Lenin's line was supported by Y. M. Sverdlov, G. V. Chicherin, F. A. Sergeyev (Artyom) and V. Volodarsky, among others. They gave a sharp rebuff to demagogic statements of the petty-bourgeois elements, showed their stand to be unfounded and reckless, and exposed those who wanted a war against the imperialists as being accomplices of the counter-revolutionary forces. In a roll-call vote, Lenin's resolution was adopted by 784 votes to 261, with 115 abstentions, including 55 supporters of Bukharin and Trotsky.

Let us note that in view of the highly intricate situation, the Central Committee, at its meeting on March 15, 1918, had adopted a decision binding all Party members attending the Fourth Congress of Soviets to vote for the ratification of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty. Consequently, the supporters of Trotsky and Bukharin, who abstained, were again ranged against the Party, when they failed to abide by the decision of the Seventh Congress and the Party's CC on the peace treaty. Once again their behaviour showed them to be factionalists.

The Trotskyites' prophecies and their schemes for the collapse of world capitalism were shown to be fallacious by the revolutionary practices of the masses and by life itself. The root of the "Left-wing" oppositionists' mistakes lay not only in the fact that they had failed to understand the concrete historical situation, but also in their very approach in analysing the aims, tasks and nature of the new epoch. They took an oversimplified, anti-Leninist attitude to the internal processes of imperialist development and failed to see the intricate maze of class contradictions in bourgeois society.

¹ *Seventh Extraordinary Congress of the RCP(B)*..., p. 98.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 129, 135-36.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 124-25.

In their efforts arbitrarily to "shorten" the existence of imperialism and to leap over some of the stages that lay ahead, the Trotskyites and other "Leftists" failed to produce the correct objective criterion for an approach to reality. They were hopelessly confused in their conceptions and categories of the various epochs—the pre-monopoly and the imperialist—and minimised the role of the working class in the peoples' liberation struggle.

Trotsky's "permanent revolution" theory, which he continued to propound in that period, doomed the proletariat which was victorious in one country to a wait-and-see policy or reckless action, something that was fundamentally at variance with the spirit and principles of revolutionary Marxism, and the ideology and policy of proletarian internationalism, and could eventually bring the Soviet Republic to destruction.

The victory of the Party's Leninist policy of concluding the peace treaty was of great importance for the future of the socialist revolution. The Communist Party had thwarted the designs of world reaction, which had tried to destroy the Soviet Republic by force of arms and to restore the rule of the capitalists and the landowners in Russia. The first attempt by the imperialists to stamp out the Soviet power had been warded off.

Lenin's vast theoretical and practical work in that period in exposing the anti-Marxist ideology of which the Trotskyites, the "Left Communists" and the SRs were the vehicles, went to enrich the Bolshevik experience in overcoming the petty-bourgeois inconstancy and vacillation. A study of the Leninist experience in the fight against the Left-wing opportunist revision of the propositions on war, peace and revolution prepared the Communist Party for dealing with fresh attempts by Trotsky and his supporters to substitute petty-bourgeois socialism for Marxism-Leninism. Relying on the Leninist ideological, theoretical and political legacy, the Party successfully solved the tasks of strengthening the unity and cohesion of its ranks and elaborating and implementing the scientifically grounded domestic and foreign policy pursued by the Soviet state to secure the triumph of the cause of socialism.

Chapter II

THE PARTY'S STRUGGLE AGAINST TROTSKYISM IN THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION FROM WAR TO PEACEFUL ECONOMIC CONSTRUCTION (1920-1921)

The Party's Exposure of the Factional Activity of the Trotskyites and Other Opposition Groups. The Trade-Union Discussion

With the foreign interventionists and internal counter-revolutionaries defeated, the young Soviet Republic was able to start peaceful economic construction. In that period, the Communist Party had to carry on an intense struggle for the unity of its ranks, against the Trotskyites, the "Workers' Opposition",¹ "Democratic Centralists" and other anti-Party groups. It was Trotsky who provided the ideological inspiration for the oppositionists. On the eve of the Tenth Congress, he and his supporters forced upon the Party a discussion which made it waste much time and effort in polemics on matters that had already been settled.

This was called the trade-union discussion, although the trade unions were not the only point at issue. Indeed, what was at issue was the fate of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the choice of concrete ways of building socialism and drawing millions of working people into the effort.

The switch to peaceful economic construction began in a highly complicated situation. The imperialist and the Civil War had ruined the country. During the war and the intervention, almost one-half of the national wealth of the Republic had been destroyed. Output in large-scale industry was down to one-seventh of the prewar level, with steel at less than 5 per cent. Agricultural production was almost

¹ *Workers' Opposition*—an anti-Party anarcho-syndicalist group within the RCP(B) whose members denied the Party's leading role and the importance of the dictatorship of the proletariat in economic construction, and set up trade unions in opposition to the Soviet state and the Party.—Ed.

halved. International imperialism and internal counter-revolutionaries exploited these difficulties in fresh attempts to overthrow the Soviet government. Lenin said: "...The enemies around us, no longer able to wage their war of intervention, are now pinning their hopes on a rebellion."¹

In late 1920 and early 1921, counter-revolutionary revolts broke out in various parts of the country: Siberia, the Urals, the Ukraine, the Northern Caucasus and Byelorussia. From the autumn of 1920 to the summer of 1921, Tambov Gubernia and a part of Voronezh and Saratov gubernias were swept by a kulak-SR revolt, which was led by the SR A. S. Antonov. The Kronstadt mutiny, instigated by the imperialists, broke out in late February 1921. A major naval fortress, guarding Petrograd, fell into the hands of the whiteguards, Mensheviks and SRs, who tried to turn it into the centre of a country-wide revolt.

The counter-revolutionary action had the support of petty-bourgeois elements. So long as the Civil War was on, the peasants accepted the "War Communism" policy, under which they had to give up all their surplus grain and sometimes even some of the grain they needed themselves, in accordance with a surplus food-appropriation system. During the war, the military and political alliance of the working class and the peasantry was based on the fact that the Soviet power had given the peasants land and that it was protecting them against the danger of a return of the landowners and the capitalists, while the peasants supplied the workers with food on credit, pending the rehabilitation of large-scale industry. This form of alliance between the two labouring classes played a decisive role in the defeat of the interventionists and the internal enemies. However, when peace came, there were signs of discontent among the peasants over the "War Communism" policy. Being the small-scale commodity producer that he is, the peasant could no longer tolerate the restrictions on trade and the appropriation of surplus food, which hindered the development of the productive forces. Lenin said: "This was the first and, I hope, the last time in the history of Soviet Russia that feeling ran against us among large masses of peasants, not consciously but instinctively."²

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, p. 270.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. 33, p. 421.

The wavering among the middle peasants and their dissatisfaction with the "War Communism" policy created a real danger of a break-up of the alliance between the working class and the peasantry and, consequently, of the destruction of the proletarian dictatorship.

The effects of the Civil War had brought about profound changes in the structure of the proletariat. Tens of thousands of industrial workers had gone to the front and to work in the state apparatus. By 1920, the number of workers in industry covered by the census was down to one-half of the 1916 figure.¹ Dozens of factories and plants were idle for lack of raw materials and fuel, and transport was at a standstill. In 1920, only 122 of the 212 nationalised metallurgical plants were still working, while the number of workers they employed was down to about 30 per cent as compared with 1913. Only 503 of the 1,342 oil-extracting and oil-refining enterprises, and 180 of the 329 cotton and wool mills were in operation.²

The workers went to the villages and took up small-scale handicraft production, and some experienced workers became artisans. This led to a dispersal of the working class and created a grave threat of undermining the social basis of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Lenin said: "By 1921, we realised that after the struggle against the external enemy, the main danger and the greatest evil confronting us was our inability to ensure the continuous operation of the few remaining large enterprises. This is the main thing. Without such an economic basis, the working class cannot firmly hold political power."³ A part of the working class, especially those who had relatives in the villages, was influenced by the mood of tiredness and discontent.

Let us recall that by the start of the transition to peaceful construction, the Party had grown numerically and had come to command great prestige and influence among the masses of the working people. Suffice it to say that 61.3 per cent of all its members had joined in 1919 and 1920. In the five years after the revolution, Party membership had increased

¹ See G. M. Krzhizhanovsky, *Desyat let khozyaistvennogo stroitelstva SSSR. 1917-1927* (Ten Years of the Economic Construction of the USSR, 1917-1927), Moscow, 1928, p. 61.

² See *Statistichesky yezhegodnik, 1918-1920* (Statistical Yearbook, 1918-1920), Part 2, Moscow, 1922, pp. 230, 223, 270.

³ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, p. 412.

25-fold,¹ to over 730,000. More than 32,000 Party cells were operating up and down the country.² But the Party was also of necessity influenced by the pressures from the petty-bourgeois elements. There were signs of wavering among the less class-conscious members, one reason being the substantial change in the Party's composition and the increase in its numbers. By 1921, less than 10 per cent of the Communists had a Party record dating from before the Revolution.³ Many of those who joined after 1917 had not been schooled in the revolutionary fight against tsarism and the bourgeoisie and had not yet the time to obtain any serious political experience. During the war, the Party organs had been unable to devote enough time and effort to their education.

The proportion of non-proletarian elements in the Party had increased from 1917 to 1920, undergoing the following change:⁴

	Workers	Peasants	Office Workers	Others
1917	60.2	7.6	25.8	6.4
1920	43.8	25.1	24.3	6.8

About 44 per cent were workers, the proportion of peasants had increased more than 3-fold and over 30 per cent were office workers and other social groups.

After the revolution, many former Mensheviks, SRs, Borotbists,⁵ Bundists,⁶ Maximalists⁷ and members of other non-proletarian parties had joined the ranks of the Communist Party. More than 22,000 members, that is, 5.8 per cent, had

¹ See *Userossiiskaya perepis chlenov RKP 1922 goda* (All-Russia Census of RCP members, 1922), Part 4, Moscow, 1923, pp. 31, 32 (calculated by the author).

² Ibid., p. 33.

³ Ibid., p. 31 (calculated by the author).

⁴ Ibid., p. 37.

⁵ *Borotbists*—members of a Ukrainian petty-bourgeois nationalist party of Left-wing SRs.

⁶ *Bundists*—members of the opportunist petty-bourgeois nationalist Jewish party, the Bund, which took a Menshevik stand on all questions of the revolutionary movement.

⁷ *Maximalists*—members of a petty-bourgeois Leftist group, close to the anarchists, which had split away from the SR party.

once been members of other political parties.¹ Now and again these elements presented a fertile soil for hostile attitudes, and many of them continued their anti-Party activity. As the class struggle became more acute, their ideas were expressed by splinter groups, the Trotskyites above all, who attacked the Communist Party's policy.

The Party was faced with the need to tackle the most complicated tasks of eliminating the consequences of two wars, rehabilitating industry and agriculture, establishing a sound economic link between the working class and the peasantry, and laying the foundations of the future socialist society in the Soviet Republic. In these conditions, the Trotskyites and other opposition groups insisted that the Party should "concentrate its attention on the trade unions ... making this the central task of the Party as a whole".²

The Trotskyites held that the trade unions were in a state of great crisis, and were about to collapse because their tasks in production were so obscure. Trotsky declared: "The discrepancy between the trade union as it is, and the union as it should be has now grown into the greatest contradiction within the workers' state."³ Other Trotskyite opposition leaders spoke out in the same vein. The Party's Central Committee sharply criticised the Trotskyites' attempt to press with the trade-union issue, without analysing the political situation. The trade unions, said Lenin, were a link between the Party and the working class. That is why it was fundamentally wrong and un-Marxist to deal with them in isolation from the position of the Party and the Soviet power. It was emphasised at the very start of the trade-union discussion that the cardinal problem of the policy of the Party and the Soviet state was the nature of the relationship between the working class and the peasantry. "It is criminal," wrote *Pravda*, "to forget, behind the trade-union discussion, about a number of questions which are exceptionally acute, questions on whose solution depends the whole subsequent course of the revolution. One such question is the relationship between town and country."⁴

The RCP(B) Central Committee discounted the Trotskyite move as an attempt to distract the Party from economic

¹ *All-Russia Census of RCP Members, 1922*, Part 4, p. 44.

² *Pravda*, January 15, 1921.

³ *Lenin Miscellany VI*, p. 322 (in Russian).

⁴ *Pravda*, February 2, 1921.

construction, and the working out of correct relations between the vanguard and the masses. In the course of the discussion, Lenin repeatedly stressed that this discussion was a political danger and an amazing luxury in view of the unprecedented difficulties, domestic and international.¹

The status and role of the trade unions within the system of proletarian dictatorship had been defined in the programme of the RCP(B) adopted by its Eighth Congress (1919). It said that the main tasks of the trade unions lay in the economic sphere, and that "the organisational apparatus of socialised industry must rest primarily on the trade unions".² It was the task of the trade unions to draw broad sections of the working people into the management of industry, and to foster among them a spirit of socialist discipline and class consciousness.

In early 1920, the Ninth Congress of the RCP(B), giving greater precision and more concrete form to some planks of the Programme, adopted a decision, "On the Question of the Trade Unions and Their Organisations", which stressed that the tasks of the trade unions lay mainly in the sphere of economic organisation and educational work. It said: "Being a school of communism and a link between the vanguard of the proletariat, the Communist Party, and its most backward sections which are not yet entirely free of the old craft-union and occupational narrow-mindedness, the trade unions must educate these masses, organise them culturally, politically and administratively, and raise them to the level of communism."³ The Congress decisions spelled out in detail the general and the current tasks of the trade unions, the forms of their participation in the work of the economic machinery, and the principles governing relations between the Party and the trade unions, and between the Soviet state and the trade unions.

In September 1920, the Party's Central Committee sent a letter to all the gubernia and uyezd committees of the Party⁴ setting out measures to render effective assistance to the trade unions. All these decisions were drafted and adopted with Lenin's direct participation.

¹ See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, p. 168.

² CPSU in the *Resolutions and Decisions*... Part I, p. 422.

³ Ibid., p. 391.

⁴ See *Izvestia TsK RKP(B)*, No. 21, 1920, pp. 4-5.

The trade unions' tasks in economic construction were also defined with sufficient clarity in the decisions of their All-Russia Congresses and the Fifth All-Russia Conference. Lenin took part in the Second (January 1919) and the Third (April 1920) All-Russia Trade Union Congresses, and his speeches determined the content of the resolutions they passed. A draft written by Lenin was the basis of a decision adopted by the RCP(B) group at the Fifth All-Russia Trade Union Congress (November 1920).

Consequently, the Trotskyites' allegations that the Party did not realise the role trade unions had to play in production and that it failed to see what they had to do with the proletariat in power were an attempt to mislead the masses and lay claim to being the only champions of the interests of the working class.

The discussion forced on the Party by the oppositionists was latent with grave danger to the Party's unity, because from the outset their stand was factional and unprincipled.

The discussion was started by Trotsky's speech at a meeting of the communist group at the Fifth All-Russia Trade Union Conference, in which he insisted that the trade unions were in "profound internal crisis", because their role in production did not accord with their tasks. He called for a shake-up of the trade-union leadership, "a shake-up from top to bottom to shake out all the remnants". Contrary to the Party's policy of switching from wartime methods to strictly democratic practices, Trotsky urged that the trade unions should be militarised and that coercion should be more extensively applied. He referred to the "experience" of the Central Committee of the United Railwaymen's and Water Transport Workers' Union (Tsektran), which had put Trotskyite methods into practice.

Trotsky's followers in the Tsektran leadership made wide use of disciplinary punishment and fines, and permitted themselves gross breaches of democracy and the principles governing the operation of local trade unions. This produced resentment among the rank-and-file, and a conflict was imminent between Trotsky's followers and those who opposed Trotsky's method of ordering the masses about. However, Tsektran's Trotskyite leadership continued its policy of "tightening up the screws", while Trotsky sought to force this policy on the whole trade-union movement.

The November 1920 Plenary Meeting of the Party's Central Committee rejected the theses tabled by Trotsky, which, Lenin said, pursued the "shake-up" policy behind a screen of talk about the trade unions being in the gravest crisis, and about "new tasks and methods".¹

It was decided that "pending completion of the commission's work, it is undesirable to bring out for broad discussion the differences which have come to light in the Central Committee", and to appoint a commission consisting of CC members and leading trade unionists for a practical, business-like elaboration of the questions in the trade-union movement. Trotsky was among those who were appointed to the commission. The Plenary Meeting adopted a resolution emphasising the need for maximum initiative among the workers' organisations and the close ties with the broadest sections of the working people. The Central Committee called for a vigorous struggle against "the degeneration of centralism and militarised forms of work into bureaucratic practices, petty tyranny, red-tapism and petty tutelage over the trade unions".²

The Communist group at the Fifth All-Russia Trade Union Conference gave full approval to the Central Committee's November Plenary Meeting. However, Trotsky refused to work on the trade-union commission. That was open defiance of Party discipline. Lenin pointed out: "...Trotsky's non-participation in the trade-union commission's work actually implies a continuation of the struggle and its transfer outside the Central Committee.... This business of disrupting the work of a commission is bureaucratic, un-Soviet, un-socialist, incorrect and politically harmful."³

In Tsektran, the Trotskyites continued to use their "shake-up" methods in their work with the trade-union masses. The split in Tsektran materialised in early December 1920. At a meeting of the Communist group of a conference of transport workers called by Tsektran the water transport Communists lodged a protest against Tsektran's bureaucratic methods and demanded fulfilment of the Party's decisions on the trade unions, and a renewal of Tsektran membership.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, p. 44.

² *Desyatyi syezd RKP(B). Stenografichesky otchet* (Tenth Congress of the RCP(B). Verbatim Report), Moscow, 1963, p. 830 (hereafter—*Tenth Congress of the RCP(B)...*).

³ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, pp. 36, 45.

The Communists walked out and were joined by a section of the Communist railwaymen. Later, the water transport men on Tsektran resigned.

The split in the country's biggest trade union was a great political danger, for Tsektran methods had produced a conflict with the majority of Communists and the trade-union rank-and-file. The working class would have been split wide open by the application of Trotskyite methods of leadership to other trade unions. Lenin emphasised: "This event (the split in Tsektran.—*Author.*) is basic and essential to an understanding of the political essence of our controversies...."¹

While the Party's Central Committee was taking steps towards a practical settlement of the differences within the Central Committee, Trotsky demanded a broad discussion and threatened to "appeal to the Party". He claimed to be the sole champion of democracy and declared that efforts to solve the trade-union issue "behind the Party's back" were intolerable.

That had a very democratic ring, but in fact the Trotskyites had already started the discussion, and had done so behind the Central Committee's back. They gave a totally one-sided picture of their own stand and said nothing about the real essence of the contradictions. At the Tsektran All-Russia Conference in December 1920, Trotsky urged that "two groups should be set up in each union—a production group and a group of the old-type trade unionists. I have no doubt that these two groups will give us a great victory...."² The demagogic meaning of Trotsky's statement becomes quite clear in view of the fact that during the trade-union discussion the Trotskyites styled themselves production workers, and labelled Lenin's supporters in the trade-union leadership as old-type trade unionists. In their speeches, the Trotskyites attacked the trade-union leaders, accusing them of "developing in their midst a spirit of corporate exclusiveness, hostility for the new leaders", and so on.

In his factional struggle, Trotsky was aided by Bukharin, who set up a "buffer" group, allegedly designed to reconcile the extremes, but in fact supporting Trotsky. The leaders of the opposition themselves admitted that the two groups had a common platform. Trotsky declared: "As for the

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, p. 76.

² *Izvestia*, December 7, 1920.

'buffer' group, we have had no fundamental differences with it at all, and I said as much from the outset. There have been some small nuances, but these have been obliterated during the campaign."¹

On December 24, 1920, in order to disarm the factionalists, the Central Committee authorised the discussion. The following day, Trotsky issued his factional pamphlet, "The Role and Tasks of the Trade Unions", which set out his platform. The appearance of a platform which the author himself said was the fruit of collective effort exposed Trotsky as a factionalist defying Party discipline. While a member of the CC, he had got together a group of men outside the CC and was publishing this group's collective work, urging the forthcoming Tenth Congress to choose between the two tendencies in the trade-union movement. The mistakes Trotsky had earlier made were further developed in this pamphlet as a complex.

While pretending to "enhance" the trade unions' role in production, the Trotskyites set out a programme for their "étatisation", which they saw as "concentration of all management of production in the hands of the trade unions ... transformation of the trade unions into agencies of the workers' state and a gradual coalescence of trade-union organs with economic organs".² Trotsky and his supporters said that the "parallel" existence of economic and trade-union organs was intolerable, and proposed an urgent reorganisation of the leadership in the trade-union movement. Subsequent events made it clear that Trotsky's demand for a "shake-up" of the trade unions had been a cover-up for his urge to oust those who followed Lenin, and to secure an organisational foothold in the trade-union leadership.

"The trade unions," Trotsky asserted, "are meaningful in Soviet society only as governing production organs, and otherwise have no meaning at all." Implementation of these proposals would have meant the destruction of trade unions as social, non-Party organisations, and their conversion into a bureaucratic adjunct of the state apparatus. The stripping of the trade unions of their specific character would have been tantamount to a rejection of the trade unions as such, as organisations that raised millions of working people to

¹ *Pravda*, February 1, 1921.

² *Lenin Miscellany VI*, p. 326 (in Russian).

participation in the running of society, and playing the part of a transmission belt from the vanguard to the masses.

The fundamental mistake made by the supporters of "étatisation" lay in their neglect of the actual condition of broad masses of trade-union members and in over-rating the pace at which the working people were moving to a mastery of production. Lenin sharply criticised Trotsky's "étatisation" slogan and showed that because of illiteracy and lack of experience the bulk of the proletariat was for the time being unable to govern.

"The workers," Lenin told the Second All-Russia Trade Union Congress, "were never separated by a Great Wall of China from the old society. And they have preserved a good deal of the traditional mentality of capitalist society. The workers are building a new society without themselves having become new people, or cleansed of the filth of the old world; they are still standing up to their knees in that filth. We can only dream of clearing the filth away. It would be utterly utopian to think this could be done all at once. It would be so utopian that in practice it would only postpone socialism to kingdom come."¹ It would take a long time to educate the working people and train them in the skills of management and administration. Let us recall that at the time only 900 workers out of six million trade-union members were engaged in managing production. The rest were still to learn how to do so. In these conditions it was fundamentally wrong to concentrate on the "top section" of the trade unions and demand their conversion into organs of management.

In urging the transfer of management to the trade unions, Trotsky put forward this erroneous slogan: the trade unions are another name for the proletariat.² The trade unions were indeed an organisation of the proletariat, but this did not mean that only proletarians were members of the trade unions. In the 1918-1920 period, trade-union membership included not only industrial workers, but also office workers, administrative and technical personnel and some artisan and semi-peasant elements.³ In 1921, 16 of the Re-

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 28, pp. 424-25.

² See *O roli professionalnykh soyuzov v proizvodstve* (On the Role of the Trade Unions in Production), p. 28.

³ See *CPSU in the Resolutions and Decisions...*, Part I, pp. 547-48.

public's 23 production trade unions had a working-class membership, in the full sense of the word, and 7 mainly working in branches providing services for production. Only about 500,000 of the 6,970,000 trade-union members were Communists.¹ In these conditions, Trotsky's slogan was not only erroneous but harmful, because it implied subordination of production to the petty-bourgeois elements.

Addressing the Eleventh Party Congress, Lenin said: "During the war people who were by no means proletarians went into the factories; they went into the factories to dodge the war. Are the social and economic conditions in our country today such as to induce real proletarians to go into the factories? No.... Very often those who go into the factories are not proletarians; they are casual elements of every description."²

Lenin criticised Trotsky's "étatisation" slogan and his idea of the "coalescence" of economic and trade-union organs, and urged that a thorough study should be made of the experience of joint working by trade unions and state organs, in order to set it against the Trotskyites' bureaucratic and empty scheming. Lenin showed that if the trade unions were to play a greater part in the country's economic life, there was need to induce the working people to take the most vigorous action and to train each of them for participation in the management of production and social affairs, and in "production training", not only in word but also in deed. In contrast to Trotsky's platform, Lenin brought out Rudzutak's theses, which contained practical proposals for further democratising the trade unions, improving production propaganda, organising disciplinary courts, and so on.

The Trotskyites launched their strongest attacks against Lenin's definition of the trade unions as a school of communism. The oppositionists came out against the Party's decision on this question, asserting that the Party alone could be a school of communism, whereas the task of the trade unions was to muster production. The Trotskyites' denial of the role of the trade unions as a school of communism in fact meant a refusal to engage in painstaking work in educating the working people, and enlisting them in the active construction of the new society.

¹ See *GPSU in the Resolutions and Decisions...*, Part I, p. 538.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, p. 299.

Had the Trotskyite thesis of "étatising" the trade unions been realised, the trade unions would have been rendered incapable of protecting the working people's interests. Trotsky argued that in a workers' state there was nothing for the trade unions to protect and that under the dictatorship of the proletariat the trade unions' tasks in protecting the workers' economic interests were entirely superfluous. He discounted the whole thing as Soviet "economic trade-unionism" and urged that the trade unions should be converted into an instrument for militarising the working class. He said that after the proletariat had won power, the trade unions themselves became "coercive", and were transformed into an organisation for coercion. In this context, a highly characteristic speech was delivered by the Trotskyite Goltsman at the Moscow Gubernia and City Conference of the RCP(B) in November 1920. He said that the mode of coercion was a mode of real policy, which is why it was not right to shun any method, including the method of "ruthless discipline of the cane with respect to the mass of workers, who are pulling us into the past.... We shall not stop at using prisons, transportation and hard labour with respect to those who are incapable of understanding our tendencies".

The Trotskyite idea of militarising the trade unions was objectively leading to a split between the Party and the trade unions, between the vanguard and the masses, and tended to undermine the dictatorship of the proletariat. Lenin said: "We have no other mainstay but the millions of proletarians, who may not be class conscious, are often ignorant, backward, and illiterate, but who, being proletarians, follow their own Party."¹

While the Party and the proletarian state were introducing the New Economic Policy, when the question of providing all-round protection for the proletariat's class interests was especially acute, the Trotskyites rabidly denied the need for the trade unions working in that direction. But the fact is that even after the victory of the proletarian revolution, the function of safeguarding the workers' interests remains and is enriched with a qualitatively new content. The liquidation of private property in the means of production and the concentration of political power in the hands of the

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, p. 58.

working class change the class orientation of this trade-union function but do not at all eliminate it.

In the socialist state the trade unions combine protection for the economic interests of the workers and of the state itself. They work to consolidate the state, while standing up for the proletariat's interests against bureaucratic distortions, formalism, red tape and breaches of legality, and work for the fullest satisfaction of the working people's material and spiritual interests. Lenin exposed Trotsky's conceptions as being reckless and his platform as being theoretically groundless and anti-Bolshevik, and proved that under the dictatorship of the proletariat the trade unions had a great part to play.

The factional fight started by the Trotskyites against the Party served as a signal for action by other anti-Party groups. During the discussion, seven anti-Leninist platforms on the trade unions were set out, namely, those of the Trotskyites and the "buffer" group, the "Workers' Opposition", the "Democratic Centralism" group, the Ignatovites, Ryazanov's and Nogin's. As the discussion went forward, they formed blocs: the "buffer" group united with the Trotskyites, the "Ignatovites" merged with the "Workers' Opposition", and the Trotskyites and the "Workers' Opposition" supported each other. What all the opposition platforms did was deny the leading role of the Party and undermine the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The "Workers' Opposition" put forward the slogan of "trade-unionising the state", with the trade unions taking over the management of the country's economy. This group held the trade unions to be the only truly proletarian organisation as opposed to the Party and the state. The main plank of the "Workers' Opposition" programme was that the national economy should be run by an "All-Russia Congress of Producers organised in trade and industrial unions".¹ This was a virtual abandonment of the Marxist-Leninist theory of the class struggle, obliterating the distinction between the working class and the petty bourgeoisie, in an obvious attempt to subordinate the Party and the Soviet state to the petty-bourgeois element.

The oppositionists strove to wrest from the proletarian dictatorship the commanding heights of the economy and to

¹ See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, p. 198.

deprive the Party of its leading role in the management of production. The "Workers' Opposition" argued that the alliance between the working class and the peasantry signified surrender on the part of the proletarian revolution to the petty-bourgeois element. While demagogically claiming to be a "Workers' Opposition", it in fact served as a reflection of the most backward attitudes among the petty bourgeoisie, and was an anarcho-syndicalist deviation. At the Tenth Party Congress, Lenin said that the "Workers' Opposition, which is hiding behind the backs of the proletariat, is a petty-bourgeois, anarchist element".¹ The tactics of this anti-Party group was most explicitly formulated by Alexandra Kollontai in her pamphlet "The Workers' Opposition". She wrote: "Even in the event of defeat at the Congress, it [the Workers' Opposition] must remain within the Party and firmly defend its point of view, step by step, saving the Party and straightening out its line."² By insisting on factional methods of struggle and on splitting the Party, the leaders of the opposition and their supporters were in practice demonstrating their repugnance of unity and Party discipline.

The "Democratic Centralism" group, whose platform was characterised by Lenin as "Menshevism and Socialist-Revolutionarism at their worst", as "the 'champion shouter' faction"³, distorted the principles of democratic centralism, demanding "boundless collegiality" and freedom to set up factions and groupings within the Party. They denied that the Party had the leading role to play within the Soviets and the trade unions, and strove to undermine the centralised leadership of the Soviet state. During the trade-union discussion they came out with their theses "On the Trade Unions", which charged that the trade unions were in a state of "bureaucratic necrosis", but simultaneously demanded an extension of their rights in production, and proposed that the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council should be formed by a plenary meeting of the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions. Their theses, "The Party's Current Tasks", amounted to an opportunist revision of the Marxist-Leninist principles of Party building.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, p. 197.

² *Ibid.*, p. 201.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

In contrast to these oppositionist platforms, the Central Committee brought out its "Draft Resolution of the Tenth Congress of the RCP, 'The Role and Tasks of the Trade Unions'", which is known as the "Platform of Ten". It was based on the Party's decisions about the role of the trade unions in the epoch of the proletarian dictatorship. It said that for the broad masses of the working people the trade unions were a primary school of political education and organisational skills. The main method used by the trade unions in their work was that of persuasion and workers' democracy. The "Platform of Ten" played a big role in defeating the anti-Party forces and in rallying the mass of Communists round the Party's Central Committee.

On January 12, 1921, the RCP(B) Central Committee reaffirmed its decision that all organisations were free to engage in discussion and adopted a resolution on the election of delegates by platform for the Party's Tenth Congress. Every trend within the Party was given full opportunity to present its views to the Communists. The Plenary Meeting condemned the oppositionists' efforts to heat up the factional fight, and urged them "not to exaggerate the differences or to distract the attention and energy of Party members from the vital and urgent practical tasks", and to conduct a discussion on the basis of principles. Trotsky and his followers, who had earlier harangued for a broad discussion, now voted against this CC decision.

It was a heavy blow at Trotsky's attempts to cobble an anti-Party bloc and to rally all the opposition to his side. It helped to show the depth of the contradictions and to expose before the masses the true face of the oppositionists. While giving all the opposition groups an opportunity to present their platforms at the Party meetings and conferences and in the press, the Central Committee criticised these platforms and showed them to be designed to undermine the Party's leading role, and the fact was that any weakening of the Party presented a great danger to the Soviet power.

The opposition leaders sought to spread among the active Party members mistrust of the Central Committee, and laid the blame for the economic hardships on some of its members. They twisted the real causes of the economic crisis through which the country was going in that period, and tried in every way to discredit the CC's policy in the eyes

of the rank-and-file members. At the Tenth Congress, Trotsky asserted that it was the CC that had doubled and tripled the existing food difficulties. He declared: "True, it has been said here that there had earlier been the wartime situation which had made it impossible to switch to a tax. The wartime situation has nothing to do with the tax in kind. . . . Had we taken the right approach to this matter a year ago, our relations with the peasantry would have been better."¹

That was not true, because in the conditions of wartime it had been impossible to establish normal economic relations between industry and agriculture, through trade, because the state did not have enough manufactured goods to exchange for farm produce, and the socialist structure was still so weak that freedom to trade played into the hands of the capitalist elements, who strove to disrupt the country's economy and to frustrate the delivery of the necessary supplies to the army and the arms industry. During the Civil War, it was the counter-revolutionaries who plugged the freedom to trade. The Soviet state was pursuing a surplus-appropriation policy precisely for the purpose of meeting the needs of supplies for workers and the army, and defeating the external and internal counter-revolution. Lenin characterised the assertions of the opposition leaders as being essentially counter-revolutionary, and added: "It is the kind of demagogy that the Makhno anarchists and the Kronstadt elements jump at."² The opposition was providing the internal counter-revolutionaries with an ideological weapon to fight the Party and the Soviet power.³

In the course of the discussion, the Trotskyites twisted the historical truth and tried to represent Lenin's principled stand as being something of a "median", centrist stand, essentially not very different from the Trotskyites'. But these

¹ *Tenth Congress of the RCP(B)*. . . , p. 350.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, p. 207.

³ Bourgeois historians have borrowed the principal theses of the Trotskyites and other anti-Party groups, and these are now being used by anti-Sovieters in the capitalist countries. Bourgeois ideologists, striving to pervert one of the most heroic stages in the development of Soviet society, have falsified a wide range of questions, including the economic causes and the political factors which led to the aggravation of the class struggle in Soviet Russia in the spring of 1921, the content of the internal Party struggle, the arrangement of forces within the Party, the true meaning of the various platforms, the Party's programme, the "War Communism" policy and the NEP.

assertions are unfounded, as will be seen from Lenin's works dating from the period of the trade-union discussion ("The Trade Unions, the Present Situation and Trotsky's Mistakes", "The Party Crisis", "Once Again on the Trade Unions, the Current Situation and the Mistakes of Trotsky and Bukharin") which played the decisive role in the opposition's ideological and organisational defeat. These works show that it was impossible to reconcile the Party's stand and that of the anti-Party groupings.

The oppositionists' attacks against the Central Committee went hand in hand with their criticism of the Party's measures in economic construction, with the plan for electrification, the most important part of Lenin's programme to transform the country along socialist lines, being the target of the most virulent attacks.

Let us recall that the Party's Central Committee attached exceptional importance to the electrification of Russia and to a single long-range economic plan. Lenin said the electrification plan was the Party's second programme and a great economic plan. He wrote: "Large-scale machine industry and its extension to agriculture is the only possible economic basis for socialism, the only possible basis for a successful struggle to deliver mankind from the yoke of capital."¹ This idea of Lenin's was given concrete form and scientifically substantiated in the plan drawn up by the State Commission for the Electrification of Russia (Russian acronym GOELRO), which opened up boundless prospects before the Soviet working people. It envisaged not only a restoration of industry to its prewar level within ten years, but a doubling of industrial production and accelerated development of the power industry, metallurgy, engineering and the chemical industry.

The electrification plan expressed the collective will of the Party and the Soviet state. The general idea behind the plan had come from Lenin, and outstanding scientists and engineers had taken part in drawing it up. The measures for which it provided were to play a tremendous role in consolidating the class basis of the proletarian dictatorship. However, the Trotskyites said it was quite "unrevolutionary" and insisted on a revision of the rates of industrial development set out in the plan.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, p. 49.

Y. Shatunovsky, a follower of Trotsky's, said that the plan "designed for 10 years, could not be realised even in 40 years, and we cannot sustain ourselves even for 5 years, unless our production becomes revolutionary".¹ He came out with an ostensibly revolutionary plan for rehabilitating Petrograd, the major industrial centre. Trotsky defended Shatunovsky's programme and declared that the electrification, "if it were tackled with heroic intensity, could be completed in eight months".²

Commenting on the attempts by the "Leftist" phrasemongers to substitute for the electrification plan projects that looked super-revolutionary, but were in fact hare-brained and hostile to socialism, Lenin wrote: "Shatunovsky's pamphlet is a lot of hot air."³ "Very weak. Nothing but rhetoric. Not the least bit of sound matter."⁴ Lenin showed that their attitude to the single economic plan revealed the same tendency to abstract talk, rigidity and scholasticism in place of vibrant action, as in the trade-union discussion. He wrote: "Again and again there is the emptiest 'drawing up of theses' and a concoction of plans and slogans, in place of painstaking and thoughtful study of our own practical experience."⁵

Lenin said the electrification plan was a specimen of scientific planning, and exposed the tactics of those who opposed the great projects it envisaged, and their attempts to twist and distort the resolution of the Eighth Congress of Soviets, "to the extent of ignoring it altogether".⁶ The oppositionists, who declared that the electrification of Russia was unfeasible, tried in fact to say as little as possible about the plan itself. Lenin ridiculed these attempts to substitute ultra-revolutionary plans for actual work, and showed that loud talk was frequently used to cover up hostility for socialist construction.

There was also a discussion with the opposition on the "peasant" question, on the "attitude to the peasantry, which was rising against War Communism".⁷ In it the Trotskyites once again fully revealed their denial of the role of the

¹ *Lenin Miscellany XX*, p. 208 (in Russian).

² *Ibid.*, p. 208.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 209.

⁴ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 45, p. 137.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Vol. 32, p. 137.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 141.

⁷ *CPSU in the Resolutions and Decisions...*, Part II, p. 108.

alliance between the working class and the peasantry in building the new society.

The Party's policy with respect to the peasantry was based on the fact that in peacetime the military-political form of alliance between the working class and the peasantry could not boost the country's productive forces or establish normal economic ties between industry and agriculture. In working on the forms in which the tasks of peaceful construction were to be tackled, the Central Committee analysed the situation that had taken shape and the earlier experience in economic construction, consulted with the local Party organisations and studied the mood of the peasantry. From September 1920 to February 1921, the Politburo of the RCP(B) Central Committee and the Central Committee's Plenary Meetings outlined a number of measures to alleviate the condition of the peasantry and to work out the correct relations between the two labouring classes.

It was Lenin who organised and inspired this effort. He received peasant delegations, many of whom had to walk from their villages to Moscow, and made a thorough study of letters from Party and Soviet government workers and farmers which arrived from every corner of the country and testified to the peasants' desire to have a tax in kind substituted for the surplus food-appropriation system.

In November 1920, Lenin motioned in the Council of People's Commissars his "Draft Decision for the CPC on Direct Taxes", which proposed that a commission should be authorised to "prepare and carry out simultaneously both the repeal of monetary taxes and the changeover from the surplus-appropriation system to the tax in kind".¹ In December he attended a conference of non-Party peasants who were delegates to the Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets, where he made a record of their speeches and circulated his notes to the members of the Party's CC and the Government. In early 1921, Lenin received at the Kremlin peasants from Tver, Tambov, and Vladimir gubernias, and from Siberia, and discussed with them various agricultural matters. In a speech delivered at a metal-workers' conference on February 4, 1921, he squarely raised the question of the need to establish correct relations between the working class and the peas-

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 42, p. 230.

antry and to meet the peasants' desire for a switch to the tax in kind.

On February 8, 1921, Lenin drew up a "Rough Draft of Theses Concerning the Peasants", which became the basis of the Party's decisions on switching from the surplus-appropriation system to a tax in kind. To work out the matter in depth, the Politburo of the Party's Central Committee adopted a decision on February 16, 1921, to start a discussion in *Pravda*. On February 24, a CC Plenum examined the draft decision, submitted by a special commission, for substituting a tax in kind for the surplus-appropriation system. On the eve of the Tenth Party Congress, a committee was appointed, under Lenin's chairmanship, to put the finishing touches to the draft. It was then put before the Tenth Congress.

Consequently, the "War Communism" policy, which had outlived itself, was giving way to the New Economic Policy (NEP), which the Party was working out in the light of the Marxist view of economic laws and their operation in the transition period. It was designed to effect a gradual transformation of the country's multistructural economy into a socialist one, and to switch the small peasant farms to the path of social production.

The substitution of a tax in kind for the surplus-appropriation system was the start and a major link in the coherent system of measures known in history as the New Economic Policy. This substitution signified a switch to trade between town and country, and the establishment of normal economic ties between nationalised industry and agriculture. Once the peasant had paid his tax to the state he was free to dispose of his surplus produce by trading it. This met his desire, as a petty proprietor, to have some freedom to trade, and created a material incentive for developing his farm and increasing his output. It also helped to harmonise the interests of the peasants with those of the Soviet state.

In allowing freedom to trade within certain limits, the Party was aware that this was fraught with some danger of a growth of capitalist elements. However, it was not a great danger, provided political power and the commanding heights of the economy remained in the hands of the proletariat. Replying to a question about whether it was possible to restore some freedom of trade for the small farmers, without

undermining the dictatorship of the proletariat, Lenin said that this was possible because the whole point was the extent to which freedom to trade was allowed. If the proletariat, which had won political power, had a quantity of goods at its disposal and arranged correct economic commerce, it would be adding economic power to its political power.¹

The NEP was the Party's discovery of forms of co-operation between the working class and the peasantry which made it possible for the socialist state to exert an influence on the petty-commodity peasant economy, and to draw the mass of peasants into socialist construction. The New Economic Policy was an organic part of the overall system of measures taken by the Party and the state in industrialisation and electrification, and was closely linked with the single economic plan for the country's socialist transformation. It was "a major and necessary stage on the road to socialism. The purpose of this policy was to surmount the economic dislocation, create the foundation for a socialist economy, develop heavy industry, establish an economic link between town and country, strengthen the alliance between the working class and the peasants, oust and then abolish capitalist elements, and achieve socialism".²

The implementation of NEP was resisted by the opposition groups. The Trotskyites said the policy was not only a retreat but gradual return to capitalism. They over-rated the possibilities of the kulak elements and insisted that the peasantry as a whole was hostile to the proletariat; they predicted an inevitable restoration of capitalism in Russia, unless a world revolution came to the rescue.

"...We are now entering a phase of capitulation to the petty bourgeoisie..." said the Trotskyite L. Sosnovsky at the Tenth Congress of the Party. "This phase will perhaps lead to a capitulation at the next congress to this selfsame petty-bourgeois element, depending on how the revolution in Europe unfolds."³ The other oppositionists spoke in a similar vein. They charged that the Party's NEP was a betrayal of the cause of socialism and tended to disrupt the policy

of the proletarian state. This idea was caught up and inflated by the whiteguard, SR and Menshevik press abroad.

These assertions had nothing in common with the actual facts, because the foundations for NEP were laid just after the October Revolution had won out. The young Soviet state started its creative endeavour by pursuing a policy aimed at overcoming the capitalist elements, consolidating the economic basis of the alliance between the working class and the peasantry, and using trade, money and market ties in socialist construction. The extraordinary measures had to be taken because of the Civil War and the foreign armed intervention which shortly began. Consequently, the New Economic Policy was a new policy only in comparison with the methods used under "War Communism".

At the Tenth Congress, Trotsky tried to counter NEP with his own proposals, which he placed before the CC in February 1920. As he himself said, they boiled down to "some easing of pressure on the kulak", a "more prudent attitude to the top sections of the peasantry... in the rich agricultural areas of Siberia, the Don and the Ukraine". He claimed that his proposals, known as "The Main Questions of the Food and Land Policy" were "letter for letter" identical with the document of the Party's Central Committee on the substitution of a tax in kind for the surplus-appropriation system. Actually, however, Trotsky's proposals ran counter to the basic lines of NEP, and were designed to intensify "War Communism" methods and administrative pressure on the labouring peasantry.

Just when the peasants were spontaneously rising against the "War Communism" policy, the Trotskyites put forward a programme of forcible measures against them. The Trotskyites' assumption was that because of its alleged sluggishness, backwardness and hostility, the peasantry was incapable of taking part in socialist construction. They presented the peasants as a solid reactionary mass, ignoring the Marxist requirement of the differentiated approach.

At every stage of the revolution, the Bolshevik Party took precisely this differentiated approach in dealing with the relations between the proletariat and the mass of peasants. In the bourgeois-democratic revolution, the proletariat was allied with the whole peasantry against the tsar and the landowners, while keeping the Cadet bourgeoisie isolated. The October Revolution was carried out by the proletariat

¹ See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, p. 219.

² *Fiftieth Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, Theses of the Central Committee of the CPSU*, Moscow, 1967, p. 11.

³ *Tenth Congress of the RCP(B)*..., pp. 78-79.

in alliance with the poor peasants, and the middle peasantry neutralised. Finally, the Party's Eighth Congress adopted a policy of establishing an alliance of the proletariat and the poor peasantry with the middle peasantry, without in any sense abandoning the fight against the kulaks and relying firmly only on the poor peasants.

The Trotskyites' talk about the reactionary and backward character of the peasantry in general tended to obscure the class stratification in the countryside, and deprived the proletariat of the labouring peasantry, a loyal ally in socialist construction. In taking this hopelessly sceptical attitude to the Russian peasantry and the "backward" sections of the working class, Trotsky and his followers were completely at one with West European opportunists like Kautsky and Otto Bauer. One need only compare Trotsky's reasoning with this statement of Kautsky's: "Socialism requires a high level of education among the people, high morals among the mass, strongly developed social instincts and a sense of solidarity.... That kind of morality... does not exist among the mass which now sets the tone in the Bolshevik proletariat."¹ According to Kautsky, the peasantry "constitutes an economically reactionary factor, which is an obstacle on the way to socialism."²

In accordance with their idea that the mass of peasants was backward and reactionary, the Trotskyites proposed a system of extraordinary measures with respect to the peasantry. They believed, in particular, that peasants should be formed into labour units, to operate almost like military units. Trotsky said: "I ask you: who is henceforth to act as this element of militarisation with respect to the peasants?... The leading workers.... Through the trade unions they can militarise great masses of peasants."³ Consequently, this Trotskyite militarisation scheme left no room for an alliance between the working class and the peasantry, the cardinal principle of the proletarian dictatorship, and urged that the working class should dominate the peasantry.

Had the Trotskyites managed to force their line on the Party, there would have been a threat of dissolution of the alliance with the peasantry, and an inevitable clash between

the two labouring classes. The Party rejected the provocative recipes of the opportunists, exposed their danger and safeguarded the Leninist policy of strengthening the alliance between the working class and the labouring peasantry.

The proposals which Trotsky put forward during the trade-union discussion were, Lenin said, "bureaucratic projecteering", "intellectualist talk" and abstract reasoning without any practical value. Like the whole of the opposition, Trotsky sought, in one arbitrary spurt, to solve all the highly complex economic, political and social problems of the transition period. The Trotskyites were pessimistic and despondent over the complexity of the tasks in socialist construction. Trotsky wrote: "We entered this struggle (the revolution—*Author*) with great ideals and great enthusiasm, and many believed that the promised land of the communist brotherhood, and the flourishing material and spiritual life was much closer at hand than it in fact turned out to be." Confronted with the reality, they "shed many of the naive illusions and hopes about the promised land being close at hand, about the new realm of justice, freedom and prosperity being near, being well within reach", whereas the "anticipation of fresh calamities and fresh hardships proved to be true". Trotsky and his followers believed that the only way out of the situation was to militarise every aspect of social life.

The Trotskyites assigned a special place to the army. They argued that each class preferred those who had undergone military training, and proposed that military men should be appointed to the key posts in production, with the army exercising special economic functions. Trotsky said: "We should site our officer courses at the main industrial centres, so that everyone attending these courses could become an officer and direct the industry of the given area.... In this way, the area, with its plants at the centre, will simultaneously be an industrial and a militia district and a militia division. As our army adapts itself to the economic life, our economic life will assimilate the elements of militarisation." The Trotskyites believed that militarised labour was the only acceptable form of labour under socialism.

As early as 1920, they put forward their "economic plan", based on a programme of extensive establishment of labour armies and the use of forced labour. During the breathing space that had materialised, the Soviet state was unable to demobilise the army because of the threat of armed attack

¹ K. Kautsky, *Terrorismus und Kommunismus*, Berlin, 1919, S. 119-20.

² K. Kautsky, *Demokratie oder Diktatur*, Berlin, 1920, S. 4.

³ *Ninth Congress of the RCP(B)*... p. 94.

and was forced to use the military units released from holding the front to heal the economic dislocation. But this was regarded as a temporary measure forced upon the country by an acute shortage of manpower. However, Trotsky and his supporters saw the labour armies as an ideal form of labour organisation throughout the transition period. They held that universal labour service should take the form of forced labour. They insisted on the extensive recruitment of untrained workers for the rehabilitation of industry and transport, and insisted that with the increasing availability of machine equipment the question of labour armies was bound to gain urgency.

This idea of Trotsky's was criticised by the Party's Central Committee. The Ninth Congress of the RCP(B) came out against the recruitment for labour of large military units and recommended the use of "the best among the skilled workers as small shock labour teams at the key industrial enterprises". The Central Committee believed that labour armies could be used on an extensive scale only when "the work was uncomplicated and could be equally done by all Red Army men".¹

The Party wanted the single economic plan to be based on a reduction in the numbers of unskilled workers through the recruitment of skilled workers for every branch of the economy. The Party believed that the success of socialist construction hinged on the ability to organise the working people and to direct their efforts into boosting the economy. Lenin repeatedly stressed that victory on the economic front would be scored only by raising to active participation in building up the state tens of millions of those who had earlier been indifferent. He said: "The greater the scope and extent of historical events, the greater is the number of people participating in them, and, contrariwise, the more profound the change we wish to bring about, the more must we rouse an interest and an intelligent attitude towards it, and convince more millions and tens of millions of people that it is necessary."²

The Trotskyites also took an extremely oversimplified approach to the problem of material incentives in the socialist state. In a pamphlet setting out his platform, Trotsky put

forward this thesis: "There is need for a policy of equalisation in the sphere of consumption, i.e., the conditions of the working people's personal existence. The principle of priority will long remain decisive for us in the sphere of *production*."³

During the Civil War, the economic hardships and the threat of invasion made it necessary to give supply "priority" to some types of production, departments and groups of workers. In the autumn of 1920, as the country was switching to peaceful economic construction, the Ninth Conference of the RCP(B), in a resolution entitled "On the Immediate Tasks of Party Construction", pointed to the need to "concentrate the Party's attention on the effort to realise greater equality, first, within the Party, second, within the proletariat, and then also within the whole mass of working people, and finally, third, between various departments and various groups of workers, in particular, the specialists and responsible workers with respect to the mass".⁴

The Trotskyites pretended that this was abandonment of the socialist principle of distribution according to labour. However, the Party had never abandoned the principle of harmonising the working people's moral and material interests in developing production. At the Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets, Lenin emphasised the need to "reward those who, after suffering tremendous hardships, continue to display heroism on the labour front... The state not only persuades, but also rewards good workers by creating better living conditions for them".⁵ With the transition to NEP, special importance attached to material incentives in work.

Lenin proved that by separating consumption from production, which was "an economic absurdity", Trotsky was confusing some elementary Marxist propositions. He wrote: "Priority is preference, but it is nothing without preference in consumption. If all the preference I get is a couple of ounces of bread a day I am not likely to be very happy. The preference part of priority implies preference in consumption as well. Otherwise, priority is a pipe dream, a fleeting cloud, and we are, after all, materialists."⁶ The Party exposed the

¹ *Ninth Congress of the RCP(B)*..., pp. 414, 415.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 498.

³ *Lenin Miscellany VI*, p. 347 (in Russian).

⁴ *CPSU in the Resolutions and Decisions*..., Part I, p. 507.

⁵ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 508.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Vol. 32, p. 28.

Trotskyites' ill-judged propositions on socialist construction, their unwillingness to reckon with the objective laws of social development, their attempt to run the economy by ordering people about, and their swings from one extreme to the other.

The RCP(B) Central Committee's stand in the trade-union discussion won complete support from the local Party organisations. The masses, to whose support Trotsky and the other oppositionists referred, were unanimous in backing Lenin's platform. A city-wide meeting of Petrograd Communists adopted an "Address to the Party" which said: "The mistake made by Comrade Trotsky and his group on the trade-union question is fraught with tremendous dangers for the Party and the proletarian revolution. As a tendency this mistake could lead to a split and a rupture between the Communist Party of Russia, on the one hand, and the all-Russia trade-union movement, on the other. And this would have the most ruinous consequences for the fortunes of our revolution."¹ This document was supported by 95-98 per cent of the city's Communists². At the Petrograd conference of the RCP(B) Trotsky's platform won only 15-19 votes.³

At the very start of the discussion, the oppositionists sought to win over the Moscow organisation of the RCP(B). On November 4, 1920, in an effort to secure the support of the Moscow Communists, Trotsky addressed a joint Moscow gubernia and city Party conference, calling for a "shake-up" and militarisation of the trade unions. He declared: "I promise to take part in this struggle, and have some articles in my briefcase." However, Trotsky's factional attacks were rebuffed by the Party activists and trade-union functionaries. Speakers at the conference pointed to his patently syndicalist tendencies and criticised his slogan of "étatising" and "shaking up" the trade unions. The conference censured the methods used by Tsektran with respect to the mass of workers and observed that the working people were being alienated from the trade unions because they were being ordered about instead of being persuaded.

The struggle in the Moscow Party organisation was made more complicated by the fact that Trotsky's supporters had

insinuated themselves into the leadership of some district committees. All the opposition groups were represented on the Moscow Party Committee. The oppositionists' splitting and double-dealing tactics now and again prevented the Party activists from taking the right orientation. Thus, at one meeting of the Moscow Party Committee which was not attended by several members supporting Lenin's platform, including the secretary Artyom (F. A. Sergeyev), Trotsky and his supporters managed to put through, by a majority of one, a resolution attacking the "Address to the Party".

But the factionalists could hope to have only some temporary success in such an ideologically steadfast organisation as the one in Moscow. On January 17, 1921, an enlarged meeting of the Moscow Committee, attended by representatives from the Party's district and uyezd committees, came out in support of Lenin's "Platform of Ten". Despite every effort made by Bukharin, Trotsky, Shlyapnikov and Sapronov, the overwhelming majority of the Moscow Committee voted for an address, "To All Party Organisations", urging unanimous support for the policy of the RCP(B) Central Committee.¹ On February 19, the Moscow Gubernia Party Conference came out almost unanimously in support of the "Platform of Ten".²

The results of the eve-of-Congress discussions in the Party organisations of the Ukraine, the Urals, Siberia and Northern Caucasus also showed that the country's major Party organisations supported the "Platform of Ten". The thing to notice is that even where the Party committees had an opposition leadership, the Communists voted for Lenin's platform. That is what happened in the Byelorussia, Yekaterinburg, Kharkov, Tambov and Kaluga organisations. Lenin observed: "In this one month, Petrograd, Moscow and a number of provincial towns have shown that the Party responded to the discussion and has rejected Comrade Trotsky's wrong line by an overwhelming majority. While there may have been some vacillation 'at the top' and 'in the provinces', in the committees and in the offices, the rank-and-file membership—the mass of Party workers—came out solidly against this wrong line."³

¹ *Pravda*, January 13, 1921.

² See *Pravda*, January 21, 1921.

³ See *Pravda*, February 3, 1921.

¹ See *Pravda*, January 19, 1921.

² See *Pravda*, February 20, 1921.

³ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, p. 107.

The elections by platform for the Tenth Party Congress showed that the majority of delegates with vote were backing the "Platform of Ten". At the Congress, the opposition comprised less than 10 per cent of the delegates. Of the seven platforms put up for discussion against the "Platform of Ten" only two lasted until the Congress: the joint platform of Trotsky and Bukharin, and the "Workers' Opposition" platform.

The Tenth Congress of the RCP(B) put an end to the trade-union discussion. The "Platform of Ten" won 336 votes, the Trotsky-Bukharin platform, 50; and the "Workers' Opposition" platform, only 18. The "Platform of Ten" was the basis for the resolution adopted by the Congress, "On the Role and Tasks of the Trade Unions". The resolutions "On Party Unity", "On the Syndicalist and Anarchist Deviation in Our Party", "On Party Construction" and "On the Control Commissions", which the Congress adopted, were of exceptional importance in strengthening the Party's unity, and exposing the anti-Marxist views and the unprincipled politicking of the opposition groups. The Congress decision to switch to a tax in kind ensured a sound alliance between the working class and the peasantry, and promoted the interests of further socialist construction.

The Party-wide discussion revealed the petty-bourgeois essence of all the factionist groupings and their anti-Party character. It showed that Trotsky and his supporters were the most dangerous group seeking to split the Party. The speeches and behaviour of the Trotskyites during the discussion were evidence that the oppositionists set loyalty to their own views above Party discipline. They stayed on in the Party so as to try to whittle down Party discipline to a minimum and secure for themselves a free hand in thwarting Party decisions. As in the past, the logic of the factional struggle led them to "unprincipled demagoguery".¹

Under Lenin's leadership, the Party subjected the oppositionists' splitting activity to withering criticism and exposed their attempts to turn the RCP(B) into a coalition of factions and groupings. It emerged from the discussion even stronger and more closely united round the Leninist CC.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, p. 51.

Lenin's Criticism of the Trotskyites' Anti-Marxist Views on the State of the Proletarian Dictatorship

The Party's struggle during the trade-union discussion was a struggle over principle, for Marxism-Leninism. The Trotskyites and other oppositionists aimed their blows against the dictatorship of the proletariat, the main element of Marxism. Lenin wrote: "A Marxist is solely someone who extends the recognition of the class struggle to the recognition of the *dictatorship of the proletariat*. . . . This is the touchstone on which the *real* understanding and recognition of Marxism should be tested."¹

Trotsky and his supporters perverted the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the essence and tasks of the proletarian dictatorship, the character of the socialist state in the period of transition from capitalism to socialism, and the role of the working class and the peasantry. The basic issue on which the Trotskyites and the Bukharinites clashed with the Party was their disavowal of revolutionary Marxism on the most important aspects of the proletarian dictatorship.

In his speech delivered on December 30, 1920, "The Trade Unions, the Present Situation and Trotsky's Mistakes", Lenin stressed: "The actual differences, apart from those I have listed, really have nothing to do with general principles. I have had to enumerate my 'differences' with Comrade Trotsky because, with such a broad theme as 'The Role and Tasks of the Trade Unions', he has, I am quite sure, made a number of mistakes bearing on the very essence of the dictatorship of the proletariat."² Lenin saw the roots of the Trotskyites' mistakes as lying in their failure to understand "the basic mechanism of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and of the essentials of transition from capitalism to communism".³

The Trotskyites twisted the very concept of the proletarian dictatorship, identifying it with the "dictatorship of the Party" and ranging the Party against the class and the masses. This was a logical continuation of Trotsky's struggle against Leninism which he had carried on during the three revolutions in Russia.

¹ Ibid., Vol. 25, p. 412.

² Ibid., Vol. 32, p. 22.

³ Ibid., p. 21.

Let us recall that when the draft Party Programme was discussed at the Second Congress of the RSDLP, Trotsky came out against the idea of the proletarian dictatorship on the plea that it was impossible to establish it in Russia's conditions. He held that the dictatorship of the proletariat could not be exercised in a country where the working class constituted a minority of the nation. He also argued that if the dictatorship were to materialise, the Party had to "identify" itself with the working class.¹

Subsequently, Trotsky took an open stand against the Party's leading role within the system of the proletarian dictatorship. In a pamphlet, *Our Political Tasks* (1904), he declared that "a proletariat capable of exercising a dictatorship over society will not tolerate a dictatorship over itself", meaning the Party's leadership. Trotsky charged that the Bolsheviks were substituting for the proletarian dictatorship a dictatorship of the Party, a dictatorship of a "strong and powerful organisation". This kind of talk was aimed against the Marxist doctrine of the Party and its role in the struggle to win and establish the power of the working class.

Trotsky's anti-Marxist views of the dictatorship of the proletariat were most clearly expressed in his "permanent revolution" theory, which he produced together with Parvus. It was based on a denial of the regularity governing the growing over of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist revolution. Under the Trotskyite scheme, the overthrow of the autocracy in Russia was to have at once led to the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. A working-class government, implementing the tasks of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, would be unable to stop there and would have to go on to socialist change. Trotsky believed that this would inevitably lead to a clash between the proletariat and the peasantry. But even if the proletarian dictatorship were established, it would be unable to last without the proletarian revolution winning out in other countries.

Trotsky asserted: "Retention of the proletarian revolution within the national framework could only be a temporary regime. With an isolated proletarian dictatorship, the contradictions, external and internal, are bound to grow together

¹ See *Utoroi Syezd RSDRP. Protocols* (Second Congress of the RSDLP. Proceedings), Moscow, 1959, p. 136.

with its successes. As it continues to be isolated, the proletarian state must eventually succumb to these contradictions. The only way out for it lies in a victory of the proletariat in the advanced countries." This defeatist theory, which fatally doomed the socialist revolution to collapse from an internal political crisis or destruction by international reaction, has nothing in common with Marxism-Leninism.

The Trotskyites' anti-Marxist and reckless view of the substance and principal functions of the proletarian state in the period of transition from capitalism to socialism also sprang directly from the "permanent revolution" theory. Trotsky and his followers, ignoring the concrete historical conditions and specific features of the transition period (social make-up of the population, Russia's level of economic development, the relation of class forces within the country) defined the Soviet state as a "purely" workers' state, as a state of one class, the proletariat. From this it followed that the proletariat, isolated from the other labouring classes had to go it alone in winning power and building socialism. The insistence on "étatising" the trade unions, which meant their integration with the state machinery, a merger of the trade unions with the Soviets, and a transfer of the state's economic functions to the trade unions testify to the Trotskyites' distortion of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the socialist state and the ways and means of its development.

The Party rejected Trotsky's unscientific ideas about the state. Lenin showed that the Trotskyites' notions about the functions of the trade unions during the transition from capitalism to socialism sprang from their abstract approach to defining the essence of the socialist state. Lenin said. "Comrade Trotsky speaks of a 'workers' state'. May I say that this is an abstraction. That is where Comrade Trotsky makes one of his main mistakes."¹ Lenin added that the Soviet state was a workers' state, with these features: "... Firstly, that it is not the working class but the peasant population that predominates in the country, and, secondly, that it is a workers' state with bureaucratic distortions."²

Therein lay the specific feature of the state of the transition period, and it was a gross error to fail to take this into

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, p. 24.

² *Ibid.*, p. 48.

account. Besides, the workers' state was not something that was set once and for all, for depending on each country's social structure, and the internal and international situation it acquired various specific features.

The dictatorship of the proletariat is the power of one class, reflecting the will of the proletariat as the vanguard of the oppressed and exploited masses. However, that is not to say that the proletariat could go it alone in tackling the tasks of socialist construction.

Accentuating the proletarian character of the state of the proletarian dictatorship, Lenin gave a classic definition of its essence and tasks. He showed that in Russia's conditions this state was "a specific form of class alliance between the proletariat, the vanguard of the working people, and the numerous non-proletarian strata of the working people (petty bourgeoisie, small proprietors, the peasantry, the intelligentsia, etc.), or the majority of these strata, an alliance against capital ... an alliance for the final establishment and consolidation of socialism".¹

Lenin saw the class content of the socialist state as consisting in an alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry, with the working class playing the leading role. Lenin's great achievement was his discovery of the Soviets, as the most appropriate form for the political alliance of the working class and the peasantry in Russia. The Soviets, embodying the proletarian dictatorship in the form of a state, unite the whole labouring population, drawing it into the fulfilment of the tasks of socialist construction.

In his approach to the Soviets, Lenin gave consideration to Russia's socio-economic conditions, the balance of class forces at home and in the international arena, the character of class contradictions and other concrete historical conditions. By contrast, the Trotskyites ignored the concrete features of Soviet Russia's economic condition and class structure, and continued to "forget" about the peasantry, which had no place at all in their schemes for a proletarian state. The oppositionists' "Leftist" approach and advocacy of a purely "workers'" state was a cover for their scepticism about the ability of the peasant masses to participate in establishing the new type of state.

The fact is, however, that the peasantry has a stake not

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, p. 381.

only in joining the proletariat in breaking up the old, exploiting state machine, but also in creating a new apparatus of power. Lenin repeatedly explained that from their early days the Soviets were a means of winning over the peasants and other non-proletarian working people to the side of the proletariat.¹ Once the proletarian dictatorship is set up, state power comes to express the interests not only of the working class but of all the working people. Let us recall that in 1920, of the 7,422 delegates of gubernia congresses of Soviets, workers constituted 33.3 per cent, peasants, 36.7, and office workers, 17.7 per cent; and of the 58,854 delegates of uyezd congresses, workers constituted 16.2 per cent, peasants, 65.4, and office workers, 13.6 per cent. That year, of the members of gubernia executive committees 35.5 per cent were workers, 7.8 per cent, peasants, and 28.2 per cent, office workers; and of uyezd executive committees, 33.2 per cent were workers, 20.6 per cent, peasants, 26.4 per cent, office workers.² In 1921, of the 10,471 delegates of gubernia congresses of Soviets, peasants constituted 36.5 per cent, workers, 31, and office workers, 22.6 per cent; and of the 88,926 delegates of uyezd congresses of Soviets, 63.3 per cent were peasants, 15 per cent, workers, and 16.2 per cent, office workers. Of the 10,419 members of executive committees 29.8 per cent were workers, 25.7 per cent, peasants, and 26.1 per cent, office workers.³

The Trotskyites did not base their "theories" on a study of the concrete facts, but on abstract and theoretically incorrect general theses formulated in academic terms.⁴ Their reasoning led the Party "into the sphere of abstraction or the ideal", which had yet to be achieved, and they refused to see the reality, "of which we have a good deal of knowledge, provided, that is, we keep our heads, and do not let ourselves be carried away by intellectualist talk or abstract reasoning, or by what may appear to be 'theory' but is in fact error and misapprehension of the peculiarities of transition".⁵ They did not make the slightest effort to study the real Soviet state, but operated with an "ideal" state, which was con-

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 26, p. 455, and Vol. 30, pp. 262-63.

² See *Statisticheskyy yezhegodnik, 1918-1920 gg.* (Statistical Yearbook, 1918-1920), Part 2, pp. 50-51, 54-55.

³ See *Statistical Yearbook, 1921*, Part 2, Moscow, 1923, pp. 317-19.

⁴ See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, p. 84.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 24-25.

structed in accordance with their own schemes and plans and was only a figment of their own imagination.

Lenin said the Trotskyites also failed to recognise some of the bureaucratic distortions existing in the state of the period of transition from capitalism to socialism. He stressed: "Ours is a workers' state *with a bureaucratic twist to it*. We have had to mark it with this dismal, shall I say, tag. There you have the reality of the transition."¹

The leader of the working class and all the working people of Russia was well aware of the difficulty of establishing the new socialist state apparatus. The victory of the October Revolution led to the emergence of a new type of state, the world's first workers' and peasants' state, which was fundamentally distinct from all earlier states in substance, aim and task. At the same time, its activity was necessarily influenced by the working people's lack of skill in state administration, and the fact that various government offices had to be filled by old civil servants, who were infected with the bureaucratic approach, and burdened with the "force of habit" in old bureaucratic methods, and capitalist and private property attitudes. All this left on some elements of the state apparatus a definite mark of formalism and red tape, with some heads of enterprises ignoring the working people's interests and displaying too much "departmental zeal".

To close one's eyes to the contradictions between the truly democratic substance of the proletarian state and some bureaucratic distortions of its character meant abandoning the struggle against these survivals and suggesting the wrong approach to the most important questions of socialist construction. But the fact is that during the trade-union discussion, the opposition platforms, instead of urging consistent, steady and practical efforts to eradicate red tape, essentially advocated bureaucratic extremes and demagogically accused the Party of unwillingness to put an end to some distortions in the work of Soviet establishments.

The Party proceeded from the fact that in a small peasant country, like Russia, where the masses did not, for the time being, have the administrative knowledge, the fight against red tape was a long and hard one. Lenin said: "It is a very difficult struggle, and anyone who says we can rid ourselves

of bureaucratic practices overnight by adopting anti-bureaucratic platforms is nothing but a quack with a bent for fine words."¹ In contrast to the demagogic declarations by the opposition, the Party, headed by Lenin, showed up the causes of red tape within the Soviet Government and Party machinery, and drew up a programme for combating it.

That the Trotskyites took a petty-bourgeois view of the functions and tasks of the socialist state was most evident in their programme for militarising every aspect of life in Soviet society. Trotsky tried to back it up with "theoretical" references to the nature of the dictatorship of the proletariat, whose essence was allegedly the use of force. In the Trotskyite scheme, the state was nothing but an instrument of force, a means of transforming the country into a "besieged bastion" and also an instrument for giving a push to the world revolution. They saw the transition period itself as a period of "permanent" transition from the revolution in Russia to revolutions in other countries, as a process without a national framework, and one brought to completion in the world arena.

That is why the Trotskyites saw the external function as being the main one of the state of the proletarian dictatorship, which was to stoke up a revolutionary war. They held that internal policy should boil down to preparing for this war and turning the state into a barrack-room. Trotsky asserted that "the way to socialism lies through the highest intensification of statehood. That is precisely the period we are now passing through. Just as a lamp, before going out, flares up in a bright flame, so also the state, before disappearing, assumes the form of the proletarian dictatorship, i.e., the most ruthless state, which imperiously encompasses the life of citizens on every side. No other organisation, with the exception of the army, has ever encompassed man in the past with such harsh compulsion as the state organisation of the working class in this gravest transition epoch. That is why we speak of militarising labour". These Trotskyite assertions were a gross distortion of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Bourgeois historians today have borrowed these assertions by the Trotskyites and other opportunists in an effort to prove that the dictatorship of the proletariat is hostile to demo-

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, p. 24.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, pp. 56-57.

cracy and implies the use of force against the working people. They have tried to present the Trotskyite view of this problem as the truly Marxist one, reflecting the Party's line. Leonard Schapiro, for instance, alleges that Lenin, initially an opponent of any state system in principle, in the early 1920s moved from "utopianism" to "revolutionary violence" over the majority, the working masses, and abandoned the idea of freedom and equality.¹ Schapiro tries to back up his slanderous invention with references to Lenin's *The State and Revolution*.² This is a crude distortion of the truth, because Lenin's work deals with the development of the Marxist doctrine of the state and the substantiation of the need for a period of transition from capitalism to socialism.

In his work, *The State and Revolution*, Lenin showed the fundamental antithesis between proletarian democracy and bourgeois democracy, which is a democracy for the rich, for a small minority. He wrote: "Democracy for the vast majority of the people, and suppression by force, i.e., exclusion from democracy, of the exploiters and oppressors of the people—this is the change democracy undergoes during the transition from capitalism to communism."³

Lenin repeatedly pointed out that the dictatorship of the proletariat is an embodiment of the new and higher type of democracy, proletarian democracy. He said the state of the transition period "must inevitably be a state that is democratic in a new way (for the proletariat and the propertyless in general) and dictatorial in a new way (against the bourgeoisie)".⁴

Indeed, the dictatorship of the proletariat is connected with the use of force, but the whole point is when and against which class this force is used. Lenin told the Tenth All-Russia Conference of the RCP(B) in May 1921: "Every state implies employment of coercion; but the whole difference lies in whether it is employed against the exploited or against

the exploiters. Is it employed against the toiling and exploited class?"¹ That is the fundamental distinction the Trotskyites "failed to notice" as they urged the use of the most extreme measures with respect to the broad masses of working people. All their talk about the use of force is generally quite devoid of the class approach to the question of the dictatorial side of the proletarian state. Behind the fine words about the "lamp that is going out" and the "grave period of transition requiring harsh measures" lurked repudiation of the main requirement of Marxism: an approach in the light of the proletariat's class struggle. Indeed, the Trotskyites virtually identified the use of force by the bourgeois and by the socialist state.

The exploiting state is known to exercise its function of suppression with respect to the vast majority of the people. In the socialist state, however, the use of force is not the main function and is directed above all against the class enemies of the new system, against a minority.

The state of the proletarian dictatorship, arising in fierce class struggle, which does not cease even after the proletariat takes over, has to use force in order to safeguard the gains of the revolution from the minority, from the hostile class forces, most frequently as a counter-measure. The Platform of the Communist International said: "The proletarian state, like any other state, is an apparatus for oppression, but one directed against the enemies of the labour class. Its purpose is to break the resistance of the exploiters, who in this desperate struggle are using every means of drowning the revolution in blood, and to make such resistance impossible in the future."²

In fact, the distinction between the socialist state and all earlier states is that the dictatorship of the proletariat has the construction of socialism as its main purpose and is a genuine democracy for the working people. Even where the proletarian state applies force to the exploiters, this act is different from the rule of the exploiters over the working people. Revolutionary coercion is aimed against the resistance to the new system put up by the exploiting classes and their remnants, and is not designed to oppress them.

¹ Similar "accusations" have been made by the West German historian O. Anweiler in his *Die Rätebewegung in Russland, 1905-1921*, Leiden, 1958, S. 317, and the American "specialist" in scientific communism Alfred G. Meyer in his *Leninism*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1957, pp. 69-70, 169-202.

² See L. Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, London, 1960, pp. 200-02, 206-08.

³ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 25, p. 462.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 412.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, pp. 417-18.

² *Communist International* No. 1, Petrograd, May 1919, pp. 95-96.

Marxist-Leninist doctrine proceeds from the fact that proletarian democracy is fundamentally different from bourgeois democracy. Lenin relentlessly ridiculed those who spoke of democracy in general, without analysing the class character and the specific features of a given social structure. Criticising the Kautskian views of democracy, as "pure democracy", he wrote: "This non-class or above-class presentation, which supposedly is popular, is an outright travesty of the basic tenet of socialism, namely, its theory of class struggle, which socialists who have sided with the bourgeoisie recognise in words but disregard in practice."¹

Marxism-Leninism proceeds from the fact that at a definite stage the use of force is an objective necessity for the proletariat because of the resistance put up by the exploiting classes. In addition, the proletarian state applies coercion with respect to the undisciplined and irresponsible elements in society, to those who break the rules of socialist community living and to all those who act as a drag on socialist construction.

Marxism-Leninism considers persuasion to be the main method of educating the masses and considers the correct balance between persuasion and coercion to be a condition for realising the dictatorship of the proletariat. Lenin wrote: "The dictatorship of the proletariat has been successful because it has been able to combine compulsion with persuasion. The dictatorship of the proletariat does not fear any resort to compulsion and to the most severe, decisive and ruthless forms of coercion by the state. The advanced class, the class most oppressed by capitalism, is entitled to use compulsion, because it is doing so in the interests of the working and exploited people, and because it possesses means of compulsion and persuasion such as no former classes ever possessed, although they had incomparably greater material facilities for propaganda and agitation than we have."²

It is of crucial importance in working with the broad masses of labouring people to be able to persuade them that the Party's policy is correct and that only conscious organisation and discipline can make the dictatorship of the proletariat impregnable. The Trotskyites set up, in opposition to

these Leninist principles of directing the masses, their own demands for barrack-room discipline, methods of ordering people about and substituting coercion for education and persuasion. Such a policy could have alienated the Party and the state from the masses, split the alliance of the working class and the peasantry, and destroyed the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Trotsky took the wrong view of the proletarian state in the transition period and came up with his anti-Marxist idea of turning democracy into an "industrial democracy", which was allegedly a stage in the development of "the workers' state into a commune".¹ Trotsky and Bukharin laid special stress on this thesis, which they took as a basis for their "trade union" platform. It revealed with especial clarity the "confusion of ideas" which Lenin had repeatedly noted in Trotsky's thinking.

Lenin ridiculed the very term "industrial democracy" as being theoretically wrong, confused and empty.² He observed: "But, the closer I look at this 'industrial democracy', the more clearly I see that it is half-baked and theoretically false. It is nothing but a hodge-podge."³ This confusion was caused above all by an eclectic mixture of economic and political categories—production and democracy. Like any political superstructure, democracy is determined by relations of production in a given society and caters for production. That is why it was sheer confusion and empty talk to bring out "industrial democracy" as differing from every other kind of democracy.

Lenin emphasised that democracy is a transient category "which must exist until classes have been abolished and a classless society established".⁴ Production is something that is necessary at all times. In his work, *The State and Revolution*, he showed very well that the state would wither away as a process running not through "abolition" or restriction of democracy, but through its utmost extension and development. He wrote: "The more complete the democracy, the nearer the moment when it becomes unnecessary.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 28, p. 457.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. 31, pp. 496-97.

¹ *Izvestia*, January 1, 1921: *O roli professionalnykh soyuzov v proizvodstve* (On the Role of the Trade Unions in Production), p. 33 (hereafter—*On the Role of the Trade Unions in Production*).

² See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, p. 81.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

The more democratic the 'state'... the more rapidly *every form* of state begins to wither away."¹ Once the state has boosted the productive forces to a high level, and overcome class distinctions, it ceases to be necessary for internal development and is transformed into communist social self-government.

Trotsky and Bukharin's "industrial democracy" was a virtual denial of democracy for the masses, a "bureaucratic orientation towards the upper strata". The two men themselves interpreted it only as elections to the governing organs, and nomination of candidates for them. In this connection, Lenin wrote: "It is wrong to consider only the elected, the organisers, the administrators, etc. After all, they constitute a minority of outstanding men. It is the mass, the rank and file that we must consider."² Exposing the political meaning of Trotsky and Bukharin's "theoretical" exercises on democracy, Lenin emphasised that the term "industrial democracy" could be taken to mean a postponement of ordinary democracy or an attempt to talk oneself out of it³ instead of serious and consistent effort to develop socialist democracy.

The Trotskyites and the Bukharinites saw the state of the proletarian dictatorship only as an instrument of force and in every way minimised its creative, constructive function, virtually denying its importance as the main implement for the construction of socialism. The anarcho-syndicalist demand that all management of production should be handed over to the trade unions was intrinsically connected with this Trotskyite conception and not only jeopardised the trade unions but also distorted the Marxist-Leninist proposition about the decisive role of the socialist state in the sphere of the economy.

The Trotskyites, acting on their assumption that it was impossible to build socialism in one country, without direct support from the proletariat in power in other countries, declared economic construction in Soviet Russia to be a minor and, in fact, useless undertaking. Trotsky wrote: "The future of the dictatorship of the proletariat and socialism ultimately depends not only and not so much on the national

productive forces as on the development of the international revolution." This adventurist theory of a passive wait-and-see attitude in expectation of a world-wide revolution or the sacrifice of the Russian revolution to a European one had nothing in common with Marxism-Leninism.

Lenin kept explaining that socialist construction in the Soviet Republic was a cause adopted by the working people of the whole world, and that by scoring its victories the Soviet state was tackling not only its national but also its international tasks and consolidating the foundation of the world revolution, because socialist construction in any country constituted a link in the single world-wide revolutionary process. In a speech at the Tenth Conference of the RCP(B), he emphasised: "We are now exercising our main influence on the international revolution through our economic policy.... The struggle in this field has now become global. Once we solve this problem, we shall have certainly and finally won on an international scale. That is why for us questions of economic development become of absolutely exceptional importance."¹

Lenin showed the full role of the proletarian state as the main instrument for building socialist society and repeatedly pointed out that the constructive function of the dictatorship of the proletariat constituted its main content. The socialist state, the sole master of the property belonging to the whole people, acted as a powerful force in transforming and developing the national economy in the interests of the working people. He added: "Under the bourgeois system, business matters were managed by private owners and not by state agencies; but now, business matters are our common concern. These are the politics that interest us most."²

The views taken by the Trotskyites and the Bukharinites of the state of the proletarian dictatorship were essentially a reflection of elemental petty-bourgeois attitudes. In his work, "*Left-wing*" *Childishness and the Petty-Bourgeois Mentality*, Lenin observed that "Bukharin regards the tasks of the proletarian dictatorship from the point of view of the *past* and not of the future. Bukharin noted and emphasised what the proletarian revolutionary and the petty-bourgeois revolutionary may have in common on the question of the

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 25, p. 474.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. 32, p. 82.

³ *Ibid.*

¹ *Ibid.*, Vol. 32, p. 437.

² *Ibid.*, p. 430.

state. But Bukharin 'overlooked' the very thing that distinguishes the one from the other".¹ Bukharin insisted that the old state machinery had to be "broken", "exploded" and that the bourgeoisie had to be "stamped out for good". The petty bourgeois likewise limited himself to destroying the old state machinery and had no intention of substituting a new one for it; he simply "abolished" the state. As for the working class, it created in place of the old bourgeois state machine a new type of state, and set it the task of building a socialist society. Therein lies the fundamental distinction.

The Party showed the views of the opposition to be theoretically ill-judged and reactionary, and adopted as the basis of its activity Lenin's idea of the constructive role of the socialist state. From the very early days of the Soviet power, the Party devoted close attention to developing the proletarian dictatorship's function of economic organisation and the promotion of culture and education.

After the Great October Revolution, Lenin tirelessly worked on the questions of state direction of the national economy in close connection with the practical struggle for socialism. The switch to peaceful construction on the basis of the New Economic Policy demanded that the Soviet state should greatly intensify its economic activity. In that period, the Party, headed by Lenin, worked out a programme for reorganising the management and planning of the national economy, measures to enhance the centralised planned direction of the economy, redouble the activity of the Republic's economic planning agencies and the Council of Labour and Defence (CLD), set up the State Planning Commission (Gosplan), outlined measures to develop the Soviet system of accounting and statistics, and so on. These measures were aimed above all at intensifying the state direction of the country's economic life.

In an attempt to conceal a revisionist substance of their stand in the trade-union discussion, Trotsky and Bukharin declared that Lenin was taking a "political" and they themselves an "economic" approach to trade-union problems, and that they were standing up for the interests of the economy, whereas Lenin, by bringing politics to the fore, was allegedly "distracting" the working people from the solution of economic tasks. Trotsky claimed to be the only advocate

of the country's economic revival and wrote that he was proceeding from purely economic considerations, and trying to get the trade unions to make a further effort on the basis of "War Communism", whereas Lenin was guided by political considerations and was easing off the military pressure.

Lenin criticised this line of reasoning by the Trotskyites and exposed the Menshevik essence of the idea of contrasting economics and politics in the proletarian state. Politics, he explained, is the concentrated expression of economics. Politics is shaped under the determining influence of society's economic interests, while economics is the material foundation for home and foreign policy. Lenin said: "Economic interests and the economic position of the classes which rule our state lie at the root of both our home and foreign policy."¹

The policy of the proletarian state reflects the fundamental economic interests of the working class and all the working people, and the objective requirements of socialist society's economic development. In this sense, politics is subordinate to economic tasks. But if the economy is to be developed and economic operations carried on, no political mistakes should be made. A political mistake by the Party on the role of the trade unions could well bring down the dictatorship of the proletariat, which is the main instrument in the successful solution of economic problems.

The socialist economy is established in struggle between the socialist and the capitalist elements, and is based on co-operation between the two main classes—the workers and the peasants—whose relations inevitably assume a political form. The elimination of actual inequality between nations through economic and cultural construction, like the conscious participation of millions of working people in erecting the socialist economy, is a political act of the greatest significance. Consequently, in the socialist state economics and politics merge into a single whole. Lenin said efforts to detach them from each other were eclecticism designed to disorganise the Party and mislead the masses.

The discussion within the Party during the switch from the war to peaceful construction showed that the Trotskyites were crudely distorting the Marxist-Leninist doctrine about

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, p. 352.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, p. 365.

the prospects for the development of the socialist state. Refusing to see the full complexity of the process, they put forward the profoundly erroneous thesis that it would wither away at the very start of the period of transition from capitalism to socialism, and it is this that they used to justify their programme for "étatising" the trade unions, and establishing "industrial democracy". Trotsky wrote: "What is this state of ours? It is that which must wither away. Another war may slow down this process, but the Soviet state must wither away."¹

The Trotskyites saw the character and functions of the socialist state in the transition period in the wrong light and the question of its withering away only as constituting a part of the problem of world revolutionary development. Since, under the Trotskyite scheme, the world revolution itself was an instant act, the state "disappeared" with the world-wide victory of the revolution. Trotsky wrote: "Together with the final triumph of the social revolution, the Soviet system will extend to the whole population, thereby losing its features of the state and dissolving in a mighty producer and consumer co-operative system."

Trotsky held that the future of the socialist state depended entirely on world revolution and argued that the Soviet system was bound to "fade away" and to be inevitably destroyed. He came up with this peremptory statement: "The period of this grave international hitch ... is having an effect on the working of the Soviet system.... Only a development of the revolution in Europe can give another powerful impetus to the Soviet system."

Consequently, the Trotskyites' arguments for instant disappearance of the Soviet state were based on external conditions, which, besides, they artificially separated from the actual factors behind the development of the socialist revolution. Their talk about the dates on which the state would wither away was unscientific through and through.

Marxism-Leninism is known to connect the ultimate future of the state as a political organisation with the higher phase of communism, when a classless society will have been built. Lenin wrote: "For the state to wither away completely, complete communism is necessary."² The founders of Marx-

ism always opposed those who believed that the proletarian state could be abolished or that right after the victory of the revolution a date could be fixed for its disappearance.

Marxist-Leninist theory draws a distinction between the external and the internal conditions for the withering away of the state. It was Marx who, in his *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, first pointed to the need for the state remaining in the first phase of communism. He wrote: "Between capitalist and communist society lies a period of revolutionary transformation of the one into the other. There corresponds to this also a political transition period in which the state can be nothing but *the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat*."¹ Assuming that the socialist revolution would more or less simultaneously win out in a majority of the capitalist countries, Marx and Engels believed that the state would wither away as a result of internal development.

Their views of the state were developed and given concrete form by Lenin, in accordance with the new historical situation. In *The State and Revolution*, inquiring into the economic causes for the withering away of the state, he wrote: "The state will be able to wither away completely when society adopts the rule: 'From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs', i.e., when people have become so accustomed to observing the fundamental rules of social intercourse and when their labour has become so productive that they will voluntarily work according to *their ability*."²

Consequently, the main internal condition for the withering away of the state is attainment of a high level of the productive forces. The state will be played out when all the class distinctions between the members of society have been overcome, when the principles of communist morality have become standards of behaviour, and when all members of socialist society develop a high sense of consciousness and rise to a high level of culture. An important condition for the withering away of the state is the overcoming of the substantial distinctions between mental and manual labour, and between town and country. The state will wither away the moment there is no longer any need

¹ *On the Role of the Trade Unions in Production*, p. 33.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 25, p. 468.

¹ K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works* in Two Volumes, Vol. II, pp. 32-33.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 25, p. 469.

for coercion. It is this gigantic internal endeavour in building socialism that the Trotskyites denied, insisting on their reckless plans for an instant withering away of the state.

The complete withering away of the state also requires external conditions, namely, the victory and establishment of socialism on a world scale. The Party saw the way to a world-wide victory of socialism as lying not in the Trotskyites' and Bukharinites' phoney revolutionary talk about "exporting revolution" and turning the socialist state into an instrument for giving the world revolution a "push", but in the all-round strengthening of the USSR and in resolute defence of socialist gains.

During the trade-union discussion, the Trotskyites also threw the wrong light on the Marxist-Leninist understanding of the workings of the proletarian dictatorship system.

This system is one of the fundamental questions of Marxism-Leninism. Working-class leadership of great masses of working people, their organisation and involvement in socialist construction, and enlistment in the administration of society's affairs imply the existence of a complex machinery of power. The dictatorship of the proletariat is a whole system of state and social organisations of working people, operating under the leadership of the Communist Party. This system makes it possible to find correct solutions for the basic problems arising from the relations between the vanguard of the proletariat and the whole class, the mass of the working people. It is impossible for the proletariat to exercise its dictatorship without this intricate machinery, without various transmission belts running from the vanguard to the mass of the leading class, and from it to the mass of the working people.¹

Lenin believed that the most important condition for the successful operation of the proletarian dictatorship was the unity and concerted action of all the elements of the state power. In his work, *"Left-Wing" Communism—an Infantile Disorder*, he explained in detail how the mechanism of the proletarian dictatorship would work as a coherent system. He emphasised that the dictatorship was exercised by the proletariat, organised in the Soviets and led by the Bolshevik Party. The Party relied directly on the trade unions. It carried on all its work through the Soviets, which

brought together working people from all walks of life. He added: "Thus, on the whole, we have a formally non-communist, flexible and relatively wide and very powerful proletarian apparatus, by means of which the Party is closely linked up with the *class* and the *masses*, and by means of which, under the leadership of the Party, the *class dictatorship* is exercised."¹ These ideas of Lenin's were of great importance for the Party's correct orientation on various aspects of the proletarian dictatorship.

In acute struggle against the Trotskyites and other oppositionists, Lenin gave concrete form to the problems relating to the mechanism of the state power of the working class. He criticised Trotsky and his followers most harshly for their attempts to distort the relations between the Soviets, the Party and the trade unions within the proletarian dictatorship system. The Trotskyites falsified the Marxist-Leninist proposition about the substance and purposes of the state and the trade unions under socialism, and this carried them into the anarcho-syndicalist camp.

At the very start of the trade-union discussion at the Moscow Joint RCP(B) Conference, Trotsky put forward the thesis that the trade unions should manage the economy, while the Party should provide overall direction. Trotsky waxed ironic over the idea that the Party should promote production. He said this was a "limited, curtailed and pathetic task". He insisted that the main task of the trade unions was to "take production into their own hands and to manage it". However, in the sphere of ideas and general guidance, he said, "we have no intention at all of abandoning our hegemony, the Communist Party's leadership". That was a crude distortion of the relations between the Party and the trade unions in the spirit of the "Workers' Opposition". No wonder, Shlyapnikov, one of its leaders, there and then expressed readiness to accept Trotsky's proposal. He said: "We find nothing new in what Comrade Trotsky has proposed to us, and we shall join him in voting for his resolution, if he motions it in the same spirit."

Trotsky asserted that the trade unions were increasingly "aware of themselves as the production agencies of a free state and assuming the responsibility for its future, without setting themselves against it, but identifying themselves with

¹ See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, p. 21.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, p. 48.

it". This demagogical statement was aimed against the Party's leading role and was designed to eliminate the Soviets as organs of the proletarian dictatorship.

Bukharin followed Trotsky in putting forward, in one of his theses, the demand that "trade union nominations for the corresponding centres and chief administrations must be compulsory", which meant that the trade unions were to appoint the state organs managing the economy. This was essentially a rehearsal of the "Workers' Opposition" slogan calling for a piecemeal handover of the Supreme Economic Council machinery to the corresponding trade unions.

In his articles and remarks on Trotsky's pamphlet, *The Role and Tasks of the Trade Unions*, Lenin sharply criticised the anti-Marxist views of the Trotskyite-Bukharinite opposition. He wrote: "Comrade Trotsky's political mistakes, aggravated by Comrade Bukharin ... make us waste time on correcting them and arguing it out with the syndicalist deviation (which leads to the collapse of the dictatorship of the proletariat)."¹

The Trotskyites' point of departure, namely that all management of production should be concentrated in the hands of the trade unions, which were to be converted into organs of the workers' state through a coalescence with the economic apparatus, twisted the Marxist-Leninist principles of relations between the state and the trade unions, and implied the transfer of the leading role in the state to the trade unions, and a decentralisation of the economy. This was clearly expressed anarcho-syndicalism because, said Lenin, it was syndicalism that handed over the management of separate industries to the mass of non-Party workers divided by production, thereby making the Party superfluous, and failing to carry on a sustained campaign either in training the masses or "in actually concentrating in their hands the management of the whole national economy".²

The Trotskyites had the wrong view of the substance of working-class leadership within the system of the proletarian state, ignored the interconnection and unity of all the components of the proletarian dictatorship, and regarded them as a purely mechanical aggregation. Here is a highly characteristic bit of reasoning by Trotsky as he tries to sort out

the question of relations between the Party, the Soviets and the trade unions, in the process crudely distorting the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the matter. He wrote: "It may be recognised that the Soviet of Deputies does not match either the Party or the trade unions in clarity of programme or distinctness of organisation. But it far surpasses both the Party and the unions in the massive numbers it involves in the organised struggle, and this quantitative advantage gives the Soviet a definite revolutionary edge."

Consequently, the whole problem was seen to consist in deciding on which was more important: the Party, the trade unions or the Soviets. But Trotsky's subsequent line of thought revealed that it ran essentially to denying the Party's leadership and minimising its role. That was precisely the purpose for contrasting the Party and the Soviets, and then the Party and the trade unions.

Because the Soviets included the workers of all enterprises, all trades, all levels of cultural development and political consciousness, Trotsky argued that they expressed the interests of the movement as a whole and were the highest form of working-class organisation under the victorious dictatorship of the proletariat. This was downright distortion of one of the fundamental ideas of Marx and Engels about the role and importance of the Communist Party. They had written: "The Communists are distinguished from the other working-class parties by this only: 1. In the national struggles of the proletarians of the different countries, they point out and bring to the front the common interests of the entire proletariat, independently of all nationality. 2. In the various stages of development which the struggle of the working class against the bourgeoisie has to pass through, they always and everywhere represent the interests of the movement as a whole."¹ By contrasting the Party and the Soviets, the Trotskyites denied the Communist Party's leading role within the system of proletarian dictatorship.

The ideas of the Trotskyites and the other oppositionists aimed against the Party's leading role in effect joined up with the petty-bourgeois counter-revolutionary slogans and led to a denial of the need for the Soviet power. Refuting the revisionists' arguments, Lenin elaborated every aspect

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, pp. 85-86.

² *Ibid.*, p. 50.

¹ K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works in Two Volumes*, Vol. I, p. 46.

of the Communist Party's role within the system of Soviet society's political organisation. He showed that the dictatorship of the proletariat was impossible otherwise than through the Communist Party.

Lenin stressed: "In the transition to socialism the dictatorship of the proletariat is inevitable, but it is not exercised by an organisation which takes in all industrial workers."¹ Only the vanguard of the proletariat, absorbing the revolutionary energy of the class and uniting its advanced sections, was able to direct the activity of the Soviet state towards the construction of socialism. The Party alone was capable of ensuring the correct and concerted interaction of every component of the proletarian dictatorship, and it alone was able to "comprise only a minority of a class, in the same way as the really class-conscious workers in any capitalist society constitute only a minority of all workers. We are therefore obliged to recognise that it is only this class-conscious minority that can direct and lead the broad masses of the workers".²

The Party exercises its leading role through the system of state and social organisations and by its own methods unites and directs its efforts towards a single goal. It develops to the utmost the initiative of the Soviet and economic organs, working to make their activity as effective as possible. If the Party is to be successful in exercising its role of leader and organiser of the proletarian dictatorship, it must have indissoluble ties with the broadest sections of the working masses. It is the Soviets above all that ensure the Party's ties with the masses in the government line, because the Soviets are the main transmission belt running from the Party to the working people.

The Party regards the importance of the Soviets as lying in the fact that they raise "to a new democracy and to independent participation in the administration of the state tens upon tens of millions of working and exploited people, who by their own experience learn to regard the disciplined and class-conscious vanguard of the proletariat as their most reliable leader."³ The Party directs the Soviets but does not substitute for them. The resolutions of the Eighth Party Congress stressed: "Under no circumstances should

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, p. 20.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. 31, p. 235.

³ *Ibid.*, Vol. 27, p. 265.

there be a confusion of the functions of the Party collectives and the functions of state organs, which the Soviets are."⁴

Within the system of proletarian dictatorship, the trade unions lie between the Party and the state. On the one hand, they ensure the connection between the vanguard of the working class in the production line, and on the other, they are a reservoir of the state power. Lenin wrote: "The dictatorship cannot be exercised or the functions of government performed without a foundation such as the trade unions."²

Consequently, the proletarian dictatorship constitutes a highly complex mechanism which sets in motion millions of working people. It is headed by "the one or two hundred thousand Communists of the proletarian vanguard, and consists of millions of organised proletarians".³

In the discussion with the Trotskyites, Lenin gave a brilliant specimen of clarity and depth in the approach to solving the problem of relations between the state, the Party and the trade unions. He wrote: "The state is a sphere of coercion. It would be madness to renounce coercion, especially in the epoch of the dictatorship of the proletariat, so that the administrative approach and 'steering' are indispensable. The Party is the leader, the vanguard of the proletariat, which rules directly. It is not coercion but expulsion from the Party that is the specific means of influence and the means of purging and steeling the vanguard. The trade unions are a reservoir of the state power, a school of communism and a school of management. The specific and cardinal thing in this sphere is *not* administration but the 'ties' 'between the central state administration' (and, of course, the local as well), 'the national economy and the broad masses of the working people'."⁴ Lenin saw the system of the proletarian dictatorship not only as a collection of separate organisations, but as an entity expressing the working people's interests.

During the trade-union discussion, Lenin sharply criticised the oppositionists' attempts to cover up their abandonment of Marxism with the aid of eclectic, scholastic and subjective assessments of political, economic and social phenomena. He showed that in the highly complex conditions of

¹ *CPSU in the Resolutions and Decisions...*, Part I, p. 446.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, p. 20.

³ *Ibid.*, Vol. 29, p. 433.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Vol. 32, pp. 97-98.

the transition from the war to peaceful economic construction, which offered the first real possibility of going on to build a new society and develop social production, Trotsky and his followers once again strove to prove that the Party's internal and external policies were wrong, and tried to impose their own reckless schemes.

Trotsky's platform on the role of the trade unions in socialist construction indicated that he had not abandoned his old stand, although he did not defend it quite so openly in that period, striving to smuggle in his old views in the guise of Leninism. The idea that it was impossible to build socialism in one country remained the crux of the statements made by Trotsky and other oppositionists.

Just as the Soviet state was making a historical turn from war to peace, Trotsky tried once again to salvage his bankrupt "permanent revolution" theory, and came out in its defence. That was another attempt to divert the Party from the Leninist path and to prove that it was impossible to build socialism in one country, and that the dictatorship of the proletariat was bound to go down.

In his "Autobiographical Note" (1921), Trotsky wrote: "With respect to the problems of the Russian Revolution (1905-1907—*Author*) I took the stand, which I still consider to be correct, namely, I recognised that the balance of class forces in Russian society must, in the conditions of the revolutionary epoch, lead to a political regime of the proletariat; this regime of the working class, relying on the labouring masses of peasants, cannot in any sense confine itself to the framework of the bourgeois revolution, but must inevitably break it up and, depending on developments in the West, this situation may unfold into a full-scale socialist revolution."¹ History has fully confirmed that Trotsky's capitulationist ideas were misconceived. There was good reason why Trotsky kept returning to his mistakes. Trotskyism is not a string of separate mistakes, however serious, but a definite trend hostile to Leninism at every stage of development and expressive of the pressure exerted on the Bolshevik Party by the petty-bourgeois element. In this light, the trade-union discussion was merely another stage of the Party's struggle against Trotskyism, an anti-Bolshevik trend, which had been fighting Leninism for decades.

¹ *Proletarskaya revolyutsiya* (Proletarian Revolution), No. 3, 1922, p. 246.

Chapter III

THE BOLSHEVIK PARTY'S STRUGGLE FOR LENINISM, AGAINST TROTSKYISM (AUTUMN OF 1923-JANUARY 1925)

The Party Exposes the Trotskyite Revision of Leninism on Inner Party Democracy and Economic Policy

The Trotskyite opposition launched a fresh offensive against the Party and Leninism in the complicated conditions of the rehabilitation period.

The imperialists of all countries were alarmed over the Soviet Union's growing strength and international influence. In 1923, they tried again to isolate the USSR as they prepared another armed intervention. The country's foreign policy difficulties were compounded by the defeat of the working people's revolutionary action in Germany, Bulgaria, Poland and Italy. In the autumn of 1923, after scoring a series of victories, the international proletariat was forced to retreat. This opened a period of capitalism's temporary and partial stabilisation. In these conditions, the Communist Parties were faced with the acute need of further closing their ranks and overcoming opportunism and sectarianism.

Under the leadership of the Communist Party, the working people of the USSR were warding off the hostile attacks of the surrounding capitalist countries and putting in all their strength into rehabilitating the national economy and carrying forward socialist construction. The results of almost three years of effort by the Party and the Soviet people under the New Economic Policy were visual confirmation that Lenin had been right when he said: "Economically and politically *NEP* makes it fully possible for us to lay the foundations of socialist economy."¹

State industry, the leading sector of the national economy, was being built up and the working people's material standards were rising. In 1922-1923, industrial production

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, p. 252.

in the USSR reached 39 per cent of the prewar level.¹ The fuel crisis was overcome, transport was running again, and freight traffic on the railways had increased. The upswing in industry and transport stopped the dispersal of the working class which had occurred during the armed intervention and the Civil War. The numerical growth of the working class helped to consolidate the class basis of the proletarian dictatorship.

Agriculture was markedly on the rise. The food crisis, which had been aggravated by the 1921 crop failure, had been eliminated, and the area under crop in 1923 came to about 78 per cent of the 1913 level. Gross farm output rose to 75 per cent of the prewar figure.

The advances in industry and agriculture helped to develop domestic and foreign trade. For the first time after the war the Soviet state took its foreign trade balance out of the red. The Party was working hard to consolidate and extend the foreign-trade monopoly.

But alongside the initial successes, the country was faced with some economic and political difficulties which could be overcome only through the further development of the socialist economy. By the end of 1923, there were almost one million unemployed. Industrial wages were below the prewar level, and labour productivity was rising slowly. The ruble was unstable and was depreciating. The link between socialist industry and the peasant economy was a tenuous one because private capital had a big share in trade. In 1922-1923, it controlled over 80 per cent of the country's retail and 50 per cent of its wholesale-and-retail trade.²

In addition, evidence of a marketing crisis came to light in the autumn of 1923. Apart from the economic causes—the lagging pace of industry behind that of agriculture—there was also a class cause: the merchants, trying to capitalise on the shortage of industrial goods, set off a price spiral. The marketing crisis was also largely aggravated by the crude distortion of the Soviet prices policy. In July 1923, the Trotskyite Pyatakov, Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council, ordered state enterprises to obtain the

¹ See *Sotsialisticheskoye stroitel'stvo SSSR* (Socialist Construction in the USSR). Statistical Yearbook, Moscow, 1936, p. 2.

² See *Trinadtsatyi syezd RSDRP*. Stenograficheskoy otchet (Thirteenth Congress of the RCP(B). Verbatim report), Moscow, 1963, p. 384 (hereafter—*Thirteenth Congress of the RCP(B)*).

highest possible profits from the sale of their goods.¹ This sent up the prices of industrial goods even higher and disrupted the normal economic links between town and country. The fact is that without these links it was impossible to consolidate the economic alliance between the workers and the peasants, to boost agriculture and to overcome the dislocation in industry.

On top of the economic difficulties, there were highly alarming defects in the life of the Party: its social make-up had changed, some Party organisations were out of touch with the masses, and various Party functionaries were still using "War Communism" methods of leadership. During the Civil War and the foreign armed intervention the number of workers in the Party had drastically declined: from 60.2 per cent in 1917 to 44.9 per cent in 1923.² At some major industrial enterprises the Party organisations were small and were unable to influence the workers. In addition, the Central Committee and local Party organisations were forced to draw on workers from industry to man the Party and government apparatus. The revival of industry, the halt in the dispersal of the working class, and the workers' approval and support of the domestic and foreign policy pursued by the RCP(B) all went to create the premises for enlarging the working class core in the Party and consolidating its class basis.

In order to invigorate inner Party life and broadly develop massive initiative, the Party had to continue to improve democratic centralism, the governing principle of Party activity. Let us recall that during the foreign armed intervention and the Civil War the Party had been forced to curtail the dialectical unity between centralism and democracy through stringent centralisation. But already the Tenth Party Congress, acting on the tasks of peaceful socialist construction, set out measures to restructure the whole of Party work through the all-round development of inner Party democracy.

The Congress gave a resolute rebuff to the revisionist tendencies inside the Party, notably, the "Democratic Cen-

¹ See *XIII konferentsiya RKP(B)*. Byulleten (Thirteenth Conference of the RCP(B). Bulletin), Moscow, 1924, p. 10 (hereafter—*Thirteenth Conference of the RCP(B)*).

² See *RKP(B) v tsifrakh* (The RCP(B) in Figures), Part I, Moscow, 1924, p. 7.

tralism" group which held that centralism had outlived itself and that it should give way to an "uncurtailed democracy" under which local organisations were not bound to submit to the central organs, and factions and groupings could be freely formed. For the purpose of developing inner Party democracy, Party organisations were invited to desist from the practice of issuing orders and to institute the election of all Party bodies from top to bottom. Each body was to report regularly to its members, work out its decisions collectively, promote criticism and self-criticism, and involve all Communists in Party affairs.

However, during the period after the Tenth Congress, the Party organisations did not succeed in completely restructuring their work: there were occasional breaches of Party democracy, the principle of electivity and removability of Party leaders was not always consistently observed, and the work of the Party bodies was not given the required publicity. Some Party functionaries still used administrative methods. The fact is, however, that the growing complexity of the economic and political tasks before the Party made it imperative that the mass of Party members should put all their efforts into socialist construction.

The Party's Central Committee had to reckon with the situation that had taken shape in the country and in the Party under the impact of the socio-economic and political conditions of NEP's early years. Accordingly, the Politburo of the RCP(B) Central Committee, and then the September 1923 Plenum of the RCP(B) Central Committee brought up for discussion questions arising from the country's economic development and the state of affairs within the Party.

The wages policy was one of the most acute problems requiring immediate solution. In August 1923, the Politburo of the RCP(B) Central Committee set up an authoritative commission, among whose members were F. E. Dzerzhinsky, V. V. Kuibyshev and Y. E. Rudzutak, to study the matter and submit concrete proposals. Having heard its report, the Central Committee's September 1923 Plenum adopted a special resolution on wages. In defining the ways of raising them, the Plenum started from the idea that "any wage increases over the immediate period ahead should go hand in hand with higher labour productivity and lower losses at enterprises, and provided that higher wages do not cause higher prices".

The Plenum gave serious attention to the marketing crisis, and decided to set up a special commission urgently to frame and put through a system of economic measures to eliminate the spread between industrial and agricultural prices, thereby doing away with the causes of discontent among the working people and ensuring a further upsurge in the economy.

Having inquired into the state of affairs in the Party, the CC Plenum noted that some Party organisations were out of touch with the workers' mass in consequence of some decline in inner Party activity and the use of bureaucratic methods. The Plenum gave a profound analysis of the state of affairs in the Party organisations and marked out the way of eliminating the economic difficulties and the shortcomings in inner Party life. These measures were met with approval in the Party organisations.

While the Central Committee was mustering the Communists to overcome the domestic and foreign-policy difficulties, the opportunist elements inside the Party were preparing for a fresh assault on its Leninist line, and believed the autumn of 1923 to be the best time to do this. To promote their own ends they sought to use the capitulationist mood among some Party members and groups of working people who were dissatisfied with the economic hardships and the various shortcomings in inner Party activity. They also hoped that, with Lenin bedridden, they would find it easier to take over the Party and government leadership and alter the Party's general line.

It was Trotsky who masterminded the anti-Party sally. On October 8, 1923, he sent in a statement to the RCP(B) Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, in which he concentrated his attack on the cadres of the Party apparatus and inner Party democracy. While displaying concern for the observance of Party democracy, he was in fact demanding a revision of the Leninist principle of democratic centralism. He charged that the Party apparatus had grown bureaucratic, and was out of touch with the masses, declaring demagogically that "the regime which took shape mainly before the Twelfth Congress and which was finally consolidated and formalised after it, falls far shorter of workers' democracy than the regime of the harshest periods of War Communism".

By demanding freedom to form groups within the Party, the Trotskyites were once again trying to force the Party to

accept an organisational structure which had been earlier rejected by Lenin in his struggle against the Mensheviks. Trotsky ignored the objective conditions in which the Party was developing and demanded that the Party apparatus should be renewed, which meant putting Trotsky supporters in place of the old Leninist leaders. This was a tactical step designed to take over the Party leadership.

Trotsky's statement was also an attempt to revise the Party's economic policy, which was aimed at concentrating industry. Earlier, at the Twelfth Congress, he had proposed that vital enterprises in industry should be closed down as not yielding a profit at the time. This approach to the economic problems of socialist construction had nothing in common with the Marxist analysis of the economics of the transition period.

In 1922, Lenin observed that "for us the rehabilitation of the destroyed means of production will long hold no promise of profit... For a rather long time, we shall have to rehabilitate our fixed capital by using our earnings from concessions or through state subsidies. Such is the present economic reality". But, said Lenin, this reality did not provide any evidence that "we are now allegedly having a 'continuous economic strengthening of NEP men' and 'continuous economic weakening of the state'".¹ In its practical activity the Party was guided by Lenin's view of the specific features of the rehabilitation period and is known to have achieved some success in developing the economy. As for Trotsky, he cast a general doubt on the Central Committee's ability to direct the country's economy and accused it of taking an "unplanned approach to our economic matters".

The adversaries of Leninism took Trotsky's statement as a signal for starting active factional moves inside the Party. On October 15, 1923, a group of his supporters sent the Politburo of the RCP(B) Central Committee a document, known as the "Statement of 46". It was signed by responsible workers of government, military and Party organs, among them Y. Preobrazhensky, G. Pyatakov, T. Sapronov, N. Osinsky, Rafail (R. Farbman), V. Antonov-Ovseyenko and V. Yakovleva. In the past, they had all sided either with Trotsky or had been among the "Left Communists",

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Fifth Russian edition, Vol. 45, pp. 267-68.

"Democratic Centralists", "Workers' Opposition" and other anti-Leninist groupings, repeatedly attacking the Party's internal and foreign policy. Having failed to win support, and having been exposed in their opportunistic moves, they now rallied round Trotsky, ignoring some minor differences in their earlier platforms. Their common aim was to change the membership of the Central Committee and substitute Trotskyism for Leninism.

The "Statement of 46" contained the same slanderous attacks on the Party as Trotsky's statement. They insisted that there was an "absolutely intolerable regime" within the Party, that it had been replaced by a "handpicked bureaucratic apparatus which ... threatens to prove itself quite incapable of facing the looming grave developments". The oppositionists' recipe for improving the state of affairs in the Party was to eliminate the regime of "factional dictatorship inside the Party" by recognising freedom of discussion and factional groupings.

The two anti-Party documents had an identical content because Trotsky took an active part in drawing up the "Statement of 46", which had been discussed and approved at his flat. He did not sign the document, because he was using a double-dealing tactic designed to circumvent the decision of the Tenth Congress of the RCP(B) barring factions in the Party.

Bourgeois falsifiers of CPSU history have been trying to prove that the Party's struggle against Trotskyism in 1923 and 1924 had no ideological basis, being merely an expression of the urge among some individuals and groupings to take over the Party and government leadership. The falsifiers do not merely deny that Trotsky's acts were anti-Leninist, but insist that after the revolution Trotskyism was allegedly fully identical with Leninism. These assertions, based on the writings of Trotsky and his supporters, are designed to distort the strategy and tactics of Leninism, to substitute for Lenin's theory of the socialist revolution Trotsky's "permanent revolution" theory, and to convince their readers that the Bolsheviks had swapped their ideas, and that socialism could not win out in the USSR.

Lenin's writings and the Party's decisions in that period had given a fitting assessment of Trotsky's opportunism, and his ceaseless attacks on the ideological, tactical and organisational principles of Bolshevism in the pre-revolutionary

period. The most comprehensive characteristic of the true essence of Trotskyism and its opportunist character and anti-Party activity is contained in Lenin's article, "Disruption of Unity under Cover of Outcries for Unity".¹

Trotsky did not abandon his opportunism even after joining the Bolshevik Party in August 1917. What he did was merely to cease his open fight against Leninism for a time. The following words of Lenin's fully apply to Trotsky and his supporters: "In reality, the opportunists' formal membership in workers' parties by no means disproves their objectively being a political detachment of the bourgeoisie, conductors of its influence, and its agents in the labour movement."² Trotsky stepped up his anti-Party and anti-state activity in the very early years of the Soviet power, and good evidence of this comes from his statements on the Peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, during the trade-union discussion and on the eve of the Twelfth Party Congress, when he demanded what he termed a dictatorship of industry. Accordingly, in his "Letter to the Congress", on December 24, 1922, Lenin once again drew the Party's attention to Trotsky's "non-Bolshevism".³

In his numerous articles in that period, Trotsky continued to plug his "permanent revolution" theory, sowing doubt about the possibility of building socialism in the USSR and trying to push the Party and the country into foreign-policy gambles. In contrast to Lenin's view of internationalism as "working whole-heartedly for the development of the revolutionary movement and the revolutionary struggle in one's own country, and supporting ... *this struggle*, this, and only this, line in every country without exception",⁴ Trotsky saw the internationalist duty of the Soviet state as consisting only in giving world revolution an armed impetus. His article, "Once Again on the Tasks of Military Construction", flatly declared that "if, generally speaking, war is a continuation of politics, for us war will be a continuation of the revolution".⁵ He regarded the USSR's relations with other states, within the capitalist encirclement, as being a class struggle "which at some moments assumes an openly

revolutionary, i.e., military form and at others, a reformist, i.e., diplomatic form",¹ and totally ignored the economic competition between the two systems as a form of class struggle. Distorting the essence of Lenin's doctrine of the revolution and socialist construction, he proclaimed that "Leninism is the supreme condensation of Marxism for immediate revolutionary action"²; thereby reducing Leninism to the direction of purely military action and denying its significance as a new and higher stage of Marxism.

Trotsky's interpretation contained nothing of Lenin's idea that for the Soviet state the central front of the class struggle was its economic policy, through which it exerted its "main influence on the international revolution."³ It was this front that Lenin considered the most important in the fight between the new and the old.

Trotsky denied that socialism could win first in one separate country, and regarded socialist construction only in the light of a "European and world revolution", thereby trying to revise Lenin's teaching of the functions of the proletarian dictatorship. In his article, "Proletarian Culture and Proletarian Art", he declared that "the dictatorship of the proletariat is not based on a production-cultural organisation of the new society but on a revolutionary order designed to fight for it". Trotsky saw the dictatorship of the proletariat as an instrument of destruction and not construction.⁴

In his article, "Thoughts about the Party", Trotsky once again put forward his "permanent revolution" doctrine, and voiced anxiety over the fact that Soviet young people "will ossify in the atmosphere of Soviet 'minor affairs' (as he termed the effort in socialist construction.—*Author*.) and will lose their revolutionary perspective". To prevent this, he proposed that they should learn from the army, because it was "the most visible link between us and the still unresolved tasks on a world scale". This was the very opposite of the programme Lenin had put forward in his speech at the Third Congress of the Komsomol.

While stepping up the propaganda of their ideas, the Trotskyites strove hard to give a boost to Trotsky's personality. They sought to set him up as the only and leading

¹ See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, pp. 325-47.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. 21, p. 247.

³ *Ibid.*, Vol. 36, p. 595.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Vol. 24, p. 75.

⁵ *Pravda*, February 20, 1923.

¹ *Pravda*, June 24, 1923.

² *Pravda*, June 26, 1923.

³ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, p. 437.

⁴ See *Pravda*, September 14, 1923.

organiser of the victories on the Civil War fronts, and for that purpose published biased collections of his articles, speeches and orders on military affairs.¹

In 1922, the Political Administration of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, which was headed by Trotsky's supporter, V. Antonov-Ovseyenko, circulated to Party, government, trade-union and military establishments draft Political Regulations for the Red Army and Navy, inviting them to comment on it. Para. 41 of the Regulations presented Trotsky as the Red Army's leader and organiser and as an orthodox Marxist-Leninist.²

In an article written on the fifth anniversary of the Red Army, Karl Radek, saying nothing at all about the role of Lenin and the Party, set Trotsky up as "the standard bearer of the armed labouring people", adding that the Soviet people owed Trotsky all their Civil War victories.³

These panegyrics induced Trotsky to take a highly supercilious attitude to the Party and its Central Committee, and on various occasions he refused to abide by the CC's decisions. Thus, during the September 1923 Plenary Meeting, when the CC was discussing the question of enlarging the Revolutionary Military Council, Trotsky who was then Chairman of the RMC, came out against the Plenum's decision on this question. When N. P. Komarov, who was attending the Plenum, declared that members of the CC had the duty to abide by its decisions, Trotsky walked out, ignoring the CC's request that he should return.

Flouting the opinion of the Politburo, Trotsky and his supporters widely circulated their slanderous statements among the country's Party organisations. In this atmosphere, a decision was taken to call a joint Plenum of the RCP(B) Central Committee and the Central Control Commission in October 1923 to discuss various aspects of the situation in the Party.

Representatives of ten major Party organisations—Petrograd, Moscow, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Nizhny-Novgorod, Kharkov, Donetsk, Yekaterinburg, Rostov, Baku and Tula—were invited to attend the Plenum. It was also attended by the authors of the "Statement of 46". The Plenum allowed

¹ These collections were compiled by Y. Blumkin, a former SR, who killed the German Ambassador Mirbach (see *Pravda*, March 3, 1923).

² See *Pravda*, December 17, 1924.

³ See *Pravda*, March 14, 1923.

the oppositionists, including those who were not members either of the Central Committee or the Central Control Commission, to set forth their views and proposals. However, they continued to smear the activity of the Party's Central Committee, the Politburo, the Secretariat of the CC, and the Central Control Commission.

The Plenum rebuffed the oppositionists' attacks and by 102 votes to 2, with 10 abstentions, condemned the Trotskyites' action as splitting, and "jeopardising the Party's unity". The Plenum endorsed the political and practical work of the Central Committee's Politburo, Organising Bureau and Secretariat, and also the Politburo's decision prohibiting any extensive discussion over the oppositionists' statements as being untimely. At the same time, full support was given to the policy of unfolding inner Party democracy.

However, trampling on the Rules, the Trotskyites refused to abide by the Plenum's decision, and instead of taking part in the work of the commissions framing measures to improve activity within the Party and the country's economy, intensified their attacks on the CC's policy.

In order to bring out the views of Party members and to prevent the opposition from establishing a monopoly in interpreting the state of affairs within the Party, the Central Committee decided, in November 1923, to start a broad discussion in the Party press.

It was opened on November 7, 1923, when *Pravda* carried Zinoviev's article, "The Party's New Tasks", which he wrote as a member of the Politburo by assignment from the Central Committee. But it gave a distorted picture of inner Party life, and the title itself contained a biased twist. In designating the tasks ahead of the Party as "new", Zinoviev seemed to be putting paid to the policy of developing inner Party democracy, which was being carried out under the CC's leadership in pursuance of the decisions of the Party's Tenth Congress.

Zinoviev alleged that the grass roots of the Party organisations did not have the requisite qualifications for tackling the economic tasks, that Party members were not as competent as non-Party people, which was why there was lack of confidence in the Party's economic policy among non-Party workers. Nor was there any ground in his assertion that "almost all our key issues were decided beforehand, as they moved from top to bottom", and that the primary Party

organisations were in a state of "doldrums, and sometimes even downright stagnation".

The Trotskyite opposition made active use of the discussion in *Pravda* to attack the Leninist principles of Party life and the Central Committee's general line. Articles by opposition leaders, among them Preobrazhensky and Sapronov, were on the whole rehashes of the slanderous inventions the Party had condemned at the October (1923) Central Committee Plenum.

In his article, entitled "About Our Party's Internal Situation", Preobrazhensky urged that the discussion should centre on confidence in the CC, and the correctness of the main line "pursued by the Party in inner Party construction and inner Party policy during the NEP period". He declared that "for two years now the Party has been pursuing a fundamentally incorrect line in its inner Party policy", and that the Party's policy was in "contradiction" with NEP's tasks. He charged that the Party tackled the economic problems haphazardly, and that "the planning principle was inadequately applied in all our economic policy". Revising the Leninist principles of inner Party life, he contrasted the Party leadership and the broad masses of members, insisting on a reversal of the decision taken by the Party's Tenth Congress, "On Party Unity", and restoration of Party life on "the lines of 1917 and 1918".¹

In his article, "What Is the Party's Next Task?", Sapronov took Preobrazhensky's ideas a step further and demanded a "renewal of the apparatus" and a replacement of the Party's officer corps, beginning from the lowest echelon.² He declared that the work of purging the Party apparatus had to be "started right away" and that this should be done without "appointments", "recommendations" or "co-ordination". This was, in fact, a call for a massacre of the Party's Leninist cadres, a release of primary Party organisations from control by higher organs, and a revision of the decisions taken by the Tenth Congress and the Twelfth All-Russia Conference of the RCP(B).

By mid-November 1923, the Party organisations began their discussion of the articles on Party development which had appeared in *Pravda*. In most primary organisations,

discussion meetings lasted well into the night and continued for several days. Because of the opposition's active attacks, the atmosphere was very tense.¹

A Central Committee commission drafted a resolution on inner Party life on the strength of the discussion results. The Politburo repeatedly sought to draw Trotsky into the discussion of the vital issues in Party life and economic policy. There were two private meetings with Trotsky's participation at which Politburo members discussed a number of economic and Party matters. He was included in the "sub-commission of three" set up to work out the final text of the draft resolution on inner Party life.

On December 5, 1923, the CC Politburo and the CCC Presidium unanimously adopted a resolution entitled "On Party Construction" which said that NEP was a necessary stage in the transition from capitalism to socialism, and that it had promoted an upswing in industry, the peasant economy and state trade and the development of co-operatives, and had also led to a growth of confidence among the broad non-Party masses in the RCP(B) as the ruling party. On the strength of this, the Politburo urged the Party organisations to improve the forms of their links with the masses by drawing the best members of the working class and the peasantry into their ranks, and to set before them the primary task of increasing the percentage of workers in the Party by recruiting shopfloor workers.

The resolution clearly and openly listed the defects in inner Party life, which were a product of the objective contradictions in the transition period and had led to breaches of the Leninist principle of democratic centralism. The CC and the CCC worked out full-scale measures to effect a regular renewal of the Party apparatus from below on the basis of quotas written into the Rules, periodic reports by leading Party organs to Party members, publicity and extensive information for the rank and file on various aspects of the Party's policy.

The resolution also stressed that the Leninist concept of Party democracy "does not at all imply freedom to set up

¹ At the Moscow Krasny Postavshchik plant, the discussion went on for five or six hours every evening four days on end, with speeches delivered by 40 of the 70 members of the cell. The opposition resolution was rejected (see *Pravda*, December 12, 1923). There were many similar facts.

¹ *Pravda*, November 28, 1923.

² *Pravda*, December 8, 1923.

factional groupings, which are extremely dangerous for a ruling party, because they always threaten to divide or split up the Government and the state apparatus as a whole".¹ Extension of inner Party democracy had nothing in common with laxer Party discipline, tolerance of clannishness or factionalism, which turned the Party into a debating society.

The resolution also set out the measures to extend the functions of local control commissions, measures on Party direction of economic work, and measures to intensify the efforts of the Party and other social organisations, and involve the masses in the practical construction of socialism. This was a broad plan for invigorating the Party's work, consolidating the unity of the Party's ranks and enhancing the Party's authority in every sphere of state and social life.

For Party organisations up and down the country, this resolution was not only a programme of action but also a powerful weapon for fighting the Trotskyite opposition. The fact that it was made public exploded the Trotskyite allegations that the Central Committee was opposed to any further development of democracy within the Party.

However, the Trotskyites persisted in attacking the Party's leadership. Scarcely had the resolution, "On Party Construction", been published in *Pravda*, when Trotsky's supporters began to spread in Party organisations in Moscow another libel, "The New Line (A Letter to Party Conferences)". All of this was done, as J. V. Stalin observed at the January (1924) Plenum of the RCP(B) Central Committee, without the CC's knowledge and without any effort to inform the CC about it. With Trotsky's letter already known to the district Party organisations, the Central Committee could not very well prohibit its publication, because such a ban would be fresh grist to the opposition's mill. On December 11, *Pravda* began to publish the text of "The New Line".

In "The New Line", Trotsky again accused the Party leadership of having degenerated, and in "having weakened the proletarian and revolutionary spirit"; he put the old cadres of the Leninist Party and the opportunist leaders of the Second International on the same footing. He urged that the old Party cadres should be "refreshed and renewed", which meant eliminating the Leninists from the Party lead-

ership. He set up the young Party members against the old ones, and urged the former to revise the old Party "formulas", declaring that the young people would work out their own character only if they took the "revolutionary formulas by assault".

The letter sounded an open call to abandon the Leninist principles of Party organisation. Trotsky demanded that the Party "as represented by all its cells and associations should regain its collective initiative ... and the right of organisational self-determination". What Trotsky meant was the right to form factions and groups within the Party, doing away with the principle of democratic centralism.

Trotsky's letter, which was published in *Pravda*, was also issued as a pamphlet the day the Thirteenth Party Conference opened. It openly preached the "permanent revolution" doctrine and contained attempts to set it up in place of the main strategic line of Bolshevism.

Revision of the Party's general line was also the leading motive of the factionalists' speeches at district meetings in Moscow. At a meeting of the bureau of the cells and active workers of the Moscow organisation on December 11, 1923, Andreichik, representing the opposition and echoing Trotsky, declared: "We the revolutionary workers' Party ... are fully aware that it is impossible to establish in a single country not only communism, but even socialism. ... We are aware that we are working for the international revolution, without which we shall become a bourgeois-democratic country."¹

However, Trotsky and his supporters realised full well that it was impossible to change the Party's general line so long as Leninism was being safeguarded by the Communists, whom Lenin had fostered and who had gone through the severe schooling of the underground. These men constituted the "organisation of leaders" which was stable, and maintained continuity, and without which, Lenin insisted, "no revolutionary movement can be strong".

Having set themselves the task of diverting the Party from its Marxist-Leninist path, the Trotskyites hurled unfounded charges at the Party apparatus of "degeneration" and attempts to set themselves against the "rest of the Party mass, as an object of influence". Trotsky and his supporters said the Party had two tiers: "the upper took the decisions, the

¹ CPSU in the Resolutions and Decisions..., Part I, p. 773.

¹ *Pravda*, December 15, 1923.

lower only learned about the decisions". All these assertions were designed to spread mistrust for the Party leadership among the masses, to split and weaken the Party, and to seize its leadership.

In its historical advance, the Bolshevik Party has had repeatedly to beat back attacks by opportunist elements who objected to the Party's work being directed from a single centre, and the whole work of the Party being organised by the Party apparatus. Back in 1904, when Trotsky, allied with Plekhanov and Martynov, carried on his subversive activity against the convocation of the Third Congress of the RSDLP, he resorted to the tactic of contrasting the Party apparatus and the masses, in an effort to "undermine the prestige of the committees in the eyes of the local communities and the workers..."¹

The pamphlet Trotsky wrote at the time, "Our Political Tasks", was shot through with the idea of setting the Party masses against the Party's leading organs. He wrote: "The Party organisation 'substitutes' for the Party; the CC substitutes for the Party organisation, and finally, the 'dictator' substitutes for the CC ... it is the committees that lay down the 'line' and cancel it, while the people are silent."² Lenin said this pamphlet was the most brazen lying and "distortion of the facts".³

In 1923, Trotsky once again brought to light the old Menshevik assertions. He also drew on the Menshevik arsenal for the slanderous charge that the Party apparatus was "fatally bureaucratic" and "threatened to lead the Party into a dead end". At a meeting of Moscow Party activists in December 1923, the Trotskyite Stukov demanded an immediate replacement of the Party "cadre", which had grown up "on administering the Party ... on the lines of bureaucratic centralism".⁴ Earlier, similar charges had been levelled by the Mensheviks, headed by Axelrod, protesting against the "system of autocratic, bureaucratic administration of the Party" and against "bureaucratic centralism", whose main concern was allegedly not internal but outward, formal unity implemented and safeguarded by purely me-

chanical means, through the systematic suppression of individual initiative. Exposing the real meaning of the Menshevik attacks on the Party leadership after the Second Congress of the RSDLP, Lenin said that "the cries about this celebrated bureaucracy are just a screen for dissatisfaction with the personal composition of the central bodies, a fig-leaf to cover up the violation of a pledge solemnly given at the Congress".¹

Lenin emphasised on many occasions that no man should be considered a bureaucrat simply because he had been appointed to leadership by the majority against the will of the minority. It is not right to accuse him of formalism if he is guided in his activity by the decisions of a congress instead of the opinion of every discontented person. Bureaucracy was harmful for the Party, but in this instance it should be seen as "subordinating the interests of the *work* to the interests of one's own *career*".² There is evidence of bureaucracy wherever the struggle for power over-rides the interests of the common cause.

The Bolshevik Party has always taken a sharply negative attitude to bureaucracy. The RCP(B) Programme said that "the Party continues ceaselessly to conduct a resolute struggle against bureaucracy ... so as to wipe out this evil".³ It believed that the main means of eradicating bureaucracy was not "shaking up" the workers of the apparatus, but gradually drawing all the working people into the administration of the state.

In his concluding speech at a meeting of the communist group of the Second All-Russia Miners' Congress, Lenin said that "overcoming the evils of bureaucracy requires hundreds of measures, wholesale literacy, culture and participation in the activity of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection".⁴ The opposition's attacks in the autumn of 1923 showed that neither Trotsky nor his supporters had abandoned the Menshevik distortion of Lenin's principles of inner Party life.

The spirit of Menshevism also pervaded all of Trotsky's talk in "The New Line" about the Party as a supra-class organisation. He urged that the Bolshevik Party, the rev-

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 43, pp. 131-32.

² *Proletarskaya revoliutsiya* No. 12, 1926, p. 50.

³ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 43, p. 129.

⁴ *Pravda*, December 15, 1923.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 7, p. 363.

² *Ibid.*, p. 364.

³ *CPSU in the Resolutions and Decisions...*, Part I, p. 416.

⁴ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, p. 68.

olutionary party of the working class, should "most carefully" verify its acts with the "mood" of young students, whom he proclaimed to be the Party's "barometer". The following data give a good idea about the social and Party make-up of this "barometer": on December 1, 1923, 15 per cent of the 132,000 students in higher schools were workers, almost 27 per cent peasants, and over 58 per cent white-collar workers, intellectuals and their children. Less than six per cent of the students were members of the Party, and less than five per cent, Young Communists.¹ Trotsky's attempt to make the Party adapt its policy to the "mood" of the young people in college, and through them to "all the social strata" of society, was a blatant attack on the Party's class basis, and the dictatorship of the proletariat.

While calling for a party of "all strata", Trotsky attacked not only the Party's proletarian class policy, but also its inner discipline. Other oppositionists, like Preobrazhensky and Sapronov, demanded a reversal of the resolution of the Tenth Congress, "On Party Unity", arguing that the "fight against groupings" allegedly ran counter to the policy of "bringing democracy to the fore". They falsified the Party's history and sought to distort Lenin's attitude to factions and groupings within the Party, and to Party discipline, arguing that the resolution of the Tenth Congress, "On Party Unity", sprang from a special situation and was a temporary measure, and that Lenin had allegedly allowed factionalism in the Party.

There is nothing in common between these statements and Lenin's doctrine of the Party. It is impossible to win and secure the dictatorship of the proletariat, unless the Party is solidly united and is ruled by an iron discipline. This discipline rests on the unity of thought and action of all Party members. It does not rule out any clash of opinion or criticism within the Party, but this applies only until a decision on the question in hand has been taken. Every Party member is bound by the Party's decision, which is collectively worked out and adopted by a majority. One of the key features of democratic centralism is that the minority submits to the majority of the members.

Earlier, when the RSDLP was assuming its organisational shape, Lenin refuted Martov's inventions about "a state of

siege in the Party" and "exclusive laws against individuals and groups", and said: "We not only can but we must create a 'state of siege' in relation to unstable and vacillating elements, and all our Party Rules, the whole system of centralism now endorsed by the Congress are nothing but a 'state of siege' in respect to the numerous sources of political vagueness."¹

After the proletariat's take-over, the struggle against "political amorphousness" in the Party continued to be important because the class environment producing it had not been eliminated. In his book, *"Left"-wing Communism—an Infantile Disorder*, Lenin said that the revolution had ousted the landowners and the capitalists, but the small commodity producers were still there. This petty-bourgeois element surrounded the working class on every side, permeated it and corrupted it with its ideology, continuously producing within it relapses into petty-bourgeois spinelessness, scattering, and individualism, with swings from enthusiasm to despondency.

The proletariat had taken over in order to destroy the forces and traditions of the old society and to establish a new society on communist lines. Its political and organisational work was to re-educate the mass of small-commodity producers and to get them to accept its ideology. The growing ideological and organising role of the proletariat was closely linked with the consolidation of its political party on the basis of strict centralisation and discipline. Lenin wrote: "Without a party of iron that has been tempered in the struggle, a party enjoying the confidence of all honest people in the class in question, a party capable of watching and influencing the mood of the masses, such a struggle cannot be waged successfully."² The existence of factions within the ruling party of the working class tends to weaken its unity of purpose and action and to undermine the working-class dictatorship. Accordingly, the Tenth Party Congress, which outlined measures further to extend democracy within the Party, resolutely rejected any unbusiness-like and factional criticism.

A separate clause in the Leninist resolution of the Congress specified the penalty in store for splinterers and de-

¹ See *Bolshevik* Nos. 3-4, 1924, p. 19.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 7, p. 322.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. 31, pp. 44-45.

stroyers of Party unity. Clause 7 of the resolution "On Party Unity" read: "For the purpose of implementing strict discipline within the Party and in all Soviet activity, and to achieve the utmost unity, while eliminating all factionalism, the Congress authorises the Central Committee to apply to cases of breaches of discipline or revival or tolerance of factionalism, all measures of Party punishment, including expulsion from the Party, and with respect to CC members their transfer to alternate membership, and even, as an exceptional measure, expulsion from the Party."¹ The Party's experience has shown that the need for iron discipline within the Party is of abiding importance.

In a speech at the Nineteenth Moscow City Party Conference (1968) General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, L. I. Brezhnev, emphasised that "the Party needs to have strong conscious discipline both when it is leading the masses to revolution and when it is working at the head of the masses to build socialist society, and in the period of full-scale communist construction. That is one of the most important sources of the Party's strength, successes and victories."²

A new period in the oppositionists' fight against the Central Committee and the leadership of the local Party organisations was opened by Trotsky's instigatory letters about the "new line". The opposition did not confine its activity to Moscow and sent its representatives and factional documents to the Party organisations in the provinces. However, Moscow continued to be the centre of the struggle, where the opposition kept its main forces. In Moscow, the Trotskyites set themselves the task of winning over the majority of the Party organisation so as to install at the gubernia Party conference a gubernia Party leadership opposed to the Central Committee. Had they succeeded in doing this, the Moscow Committee would have become another governing organ, virtually duplicating the Central Committee.

In his letter, "The New Line", Trotsky flatly declared that the "initiative of revising the Party line" should be undertaken by Moscow, with "the whole Party then following Moscow through the necessary stage of reappraising some of the values of the past period".³ Trotsky's directive about

"winning" Moscow was formulated in a special clause in the draft resolution which the Trotskyites sought to impose on the Party organisations.

Meetings of Party activists were held in all the six districts of Moscow in the first half of December 1923, to discuss the Central Committee's resolution, "On Party Construction". The opposition mustered all its forces to win over those who were attending these meetings. The fight against the Trotskyites was fiercest in the Krasnaya Presnya District, which had the biggest Party organisation in the city. The meeting there was attended by the opposition's main forces, including Preobrazhensky, Osinsky, Smirnov, Drobni, Rafail and Stukov, and their speeches on December 2, 7 and 8 were specimens of malicious criticising attacks against the Central Committee and the local Party apparatus. However, the Krasnaya Presnya District Communists did not follow the opposition. After a three-day discussion, the members of the cell bureaus approved the Central Committee's political and organisational line and said that the whole effort to improve inner Party life "must be carried on in accordance with the CC resolution, which indicated the true way of uniting the Party". The meeting urged all Party members to act together in support of the CC line.¹ The Trotskyites in the district were completely defeated. By mid-December, 76 of the 80 cells at enterprises in the district had adopted resolutions in the spirit of the decision passed by a meeting of district Party activists.²

The platform of the Trotskyite opposition was also condemned by a meeting of the cell bureaus and active workers of the Moscow organisation, which was held on December 11. This meeting clearly showed that the oppositionists' talk about Party democracy was entirely hypocritical. The meeting patiently heard out the direct attacks of Sapronov and Stukov, and the diplomatically subtle speeches of Radek and Preobrazhensky. But when workers representing the districts began to criticise the Trotskyites, the factionalists booed, shouted and staged walkouts. Nevertheless, an overwhelming majority of Moscow Party activists passed a resolution in support of the CC line which was motioned by Mikhail Kalinin.

¹ CPSU in the Resolutions and Decisions..., Part I, p. 529.

² Pravda, March 30, 1968.

³ Pravda, December 11, 1923.

¹ See Pravda, December 12, 1923.

² See Pravda, December 15, 1923.

On December 14, a Plenum of the Party's Moscow Committee unanimously approved the CC resolution, "On Party Construction", and authorised the Moscow Committee's Bureau to prepare concrete proposals for implementing it in the Moscow organisation.¹

Neither the Moscow Committee's decision nor the opinion of the majority of the Party activists helped to stop the oppositionists in their splitting activity. They also ignored the appeal of the RCP(B) Central Committee to the country's Party organisations, inviting them to discuss the resolution, "On Party Construction", without setting up groupings.² The Trotskyites also ignored the Politburo decision designed to prevent any sharpening of the inner Party struggle, which was published in *Pravda* on December 18. They did their utmost to undermine the Party's unity and to split the Party. One instance of this was the meeting of 16 Party cells of the First Joint Command School named after the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, where a co-report on behalf of the opposition was given by V. A. Antonov-Ovseyenko. His speech was based on inventions and abounded in attacks on the Party leadership. He followed this up by motioning the resolution blaming the CC for all the shortcomings in inner Party activity and economic life. However, most speakers—a total of 23—voiced resolute support for the resolution, "On Party Construction", and the Party's policy as a whole.

Sensing the Communists' mood, Antonov-Ovseyenko tried to change his tune and smooth over the substance of the difference between the opposition and the CC, so as to present Trotsky as the "aggrieved party". He motioned a fresh resolution proposing endorsement of the CC line, but overstating the shortcomings in the Party leadership's activity. This variant of the Trotskyite resolution won only 20 votes and was rejected. An absolute majority of the more than 800 Communists who attended passed a resolution approving the CC's political and organisational line, and stressing that it was intolerable to allow "the existence of any groupings or factions fragmenting the Party's unity and leading to a split between the Party and the working class".³ The Party cells of a number of military establishments adopted similar resolutions.

¹ See *Pravda*, December 16, 1923.

² See *Pravda*, December 15, 1923.

³ *Pravda*, December 20, 1923.

The opposition failed in its efforts to establish its influence in Moscow's military organisations: only 22 of the 93 Party cells supported the Trotskyites. But the struggle was intense because many leaders of the opposition held responsible posts in the Red Army. Trotsky himself was People's Commissar for Army and Navy Affairs and Chairman of the Revolutionary military Council of the USSR; Antonov-Ovseyenko, Chief of the Political Administration of the RMC, and Muralov, Commander of the troops of the Moscow Military District. Let us recall that both Antonov-Ovseyenko and Muralov had signed the "Statement of 46" and were engaged in factional activity. Apart from his personal speeches in defence of Trotskyism at Party meetings during the discussion, Antonov-Ovseyenko used his official position to issue orders designed to strengthen the influence of the opposition in the Army's Party organisations. His factional activity was condemned by a resolution of the Central Committee's Plenum on January 14, 1924, and by the Thirteenth Party Conference.¹

In their efforts to falsify public opinion, the Trotskyites had their supporters in the central and local Party press twist the essence of the inner Party discussion, and deliberately misinformed the Communists. Head of the Party Life Department in *Pravda*, Konstantinov, and his deputy, Vigilyansky, held up the publication of articles and Party meetings' resolutions aimed against the opposition. At the same time, in their speeches at Party meetings the Trotskyites slandered the Central Committee and *Pravda*, accusing them of "violating workers' democracy in the sphere of the Party press", and in giving "untrue and biased information" about the course of the discussion. The Central Control Commission, which organised a check-up on the work of this department, adopted a special decision saying that because persons acting from anti-Party interests had secured control of the Party Life Department, the wrong light was being thrown on the discussion in *Pravda*. It added: "Being responsible to the Party and the working class, the CC organ cannot do otherwise than quite definitely conduct the CC's line."² Shortly afterwards, the Thirteenth Party Conference pointed out the need to reinforce the Central Party Organ with "fitting forces" of Party writers.³

¹ See *Thirteenth Conference of the RCP(B)*..., p. 155.

² *Pravda*, December 23, 1923.

³ See *Thirteenth Conference of the RCP(B)*..., p. 203.

The course of the discussion gave convincing evidence that the opposition was losing out. A Party meeting at the AMO Works adopted a resolution saying: "We stand foursquare for preserving unity in our Party's ranks, and call to order those who, wittingly or unwittingly, are working to disorganise our Party's ranks." The overwhelming majority of the Party meetings issued similar statements: the workers of Moscow were giving the splitters a resolute rebuff.

Lenin taught the Party to find the crucial element in all its actions at every stage of historical development. In the rehabilitation period, the Party's main task was as follows: "Link up with the peasant masses, with the rank-and-file working peasants, and begin to move forward immeasurably, infinitely more slowly than we expected, but in such a way that the entire mass will actually move forward with us."¹ It was possible to rehabilitate and develop large-scale industry only in alliance with the peasantry, which is why it was extremely important to keep the pace of industrial development commensurate with the state of agriculture and the possibilities of the peasant market.

On December 24, 1923, the RCP(B) Central Committee adopted its resolution, "On the Immediate Tasks of Economic Policy". It said that all practical measures in the sphere of economic policy had to be geared to solving the main political task: consolidation of the alliance between the working class and the peasantry. The Party condemned the policy of "maximum profits" in industry, as having nothing in common with socialist accumulation. The concentration of industry was an "inevitable element" of the effort to improve the organisation of Soviet industry, but commercial and budgetary considerations had to be subordinated to political interests. It would be an intolerable political mistake to practise "stringent" concentration and close down factories where this would lead to a dispersion of the working class.

The resolution clearly set out the Central Committee's view of the further development of foreign trade. It held that foreign trade should be developed only through the purchase of goods vitally necessary for the further boosting of industry and agriculture. Under NEP, tremendous importance attached to various aspects of domestic trade, through which ran the direct links between socialist industry and the peasantry.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, pp. 271-72.

It was still too early to eliminate all private trade, which is why the correct way was gradually to restrict and ease out private capital in trade through the utmost development of co-operatives and state trade, which would signify a simultaneous extension of the socialist sector. Co-operative and state trade had to be so organised as to offer higher-quality goods at lower prices. The Party did not panic in face of private capital, and indicated ways of curbing it by means of a prices-and-taxes policy. In order to exercise control of private trade, the Central Committee proposed that firm prices should be fixed for sugar, salt and kerosene.

The Central Committee came out for a fuller application of planning in the economy, but added that the plan should not be regarded as a cure-all for the country's economic ills. How well the state could direct planning depended on the possibility of regulating the many millions of small peasant farms, and on the stability of the ruble. That is why the Central Committee set out as a primary task measures to complete the monetary reform so as to stabilise the ruble's parity.

A broad discussion on the Party's immediate tasks in the sphere of economic policy got underway as soon as the CC resolution was published. On December 27, 1923, it was unanimously endorsed at meetings of Party cell secretaries and active workers of the Zamoskvorechye and Sokolniki districts of Moscow.¹

Two days later, a Moscow meeting of Party activists discussed the results of the economic year and the immediate economic tasks. On behalf of the Trotskyite opposition, Osinsky motioned a "resolution of four" which he had drafted together with Preobrazhensky, Pyatakov and V. Smirnov.

This was rejected by the meeting, which by an overwhelming majority approved the CC resolution, and decided to pass it on for discussion to the Party organisations, laying special stress on the need to give the fullest consideration to the experienced Party members in evaluating the Central Committee's practical proposals.² That was another blow at the factionalists. The Party no longer wished to hear the demagogic inventions about the activity of the governing organs being "haphazard and lacking in method", about the "lack of plan and leadership"; the Party wanted to have concrete business-like proposals for strengthening the economy.

¹ See *Pravda*, January 1, 1924.

² *Ibid.*

The opposition again tried to impose on the Party its policy of "maximum profitability" in industry, through an overpricing of manufactures. A little later, the Trotskyites sought to lay a "theoretical" basis for this demand in the form of Preobrazhensky's "fundamental law of socialist accumulation", which said that the way of a backward, peasant country to the socialist organisation of production lay through "exploitation of the pre-socialist forms of the economy", that is, the peasantry. In their efforts to undermine the alliance between the working class and the peasantry, the Trotskyites strove to have the socialist state extract more from the peasants than had been extracted from them under capitalism.

The opposition proposals on foreign trade led to outright surrender to the imperialist West. In opposition to the CC line, the Trotskyites proposed that there should be "no proclamation of the abstract slogan of active trade balance, but a start on working out a rational import plan and broad resort to commodity intervention". This meant that the oppositionists were against the country's economic independence, against the development of its own industry, and against the Leninist plan for socialist construction.

The petty-bourgeois character of the opposition stood out with especial clarity in its amendments to the CC resolution "On the Immediate Tasks of Economic Policy", which contained, on the one hand, a Leftist call for the "exploitation of pre-socialist forms of the economy", and on the other, a proposal to capitulate to the Western imperialists. Both points flowed from their denial of the possibility of building socialism in one, separate country, and from Trotsky's theory of "permanent revolution".

It was quite clear that the Trotskyites' economic platform was politically untenable, so that the discussion of the Party's economic tasks everywhere proceeded in a calmer and more business-like atmosphere as compared with the discussion of inner Party activity. The Party organisations correctly qualified the opposition's sallies on economic policy as a departure "from the fundamental principles of Leninism towards opportunism".¹

As the communist workers discussed the CC resolution, they strove to determine their own place in implementing it,

¹ *Pravda*, January 9, 1924.

and made many practical proposals to improve the organisation of production. The People's Commissar for Public Health, N. A. Semashko, who took part in the discussion at the Model Printing Works, remarked on the unanimity with which the Communists adopted his proposal to make a business-like calculation of the possibilities of improving their economic indicators.¹

On January 10-12, 1924, the Eleventh Moscow Gubernia Party Conference met to sum up the discussion in Moscow.² Although the Trotskyites Preobrazhensky, Osinsky, Boguslavsky, Sapronov, Rafail and others continued to smear the Central Committee and the leadership of the Moscow Party Committee, they had no success. An overwhelming majority of delegates at the Conference endorsed the CC policy and rejected all the opposition attacks as unfounded. In the elections to the Moscow Committee, the factionalists also found themselves in a minority.

Despite the difficulties, the Moscow Party organisation emerged from the discussion much stronger and more united. The Central Committee's line was approved and supported at all the district Party conferences held in January 1924, with the exception of Khamovniki District, where the Trotskyites managed to secure an insignificant majority and to establish themselves in the district committee leadership. The opposition was able to score a temporary success in that district, because most Party cells there consisted of students, with shopfloor workers making up only five per cent.

Of the total of 413 workers' cells in Moscow, 346, or 83.7 per cent, voted for the CC line, and only 67, or less than 17 per cent, for the opposition. As a rule, the latter were Party cells at small factories.³

The CC line was also approved by most Party cells at Soviet institutions: 181 out of 238. The opposition was supported by just over two-thirds of the college and by 22 of the 93 Army Party cells. The opposition managed temporarily to take over control of the leadership in the Moscow, Ivanovo-Voznesensk and Kashira uyezds committees,⁴ but even there its position was unstable. During the discussion, the Central Committee line was unanimously approved in

¹ See *Pravda*, January 9, 1924.

² See *Pravda*, January 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15, 1924.

³ See *Pravda*, January 12, 1924.

⁴ See *Pravda*, May 16, 1924.

such major proletarian centres as Petrograd, Kharkov, the Urals, Donbas, Tula, Baku, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Rostov-on-Don and Yekaterinoslav.

Earlier, on December 1, 1923, the Nineteenth Petrograd Gubernia Party Conference, in joint session with the city's district conferences, adopted a resolution condemning the Trotskyites' factional activity. It pointed out that the line towards democracy in the Party had nothing in common with the demand for freedom to set up factions and groups. The conference determined its attitude to the opposition's demagogic attacks in these words: "The supreme law for every Bolshevik is the revolutionary interests and not at all the 'sanctity' of this or that abstract principle."¹

The resolution of the Nineteenth Petrograd Gubernia Party Conference was given full backing at group Party meetings of factories like Krasny Putilovets, Krasny Treugolnik and Bolshevik (formerly Obukhovsky).² The workers of Petrograd were demanding that the opposition leaders should explain why they were taking their anti-Party action. However, neither Trotsky, Preobrazhensky nor Sapronov dared to set out their standpoint at a city meeting of cell bureaus and Party activists on December 15, and did not accept an invitation to take part in the discussion. Only five of the 3,000 Communists voted against the CC resolution, "On Party Construction", which was approved in its entirety. The meeting addressed a letter to all Party organisations throughout the country, sternly censuring the acts of the opposition and its leader, Trotsky.³ Altogether, just over five per cent of the membership voted for the Trotskyite platform in the Petrograd Party organisation.⁴

On December 19, 1923, a general meeting of cell bureaus and Party activists of the Kharkov⁵ Party Organisation—a total of more than 1,000—adopted, by an overwhelming majority, a resolution condemning the acts of the Trotskyite opposition.⁶ In their speeches, V. Y. Chubar, A. G. Shlikh-

¹ *Pravda*, December 7, 1923.

² See *Pravda*, December 15, 1923.

³ See *Pravda*, December 18, 1923.

⁴ See V. M. Ivanov, *Iz istorii borby partii protiv "levogo" opportunizma* (From the History of the Party's Struggle Against "Left" Opportunism), Leningrad, 1965, p. 31.

⁵ From December 1917 to July 1934 Kharkov was the capital of the Ukraine.—Ed.

⁶ See *Pravda*, December 21, 1923.

ter, E. I. Kviring and others exposed the demagogic attacks by the oppositionists, whose purpose was to weaken the Party and the dictatorship of the proletariat.¹

In early January 1924 the Communists of Yekaterinburg, Perm, Motovilikha, Chusovaya, Nadezhdinsk, Zlatoust, the Kizel coal district and other towns and districts across the country came out unanimously in support of the CC line, and against the opposition's anti-Party actions.² The Chelyabinsk Party organisation was the only one in the Urals where the Trotskyites managed temporarily to throw the Party's ranks into confusion. However, even there the success of the oppositionists was short-lived.

A plenum of the Urals Regional Party Committee was held on January 6, 1924. Its resolution stated quite definitely that "in the struggle between the two trends in the Party—Leninism and Trotskyism" the plenum was "fully and resolutely taking the Leninist path".³ The participants in the plenum declared that they saw it as their duty to continue the struggle under the leadership of the Central Committee against Menshevism of every stripe, and against attacks on "the organisational forms of the proletarian revolutionary Party". The following day, more than 2,000 Communists attended a city Party meeting in Yekaterinburg. A report on the Party's tasks was given by A. V. Lunacharsky. By an absolute majority, the meeting adhered to the resolution adopted by the regional committee plenum the day before.

There was also a broad discussion on various aspects of Party life in the Party organisations in Donbas. The bureau of the Donetsk Gubernia Party Committee issued an address to all members of the gubernia Party organisation urging the Communists of Donbas to give unanimous backing to the decisions of the CC and the CCC. It declared Trotsky's acts to be destructive for the "Party's unity" and revising Lenin's "view of discipline" in the Party, and demanded that in the interests of the "Party's unity" the oppositionists should be condemned.⁴ This address helped many Communists to see through the Trotskyites' factional demagoguery. A plenum of the Donetsk Gubernia Party Committee met in January 1924 to sum up the results of the discussion in Donbas, and em-

¹ See *Pravda*, December 22, 1923.

² See *Pravda*, January 10, 1924.

³ Ibid.

⁴ See *Pravda*, January 9, 1924.

phasised that an overwhelming majority of the members of the Donetsk Party organisation had fully endorsed the Party's political and organisational line and the CC and the CCC resolutions on Party construction.¹

The Trotskyite opposition was given a crushing rebuff in Baku, where a conference of cell bureaux of the Baku Party organisation, meeting with activists on December 21, 1923, adopted, on S. M. Kirov's report, a unanimous resolution fully endorsing the Central Committee's political line. The real meaning of the Trotskyite opposition's anti-Party action was exposed at the conference. The Communists of Baku sharply condemned those who were breaking up the Party's unity, and declared: "By attacking the policy of the Party's Central Committee the opposition is attacking the main line of Leninism; however, the Party will not tolerate a revision of Leninism by any group whatsoever.... The Baku organisation, one of the oldest Bolshevik organisations, feels duty-bound categorically to declare that all sorts of activity weakening the Party's unity must be stopped at once, and that we must all rally round the Central Committee."² In the whole of the Baku Party organisation the Trotskyite opposition's platform won only 142 votes,³ mainly in the office Party cells.

On December 23, 1923, a plenum of the Transcaucasian Territorial Committee of the RCP(B), together with the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia, and with the participation of representatives of Baku, Tiflis, Erivan, Batum, Ganja and other Party organisations, condemned the opposition's factional moves. The plenum called on the mass of Party members to rally closer round the Central Committee for the undeviating implementation of the Party's general line.⁴ The opposition managed to score some temporary successes in Penza, the Crimea, Simbirsk and several other places where the Party

¹ See M. A. Toloknov, *Borba Kommunisticheskoi partii za ukrepleniye yedinstva i uluchsheniye kachestvennogo sostava svoikh ryadov* (1923-May 1924) (The Communist Party's Struggle for Stronger Unity and Qualitative Improvement of Its Ranks [1923-May 1924]), Novocherkassk, 1967, p. 20.

² *Bakinsky rabochy* (Baku Worker), December 23, 1923.

³ See *Ocherki istorii Kommunisticheskoi partii Azerbaidzhana* (Essays on the History of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan), Baku, 1963, p. 390.

⁴ See *Bakinsky rabochy*, January 1, 1924.

organisations turned out to be infested with petty-bourgeois elements.

A Plenum of the RCP(B) Central Committee, which was also attended by members and alternate members of the Central Control Commission and two representatives of the CCC of the Ukraine, was held on January 14 and 15, 1924. It discussed the country's international position, and the tasks in the sphere of economic policy and Party construction, and made a preliminary summing-up of the Party discussion. It turned out that 98.7 per cent of the Communists had voted for the Central Committee's line and 1.3 per cent for the opposition, which got its support mainly in the offices and colleges.¹

K. Y. Voroshilov, N. A. Skrypnik, J. V. Stalin and other speakers at the Plenum sharply criticised the opposition's line and the behaviour of its leaders, Trotsky, Pyatakov, Antonov-Ovseyenko and Radek. Stalin motioned a proposal that the next Party Conference, the Thirteenth, should discuss, alongside various aspects of Party construction and economic policy, a special resolution on the results of the discussion. He said the resolution should characterise the activity of the Trotskyite opposition and state the measures capable of "safeguarding the Party in the future from the upheavals and the poison which had been injected in the heat of the discussion". Having discussed a report on the immediate tasks of economic policy and Party construction, the Plenum approved the CC resolution on economic questions and Party construction. After a detailed examination, the Plenum rejected Pyatakov's amendments to the resolution on economic questions. As a result, Pyatakov alone voted for the opposition's amendments.

Threats against the CC and against "arrogant leaders" rang in the speeches of Pyatakov and Antonov-Ovseyenko. Radek came out in defence of Trotsky and tried to prove to the Plenum that for all his "individual shades" Trotsky had never been a Menshevik, even when "he was adhering organisationally to the Mensheviks". These speeches were condemned by the Plenum. The participants in the Plenum also sharply criticised Radek's activity as the RCP(B) representative in the Comintern. In that responsible post, Radek tried

¹ See *KPSS. Spravochnik* (The CPSU Handbook), Moscow, 1963, p. 193.

to arouse the Comintern's Presidium and the leaders of the German and the Polish Communist Party against the RCP(B) Central Committee, and carried on agitation in favour of the opposition. The Plenum pointed out to Radek that he had the duty strictly to abide by the CC's decisions on international matters, and issued a stern warning to him and other oppositionists against carrying the factional fight into the Comintern.

The Thirteenth Conference of the RCP(B) opened on January 16, 1924, the day after the Plenum closed. The Conference unanimously adopted the resolutions, "On Party Construction", "On the Immediate Tasks of Economic Policy" and "On the International Situation". With the exception of three delegates, all voted for the resolution, "On the Results of the Discussion and on the Petty-Bourgeois Deviation in the Party", which said: "There is no doubt that this opposition is an objective reflection of the drive by the petty bourgeoisie against the positions of the proletarian Party and its policy. Already the principles of inner Party democracy are being given a broad interpretation outside the Party, in the sense of a weakened dictatorship of the proletariat and greater political rights for the new bourgeoisie."¹ The Conference pointed to the danger for the Party's unity and the future of socialism in the USSR which sprang from the activity of the Trotskyite opposition, and urged the Party organisations to carry on a vigorous fight against the petty-bourgeois deviation.

The Conference proposed the publication of Paragraph 7 of the resolution adopted by the Tenth Congress, "On Party Unity", which had not been made public earlier and which provided for measures of Party influence with respect to CC members engaged in factional activity. For the purpose of further consolidating the Party, it was decided to increase its working class core, to extend the efforts to explain the Party's policy, and to study the history of the Bolshevik struggle against Menshevism. Special attention was devoted to a correct organisation of Party work in the Army. All Party organs were instructed resolutely to cut short any attempt at factional activity in the Party organisations in the Army.

Considering the country-wide discussion at an end, the

¹ CPSU in the Resolutions and Decisions..., Part I, p. 782.

Conference called on all Party organisations to go on to the solution of the problems that lay ahead. Its resolution re-emphasised that solid Party unity was the main premise for preserving and further advancing the revolutionary gains. The decisions of the Thirteenth Party Conference gave the Party a clear programme of action and defined the tasks ahead in the further extension and strengthening of the Soviet Union's economic and political foundations. These documents were a reflection of the Party's single purpose in implementing the Leninist plan for socialist construction.

Strengthening Party Unity on the Basis of the Thirteenth Conference and the Thirteenth Congress of the RCP(B) Decisions

The Thirteenth Conference, having unanimously condemned the petty-bourgeois deviation of the Trotskyite opposition, set before the Party important tasks in developing the economy and improving Party work. Its decisions were a fresh expression of the Party's urge for the unity of its ranks. The conference worked out a broad programme of action in that direction for all Party organisations.

The Conference ended on January 18, 1924, and three days later came the terrible news that Lenin was dead. The Party, the Soviet people and all progressive mankind were in a state of profound grief. At that hour of sorrow the Party's unity with the labouring masses, the working class above all, was revealed with fresh force. There was a surge in the workers' desire to link their lot with the Communist Party. In the first few days after Lenin's death, 6,000 workers in Moscow and Moscow Region alone applied to join the Party. They wrote that they yearned to become Party members to dedicate themselves to implementing Lenin's precepts. Workers of the Vladimir Ilyich Works in Moscow wrote in their collective application: "We request the RCP cell to admit us into its midst—the Communist Party. The death of our dear leader, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, has made us realise that every politically conscious worker must be a vehicle of his ideas and must translate his precepts into life."¹ Similar applications were being received by Party committees throughout the country.

¹ Pravda, February 5, 1924.

Accordingly, a Plenum of the RCP(B) Central Committee held from January 29 to 31, 1924, adopted a decision, "On Enrolling Shopfloor Workers in the Party",¹ which defined the procedures for the Lenin Enrolment. The Party committees had the duty to help applicants obtain references from members who had the required Party record. Applications for membership were accepted from individuals and from whole collectives, but enrolment was carried out on each applicant's merits. The Plenum recommended a preliminary discussion of applicants at general workers' meetings at the enterprises, a procedure that helped to select the best men and women from the working class for the Party, and to consolidate its ties with the broad masses of the working people.

The Central Committee specifically drew the attention of Party organisations to the political education of those who joined during the Lenin Enrolment. It recommended that political education schools for the new candidate-members should have courses based on a study of the history of the Party and Leninism, concentrating on such subjects as "Lenin and the RCP", "Lenin in the Struggle for the Proletarian Dictatorship", "Lenin on NEP" and "Lenin on Party Construction".

During the Lenin Enrolment, almost 300,000 workers, peasants and Red Army men applied for membership in the Party. From February 1 to August 1, 1924, 203,000 persons were admitted as candidates for the Party.² Of these 190,000, or 93.8 per cent, were industrial or transport workers.³ In the first six months of 1924, the percentage of workers in the Party went up from 44 to 60 per cent.⁴

In that period, more than 25,000 workers joined the Moscow Party organisation. In the Leningrad organisation, the number of candidates for the Party increased from 6,500 on February 1, 1924, to 26,300 by June 1, or four times. In the Tula Party organisation, there had been 1,300 candidates by the start of the Lenin Enrolment, and 6,900 by the end of it, or five times more.⁵ In Penza, 1,079 shopfloor workers

¹ See *CPSU in the Resolutions and Decisions...*, Part I, pp. 809-11.

² See *Partiya v tsifrovom osveshchenii. Materialy po statistike lichnogo sostava partii* (The Party in the Light of Figures. Statistics on Party Membership), Moscow-Leningrad, 1925, p. 69 (further—*The Party in the Light of Figures...*).

³ *Ibid.*, p. 73.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 69.

had been admitted to the Party by May 1, 1924, increasing the percentage of workers in the gubernia Party organisation from 25 to 46 in four months.¹

The Lenin Enrolment strengthened the Party organisations in production. In early 1924, there were only 140 Communists, that is—32 per 1,000 workers—at the Putilov Works, but by mid-year they numbered 1,312-153 per 1,000 workers. At the Baltiisky Shipbuilding Works, the Lenin Enrolment increased the number of Communists from 45 to 215 per 1,000 workers.² The rapid growth in the numerical strength of Party organisations in production helped to enhance their role in the drive to rehabilitate and further develop industry. The Party's social make-up was improved, its unity and cohesion was consolidated, and its ties with the working class and all working people extended.

This policy of bringing about a sharp increase in Party membership by enlisting shopfloor workers was based on Lenin's precept about the leading role of the working class at every stage of the struggle for communist construction. Lenin had written: "Only a definite class, namely, the urban workers and the factory, industrial workers in general, is able to lead the whole mass of the working and exploited people in the struggle to throw off the yoke of capital, in actually carrying it out, in the struggle to maintain and consolidate the victory, in the work of creating the new, socialist social system and in the entire struggle for the complete abolition of classes."³ The working class exercises its leading role in the drive to transform society through its state and economic organs, the trade unions, co-operatives and young communist and other social organisations. The Communist Party is the best embodiment of working class influence on every aspect of society's life. The Lenin Enrolment, by assuring the Party of a predominantly working class make-up, intensified the influence of that class on every sphere of the Soviet people's life—production, economic, social, political and spiritual.

The January (1924) Plenum of the RCP(B) Central Committee also confirmed the resolutions of the 13th Party Conference "On the Results of the Discussion and on the Petty-

¹ See *Pod znamenem leninizma* (Under the Leninist Banner) No. 13, 1924, Penza, p. 13.

² See *The Party in the Light of Figures...*, p. 70.

³ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, p. 420.

Bourgeois Deviation in the Party", "On Party Construction" and "On the Immediate Tasks of Economic Policy". It entered an addendum to the resolution on the results of the discussion, drawing the attention of all local organisations where the discussion had assumed acute forms to the need to smooth things out as soon as possible and to consolidate full unity of Party ranks, which became imperative after Lenin's death.¹

The exposure of the petty-bourgeois substance of the Trotskyite opposition, the study by the mass of Party members of the Central Committee's concrete measures in Party construction and the economy, and the heightened responsibility falling on each Communist for the future of the Party and the state all went to strengthen the unity of the Party's ranks, and to wean away from Trotsky's anti-Party group the small number of primary organisations and individual members who had supported the opposition during the discussion.

The Party committees began to receive applications from individual Communists and resolutions adopted by meetings in Party organisations condemning their former views and giving assurances of support for the Central Committee's policy. By January 30, 1924, a general meeting of the Party cell of the Kremlin building workers passed a resolution in which the Communists censured their anti-Party attitudes during the discussion. It said that it was the duty of every member of the cell to strengthen the close cohesion, unity and confidence in the Party's Central Committee.²

During the discussion, the Trotskyite opposition had managed temporarily to win over the Party organisation at the Ikar Works in Moscow. But in early April, a general meeting of its members resolved: "To consider the cell's old line, adopted during the Party discussion in the spirit of the so-called opposition under the influence of demagogic speeches by some responsible comrades, to be erroneous, and to inform the Party district committee and the whole Moscow organisation that we are fully backing the all-Party Leninist line, which we consider the only correct one. . . . We believe it to be necessary to establish solid unity in the Party, not by a conciliatory blunting of edges between the contending

sides, but by rallying the Party on the platform of rock-like Leninist Bolshevism with a relentless sifting of everything that tends to deviate."¹

The shedding of Trotskyite influence by rank-and-file Party members then spread to the colleges and the offices. Thus, a general meeting of Party members and candidate members at the Second Moscow State University, having heard and discussed a report on the results of the Thirteenth Party Conference, fully adhered to its decisions, including its definition of the ideological substance of the opposition as a petty-bourgeois deviation within the Party. The meeting resolutely condemned a speech by Vorobyov, a student of the First Moscow State University, and a member of the Khamovniki District Party Committee, who had told a district Party meeting, allegedly on behalf of most student-Communists, that the All-Russia Party Conference did not express the views of the whole Party.²

The Trotskyites on the whole also failed in their attempt to range young people against the older generation in the Party. On January 17, 1924, a Plenum of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Youth League passed a decision exposing Trotsky's acts as clashing with the aims of "the revolutionary education of the new cadres of communist youth". During the discussion, the leaders of the Komsomol, Komsomol activists, students of Moscow higher schools and workers' training departments wrote articles for the press sharply rebuffing Trotsky's anti-Party actions.

"The Party discussion was a historic test for our League," said N. P. Chaplin, Secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee, in his report at the Sixth All-Union Congress of the Komsomol. "For the first time since the League was set up fundamental Party issues were raised which made each activist give deep thought about what Leninism is. The Komsomol has passed the test."³

While rank-and-file Party members, realising their errors, were censuring the stand they had taken during the discussion, the top oppositionists did not cease their subversive activity in the Party. Thus, Maximovsky, Zhakov, Sapronov and other oppositionists who had managed to infiltrate the

¹ See *CPSU in the Resolutions and Decisions...*, Part I, p. 807.

² See *Pravda*, February 10, 1924.

¹ *Pravda*, April 15, 1924.

² See *Pravda*, February 27, 1924.

³ *Pravda*, July 16, 1924.

leadership of the Party's Khamovniki District Committee, tried hard to frustrate the implementation of the decisions taken by the Thirteenth Party Conference. Under various pretexts, they prevented Communists who had actively fought Trotsky's anti-Party action during the discussion from being appointed to work in the district committee's apparatus.

For the purpose of extending their subversive activity in the district, the leadership of the Khamovniki District Committee set up a 33-man group of agitators handpicked for their loyalty to Trotskyite ideas and readiness to fight against the Central Committee's Leninist line. Among the agitators in this group were Preobrazhensky, Pyatakov, I. N. Smirnov, V. M. Smirnov, Drobnis, Stukov, Mdivani, Lentsner, Sapronov, and Maximovsky. In the hope of turning the Khamovniki District into a bridgehead for fresh battles against the Party, the opposition assembled there its forces from all the other districts of Moscow, including persons who had nothing to do with the district Party organisation. Thus, Preobrazhensky was registered with the Party cell at the Serp i Molot Works in the Rogozhsko-Simonovsky District; Pyatakov, in the cell of the Supreme Economic Council of the same district; Drobnis, in the cell of the 16th Printing Works of Krasnaya Presnya District; and I. N. Smirnov, in the cell of the Ikar Works in Bauman District. At the same time, the Trotskyite leadership of the district committee refused to use in this agitation work men like A. S. Bubnov¹ and V. G. Knorin, among other members of the Khamovniki District organisation, who had come out against the opposition during the discussion.²

But for all its pains, the Trotskyite leadership of Khamovniki District failed to carry the district Party organisation with it. The oppositionists had to give up the leadership of the district committee after two general meetings, which were attended by almost 4,000 members, and which gave full approval and support for the CC line.³ The new district committee fully expressed the views of the district Party organisation.

¹ Bubnov had signed the "Statement of 46", but already on December 15, 1923, he criticised his earlier views and dissociated himself from the group which, he said, "had actually started a campaign against the principles of Bolshevism's organisational policy" (*Pravda*, December 18, 1923).

² See *Pravda*, February 21, 1924.

³ See *Pravda*, May 13, 1924.

The participants in the Third Khamovniki Party Conference, which opened on May 9, 1924, sharply condemned the anti-Party activity of the old leadership, headed by Maximovsky, and declared that the change in the leadership had led to the establishment of the Party line in the district, to greater activity among the members of the organisation and closer contacts between the Party cells and the district committee. By an absolute majority the conference passed a resolution fully endorsing the CC's activity.¹

The opportunist activity of the leadership of the Moscow Uyezd Committee likewise ended in total failure. In a resolution on April 10, 1924, the Uyezd Committee itself admitted that its work and state of organisation were unsatisfactory. A conference of the Moscow Uyezd Party organisation held on April 20 and 21, heard a report and, by an absolute majority, adhered to this evaluation, emphasising that the old leadership had pursued the wrong political line. The conference elected a new Party committee.² In May 1924, the Twelfth Gubernia Party Conference noted that Party organisations in the gubernia had, as their conferences had shown, strengthened the cohesion of their ranks on the basis of Leninism, and had overcome the oppositionist vacillation which had occurred in the course of the discussion.³

As the explanatory and organisation work on the basis of the Thirteenth Party Conference decisions went forward, the opposition line was abandoned even by the provincial organisations which had supported it during the discussion. As a rule, these organisations had few workers among their members, so that petty-bourgeois ideology had an especially strong influence. The Penza Gubernia Party organisation was typical in this respect: during the discussion the opposition line was supported by two-thirds of the cells in the city of Penza and three uyezd organisations out of 13.

Penza Gubernia was a typically agricultural area. Of the 1,044,000 population over the age of 18, just over 40,000, or 3.85 per cent, were blue- and white-collar workers. More than 90 per cent of the population in the gubernia was engaged in agriculture. The workers were scattered among a great number of small factories mainly in the food and the

¹ See *Pravda*, May 13, 1924.

² *Pravda*, April 23, 1924.

³ *Pravda*, May 18, 1924.

wood-working industry. At the industrial and transport enterprises, the Party organisations were small. On January 1, 1924, workers made up only 25 per cent of the membership in the gubernia Party organisation.

The Trotskyite opposition in Penza was headed by members of the gubernia Party committee, I. Valentinov, head of the gubernia finance department, and Kosterin, editor of the gubernia newspaper, *Trudovaya pravda*. They managed to cobble a group consisting mainly of responsible workers in gubernia and city organisations, which distributed Trotskyite documents in the gubernia Party organisation and used *Trudovaya pravda* to mislead the masses.

Lies, demagogy and downright falsification were the main methods used by the Penza Trotskyites, who were faithfully imitating their mentors from the centre. Thus, on December 28, 1923, at a meeting of the Party cell of the local pipe factory to discuss the report, "On the Party's New Tasks", the Trotskyites made use of some delay in the payment of wages to suggest to the Communists that "the Party is not protecting the interests of the workers" because the country did not have "a dictatorship of the proletariat, but the Party's dictatorship over the proletariat". While paying lip service to the CC resolution on Party construction, the oppositionists insisted that it had the defect of not allowing freedom to set up factions and groups within the Party.

Under the influence of Trotskyite propaganda, a general meeting of the Penza City Party organisation of January 7, 1924, adopted a motion of no-confidence in the CC by 168 votes to 116. Three days later, the Trotskyites on the gubernia committee tried to obtain the backing of the plenary meeting of the Party's gubernia committee. However, by an absolute majority, the plenum rejected Kosterin's resolution and the oppositionists' amendments to a resolution of the gubernia committee's bureau on inner Party democracy.

Thereupon, with broad support from the Party activists, the gubernia committee started a resolute drive against the Trotskyites. On February 8, 1924, a general meeting of Penza City Communists, after hearing a report by D. Orlov, the gubernia committee secretary, "On the Results of the Work of the Thirteenth All-Russia Party Conference", unanimously passed a resolution approving the Conference's decisions.

Another general meeting of the city organisation was held in Penza on February 12, with A. V. Lunacharsky giving a report on the Party's tasks. The meeting endorsed the decisions of the Thirteenth Conference and urged every member of the Party to discard the various factional considerations and rally round the Central Committee. The resolution said: "The meeting sends its greetings to the Central Committee and declares that under its leadership and with our support for it, the Party will succeed in overcoming all obstacles on our way and in realising the precept of the Party's late leader, V. I. Lenin." The line of the Trotskyite opposition was exposed and condemned by the uyezd and city Party conferences held from February 5 to 25, 1924.

In their struggle against the anti-Party elements, the Communists of Penza were greatly assisted by M. K. Muranov, member of the RCP(B) Central Control Commission, whom its Presidium had appointed to head the gubernia commission to check up on the non-proletarian make-up of the Party organisation. Muranov, a loyal Leninist and a one-time member of the Bolshevik group in the Fourth Duma, delivered numerous speeches to show the true face of the Penza oppositionists and their mentors from the centre, and helped to see through to the real aims pursued by Trotsky and his supporters.

The Sixteenth Gubernia Party Conference was held in Penza from May 10 to 14, 1924, to discuss the tasks facing the organisation in view of the approaching Thirteenth Congress of the RCP(B). Speakers at the conference noted that the discussion within the Party had been a very painful one in the gubernia and that the turning point was reached only after the Thirteenth All-Russia Party Conference, when the whole organisation approved the CC line on Party construction and economic matters, and the Central Committee's assessment of the opposition's actions. The Conference worked out measures designed to invigorate the political activity of Party members in the fight against the petty-bourgeois ideology.

The decisions of the Thirteenth Conference also helped the Communists of the Crimea to expose the Trotskyite opposition, whose views there were being aggressively spread by some of the responsible workers headed by N. Ufimtsev, the regional Party secretary. On January 9, 1924, two members of the regional committee, N. Ufimtsev and S. Said-

Galiyev, motioned at a plenary meeting a resolution vindicating the actions of the opposition and alleging that Trotsky's speeches had not contained any opportunism or "any serious deviation from Leninism in general". The two men sought to convince the Party organisation that the Party's unity was being jeopardised not by Trotsky's supporters but by "some hot-headed leading comrades", with their "sharp personal attacks against Trotsky". At the following plenary meeting of the regional committee in February 1924, Ufimtsev, Said-Galiyev and their group of supporters continued to maintain the Trotskyite opposition's line.

However, the Trotskyites on the Crimea Regional Party Committee failed to win over all its members or the mass of Party members in the region. Even at the plenary meeting on January 9, 1924, the anti-Party actions of the Ufimtsev-Said-Galiyev group were given a fitting rebuff by a large section of its participants, above all, the Communists representing the Sevastopol city organisation.

The Ninth Crimea Regional Party Conference held at Simferopol from May 9 to 13, 1924, revealed the complete fiasco of the moves by the Trotskyite opposition. At the conference, the report on the Central Committee's activity was given by A. S. Bubnov, and the participants in the conference met with applause his statement that the behaviour of Trotsky and his accomplices in the leadership of the Crimea Regional Party organisation was harmful and contrary to the Party's interests.

On Bubnov's report, the conference adopted a resolution approving the CC line as "having ensured the Party's successful solution of all the major tasks in international, economic, national and inner Party policy". It underlined that the CC was conducting a correct and consistent line on questions of improving Party activity. In the elections of the leading Party organs, the delegates withdrew their confidence from the pro-Trotskyite leadership and elected other men to the regional committee and the regional control commission from among those who had taken a firm Leninist stand during the inner Party discussion.

Party conferences were held in all gubernia, regional and republican organisations in May 1924. Everywhere the Communists demonstrated their unity of thought and action, endorsing the Central Committee's line in exposing the petty-bourgeois substance of the Trotskyite opposition. Summing

up the results of these conferences, *Pravda* observed: "If after the January All-Union Conference anyone had still hope of widening the cracks and breaches in our Party, nothing now remains of these hopes. In Moscow, Leningrad, Nizhny Novgorod, the Urals, the Ukraine, Armenia and Azerbaijan—all over the country—delegates have endorsed the CC line with the greatest and not at all surprising unanimity, issuing a resolute condemnation of those who had wanted to betray the Leninist principles of Party organisation and to divert it from the firm Leninist path."¹ Life itself provided the touchstone for the Central Committee's policy. It took only a few months for the Trotskyite opposition's attacks on the Party to be revealed as unfounded and mendacious.

The Party refuted the Trotskyite arguments both in theoretical and in practical terms. The implementation of the measures it had mapped out in the sphere of the economy promoted the further consolidation of the economy. By mid-1924, the marketing crisis was in the main overcome, and the price spread between industrial goods and farm produce was markedly reduced. The completion of the monetary reform helped to stabilise the parity of the ruble, laid a sound financial foundation for economic development and helped to improve the working people's material conditions. At the end of April 1924, the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars issued their decree on the single agricultural tax, which was calculated in gold rubles and levied entirely in cash. The introduction of the single agricultural tax helped considerably to intensify the financial drive against the kulaks and to consolidate the middle and poor peasant farms.

The People's Commissariat for Internal Trade was set up in May 1924, a measure designed to enhance the state direction of trade, to improve the operation of trading bodies and, consequently, to oust private capital from the sphere of trade. Contrary to the Trotskyite prediction of a looming crisis and the sway of private capital, the Party's economic policy led to a further strengthening of the commanding positions of socialism in the economy, the rise in the living standards of the working people, and even closer cohesion of the working class and the peasantry round the Party's

¹ *Pravda*, May 18, 1924.

slogans. Evidence came from numerous letters written by workers to the Central Committee and the Thirteenth Congress which was then in session. One such letter from the workers of the Krasnoye Sormovo Works said: "Today, as in the past, we place our full trust only in the Communist Party, and swear that under the leadership of the old Bolshevik guard we shall fully carry out Lenin's precepts, despite the hardships we have to overcome."¹

The opposition was prophesying that the Party's foreign policy would be a fiasco. However, the "period of recognition" of the USSR by other states in 1924 provided more good evidence that the Party was following a correct foreign-policy line and testified to the Soviet Republic's growing prestige.

The opposition had accused the Party of undergoing "bureaucratic degeneration" and of damping down initiative and freedom of action among the Party's rank and file. These inventions were blasted by reality. The Party's measures in the sphere of Party construction helped to strengthen the collective principle in the Party leadership, which involved more extensive election of leading Party organs, enlistment of a broader circle of Communists for work on standing commissions under Party committees, and periodical reports by the heads of Party bodies to Party members.

Political activity of Party members and all working people was especially vigorous during preparations for the Thirteenth Party Congress. Under a CC decision, the Party press carried the theses of the reports on the main items of the agenda for broad discussion. *Pravda* printed eight pre-congress discussion sheets, in which Communists expressed their views on these items. The theses of the reports were broadly discussed at Party meetings.

During the discussion, workers, peasants, Party, Soviet government and economic workers made valuable proposals for improving the activity of local Party, state and co-operative bodies.

The Thirteenth Congress of the RCP(B), held from May 23 to 31, 1924, demonstrated the Party's unity and cohesion and its loyalty to Lenin's precepts. The Congress broadly discussed various aspects of inner Party life and Party organisation. Economic problems, connected with the further

¹ Thirteenth Congress of the RCP(B)... p. 19.

consolidation of the bond between socialist industry and agriculture, and consolidation of the alliance between the working class and the peasantry, were very prominent at the Congress. It gave the most serious attention to ideological work and ideological and political education of all Party members, especially those who had joined in the Lenin Enrolment.

During the discussion of the CC's political and organisational reports, the Trotskyites once again tried to involve the Party in a discussion of matters that had been settled. In their speeches at the Congress, Trotsky and Preobrazhensky strove to justify their anti-Party conduct. Trotsky gave the principles of inner Party democracy a demagogic reading and once again declared that the CC's line on inner Party construction was wrong. He said that "certain passages" in the decisions taken by the Thirteenth Party Conference were "wrong and unjust" and declared that he did not agree with his stand being described as a petty-bourgeois deviation in the Party. Preobrazhensky tried to prove that his economic "amendments" had been correct, and opposed a purge of Party cells in the non-productive sector and the ban on factions and groupings.

The fresh attempts of the Trotskyites to impose their opportunist views on the Congress were a complete failure. Delegates D. Z. Manuilsky, V. V. Kuibyshev, Y. E. Rudzutak, N. P. Chaplin, Y. Yaroslavsky and others, and J. V. Stalin in his concluding speech on organisational questions, said quite clearly that the Trotskyites sought to destroy the Leninist principles of the Party's organisational structure and to get it off the path of socialist construction indicated by Lenin. Rukhimovich, Rudzutak and other delegates exposed the opposition and declared that in overcoming the crisis in marketing, planning and organisation of foreign trade the Party had acted on Lenin's precepts and the decisions of the Party's Twelfth Congress, and not on the opposition's recipes. They said that the policy of large-scale imports of industrial goods, which the opposition was trying to foist on the Party, was not a proletarian but a petty-bourgeois policy. Y. E. Rudzutak recalled that the workers had been right in supporting the decision of the Council of Labour and Defence to import cotton and had rejected the opposition's proposal to import cotton fabrics.¹

¹ See Thirteenth Congress of the RCP(B)... p. 197.

The Congress approved the CC's economic policy, pointed out the opposition's complete failure on economic questions, and authorised the Central Committee to continue to show the utmost circumspection in leasing any concessions, to take a firm stand on the foreign trade monopoly, to develop the export of grain, and see to the consolidation of the active foreign trade balance.

At the Congress, Zinoviev was the only speaker to say that the Trotskyites were "the most sincere among the opponents of the Party's Central Committee".¹ For Zinoviev, this attitude was not accidental. He had shared many of Trotsky's views, and even before the discussion had offered his support in doing away with the Politburo and in reorganising the CC Secretariat. There was also good reason for Zinoviev's distortions in the article which opened the discussion in the press of various aspects of inner Party life.

The Congress gave full approval to the Central Committee's activity, emphasising that it had taken a firm stand and displayed Bolshevik implacability in the struggle against the opposition. It approved the resolutions of the Thirteenth Party Conference, "On Party Construction" and "On the Results of the Discussion and on the Petty-Bourgeois Deviation in the Party", incorporating these resolutions with the decisions of the Thirteenth Congress of the RCP(B) as its own. The Congress authorised the Central Committee to continue, with the same resolution and boldness, to safeguard Party unity and the Bolshevik line from any deviations whatsoever. Its resolution said: "After the Party had lost Comrade Lenin, the cause of ensuring full Party unity became even more important and necessary than before. There must be the most stringent action against the slightest factionalism. The RCP's steadfastness and solid unity, on the basis of the fundamental principles of Leninism, are the most important premise for the revolution's further successes."²

The defeat of the Trotskyites' attempts to dismantle the Leninist Party was the key condition for preserving and further strengthening the unity and cohesion not only of the RCP(B) but of all the fraternal Communist Parties. William Z. Foster, prominent leader of the Communist Party of the

USA and the world Communist movement, assessing the importance of the struggle of the CPSU against the Trotskyites' moves, said that "in this fight not only was the fate of the Revolution in Russia at stake, but also that of the world Communist movement. A victory for the Trotsky forces would have been a decisive success for world reaction."³

Communists abroad kept a close watch on the discussion in the RCP(B). Let us note that when the discussion assumed extensive proportions, the Communists of Berlin, basing their judgement on the earliest reports in the press, came out in favour of the Central Committee's line. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany declared that the Party organisation of Berlin and all German Communists supported the RCP(B) Central Committee, and resolutely condemned Trotsky's anti-Leninist attitude.⁴

In the French Communist Party, the Rightists, led by Souvarine and Rosmer, tried to induce the rank-and-file members to support the Trotskyite opposition, but they were given a rebuff by the delegates of the National Council (Conference) of the French Communist Party, which met on June 1, 1924. By 2,353 votes to 15, the National Council approved the CC line on all the outstanding issues.⁵ Support for the RCP(B) Central Committee also came from other Communist Parties, among them those of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Finland and Estonia.

The Fifth Congress of the Communist International, attended by delegates from 46 Communist Parties, met on June 17-July 8, 1924, soon after the Thirteenth Congress of the RCP(B). The second sitting of the Congress was a day symbolising the loyalty of the Communists of the world to Lenin's precepts: together with Moscow workers, the delegates assembled by Lenin's tomb in the Red Square to hear M. I. Kalinin's report, "Leninism and the Comintern".⁶

The Congress of the Comintern devoted much attention to the RCP(B) discussion and the economic situation in the

¹ William Z. Foster, *History of the Three Internationals*, New York, 1955, p. 349.

² See *Thirteenth Congress of the RCP(B)*... p. 26.

³ See *Pravda*, June 3, 1924.

⁴ *The Fifth World Congress of the Communist International. Verbatim Report*, Part I, Moscow-Leningrad, 1925, p. 33.

¹ *Thirteenth Congress of the RCP(B)*... p. 40.

² *CPSU in the Resolutions and Decisions*... Part II, pp. 13-14.

USSR. Its resolution, "On the Economic Situation in the USSR and the Discussion in the RCP", pointed out that success in the struggle against the capitalist encirclement and assurance of the USSR's development towards communism required revolutionary tenacity and internal cohesion from all the members of the Russian Communist Party. Having discussed the struggle against Trotskyism within the RCP(B), the Congress endorsed the resolution of the Thirteenth Conference and the Thirteenth Congress of the RCP(B) on the petty-bourgeois essence of the Trotskyite opposition, and published it as its own decision binding on all the Communist Parties.

The Congress gave much attention to the Communist Parties' assimilating the ideological, tactical and organisational principles of Leninism, necessitating a reckoning with the concrete situation and the political and historical conditions of development in each country. Development of the Communist Parties on Bolshevik lines was a vital requirement for the further advance of the world communist movement. Bela Kun, a prominent leader of the Hungarian and world Communist movement, wrote in this context: "It is only by assimilating the enormous revolutionary experience embodied in Leninism, that the Communist Parties will be able to adopt towards every revolutionary event an independent and critical attitude."¹

Accordingly, the Congress decisions defined the principal tasks of the Communist Parties. These were to work for massive Party organisations, for stronger ties with the working class, and all sections of the working people, for establishing the principles of democratic centralism in the fraternal parties, and for subordinating all their day-to-day effort to the attainment of the ultimate goal: the triumph of communist ideals.

The decisions of the Fifth Congress of the Comintern dealt a blow at the schemes of the Trotskyite groupings and promoted the further consolidation of the world communist movement on the basis of Leninism. A big contribution to the cohesion of the Communists' ranks throughout the world was made by the RCP(B), the first to show the danger of Trotskyite anti-revolutionary slogans.

¹ *The Communist International* No. 2, 1924, p. 112.

Trotskyism's Ideological Defeat in the Inner Party Discussion in Late 1924. Failure of Trotsky's Attempt to Substitute Trotskyism for Leninism

The inner Party discussion at the end of 1923 and in early 1924 ended in defeat for the Trotskyite opposition. The anti-Party stand of Trotsky and his supporters was sharply condemned by the decisions of the Thirteenth Conference and the Thirteenth Congress of the RCP(B). The Fifth Congress of the Comintern, having approved these decisions, pointed to the need of fighting the manifestations of Trotskyism in the ranks of the international communist movement. In spite of this, the Trotskyites did not cease their splitting activity. In fact, they made use of Lenin's death to intensify it. Once again they tried to revise the fundamental principles of Marxist-Leninist theory. In a series of articles and pamphlets published in 1924, Trotsky, Preobrazhensky and Radek, among others, hypocritically styled themselves consistent Leninists, while actually slandering Lenin. They pretended to spread Lenin's ideas, but in fact revised Leninism, striving to set up Trotskyism in its place, and distorting the history of the Communist Party.

In his pamphlet, *The New Line*, issued the day the Thirteenth Party Conference opened, Trotsky declared that Leninism had changed its ideas, and alleged that the "permanent revolution" theory was identical with the "main strategic line of Bolshevism". He said that the Party's development up to April 1917 was a "preparatory period" of minor importance in its history. This idea of "dissecting" Bolshevism was designed to back up his claim that in the period before the October Revolution Bolshevism had merged with Trotskyism, this being the only reason why it was able to fulfil its historic mission.

Preobrazhensky also preached the "dissection" of Bolshevism. His article, "Marxism and Leninism", and his book, *V. I. Lenin*, purveyed the idea that a distinction should be drawn between two periods of Leninism: one before the First World War, and the other after it. Like Trotsky, Preobrazhensky deliberately denied the Leninism of "the first period" any importance of its own. He wrote: "If, to our misfortune, Comrade Lenin would have ended his existence before the start of the world war, it would not have occurred to anyone of us to speak of Leninism as of some special

edition of Marxism, as it subsequently became."¹ Preobrazhensky asserted that the "second period" of Leninism did not "in any sense flow logically from the first".² By this line of argument, Preobrazhensky tried to reinforce Trotsky's anti-Leninist idea that Trotskyism had "anticipated" Leninism.

The Trotskyite publications about Lenin, while minimising his role as theorist, founder of the new type of party, leader of the Great October Socialist Revolution and founder of the world's first socialist state, tried hard to build up a personal cult of Trotsky, in an effort to produce the "theory" that the proletarian revolution had two leaders—Trotsky and Lenin. Trotskyite reviewers of Trotsky's reminiscences of Lenin wrote with a ready pen that "apart from its direct task, Trotsky's work makes it easier for us to understand the majestic figure of Trotsky himself".³

Trotsky revised the history of the Party and concentrated his attacks on the Leninist line of building socialism in one, separate country. In the summer of 1924, he continued his efforts to sow scepticism about the Party's economic policy and complained that "the humdrum daily round of the revolution tends to erode the revolutionary experience".⁴ He flatly declared that "neither communism nor even socialism can be built with the peasant wooden plough". Trotsky said that the construction of socialism required a high technical level and declared that such a level could be reached only "if we take over the whole capitalist world".⁵ Trotsky strove to divert the Party and the Soviet people onto the path of giving world revolution a "push" and aggravating the international situation to the point of war. These Trotskyite attacks against Leninism met with resolute rebuff.

The Party's struggle against Trotskyism became especially acute in November and December 1924, following the publication of Trotsky's article, "The Lessons of October", which he had written as an introduction to Volume III of his works. It gave the gist of Trotsky's revisionist views. He revised Leninism as a whole, notably Lenin's doctrine of the motive forces of the Russian revolution, preached his own "perma-

nent revolution" doctrine, and distorted the history of the October Revolution and the role of the Party and Lenin in it.

In passing, Trotsky accused the Comintern leadership of incomprehending and failing to act on the lessons of the October Revolution, and blamed it for the defeat of the revolutionary action in Bulgaria and Germany in 1923. Trotsky's fresh statement threatened to inflict great harm on the Party, the cause of socialist construction in the USSR, and the revolutionary effort of the fraternal Communist Parties. It was necessary to show the members of the Party and all working people the anti-Leninist substance of Trotskyism, and to put an end to Trotskyism as an ideological trend.

Many members of the Leninist guard urged the need to exorcise the "evil spirit" of Trotskyism in the Party. G. I. Petrovsky told the January (1925) Plenum of the RCP(B) Central Committee: "Our Party has matured, and while initially we were unable and did not have the time to pay attention to what Trotsky wrote in 1905 and in his subsequent works, now that we are free of war and the fight against the counter-revolution we can take a closer look at the literary writings not only of Trotsky himself." Y. Yaroslavsky motioned that there should be "an absolutely definite, totally unobscured demarcation line with Trotsky, so that we should know quite clearly who is now with Trotsky and who is with the Party—against that absolutely intolerable un-Bolshevik stand which Trotsky has taken".

The periodical press carried dozens of articles exposing Trotsky's revisionist aspirations. From November 1924 to January 1925, some 40 articles and speeches, and over 20 collections and pamphlets were published in Moscow alone. Collections of Lenin's articles exposing the opportunist substance of Trotskyism and books and pamphlets describing the Party's struggle against Trotskyism were issued in large printings. A great part in the ideological defeat of Trotskyism was played by J. V. Stalin's article, "The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists", and his speech at the Plenary Meeting of the Communist group of the All-Russia Central Trade Union Council, "Trotskyism or Leninism?", in November 1924, and also articles in the press and speeches at meetings of Party activists by A. S. Bubnov, N. K. Krupskaya, M. S. Olminsky, M. V. Frunze, F. E. Dzerzhinsky, A. I. Mikoyan, S. M. Kirov,

¹ *Bolshevik*, 1924, No. 11, p. 23.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Pravda*, August 29, 1924.

⁴ *Pravda*, September 6, 1924.

⁵ *Pravda*, August 5, 1924.

I. M. Vareikis, O. V. Kuusinen, V. Kolarov and other prominent members of the Bolshevik Party and the Communist International.

In his speech at the Plenary Meeting of the Communist group of the All-Russia Central Trade Union Council on November 19, 1924, Stalin described the curious methods used by the Trotskyites who fought against Leninism in that period. They remained invariably hostile to Leninism but no longer dared to come out against Leninism as a bellicose force, preferring to "operate under the general banner of Leninism and act under the slogan of interpreting and improving Leninism". The new Trotskyism did not consider it necessary to take an open stand for the "permanent revolution" theory. It kept saying that the October Revolution had fully vindicated the idea of the "permanent revolution".

In that period, the Party directed its main blow against the Trotskyites' attempts to dissect Leninism into the "old" and "unfit" Leninism and the "new", postwar, October Leninism. Veterans of the Leninist Party exposed the secret purpose of the "dissection" theory as an effort to facilitate the inclusion into Leninism of the one-time adversaries of Bolshevism.¹

In its fight against the Trotskyite theory of two "inequivalent" and two "logically" separate periods in the history of the Bolshevik Party, the RCP(B) based itself entirely on Lenin's precepts. After all, it was Lenin who wrote in 1920, looking back to the Party's historical experience, that "as a current of political thought and as a political party, Bolshevism has existed since 1903. Only the history of Bolshevism during the *entire* period of its existence can satisfactorily explain why it has been able to build up and maintain, under most difficult conditions, the iron discipline needed for the victory of the proletariat".² Lenin said the Bolshevik Party's successes were due not only to the fact that it was based on the sound foundation of Marxist theory, but also to the fact that "Bolshevism, which had arisen on this granite foundation of theory, went through fifteen years of practical history (1903-1917) unequalled anywhere in the world in its wealth of experience".³

¹ See E. I. Kviring, *Zachatki revizii leninizma u Preobrazhenskogo* (First Signs of Preobrazhensky's Revision of Leninism), Kharkov, 1924, p. 9.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 24.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

In view of the fact that there were elements in the history and the present-day tactics of Bolshevism that were generally applicable, generally significant and generally imperative for all the Communist Parties of the world, Lenin drew the Communists' attention to the need for making a coherent study of the history of Bolshevism at every stage of its development. Only then was it possible to understand the specific features and regularities in the development of the new type of proletarian party, its strategy and tactics, skill in using and changing various forms and methods of struggle depending on the concrete conditions, and also the fundamental features of the Russian revolution, like the dictatorship of the proletariat, the alliance of the working class and the mass of labouring peasants, and the leading role of the Communist Party, as the principal regularities of transition from capitalism to socialism in all countries.

The Communists, opposing the Trotskyites' literary "exercises" and taking a stand for the Leninist approach to the study of Bolshevism's historical experience, made it quite clear that the fresh falsification of Leninism was essentially aimed against the Party and rested on the urge to whitewash Trotsky's open fight against Bolshevism until 1917 and to connect the Bolshevik Party's successes in the October Revolution with Trotsky's personality and his "permanent revolution" doctrine. That is precisely the idea that Radek strove to insinuate into the minds of his readers when he declared that the "permanent revolution" doctrine, while being premature in the 1905 situation, had been borne out by the course of the Great October Revolution, in fact constituting the "second stage in the historical development" of the revolution.¹ In his "The Lessons of October", Trotsky blatantly declared that his views of the advance of the Russian revolution, as set out in a series of articles in March 1917, were "in complete accord with the analysis of the revolution given by Lenin in his 'Letters from Afar'". Trotsky asserted that from the very first days of his arrival in Petrograd (May 5, 1917), he had based all his work "on absolute co-ordination" with the Bolshevik Central Committee, "fully and entirely" backing the Leninist policy of a proletarian take-over, and not having "even a shade of difference with Lenin" over the peasantry.

¹ See *Pravda*, February 21, 1924.

Trotsky's supporters, like the editor of his works, N. Lentsner, added "depth" to this idea by declaring that Trotsky's letters from America had "fully anticipated" Lenin's "Letters from Afar", subsequently the basis of his April Theses. All these statements had one far-reaching aim: to set up Trotsky as a theorist and leader of the October Revolution and to put him on the same footing with Lenin, thereby not only obscuring the substance of the Party's ideological struggle against Trotskyism at that time, but also creating the impression that it was not Lenin's theory of socialist revolution, but Trotsky's "permanent revolution" writings that constituted the basis of the Bolshevik Party's strategy and tactics in the October Revolution. Consequently, Trotsky's arguments seemed to suggest that the development of the Communist Parties of the Comintern on Bolshevik lines, which had been broadly going forward under the decisions of the Fifth Congress of the Comintern, and preparations by the Communists abroad for the "hour of their own October" had to be based not on Lenin's ideas and the experience of the RCP(B) but on Trotsky's conceptions.

The Trotskyite falsifiers were rebuffed and exposed by Party writers. The Party's documents and the works of Lenin helped to destroy the myth of Trotsky's ideological kinship with the Bolshevik Party and Lenin from early 1917 on. Actually, Trotsky's activity in the USA, his writing for *Novy mir*, a newspaper of socialist émigrés from Russia, provided firm evidence that at the time Trotsky had joined the Rightist group and had together with them attacked the Bolsheviks and all Leftist supporters of Zimmerwald.¹ That is precisely why, in a letter to A. M. Kollontai on February 17, 1917, Lenin urged exposure of Trotsky's subversive activity behind a screen of "Leftist" talk.²

Speaking subsequently at the Petrograd City Conference of the RSDLP(B) on May 5, 1917, Lenin sharply condemned the proposal put forward by some Party comrades to set up, during the municipal elections, a bloc of Bolsheviks and men like Chkhaidze and Trotsky. Lenin told the conference: "Who are we to form the bloc with? . . . Chkhaidze is the worst screen for defencism. When publishing his paper in Paris, Trotsky

failed to make clear whether he was for or against Chkhaidze. We have always spoken out against Chkhaidze, because he is a fine screen for chauvinism. Trotsky failed to do his i's".¹

In that period another document of Lenin's—a plan he wrote after May 6 for a pamphlet he intended to write about the April Conference—also urged the need to combat Trotsky's line. In the new conditions, he said, the Party's main task was to combat the petty-bourgeois vacillations in the coming revolution, which was bound to be a "*thousand times stronger than the February revolution*". Among those who expressed these vacillations, Lenin said, was Trotsky.²

Before joining the Party, Trotsky had organisational links with the conciliators and opponents of Bolshevism. As for Trotsky's letters from the USA, they had nothing in common with Lenin's theory of socialist revolution. In his letters he re-asserted the fundamentally incorrect, anti-Party slogan of "No tsar, but a workers' government", which meant a revolution without the peasantry, and a leaping over the stage of democratic revolution.

Lenin at once found it necessary to draw a line between his own and Trotsky's extremely adventurous stand. In his "Letters on Tactics" (April 1917), he made a point of emphasising that Trotsky's slogan was wrong for it failed to reckon with the motive forces and the pace of the revolution. Lenin qualified the "No Tsar, but a workers' government" slogan as a "playing at 'seizure of power'", as a "kind of Blanquist adventurism".³

Trotsky excluded the peasantry as the proletariat's ally in the socialist revolution and argued that a workers' government in Russia could stay in power only if it received direct state support from the working class of Western Europe. This idea was aimed against Lenin's conclusion that the socialist revolution could initially win out in one, separate country. During the 1924 discussion of "The Lessons of October", the Communists exposed the idea that Trotsky had "anticipated" Lenin, and proved it to be quite absurd. Stalin pointed out that "Trotsky's 'permanent revolution' is

¹ *Zimmerwald*—a conference of socialist internationalists from various countries held at Zimmerwald, Switzerland, in September 1915.

² See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 35, p. 285.

¹ *Sedmaya (Aprelskaya) Vserossiiskaya konferentsiya RSDRP (bol'shevikov)*. Protokoly (Seventh [April] All-Russia Conference of the RSDLP(B). Proceedings), Moscow, 1958, p. 47.

² *Lenin Miscellany IV*, p. 290 (in Russian).

³ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, p. 48.

a variety of Menshevism . . . and leads to the *repudiation* of Lenin's theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat".¹

In preaching an anti-Leninist line on the relations between the proletariat and the peasantry, Trotsky strove ideologically to disarm the Party and the working class and to undermine their confidence in the possibility of a socialist victory in the USSR, thereby driving them to a passive attitude. A resolution of the January (1925) Plenum of the RCP(B) Central Committee said: "Mistakes on this question are especially dangerous now that the Party, implementing its 'face the countryside' slogan, is working hard to consolidate the bond between urban industry and the peasant economy . . . now that any further success or lack of success for the revolution depends precisely on how correct or incorrect the relations between the proletariat and the peasantry are."² By exposing the opportunist substance of the "permanent revolution" doctrine, the Party safeguarded the Leninist doctrine of socialist revolution and showed that Leninism was of world-wide historic importance.

During the discussion, the Communist Party devoted much attention to exposing the Trotskyite distortions of the history of the October Revolution. Those who had actually taken part in the Revolution gave a true picture of the struggle to carry it to victory. They provided good evidence to show Lenin's outstanding role as the man who inspired and organised the socialist revolution, and to expose Trotsky's lying assertions about there having been sharp contradictions between Lenin and other members of the Central Committee in evaluating the April and the June demonstrations, and about there having been a prevailing Right-wing deviation in the Party on the eve of the revolution.

In "The Lessons of October", Trotsky asserted that Lenin's call at the Finlandsky Railway Station for struggle to carry the socialist revolution to victory had the effect of a "bombshell" on many Party leaders, and that upon his return to Russia Lenin had been quite alone for some time and had faced resistance from many members of the Central Committee, above all its "Right wing". Trotsky asserted that the April demonstration was a sharp issue between Lenin and other Party leaders. He alleged that Lenin had wanted an

armed April demonstration, with the slogan of "Down with the Provisional Government!", for he had seen it as a "reconnaissance sortie to probe the mood of the masses". Trotsky declared that this had given the "Right wing" of the CC ground to accuse Lenin of Blanquism.

These inventions of Trotsky's are totally refuted by Lenin's articles "Lessons of the Crisis", "How a Simple Question Can Be Confused", "Foolish Gloating", and other works written in the spring of 1917, which show that in April 1917 Lenin, together with a majority of the Central Committee, opposed those individuals who were inclined to demand an immediate overthrow of the Provisional Government, and action by separate armed groups. He condemned the attempts of the "Leftists" on the Petersburg Committee of the RSDLP (Bagdatyev and others) to take a stand "just Left of the CC" and branded the Mensheviks' inflation of this fact as "stupid gloating".

Consequently, the April demonstration had never been an issue between Lenin and the CC of the RSDLP. Lenin had never tried to force the pace of events, and had never taken a stand "Left" of the CC line on this matter. It was not the "Right wing" that had accused Lenin of Blanquism, but it was he who had criticised Bagdatyev for his Blanquism. Speeches at meetings and articles in the press by Communists showed that Trotsky had an axe to grind: trying to misrepresent and minimise the role of Lenin and the whole Central Committee, and to exalt his own personality during the preparation and carrying out of the October Revolution.

In fact, it was the Party's unity that had been one of the most important factors in securing the victory of the Great October Revolution. The Party may have had to carry on a struggle within its ranks, but only against such isolated groups as Bagdatyev's. But it had to carry on a much longer and more involved struggle against the Right-opportunist group of Kamenev and Zinoviev, and also against Trotsky's camouflaged and double-dealing line in September and October 1917. Lenin exposed Trotsky's anti-Party stand on the uprising, although it had been painstakingly camouflaged. Let us recall that, without openly attacking Lenin's plan for an armed uprising, Trotsky proposed that it should be delayed until the opening of the All-Russia Congress of Soviets, although he was well aware that the Menshevik and SR

¹ J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 6, 1953, pp. 385-86.

² CPSU in the Resolutions and Decisions . . . , Part II, p. 111.

leaders of the Central Executive Committee, who were losing their majority in the Soviets, were working hard to torpedo the Congress, to disrupt the activity of the Soviets, and eventually to do away with them. Trotsky's plan doomed the revolution to defeat. Lenin said his attitude was either *utter idiocy or sheer treachery*, and urged the Central Committee to overcome it at all costs.¹

In a retrospective effort to clear himself and parade as a leader of the revolution, Trotsky gave, in "The Lessons of October", a distorted picture of the armed uprising and the question of its timing. He declared that the October armed uprising had allegedly been carried out in two stages. He claimed that the outcome had already been predetermined, to the extent of three-quarters, if not more, as early as October 9, 1917, when the Petrograd Soviet, of which Trotsky was Chairman, adopted a resolution refusing to carry out the Provisional Government's order to pull out the troops. Moreover, Trotsky completely denied that the Bolshevik Party's Central Committee and local Party organisations had taken part in preparing and directing revolutionary action throughout the country following the October armed uprising in Petrograd.

And so we find Trotsky claiming to have been alone at the centre of the leadership in the October events, and alleging the decision of the Petrograd Soviet not to pull out the troops to have given the impetus to all the main developments. The rest, he averred, was nothing but "a small auxiliary uprising" impelled by the force of momentum. This totally discounted the importance of the CC meetings on October 10 and 16, which decided on the uprising, and played down the role of Lenin, from whom the direct leadership in the uprising had come. The issue was decided only by the armed uprising on October 24-25, which overthrew the Provisional Government and gave power to the Soviets. It was not the force of momentum but the Party's extensive organisational and ideological effort at the centre and in the localities that had ensured the triumphal advance of the Soviet power.

The discussion of "The Lessons of October" helped to expose Trotsky's subversive activity against the world communist movement and exploded Trotsky's demagogic charges

¹ See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 26, p. 82.

against the RCP(B) Central Committee and the Executive Committee of the Comintern, alleging that they had been responsible for the defeat of the European proletariat in 1923. V. Kolarov, a leader of the Bulgarian and international communist movement, wrote on this score: "Nothing but vacillation, confusion and bewilderment is being introduced by 'The Lessons of October' into the effort of the Comintern's revolutionary construction, that is, the establishment of real Bolshevik Parties capable of organising victory in the proletariat's struggle for power."¹

The representatives of the Communist Parties in the Third International showed that the defeat of the revolutionary action by the European proletariat in 1923 was due mainly to the lack of experience among the Parties and the masses in these countries. Trotsky's attempts to put the blame on the RCP(B) Central Committee and the Executive Committee of the Comintern were in fact a veiled attack against the line of the Third International and against the need for the Communist Parties to assimilate Leninism on various questions of the socialist revolution.

The class enemies inside the country met with approval the attacks by Trotsky and his supporters against the Party's general line. Former SRs, Mensheviks and bourgeois nationalists stepped up their anti-Soviet activity. At the end of 1924, counter-revolutionary action was mounted by the Mensheviks in several uyezds in Georgia, and leaflets against the Soviet power and the Communist Party appeared in some towns. The leaders of the Second International tried to use Trotsky's fresh attacks against the fundamentals of Leninism in order to discredit Leninism and to minimise the importance of the October Socialist Revolution in the eyes of the working masses of Europe, thereby undermining the authority of the Parties within the Communist International.

D. Z. Manuisky told the January (1925) Plenum of the RCP(B) Central Committee that "Trotsky is becoming a centre of attraction for all the Rightists on an international scale". The whole Party opposed Trotsky's opportunist views and actions. The vigorous and convincing speeches and articles by members of the old Leninist guard helped the broad masses of Communists and non-Party people to understand the anti-Leninist substance of Trotskyism and led to a fur-

¹ *Pravda*, December 20, 1924.

ther consolidation of the forces of the Party and the people round the Central Committee.

In the 1924 discussion, all the Party organisations in the country were unanimous in condemning Trotsky's revisionist schemes. A meeting of the Party's Moscow Committee, with the participation of Party activists, resolutely branded Trotsky's fresh attacks as "a gross distortion of the history of Bolshevism and the history of the October Revolution". Speakers at the meeting pointed out that Trotsky's article was a continuation of the fight against the governing bodies of the Party and the Comintern, which he had been ceaselessly conducting from the autumn of 1923. The meeting of activists asked the Party's Central Committee to discuss this matter at its next Plenum and to take resolute steps to prevent any distortion of the fundamental ideas of Bolshevism and the history of the Party and the October Revolution.¹

On November 29 and 30, 1924, a plenum of the Ivanovo-Voznesensk Gubernia Party Committee discussed Trotsky's "The Lessons of October" and said in its resolution that it was essentially and fundamentally of an anti-Party nature. The plenum proposed that there should be "a radical solution of the question concerning the further attitude to Trotsky as a member of the Political Bureau, a member of the Central Committee and a member of the Party in general". The resolution put it in these words: "Either Trotsky will admit his mistakes and unconditionally abide by the Party's decisions, or the Party will withhold its trust in Trotsky."

An enlarged meeting of activists of the Nizhni Novgorod Party organisation adopted a decision on November 28, 1924, which said that Trotsky's "The Lessons of October" was an "intolerable distortion of the events of the October Revolution, the actual history of our Party and of the relations between Lenin and the Central Committee, and an attempt to throw an unfavourable light on the Party's governing bodies and Comrade Lenin himself, an attempt ultimately designed to prove the superiority of Trotskyism over Leninism, and to amend Leninism with the aid of Trotskyism". It demanded that the Central Committee should take resolute steps against Trotsky. Delegates to the 23rd Moscow Uyezd Conference held in December 1924, having heard K. Y. Voroshilov's report on the activity of the RCP(B)

¹ See *Pravda*, November 19, 1924.

Central Committee, sharply condemned Trotsky's fresh anti-Party statement and requested the Central Committee that it should "once and for all put an end to such attempts to undermine our Party's integrity".

The Central Committee was supported, in the teeth of Trotskyist revisionist writings, by the Communists of Leningrad, the Ukraine, Tula, Baku, the Urals, Penza, the Crimea and other towns and districts throughout the country. The Party organisations took a unanimous stand on the substance of Trotsky's subversive activity and criticised Trotskyism in the light of Bolshevik ideological and political principles.

In January 1925, a joint Plenum of the CC and the CCC of the RCP(B) considered the resolutions of the local Party organisations on Trotsky's actions. Speakers at the Plenum issued a stern condemnation of Trotsky's anti-Party actions. The resolution, adopted by an overwhelming majority, said that Trotsky's article had "started an open campaign against the fundamental principles of the Bolshevik world outlook".¹ On a motion by the representatives of Moscow, Leningrad, the Urals and the Ukraine, the CC Plenum gave Trotsky a categorical warning and demanded that he should fully and unconditionally repudiate his revisionist activity. On the strength of demands from the Communists and in view of the fact that in his capacity as Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council Trotsky had "in the recent period failed to give sufficient attention to military work", the Plenum decided that he could not continue in his post. Accordingly, on January 26, 1925, the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR decided to release Trotsky from the duties of People's Commissar for Army and Naval Affairs, and Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, appointing M. V. Frunze to both posts.²

The Plenum invited all Party organisations to bring to an end their discussions of Trotsky's actions, and put the duty on them to improve the study of the theory and history of the Communist Party, and the history of its struggle against Trotskyism.

The Central Committee did a great deal to draw up new syllabuses for the system of Party courses, Party schools and communist higher schools, accentuating the Party strug-

¹ *CPSU in the Resolutions and Decisions...*, Part II, pp. 109-10.
² See *Pravda*, January 31, 1925.

gle against Trotsky and other opportunists. There was a considerable extension in the printing and distribution of Lenin's works. In 1924, 580 of Lenin's works and books about Lenin, as compared with 57 in 1923, were put out in the Russian Federation alone.¹ The mass printing of Lenin's works and the in-depth study of Leninism by all Party members were an important condition for the ideological defeat of Trotskyism.

The Communist Party's struggle against Trotsky's latest revisionist sortie was supported by all the fraternal Communist Parties. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Poland declared that it condemned Trotsky's actions "as intolerable from the organisational standpoint and politically harmful, and expresses its full solidarity with the RCP Central Committee, and readiness to give it resolute support in its struggle against the echoes of Menshevik and opportunist aspirations".² Similar statements came from the Communist Parties of Germany, France, Britain, Finland and Czechoslovakia, among others.

The Fifth Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, held in March-April 1925, approved the decision of the January (1925) Plenum of the CC and the CCC of the RCP(B) on the fresh Trotskyite attempts to revise Leninism. Its special resolution said that Trotsky had made another attempt to revise Leninism and to disorganise the leadership of the RCP(B). The resolution added that Leninist theory and tactics alone ensured solid unity of the ranks of the Party and the working class. Any attempt to shake this unity inflicted the greatest harm on the world communist movement, and would meet with the most resolute condemnation.³

The exposure of the Trotskyite attempts to revise Leninism marked an important stage in the struggle for the purity of Lenin's legacy and for the ideological and organisation unity of the Party's ranks. The RCP(B)'s struggle against Trotskyism dealt a resolute blow at opportunism within the ranks of the international communist movement, and helped to consolidate the unity and cohesion of the Communist Parties on the ideological basis of Marxism-Leninism.

¹ See *Kniga v 1925 godu* (Books in 1925), Moscow-Leningrad, 1927, p. 62.

² *Pravda*, December 2, 1924.

³ See *Communist International in Documents*, pp. 506-07 (in Russian).

Chapter IV

THE TOTAL DEFEAT OF THE TROTSKYITE-ZINOVIEVITE ANTI-PARTY BLOC

Trotskyism—the Main Danger in the Party During the Switch to Socialist Industrialisation

The leading and guiding role of the Communist Party was of decisive importance for the establishment of a socialist society in the USSR. Historical experience has confirmed that only a party equipped with an advanced revolutionary theory, solidly united and closely linked with the working class and the labouring peasantry was capable of organising and leading the Soviet people to the triumph of socialism.

The dedicated labour effort of the workers and peasants, led by the Bolshevik Party, was increasing the Soviet Union's economic and political strength. In 1926, large-scale industry was producing at 108.1 per cent of the prewar level and was becoming the leading force of the national economy. The most important result of the Party's effort to implement NEP was a strengthening of socialism's commanding heights in the economy, a growth of political activity among the working people, and a consolidation of the proletarian dictatorship.

The state of the proletarian dictatorship was the main instrument of socialist construction in the USSR. Under the leadership of the Party it set in motion the Soviet people's powerful forces. The solid alliance of the working class and the peasantry was the decisive premise for the building of socialism. With the aid of this alliance, the Soviet power overcame the resistance of the overthrown exploiting classes and secured all the necessary conditions for developing the productive forces and bringing about a powerful upswing in socialist construction. The growth in the Soviet Union's economic and political strength fortified its international positions. The long breathing space it had won assured it of the possibility of advancing forward, towards socialism.

Socialist construction was going forward against a background of sharpening contradictions between the USSR and the capitalist countries. The imperialist governments were terrified of the growing forces of socialism and sought to frustrate or slow down the Soviet Union's industrialisation. They refused to give credits to the Soviet Union, pursued a policy of keeping it in economic isolation, and threatened to mount another armed intervention. Many capitalist countries introduced special restrictions on goods coming from the USSR. The bourgeois press was making a lot of noise over Soviet exports, spreading slanderous inventions about "forced" labour in the USSR and about "Soviet dumping".

In addition to economic means, the imperialists organised a series of provocations and subversions against the Soviet Union. At the time this anti-Soviet policy was being inspired by the British imperialists, who enjoyed the support of the US and French governments. Through their agents they organised raids on Soviet missions and establishments in Peking, London and elsewhere, and assassinated Soviet Ambassador in Poland, P. L. Voikov. All this was being done for the purpose of provoking a war between the Soviet Union and the imperialists, and slowing down its advance to socialism.

The country's economic backwardness was a great obstacle to socialist construction. Although by the end of the rehabilitation period the Soviet economy had approached the prewar level, it continued to be 50 or 100 years behind the leading capitalist countries in technical-economic terms. This was compounded by the fact that the USSR could not expect to obtain any material or technical assistance from outside. In addition, the workers and peasants, who had won out, had no experience in building the new society, and the country was short of skilled labour.

The Party had to pursue its policy of socialist construction in a fierce fight against the remnants of the overthrown exploiting classes, the capitalist elements in town and country and the "Left" and Right opportunists, who were trying to push the country off the Leninist path. The struggle against the anti-Party elements became especially acute after the Fourteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) (CPSU(B)) in 1925, which adopted the policy of socialist industrialisation.

Making use of the external and internal difficulties in socialist construction, the temporary ebb of the revolutionary movement in the West, and the partial stabilisation of capitalism, the Trotskyites, Zinovievites and other oppositionists launched fierce attacks on the Party. In the summer of 1926, they set up the Trotskyite-Zinovievite anti-Party bloc, which was as unprincipled and adventurist as the August Bloc of 1912. Its members were united on a common anti-Leninist platform of fighting the Party's general line.

It was Zinoviev who issued the signal for all the factional groupings to unite when, in his concluding speech at the Party's Fourteenth Congress, he proposed that all the earlier defeated opposition groups should have their representatives on the Central Committee. After this, at the April (1926) Plenum of the Party's Central Committee, Trotsky and Kamenev motioned amendments to a Politburo resolution on the economic situation and economic policy, demagogically proposing a faster pace of industrialisation, higher wages for workers, abandonment of reserves in foreign trade, and elimination of the goods shortage.

Trotsky accused the Party of underestimating the importance of state industry as the leading force of the national economy, and said that its policy in industry was one of following in the tail of events. Ignoring the actual possibilities, he insisted that investments in industry should be increased from 880 million to one billion rubles, the extra capital coming from higher agricultural taxes and higher prices on durables. Kamenev and Zinoviev took the same stand. They shared the views of the Trotskyite Preobrazhensky, who saw the mass of labouring peasants as an object of colonial exploitation.

The oppositionists were against any improvement in the peasant economy and the raising of the peasants' material standards. Trotsky flatly told the Plenum that industry had no commodity reserves, which is why a bumper crop could well become a factor disorganising the economy and sharpening relations between town and country. Kamenev also believed that a good crop would merely increase the economic difficulties. These conclusions ran counter to Lenin's idea that a good crop was "salvation for the state".

Trotsky and Kamenev's amendment urged an increase in the pace of industrial development in general, whereas the Party was concentrating on creating a heavy industry, devel-

oping the means of production, and establishing a Soviet engineering industry. The resolution of the Party's Fourteenth Congress emphasised that there was need "to carry on economic construction with a view to transforming the USSR from a country importing machinery and equipment into a country manufacturing machinery and equipment".¹

In addition, these amendments were designed to break up the link between town and country, undermine the alliance between the working class and the peasantry, and unhinge the dictatorship of the proletariat. The Fourteenth Congress and the Central Committee's April (1926) Plenum set the task of developing industry through the extensive use of the domestic market, which was predominantly peasant, increasing the output of primary products in agriculture, and consolidating the alliance between the working class and the peasantry as the supreme principle of the proletarian dictatorship. The Plenum noted that socialist construction in the USSR could be assured only if agricultural development ran along the line of stronger links with industry. The Plenum rejected Trotsky and Kamenev's amendments as being adventurist and clashing with the policy of industrialisation. Ignoring the collective will of the Plenum, Trotsky and Kamenev, by previous arrangement, each voted for his own amendment, thereby taking the path of establishing an anti-Party bloc under a mutual-amnesty agreement.

Only recently, before the Fourteenth Congress, Zinoviev and Kamenev had now and again criticised Trotsky's views, even if their criticism had not been altogether consistent or principled, and—what is most important—had been designed to win over the workers for the "New Opposition". Thus, in a speech at the Thirteenth Congress, Zinoviev described Trotskyism as a variety of Menshevism, adding that there was not an iota of Bolshevism in Trotsky's book *The New Line*, and that "The Lessons of October" was a straightforward attempt to liquidate the fundamentals of Leninism. Kamenev spoke in the same vein, saying that the Party should "keep its trenches in full order against Trotsky's petty-bourgeois influence". For his part, Trotsky repeatedly gave Kamenev and Zinoviev reminders of their opportunist, capitulationist stand during the preparation of the October armed uprising.

However, at the April (1926) CC Plenum, Trotsky, Ka-

menev and Zinoviev already took something of a common anti-Leninist stand on the Party's economic policy. After the Plenum, Zinoviev not only reversed his earlier assessment of Trotskyism, but even went so far as to assert that in 1923 the Trotskyite opposition had been right in warning about the danger of the Party sliding from the proletarian line and about the precarious growth of the apparatus regime. For his part, Trotsky admitted that he had been wrong in 1917 to associate the names of Zinoviev and Kamenev with the opportunist policy. In this way, the leaders of the two anti-Party groups—the Trotskyites and the "New Opposition"—granted each other a full amnesty.

With unequalled self-complacency, Trotsky began to advertise the role of the two opposition groups. He said that "only thanks to the joint experience of the two trends (the opposition of 1923 and the opposition of 1925) correct and coherent solutions were found for the main problems—in the economy, the Party regime and the Comintern's policy".¹ The merger of the two oppositionist groups finally gave shape to the Trotskyite-Zinovievite anti-Party bloc, which was joined by the remnants of the scattered "Workers' Opposition" and the "Democratic Centralism" group.

The switch of the "New Opposition" to Trotsky's ideological positions, its surrender to Trotskyism, was of decisive importance for the establishment of the anti-Party bloc. This switch was due both to the defeatist mood of the "New Opposition" supporters and to the fact that it had been utterly routed at the Party's Fourteenth Congress. By joining the Trotskyites it sought to make good its weakness and isolation from the proletarian mass.

Having become the backbone of the anti-Party bloc, Trotskyism presented at this stage the main danger for socialist construction. It was the consummate opportunist trend, which had always displayed the greatest hostility for Leninism behind a smoke screen of "Leftist" talk. The Trotskyites usually stepped up their anti-Party activity whenever history took a sharp turn. One of these was the country's switch from economic rehabilitation to socialist industrialisation.

¹ XV konferentsiya Vsesoyuznoi Kommunisticheskoi partii (b). Stenographic report (Fifteenth Conference of the CPSU(B). Verbatim Report), Moscow-Leningrad, 1927, p. 552 (further—*Fifteenth Conference of the CPSU(B)*...).

¹ CPSU in the Resolutions and Decisions... Part II, p. 195.

sation, when socialism, once a distant prospect, became a practical concern for the Soviet people. That was an offensive by the socialist elements against the capitalist elements, which met with difficulties mainly because of resistance from the capitalist elements.

Trotskyism was a reflection of the pressure being exerted on the Communist Party by the capitalist elements of town and country. Trotskyism and the whole anti-Party bloc had for their social basis the urban petty-bourgeois sections which were being ruined by the developing socialist forms of the economy. Trotskyism stored up the discontent among these sections with the proletarian dictatorship, and acted as the mouthpiece for the decadent feelings and views which penetrated the ranks of the Party and led some unsteady Communists to vacillate, thereby weakening the proletariat's will to defeat the capitalist elements, and slowing down socialist construction.

The Trotskyites used "Leftist" revolutionary talk to camouflage their capitulationist platform and opportunists' acts so as to win over the working class and the labouring masses in general, and to mislead them. A distinctive feature of the Soviet working class was the high level of political awareness, efficient organisation and revolutionary steadfastness and refusal to compromise with any enemies of Marxism-Leninism. It was an embodiment of the people's remarkable revolutionary traditions, and was heir to the galaxy of men who had fought for the working people's happiness. That is why the Trotskyites had to use revolutionary talk in their efforts to win over the workers.

Trotskyism has always been unprincipled and unscrupulous in its means. In the Trotskyite arsenal the enemies of the Party and socialism found slander, lies, deceit, hypocrisy, double-dealing and political adventurism. This unprincipled and unscrupulous attitude to the means and methods of struggle was adopted by the Trotskyite and Zinovievite anti-Party bloc.

Under the banner of the anti-Party bloc, the Trotskyites tried to set up a new party, a party to restore capitalism. They wanted to deprive the Communist Party and the people of the perspective for building socialism in the USSR, denied its importance for the world revolutionary movement, and sought to impose an adventurist line which doomed socialist construction in the USSR to defeat and which was

designed to give revolution in other countries an artificial "push". The Trotskyites urged the use of anti-democratic methods of directing the masses at home, denied the Leninist principle of democratic centralism, and insisted "on 'freedom' of factional struggles in the Party, and, on this road, slid into anti-Sovietism".¹ In view of this, the Party had to concentrate its forces on exposing Trotskyism.

The Main Plank of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite Anti-Party Bloc Platform: Denial of Socialist Victory in One Country

The character and prospects of the socialist revolution and the victory of socialism in one country were the main issue on which the Party fought the Trotskyite-Zinovievite anti-Party bloc. The oppositionists rejected the Party's general line for the construction of socialism in the USSR, arguing that its main task was to give a "push" to world revolution by waging a so-called revolutionary war against imperialism. They wanted to export revolution, and this, as an expression of petty-bourgeois adventurism, was incompatible with Marxism-Leninism.

In their effort to justify their adventurist line, the oppositionist bloc leaders resorted to diverse inventions and falsifications. At the Fifteenth Party Conference, Trotsky hypocritically posed these questions: "Why do we need to have theoretical recognition of socialist construction in one country? Where has this prospect come from? Why had no one put forward this question before 1925?"² He said that it was scholasticism merely to raise the question of building socialism in one country, and that it had nothing to do with the Party's policy. A look at Lenin's writings shows this to be nothing but a trick.

Let us recall that on the possibility of building socialism initially in one country the Party started from Lenin's works, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, *On the Slogan for a United States of Europe*, and *The War Programme of the Proletarian Revolution*. In these writings Lenin gave the theoretical basis for the possibility of building socialism ini-

¹ *Fiftieth Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution*, p. 12.

² *Fifteenth Conference of the CPSU(B)*... , p. 533.

tially in one, separate country, and showed that it could not win simultaneously in all countries. After the October Revolution, he gave the Party and the Soviet people a scientific plan for building socialism, which consisted of three parts, and which reckoned with the economic and political conditions for its implementation: the dictatorship of the working class, the leading role of the Marxist-Leninist Party, the concentration of large-scale production in the hands of the state, the alliance of the working class and the peasantry with the leading role played by the working class, the country's industrialisation, and co-operation in agriculture. It was Lenin's proposition about socialism being able to win out initially in one country that was the basis of the decisions of the Party's Fourteenth Conference and then of its Fourteenth Congress, a proposition that was accepted as law by all members of the Party.

The Trotskyite-Zinovievite oppositionists rejected Lenin's theory and ignored the Party's decision on this question. To justify their attitude, they resorted to revisionist distortions of passages from the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin. Thus, Zinoviev took some ideas of Marx and Engels out of context and turned them into dogmas. In order to vindicate the oppositionist bloc's negative attitude to the possibility of socialism being victorious in one country, he referred to the *Principles of Communism*, written by Engels in 1847, which said that the communist revolution would take place simultaneously in all civilised countries.

What Zinoviev and other oppositionists did not say was that the *Principles of Communism* referred to a period when capitalism was as a whole on the upgrade. A proposition that had been correct for one period could not be applied to the new historical period, when capitalism had grown into its higher and final stage—imperialism—and had become stagnant and moribund capitalism, the eve of the proletarian revolution.

The law of unequal economic and political development was known to operate even in the period of industrial capitalism, but its manifestations and results were fundamentally different from those produced by the law of unequal development in the imperialist epoch, when it proceeds in leaps and bounds and becomes cataclysmic, so that some countries are rapidly ousted from the world market by others. Again and again, this breeds the urge for a redivision of a divided

world by means of armed clashes and world wars, all of which deepens and sharpens the conflict in the imperialist camp, weakens the front of world capitalism, produces weak links in the chain of imperialism, making it possible for the proletariat in individual countries to effect a breakthrough and carry socialism to victory in one, separate country.

This conclusion was confirmed by the victory of the October Revolution, and became the governing principle of socialist construction. However, the anti-Party bloc leaders continued to twist some of Lenin's ideas. For example, when Lenin said that the Russians had found it easier to start a proletarian revolution but harder to continue it and carry it to final victory, meaning full-scale socialist society, Zinoviev read this as a denial of the possibility of building socialism in the USSR.

Kamenev followed Zinoviev in asserting that Lenin's conclusion about it being possible for socialism to win in one country did not apply to Russia but to other capitalist countries. Trotsky repeatedly tried to prove that his views were identical with Lenin's theory of socialist revolution.¹ However, the facts tell a different story.

What Trotsky was saying at the time showed that he was falsifying the law of capitalism's uneven economic and political development in the imperialist epoch, which lay at the root of the conclusion that socialism could win out initially in one, separate country. The opposition bloc leaders rejected this law and said that in the preceding historical epoch the uneven development of the capitalist countries had been much more acute and profound than under monopoly capitalism. Trotsky declared, without bothering to furnish any proof, that "the law of uneven development was not a law of imperialism but a law of all human history. In its initial epoch, capitalist development had led to an extreme discrepancy between the economic and cultural levels of development of different nations; imperialist development, i.e.,

¹ These false assertions were caught up by the British bourgeois ideologist L. Schapiro, who wrote that Trotsky's "permanent revolution" theory was "close ... to Lenin's practice in 1917". Schapiro maintained the oppositionists' slanderous inventions that in drawing the conclusion that socialism could be built in one country, Lenin "was not referring to Russia" and that he saw the victory of the revolution in one country as depending on a world revolution (L. Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, pp. 288, 289).

the latest phase of capitalism, far from increasing this discrepancy, has on the contrary largely helped to even it out."¹

Consequently, Trotsky was confusing the economic inequality of various countries in the past with uneven economic and political development under imperialism. By identifying these two different concepts and denying that capitalist development in the imperialist epoch was uneven, he was smuggling in the Kautskian theory of ultra-imperialism. Lenin used to say that Kautsky's talk about ultra-imperialism was grist to the mill of the apologists of imperialism, spreading the idea that the domination of finance capital tended to ease the contradictions within the world capitalist economy.

The Trotskyites did not accept the fact that the levelling off between the capitalist countries, far from weakening, in fact intensified the effect of the law of uneven development under imperialism, for it is precisely the unprecedented technical progress and the increasing alignment of the development levels of the capitalist countries in the imperialist period that have created the possibility of some countries leapfrogging over the others. The oppositionists used these "theoretical" exercises to try to refute Lenin's conclusion that socialism could win out in one country, a conclusion that flowed directly and immediately from the law of uneven, spasmodic development of monopoly capitalism.

The Trotskyite "permanent revolution" theory was the opposition bloc's main "ideological" weapon in its fight against the Party's Leninist line. Trotsky may have repeatedly given assurances that upon joining the Bolshevik Party he had consigned his theory to the archives, but the facts did not bear this out. In December 1921, he wrote that the "permanent revolution" theory was "entirely identical with our Party's stand from 1917 on". During the 1924 discussion, Trotsky kept saying that he saw absolutely no reason to renege on what he had written about the "permanent revolution" in 1904 and 1905.²

In a preface to his book, *1905*, written in 1922, Trotsky claimed that 12 years after the first revolution in Russia his "permanent revolution" theory had been fully confirmed. He was even more outspoken on this score in a footnote to his

¹ *The Ways of World Revolution. Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International. Verbatim Report. Part II, Moscow-Leningrad, 1927, p. 99.*

² See *Fifteenth Conference of the CPSU(B)*... p. 681.

article, "Our Differences", when he said that the Bolsheviks had triumphed in 1917 only because they had re-equipped themselves on the basis of the "permanent revolution" theory. All these slanderous inventions had been blasted by the October Socialist Revolution, and by the advance of the Soviet socialist state.

When the Party roused the mass of working people to revolution it was acting on Lenin's idea that the proletariat should advance towards socialism in solid alliance with the peasantry. Lenin stressed that an alliance of the proletariat and the labouring peasants was alone capable of safeguarding the socialist revolution in Russia until such time as the revolution triumphed in other countries as well. He saw the alliance of the working class and the labouring peasantry as the supreme principle of the proletarian dictatorship, and the key condition for the victory of socialism.

Lenin's plan for co-operation in agriculture showed the way to involve the peasants in socialist construction. He believed that under the dictatorship of the proletariat the mere spread of co-operatives was identical with socialist growth. Guided by Lenin's ideas the Party's Fourteenth Congress observed that "the main line of socialist construction in the countryside is, with increasing economic direction on the part of socialist state industry, state credit establishments and other commanding heights in the hands of the proletariat, to draw the bulk of the peasantry into the co-operative organisation and to assure this organisation of socialist development, making use, overcoming and ousting its capitalist elements".¹

The Trotskyite-Zinovievite opposition denied that it was possible to involve the mass of peasants in co-operatives and to get them to take the path of socialist construction. Trotsky prophesied an inevitable clash between the proletariat and the peasantry, asserting the contradictions arising from the position of a workers' government in a predominantly peasant country to be insoluble until such time as the proletarian revolution triumphed on an international scale.

In his preface to *1905*, Trotsky wrote that the proletariat which had taken power would inevitably clash not only with all the groups of the bourgeoisie, but also with the broad masses of the peasantry.

¹ *CPSU in the Resolutions and Decisions...* Part II, p. 198.

The oppositionists stubbornly stuck to their anti-Leninist thesis that the Soviet state was unable to build socialism because of its technical backwardness and dependence on the capitalist world economy. The opposition leaders tried to get the Party to accept their idea that the country's technical backwardness was an insuperable barrier in the way of building a socialist society. On the eve of the Fourteenth Party Conference, Kamenev and Zinoviev affirmed that because of its technical and economic backwardness the Soviet Union would fail to cope with its internal difficulties unless it was saved by an international revolution. This was an expression of mistrust in the strength of the working class and the peasant masses following it, and was a total departure from the Leninist line.

The Party had never minimised the difficulties arising from the country's technical backwardness, but it held that the conditions for overcoming this backwardness were latent in the Soviet system itself. The chief of these was socialist industrialisation aimed at transforming the USSR into an advanced industrial power. The Party regarded the socialist industrialisation policy as assuring consolidation of the Soviet Union's economic independence. The resolution of the Party's Fourteenth Congress on the Central Committee's report underscored the need "to assure the USSR of economic independence, safeguarding the USSR from transformation into an adjunct of the capitalist world economy, and with that aim in view to maintain the line of the country's industrialisation, development of the production of the means of production and formation of reserves for economic manoeuvring".¹

Internal and international conditions demanded that the country should be industrialised in the shortest possible time by applying the Soviet method of industrialisation, because the capitalist method was absolutely unacceptable in socio-economic content, approach, sources of accumulation, goals and social consequences. One of the main features of the Soviet method was that industrialisation should start with the development of heavy industry, which helped to win much time, the all-important factor.

The main purpose of socialist industrialisation was to lay the material-technical basis of socialism, and to develop and

¹ CPSU in the Resolutions and Decisions..., Part II, pp. 196-97.

consolidate the socialist relations of production. With the Party pursuing the correct policy, this ensured a growth of the working class, a growing role for it with respect to the labouring peasantry, a strengthening of the alliance between the working class and the peasantry, creating the conditions for doing away entirely with the actual inequality of the once oppressed peoples, boosting the material and cultural standards of the Soviet people and enhancing the defence capacity and economic independence of the Soviet state.

Against the Party's general line, Trotsky propounded the idea that the country's industrialisation, far from reducing, in fact tended to increase its dependence on world capitalism, its technology and economy. The Trotskyites insisted that, on its own, the Soviet Union would never be able to break loose from its technical and economic dependence on the world capitalist economy. Trotsky told the Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International: "Anyone who imagines that within the next few years we shall be able to make all our own equipment or the greater part of it is a visionary."¹

Trotsky maintained that an isolated socialist state was one that existed only in the imagination of journalists, for in actual fact it continued always to be under the control of the world capitalist economy. Distorting the nature of the USSR's economic ties with the capitalist countries, he put forward the idea that the Soviet economy was coalescing with the world capitalist economy. He saw the Soviet economy as a component part of the world capitalist economy and invented his theory of "historical continuity", under which the Soviet Union had succeeded to the economy of pre-revolutionary Russia, which had been a component part of the world capitalist economy. He claimed that the October Revolution was unable to pull the Soviet economy out of the general system of capitalist relations. Trotsky kept plugging his "historical continuity" theory, deliberately saying nothing about the causes for which tsarist Russia had been economically dependent on world capitalism. He glossed over the fundamental distinctions between the Soviet socialist

¹ *The Ways of World Revolution*. Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International. Verbatim Report, Part II, p. 101.

state and tsarist Russia, and turned a blind eye to the factors which enabled the Soviet Union to safeguard its economic independence.

He completely ignored the fact that the Soviet Union had cancelled the tsarist loans, nationalised large-scale industry, notably, enterprises which had been owned by foreign capitalists, established a foreign trade monopoly, and introduced national economic planning, that is, that it had done away with the causes behind tsarist Russia's economic dependence on world capitalism. Trotsky exaggerated the Soviet Union's temporary dependence on deliveries of some foreign machinery and, what was most important, denied that the country could overcome its technical backwardness through its own efforts, drawing the conclusion that "it is impossible to build socialist society independently in any country of the world".

The Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc set up a smoke-screen of "Left" ultra-revolutionary talk about world revolution to cover up its lack of faith in the creative strength of the working class. The resolution of the Fourteenth Party Conference said: "A component part of the Trotskyite permanent revolution theory is the assertion that 'only after the proletariat wins in the major countries of Europe will it be possible to bring about a real upswing in Russia's socialist economy'."¹

The oppositionists accused the Party's Central Committee of failing to show concern for the interests of the international proletarian revolution, grossly falsifying the Leninist proposition about the need to draw a clear line of distinction between the victory of socialism in one country and victory on a world scale. Lenin repeatedly explained that the construction of socialism in one country should not be confused with the complete and final triumph of socialism on a world scale. Back in 1915, the Bolsheviks, who were led by Lenin, criticised the Trotskyites for propounding the United-States-of-the-World slogan, which suggested that socialism could not win out in one country.

On the strength of the experience of the Soviet state's early years, Lenin stressed that from the standpoint of the proletarian dictatorship's principal economic problem the triumph of communism over capitalism in the USSR was assured.

¹ CPSU in the Resolutions and Decisions..., Part II, p. 169.

But the strength of the working class in the USSR alone fell short of what was required to bring about the triumph of socialism on a world scale. He wrote: "Complete and final victory on a world scale cannot be achieved in Russia alone; it can be achieved only when the proletariat is victorious in at least all the advanced countries, or, at all events, in some of the largest of the advanced countries."¹ These ideas of Lenin's were made the basis of the decisions adopted by the Fourteenth Party Conference, which divided the question of the possibility of socialism winning out in one country, into two component parts: the internal and the international. The internal aspect of the question was implementation of the tasks of overcoming the "home" bourgeoisie in the economic sense and of building a full-scale socialist society through the efforts of the working class and the peasantry of the USSR, without waiting for the revolution to triumph in the West. The Party's practical effort in socialist industrialisation and collectivisation of agriculture was entirely geared to this task.

The international aspect of the question was the Soviet Union's relations with the capitalist countries, whose ruling classes were seeking a convenient opportunity to mount another armed intervention and restore capitalism in the USSR. It required the efforts not only of the Soviet people, but also of the international proletariat to eliminate the danger of capitalist intervention and to provide a guarantee against the restoration of capitalism. That is why the Fourteenth Party Conference emphasised: "Consequently, a *victorious socialist revolution* in a number of countries is the sole guarantee of a final victory for socialism, i.e., a guarantee against restoration."²

Having finally broken with Leninism, the leaders of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite anti-Party bloc saw the Party's theoretical and practical activity in bringing about the victory of socialism as a sign of "national narrow-mindedness" and as abandonment of an international proletarian revolution. In 1915, Trotsky wrote in the Menshevik newspaper *Nashe slovo* that to regard the prospects for social revolution within the national framework was to fall victim to the self-same national narrow-mindedness which was the essence of social patriotism.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, p. 58.

² CPSU in the Resolutions and Decisions..., Part II, p. 169.

Maintaining his old stand, Trotsky reiterated in September 1926 that he considered the thesis that socialism could be built in one country a "theoretical justification for national narrow-mindedness". In a letter to the other oppositionists, Trotsky said that "the Leningrad opposition vigorously attacked the socialism-in-one-country idea as a theoretical justification for national narrow-mindedness". Zinoviev also insisted that by suggesting that socialism could be built in one country, the Party had slid into "national narrow-mindedness". Through all the reasoning of the oppositionists ran the idea that the Soviet Union was "isolated" and "nationally secluded". Thus, the Trotskyites exaggerated the dependence of the Soviet economy on the world capitalist economy, on the one hand, and on the other, minimised the revolutionary strength of the international proletariat, and its support for socialist construction in the USSR.

The Trotskyites took the extremely distorted view of the international solidarity of the working class in the capitalist countries with the Soviet Union, recognising only one form of support: direct state support from the proletariat of Western Europe. Trotsky declared that "without direct state support from the European proletariat the working class of Russia will be unable to stay in power and convert its temporary supremacy into a long-term socialist dictatorship". This meant that unless there was a victory of the proletarian revolution in the West beforehand, the working class of the USSR was incapable not only of bringing about a victory of socialism but even of staying in power.

When starting on socialist construction in the USSR, the Party took account of the fact that the working class in the capitalist countries was still unable to give the Soviet Union direct state support. But in contrast to the Trotskyite-Zinovievite oppositionists, the Party's Central Committee was quite sure that support for the Soviet Republic from the proletarians of all countries was bound to grow as the USSR multiplied its successes in socialist construction. Aware of its duty to the first socialist state, the international proletariat was displaying its solidarity with the Soviet Union in the most diverse forms: through direct revolutionary struggle, and meetings and demonstrations in defence of the Soviet Republic against imperialist attacks. During the Civil War and foreign armed intervention, "Hands Off Soviet Russia" committees had been set up in many countries. The mass

movement in support of the young Soviet Republic had hamstrung international capital in its actions. During the Civil War, Hungarians, Poles, Serbs, Bulgarians, Czechs, Slovaks, Germans, Finns, Koreans, Chinese, and men of many other nations had fought in the ranks of the Red Army.

Striking manifestation of international solidarity of the working people of the world for the USSR came in the form of visits by numerous delegations to the Soviet Union. Workers' delegations made a thorough study of the Soviet people's life, and went back to spread across the world news of the USSR's successes in socialist construction. This was the best and most effective propaganda for the Soviet system against the capitalist system.

Lenin's principle that the proletariat's national and international tasks were indivisible and constituted a single whole was distorted by Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev, whose talk was designed to present themselves as being the sole champions of proletarian internationalism and the world proletarian revolution, but whose barrage of "Leftist" revolutionary catchwords in fact served to cover up their denial of the international character of the October Revolution and of its influence on the revolutionary movement of the proletariat in the capitalist countries.

The Trotskyite-Zinovievite oppositionists saw the Great October Socialist Revolution merely as a signal and the starting point for a socialist revolution in the West, a view that played down the historical role of the October Revolution, tending to relax the Soviet people's determination to build socialism, and hampering the further advance of the revolutionary movement in other countries. For that reason it ran counter to the principles of proletarian internationalism.

As opposed to the Trotskyites, the Party proceeded from the fact that the October Revolution was not only a signal or an impetus for a socialist revolution in the West, but also the basis for the further unfolding of the world revolutionary movement. The Great October Revolution opened the period of transition from capitalism to socialism, a period in which the working class of the USSR in alliance with the peasantry was capable of erecting a full-fledged socialist society, with the interests of the proletariat of the USSR being interwoven with the immediate tasks of the revolutionary movement in other countries.

The Party said that socialist construction in the USSR was a component part of the world proletarian revolution, and the way the country's working people were fulfilling their internationalist duty. To ensure the final victory of socialism, there was need for a fraternal alliance of the Soviet working class and the working class of all countries. The way to the triumph of the world revolution lay through international proletarian solidarity, with national and international tasks being indivisible and constituting a single whole.

The Soviet working class saw all the successes in socialist construction in the light of the interest of advancing the world revolutionary process. In fulfilment of their internationalist duty, Soviet workers exerted tremendous efforts to accelerate socialist construction, to fortify the Soviet Union's military might, and did "the utmost possible in one country for the development, support and awakening of the revolution in all countries".¹ The Bolshevik Party started from the fact that in each country the proletariat had to act above all on its national soil, while tackling tasks of international importance which sprang from the nature of the working class and its position in society.

Lenin said on many occasions that the Soviet Republic exerted its main influence on the international revolution by the successes of its economic policy. Acting on Lenin's idea, the Soviet people concentrated their efforts on economic construction. The Soviet people's struggle for socialism exerted a great revolutionising influence on the working people of the world. Clara Zetkin told the Fifteenth Party Conference: "The creative development of the proletarian revolution into the Soviet Union's socialist construction is the most powerful motive force of the world proletarian revolution.... The Soviet Union's socialist construction is the motor behind the world proletarian revolution, and is an earnest of its victory."²

The Party firmly rejected the Trotskyite allegations that Lenin had believed that it would take no less than 30-50 years to build socialism in the USSR. That was a blatant falsification of Leninism. After all, Lenin had stressed the following idea: "Ten or twenty years of regular relations

with the peasantry and victory is assured on a world scale (even if there is delay in the proletarian revolutions, which are maturing)...."¹

At the same time, Trotsky made the unfounded statement that the proletariat of the capitalist countries had more chances of overthrowing the bourgeoisie and taking over than the working class of the USSR of building socialism.

The practice of socialist construction has blasted Trotsky's slanderous idea that it would take the socialist system at least 50 or even 100 years to prove its superiority over the capitalist system. Contrary to Trotskyite assertions, the Soviet people, led by the Communist Party built a large-scale modern industry in the shortest possible period and without outside help. Even the fulfilment of the first three five-year plans transformed the Soviet Union into a mighty industrial power, second in the world in industrial output and completely independent of the capitalist economy.

Consequently, on the question of whether socialism could triumph in one country there were two diametrically opposite approaches: the Party's Leninist general line, and the platform of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite anti-Party bloc. The Party's line designed to build socialism met the vital interests of the peoples of the USSR and the international proletariat. The practical implementation of the Leninist line for the triumph of socialism gave mankind a socialist society that was an existing reality.

The Trotskyite-Zinovievite anti-Party bloc followed a line that meant a complete break with Leninism. It was a capitulationist line which tended to breed scepticism about the victory of socialism, relax the determination of the working class and doom it to a passive attitude. It spread decadent and defeatist feelings, fed the hopes of the capitalist elements for a return to the old order in the USSR, and slowed down the advance of the international proletarian revolution.

Exposure of the Opposition Bloc's Platform on the Party's Home Policy

The practical platform of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite anti-Party bloc sprang directly from Trotsky's "permanent revolution" theory and the denial that socialism could triumph in

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 28, p. 292.

² *Fifteenth Conference of the CPSU(B)*..., pp. 706-07.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, p. 323.

the USSR. Having broken with Leninism, the oppositionists attacked the Party on NEP, state capitalism, socialist industry, co-operatives, and the role and importance of the middle peasantry, putting forward the slanderous thesis that the leading role of the working class had weakened and that the Party and the Soviet power had degenerated.

The platform of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite opposition regarded state socialist enterprises as state capitalist enterprises, with low wages for workers and manned by old specialists. Referring to the opposition's documents, the Menshevik Tsereteli, one-time member of the Provisional Government, in a speech in Sweden on December 4, 1927, declared that the Bolsheviks in Russia had established a harsher capitalism for the workers than they had before the revolution. He emphasised: "It is not only we opponents of the Bolsheviks who say this, but the most respected Bolshevik leaders themselves—Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev and others."¹ The Menshevik *Sotsialistichesky vestnik* echoed the Trotskyite-Zinovievite oppositionists in asserting that the regime at Soviet enterprises was worsening, that management wielded unlimited powers and that the "red director", the executive, was lording it over the workers. In other words, they alleged that the state of affairs was similar to that prevailing at capitalist enterprises.

The opposition argued that with non-socialist enterprises prevailing in the towns and private owners among the population in the countryside, there was no ground to speak of socialist construction. In addition, they claimed that NEP was a retreat to capitalism, and circulated the slanderous idea that NEP stimulated the growth of capitalist elements only. These ideas were being spread in a country where the proletarian state controlled large-scale industry, transport, the banks and the land. In these conditions, NEP was a twofold process in which there was not only some growth of capitalist elements, but also a tempestuous growth of the socialist sector, with the capitalist elements being overcome by the socialist elements, a process that was to result in the triumph of socialism.

The oppositionists twisted Lenin's interpretation of the role of the co-operatives under the dictatorship of the proletariat. They referred to Lenin's work, "The Tax in Kind", and said

¹ *Pravda*, December 6, 1927.

that co-operation was only a brand of state capitalism. That was an adequate interpretation in 1921, when a developed socialist industry had not yet been established, and when the co-operatives were viewed in combination with state capitalism. However, the assumption that the rehabilitation of industry would run along the lines of state capitalism had proved to be unjustified.

In 1923, Lenin formulated the proposition that under the socialist system, resting on social property in the means of production, co-operatives were socialist-type enterprises. By then, socialist industry had already grown and the growth and development of co-operatives went hand in hand with it, the latter serving as a link between industry and agriculture.

Co-operatives in general, and agricultural co-operatives in particular, were not only of tremendous economic importance, but were also the best form for uniting the peasants in production, promoting their initiatives and beginnings, a form for their economic, cultural and political re-education and involvement in socialist construction.

Behind the Trotskyite view of co-operation was concealed a rejection of Lenin's co-operative plan. Having rejected this plan, the oppositionists inevitably slid onto the capitalist way of development in the countryside. In his report, "On Our New Tasks", which Trotsky gave at a city-wide meeting of the Zaporozhye Party organisation on September 1, 1925, he said that the productive forces in the countryside had to be developed "by means of capitalist methods".

The Trotskyites asserted that the peasantry would never voluntarily take the path of socialist development, which is why it was necessary either to refrain from taking power and wait until more peasant farms had been ruined through capitalist development or, having taken over, to expropriate them, for only then would the peasant, deprived of his property in the means of production and turned into a wage labourer, take the socialist path. This Trotskyite idea was further "theoretically" elaborated in the "works" of his follower Preobrazhensky and in the practical proposals of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite anti-Party bloc.

On the strength of Preobrazhensky's "Fundamental Law of Socialist Accumulation", which was a copy of the law of primary capitalist accumulation, the opposition bloc proposed that greater tax pressure should be applied to the peas-

antry, that wholesale prices for durables should be increased, and so on. Had the proletariat and its Party taken this kind of attitude to the peasantry, there could have been no question of an alliance between the two classes: the peasantry would have inevitably turned to the bourgeoisie. This line led straight to a rupture of the alliance between the working class and the toiling peasantry, which could result only in a restoration of capitalism.

The Trotskyite-Zinovievite oppositionists extolled the capitalist way in the countryside, while accusing the Party's Central Committee of conducting a policy of surrender to the kulaks. At the Fourteenth Party Congress Kameney exclaimed: "Leaseholds and wage labour, are these not concessions to the kulak?" The opposition distorted Lenin's view of stratification in the countryside and insisted that there was a growth of the kulak section everywhere, but failed to see the growth of the middle peasantry. It regarded the differentiation of the peasantry as a continuation of the process which had gone on in Russia before the Revolution. Preobrazhensky said in a speech at the Communist Academy that in the period since the October Revolution the "thread of the economic development of the upper strata in our countryside runs towards the establishment of a stratum of capitalist farmers, a thread which was cut short by the revolution and which has now been taken up by history and is again being spun".¹

The oppositionists cited data on Siberia in an effort to back up their assertions of unlimited growth of the kulaks and the spread of capitalist farming. There were some specific features about development in Siberia, where the stratification in the countryside was much faster. This was due, first, to the influx of settlers. Lenin emphasised: "The development of the migration movement is giving a tremendous impetus to the differentiation of the peasantry. Migration is accelerating the differentiation of the peasantry in the areas of emigration and is carrying the elements of differentiation to the new places."²

The second factor intensifying the stratification in the Siberian countryside was the forms of land tenure. Over a large part of Siberia, especially in the east, the old patri-

monial system of land tenure had been retained. No equalising division of land had taken place in those parts like the one the October Revolution brought about over the larger part of the country, and this had led to the establishment of multicrop farms with the employment of wage labour. Stratification in Siberia was also being intensified by the rural bourgeoisie, eased out of trade, directing the bulk of its resources into farming, where co-operatives were fast growing. In view of all this, the figures for villages in the south of Siberia by 1927 were: kulaks, 6.3 per cent, middle peasants, 54.8 per cent; poor peasants, 38.9 per cent, and in the east of Siberia, kulaks, 4.5 per cent, middle peasants, 59 per cent and poor peasants, 36 per cent.¹ These figures refuted the oppositionists' assertions that a steady growth of the kulak section was the definitive feature of the Soviet countryside after the October Revolution.

Despite the much faster stratification of the peasantry in Siberia, as compared with other areas, it was the middle peasant and not the kulak who remained the central figure in the Siberian countryside. This was borne out by the distribution of the means of production among the various social groups of peasants. For instance, in southern Siberia, the kulaks constituting slightly more than 6 per cent of the households held close on 17 per cent of the means of production, the poor peasants, constituting 40 per cent, held just 13 per cent, and the middle peasants, constituting about 55 per cent, held 70 per cent of the means of production.² The implementation of the Decree on Land, far from eroding the middle peasantry, was in fact maintaining and consolidating it, with a simultaneous reduction in the number of poor peasants, mainly through their movement into the middle group, and a simultaneous proletarianisation of a very small section. Consequently, development in the Siberian countryside presented the same picture of peasant stratification as in the country as a whole.

The Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc ignored the fact that "in contrast to the capitalist type of development, which is expressed in a *weakening* ('erosion') of the middle peasantry, with a growth of the groups at both ends—the poor and the

¹ *Fifteenth Conference of the CPSU(B)*. . . , p. 124.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 3, pp. 182-83.

¹ See *XV s'ezd UKP(B)*. Stenographichesky otchet (Fifteenth Congress of the CPSU(B). Verbatim Report). Vol. II, Moscow, 1962, p. 1278 (hereafter—*Fifteenth Congress of the CPSU(B)*. . .).

² *Ibid.*

kulaks—we have, on the contrary, evidence of a *strengthening* of the middle group, with some growth of the kulak group for the time being at the expense of the more prosperous part of the middle peasants, and a reduction in the poorer, of whom one part is being proletarianised and the other, a much larger part, is gradually moving into the middle group”.¹ The most important distinctive feature of the Soviet countryside was that under the dictatorship of the proletariat the poor peasants had increasing opportunities of moving into the middle group.

The oppositionists fully applied the regularities of development in peasant farming under capitalism to the transition period, refusing to see that in the Soviet Union the capitalist elements were confronted not only by the farmers, the poor peasants and the middle peasants, but by the whole proletarian dictatorship system, with its socialist industry, co-operatives, credit facilities and other levers of exerting a planned influence on agriculture.

The Party's economic policy proceeded from the fact that the development of industry and agriculture should be harmonised. The socialist method of industrialisation envisaged higher material and cultural levels for the working people, stronger links between town and country and consolidation of the alliance of the workers and the peasants.

By contrast, the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc started by erecting an antithesis between industry and agriculture, arguing that industry could be developed at the expense of the peasantry. Accordingly, it had worked out a special fiscal programme for the countryside designed to extract more taxes for a policy of “super-industrialisation”. What the oppositionists did not like at all was that in the Soviet state direct taxes levied on the peasants were much lower than those in tsarist Russia: only 312 million rubles in 1925 as against 564 million before the Revolution. The Soviet power had a tax policy based on the class principle, with the main burden falling on the kulaks. The Party believed it was wrong to “start from the demand of channelling the maximum possible resources from the sphere of the peasant economy into the sphere of industry, because it not only means a political break with the peasantry, but also under-

mines the material base of industry itself, undermines its home market, undermines exports and upsets the equilibrium of the whole national economic system”.¹

The Party's policy was designed steadily to reduce the size of the agricultural tax and to lower the prices of durable goods. By government decision, 35 per cent of peasants running marginal farms were completely exempt from agricultural tax. The Party's economic activity was strictly based on the Leninist proposition that socialist industry must supply the peasants with goods at lower costs than they had been able to get under capitalism. The February (1927) Plenum of the Party's Central Committee adopted a decision to cut wholesale and retail prices by 10 per cent. The Plenum said the policy of high industrial prices was wrong and harmful, and stressed that socialist accumulation should not result from a high level of prices or from rising prices, but from a reduction of costs in production, trade and overheads, a rational structure of the apparatus and various other economies.

The opposition countered the Party's line with the demand for higher taxes for peasants and higher prices for durables. It proposed a 20 per cent increase in selling prices for consumer goods. The opposition's practical proposals on this question threatened to break the economic links between the proletariat and the peasantry, to frustrate socialist industrialisation, and to destroy the proletarian dictatorship.

Completely at variance with the Leninist policy, the opposition demanded that state funds should be withdrawn from trade. Smilga and Pyatakov, for instance, proposed that one billion rubles should be withdrawn from state and co-operative trade to be invested in the construction of new factories and plants. This bureaucratic fiat policy threatened to hand control of the links with the countryside over to private capital, by allowing the private trader to run the exchange between the state industry and the peasantry.

The Party was pursuing a consistent policy of ousting the private entrepreneur from the sphere of trade and of strengthening state and co-operative trade. Consumer co-operatives were making rapid headway as socialist industry grew. Acceleration in the growth of co-operatives was an important means of consolidating the links between town and country,

¹ CPSU in the *Resolutions and Decisions...*, Part II, p. 473.

¹ CPSU in the *Resolutions and Decisions...*, Part II, p. 473.

and the alliance of the working class and the peasantry. The Party called for resolute struggle against both deviations on the peasant question: the underestimation of danger arising from the growth of the kulaks, and the overestimation of this danger, which led to a glossing over of the main question of the Party's policy in the countryside, namely, the struggle to win over the middle peasant as the central figure in agriculture. The Party organisations gave a fitting rebuff to the oppositionists' efforts to cover up with the aid of "Leftist" talk about "super-industrialisation" their efforts to frustrate the policy of consolidating the alliance of the working class and the middle peasantry, as the key condition for socialist construction. They saw and exposed in good time the "Leftist" deviation of the opposition leaders on the peasant question, which consisted in exaggerating the kulak danger, in minimising the role of the middle peasants, and in denying the need for an alliance between the working class and the poor peasants, on the one hand, and the middle peasants, as the central group in agriculture, on the other.

The opposition bloc leaders asserted that the Party's main slogan on the peasant question was not a strong alliance of the working class and the middle peasantry, but neutralisation of the latter. This was an effort to push the Party onto the path of inflaming the class struggle in the countryside, which would be a retreat to the poor peasants committees, to the policy of dispossessing the kulaks, back to civil war and an end to socialist construction. The Party's Fourteenth Congress had resolutely condemned the attempts to turn the Party from its slogan of a strong alliance between the working class and the middle peasantry, to a policy of neutralising the latter. The Congress made a point of stressing the need to fight the "Leftist" deviation on the peasant question, which threatened a return to the policy of dispossessing the kulaks, and set out measures designed further to consolidate the bond between the working class and the peasantry.

Under the decisions of the Party's Fourteenth Congress a great deal was done in the economic, administrative-political and cultural-educational sphere to ensure consolidation of the bond between the working class and the millions of peasants. The Party's line was justified by practice. But the oppositionists continued to deny the need for an alliance between the working class and the middle peasantry. On the

eve of the Party's Fifteenth Congress, the Trotskyite I. N. Smirnov told a Party conference in Moscow's Rogozhsko-Simonovsky district: "We say there is need to revise our state budget, to have the bulk of five billion in our budget go into industry, because it is better to fall out with the middle peasants than to move on to inevitable destruction." He proposed that state appropriations should be withheld from agriculture, virtually conducting industrialisation at the expense and to the detriment of agriculture.

Another expression of the "anti-middle peasant" deviation was the proposal written into the opposition platform and counter-theses on the eve of the Party's Fifteenth Congress, calling for the establishment of a "poor peasants' alliance". This was a grave error. There had been need of a massive organisation of the poor, organised on its own lines, in the period when the middle peasants were vacillating, and had to be neutralised, to prevent the kulaks from winning them over. Now that the alliance of the working class and the middle peasantry was there, the task was further to strengthen it, and the establishment of a "Poor Peasants' Committee" type of organisation would have been a return to an old stage, and would have meant a weakening of the alliance.

The Party's task was not to isolate the peasant poor, not to make them leave the Soviets, the co-operatives and the collective farms, but to help the masses of the poor peasants in the countryside to exert a decisive influence through the groups of poor peasants in these organisations. By contrast, the opposition's proposal hindered the enlistment of broad masses of middle peasants in socialist construction.

The nationalities question was an important aspect of the Party's struggle against the Trotskyite-Zinovievite anti-Party bloc. The Leninist nationalities policy was the touchstone by which the Party's political line was proved to be correct and the oppositionists' platform untenable. Let us recall that Trotsky viewed the nationalities question from the standpoint of great-power chauvinism. Earlier he had refused to recognise the right of nations to self-determination, including secession and establishment of an independent state, in fact regarding the relations between the Russians and the once oppressed nations as those of domination and subjugation. The national fringes of Russia liberated by the October Revolution had a peasant population, so that Trots-

ky's hostility to the peasantry was clearly expressed in the nationalities question as well.

Trotsky and the other leaders of the opposition attacked the culture of the peoples of the USSR, which is national in form and socialist in content. At a Joint Plenum of the CC and the CCC of the CPSU(B), held from July 29 to August 9, 1927, Zinoviev tried to justify his anti-Marxist stand by referring to Lenin's idea that in the epoch of bourgeois domination the slogan of national culture in a multinational state was a bourgeois slogan. However, Lenin had had in mind the period in which the bourgeoisie was in power, when this slogan meant nothing but the spiritual subjugation of the working people of all nationalities to the bourgeois dictatorship. But after the proletarian takeover, it was helping to develop the national culture of the peoples of the USSR in the interests of socialism and communism.

With socialism and communism under construction, the Party has invariably stood for a development of the culture of the Soviet peoples that is national in form and socialist in content, the only kind of culture capable of helping to involve the working people of all nationalities in socialist construction and paving the way for a fade-out of national distinctions. Socialism can be built only on the basis of fraternal co-operation and mutual assistance of all the peoples in the country. The experience of the USSR and other socialist countries has confirmed that the principle of proletarian internationalism, and the friendship and mutual assistance of nations is one of the main regularities of socialist construction.

The opposition bloc leaders grossly distorted the facts and hurled at the Party slanderous accusations of pursuing a colonialist policy. Zinoviev told a meeting of the CCC Presidium that in the non-Russian Republics the Central Committee was conducting a policy of "issuing orders and colonising". An anonymous document—a draft "Programme of the Communist Party of the working class of the USSR", was circulated in Odessa in the autumn of 1927. It contained the demagogic assertion that "instead of destroying classes and national partitions, they (the Bolsheviks.—*Author.*) are conducting the same old tsarist policy of 'divide and rule', inciting the workers against their national intelligentsia". It made the lying accusation that the Party was putting off the "internationalisation of the working class for hundreds of

years".¹ Behind this barrage of talk about the international unification of the working class, the oppositionists were inflaming national hostility, in an effort to rally bourgeois nationalists round their platform and to slow down political, economic and cultural development in the country's non-Russian areas.

In Azerbaijan, the oppositionists established contacts with the nationalistic counter-revolutionary Mussavat Party. In Kazakhstan, S. Khodzhanov's nationalistic group came out against the Party's socio-economic measures, seeking to stoke up national hostility and glossing over the class aspect of the nationalities issue. Grave nationalistic errors were made by T. Ryskulov, who was Deputy Chairman of the RSFSR Council of People's Commissars from 1926 to 1929. Later, he wrote: "We overdid the national slogan, wishing to be 'national leaders', underestimating our internationalist tasks, working to install our own national officials in the apparatus, and so on."² Under the impact of Party criticism, Ryskulov gradually overcame his nationalistic mistakes.

In the Ukraine, the Communist Party was opposed by the national-deviationists headed by A. Shumsky, who equated the enlistment of Ukrainian national personnel for the Party and state apparatus and the Ukrainisation of the proletariat. Through administrative pressure from above, he sought to Ukrainise all workers living in the Ukraine, including Russians, forcing them to abandon their native tongue and culture and to adopt the Ukrainian language and culture as their own. The national-deviationist N. Khvylevoi went even further and demanded an "immediate de-Russification of the proletariat" in the Ukraine, insisting that "Ukrainian poetry must seek to flee as soon as possible from Russian literature and from its style". Khvylevoi sounded the call, "Away from Moscow!", declaring that "we are aware of the proletariat's ideas without Moscow art to help us along".

At the same time, Zinoviev, Ter-Vaganyan, and Larin attacked the Leninist nationalities policy from the standpoint of great-power chauvinism. They objected to the Ukrainisation of the Party and state apparatus, and denied

¹ Fifteenth Congress of the CPSU(B)... Vol. I, Moscow, 1961, pp. 548, 549.

² *Ocherki istorii Kommunisticheskoi partii Kazakhstana* (Essays on the History of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan), Alma Ata, 1963, p. 260.

the need for developing a Ukrainian literature that was national in form and socialist in content. Zinoviev even went so far as to make the slanderous assertion that the "Ukrainianisation" being carried out in the Ukraine was tantamount to "Petlurisation".¹

The national-deviationists and great-power chauvinists were given a resolute rebuff by the Party organisations of the Ukraine. The Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of the Ukraine said in a statement sent to the Executive Committee of the Comintern that the deviation towards great-power chauvinism was designed to weaken the Party, undermine its links with the masses, break up the alliance between the working class and the peasantry, and disrupt the friendship of the peoples of the USSR. On November 4, 1927, the Executive Committee of the Comintern fully endorsed the "nationalities policy of the CC of the Communist Party (B) of the Ukraine, formulated most fully in its latest letter to the Comintern's EC, and... the correct line pursued by the Communist Party (B) of the Ukraine in the struggle both against great-Russian chauvinism deviations and against Ukrainian chauvinism deviations, specifically Shumsky's attitude".²

The Party exposed the Trotskyite-Zinovievite oppositionists, national-deviationists and great-power chauvinists, consistently pursuing the Leninist nationalities policy and giving much attention to developing the non-Russian Republics and drawing them into socialist construction. In the non-Russian Republics and regions within the RSFSR, the bulk of the resources went mainly into raising the economic and cultural levels of the native population (Tatars, Bashkirs, Udmurts, Maris and others). In 1927, for instance, 80 per cent of appropriations went into the establishment of co-operatives among the peasants in the Tatar villages, although Russian peasants in that Autonomous Republic made up almost 42 per cent of the population.

After the Fourteenth Party Congress, a land reform was carried out in the Central Asian Republics to eliminate feudal landed estates. As a result, 120,000 households of farm labourers, wage labourers and poor peasants received land, while the number of rich kulak farms was halved.

¹ *Fifteenth Congress of the CPSU(B)*... Vol. I, p. 718.

² *Ibid.*, p. 719.

The directives for the First Five-Year Plan of Economic Development (1928/29-1932/33) said that there was need "to devote special attention to various aspects of raising the economy and culture in the backward outlying national districts and lagging areas in the light of the need gradually to eliminate their economic and cultural backwardness, making a corresponding provision for a much faster rate of development of their economy and culture, in the light of the need to tie in the requirements in these areas with those of the USSR as a whole".¹

The slanderous assertions that the Soviet state was "degenerating" was one of the main planks of the practical platform of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc. Trotsky declared at the July (1926) CC and CCC Plenum that the Soviet state was "not a proletarian one at all", and that its lower tiers were being filled by kulaks and its upper ones by bureaucrats. The opposition circulated a document in Tula claiming that "a majority of the CC... is in fact promoting a gradual diminution of the proletarian character of our state".²

In a speech at the August (1927) CC Plenum, Trotsky asserted that "the proletariat is being increasingly folded up, giving place to other classes, which are making ever greater headway". At a sitting of the CCC Presidium he made the demagogic assertion that "the proletariat as a whole is being reduced, while our Party regime is helping to intensify the class fold-up of the proletariat". These inventions were completely refuted by the practice of socialist construction. The facts showed that far from being folded up or ousted by other classes, the working class continued to grow and develop. Thus, the total number of wage earners increased from 8,215,000 in 1924/25 to 10,346,000 in 1926/27, i.e., by 25 per cent. Of these, in 1924/25 large-scale industry employed 1,794,000, and in 1926/27, 2,388,000, an increase of 33 per cent. The growing weight of the working class meant a strengthening of the base of the proletarian dictatorship.

The Party gave much attention to raising the cultural and educational levels of the working class. From year to year, the percentage of workers at workers' colleges and in the institutes increased: in Moscow it had gone up from 34.2 per cent in 1926 to 41.9 per cent in 1927; the percentage of

¹ *CPSU in the Resolutions and Decisions*... Part II, p. 463.

² *Fifteenth Conference of the CPSU(B)*... pp. 666-67.

students of working-class and peasant origin went up by 4.9 per cent in Leningrad colleges, and by 14.3 per cent in provincial colleges. These data overthrew the opposition claims that office workers and "others", instead of workers, prevailed among college students.

The opposition gave an even sharper formulation to its ideas about the state apparatus. It said: "It is quite obvious that in composition and level of life the state apparatus is largely bourgeois and petty-bourgeois, and is pulling away from the proletariat and the peasant poor towards the ensconced intellectual, on the one hand, and towards the leaseholder, the merchant, the kulak and the new bourgeois on the other."¹ Had that been so, there could have been no socialist construction at all, because socialist construction can proceed only on a political basis—the proletarian dictatorship.

The opposition leaders were slinging as much dirt as they could on the Soviets, as organs of state power. The opposition-bloc platform claimed that the Soviet state apparatus was growing ever more bureaucratic, and demanded that it should be broken up. These attacks on the state apparatus reflected the old hostility on the part of the opposition leaders to the Soviets as the state form of the proletarian dictatorship. Even on the eve of the October Revolution, Kamenev and Zinoviev came out in favour of establishing a combined type of state power, i.e., the Soviets and the bourgeois Constituent Assembly. They declared: "*The Constituent Assembly and the Soviets are the combined type of state institutions towards which we are moving.*"²

The oppositionists continued to say that it was possible to combine a bourgeois and a proletarian form of government, and saw nothing but negative sides to the activity of the Soviets, excessively exaggerating some bureaucratic distortions in evidence in the Soviet state apparatus. They failed to consider the fact that after the victory of the October Revolution, with the working class lacking experience in running the country, and in the absence of skilled personnel, some use had to be made of the old civil servants. Lenin wrote: "The tsarist bureaucrats began to join the Soviet institutions and practise their bureaucratic methods, they began to assume the colouring of Communists and, to succeed

better in their careers, to procure membership cards of the Russian Communist Party. And so, they have been thrown out of the door but they creep back in through the window. What makes itself felt here most is the lack of cultured forces. These bureaucrats may be dismissed, but they cannot be re-educated all at once. Here we are confronted chiefly with organisational, cultural and educational problems."¹

Bureaucracy had its economic roots in the country's backwardness, in the prevalence of the small commodity economy and in the shortage of educational, cultural, and technical personnel. Lenin relentlessly criticised bureaucratic practices and red tape, and showed the way to develop the Soviet state apparatus.

Lenin was sure that the working class was strong enough to make the old government officials work for socialism. He believed that the wholesale involvement of the working people in running the country was the most important means of strengthening the Soviet state apparatus. He wrote: "We can fight bureaucracy to the bitter end, to a complete victory, only when the whole population participates in the work of government."²

Implementing Lenin's ideas, the Party pursued a consistent line in strengthening the Soviet state apparatus and improving its activity. It resolutely condemned the oppositionists, who strove, under the pretext of fighting bureaucratic practices, to destroy the Soviet state apparatus. Exposing the opposition, the Central Committee emphasised these words of Lenin's: "We should have perished long ago but for the 'apparatus'. Unless we wage a systematic and persevering struggle to improve it we shall perish before we manage to lay the foundation of socialism."³ The Party and the government devoted much attention to increasing the percentage and role of Communists within the state apparatus. A decision of the Party's Central Committee on November 15, 1926, put the duty on all Communists working in Soviet government and economic agencies to take an active part in rooting out bureaucratic practices, in exercising the strictest economies in state spending and in simplifying and reducing the cost of the apparatus.

¹ See *Fifteenth Conference of the CPSU(B)*..., p. 618.

² *Fifteenth Congress of the CPSU(B)*..., Vol. 1, p. 192.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, p. 183.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, Vol. 32, pp. 321-22.

The Party concentrated all its efforts on strengthening and improving the state apparatus by developing proletarian democracy, invigorating the Soviets, and involving additional hundreds and thousands of workers and peasants in government. Consequently, contrary to the lying propaganda of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc about a weakening and "degeneration" of the proletarian state in the course of socialist construction, there was in fact a further strengthening of the Soviet state apparatus and a consolidation of the Soviet power. The Party administered a firm rebuff to the opposition leaders' demagogic talk about a fold-up of the working class and its ousting from state administration.

The Trotskyite-Zinovievite oppositionists echoed the Mensheviks in asserting that the Soviet trade unions were hostile to the working class, and strove to hamper the development of the trade-union movement in the USSR.

However, by 1927, despite resistance from the opposition, the trade unions had almost ten million members, a 30 per cent increase as compared with 1925, including 28 per cent in production workers and 25 per cent in office workers. The steady growth of the trade unions showed that they were the most massive organisations of the working class.

The Party's Fifteenth Congress noted that the trade unions, while involving masses of proletarians in the great constructive effort, must become the main levers for the restructuring of industry. Its decisions emphasised that "on the basis of a policy of reducing working hours and raising wages (commensurate with the country's resources and industrial growth) the trade unions must do their utmost through the factory committees, production conferences and meetings, control commissions, and so on, to help in the labour education of the mass of proletarians, in organising labour at the factories and plants, in improving shopfloor routines, and in advancing technical rationalisation at the enterprises. The trade unions must help the lagging sections of the proletariat to arrive at a full realisation of the fact that it is the proletariat, as a class, that is master of industry, that it has before it vast prospects, provided there is a tireless and steady advance in industrialising the country, rationalising its economy and building socialism."¹

¹ Fifteenth Congress of the CPSU(B)..., Part II, p. 1452.

In that period, the Party was carrying on a resolute struggle against the oppositionists' subversive activity among the young people. In an effort to cobble an illegal party, the leaders of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite opposition were pinning their hopes on the Leninist Young Communist League, expecting it to provide the building material for such a party. With that end in view, they drew up an anti-Leninist programme for another, Trotskyite youth league, and this they put forward at the July (1926) Plenum of the CC and the CCC. This slanderous document claimed that a bureaucratic regime in the Party was "gripping the young people's development in a vice, driving their doubts deep inside and undercutting criticism, thereby spreading scepticism and decay, on the one hand, and careerism, on the other. In the recent period, there has been an exceptional development of bureaucracy in the upper layers of the Youth League, producing many bureaucrats who were still young, but who had already made much headway as bureaucrats. Hence, the ever greater displacement from among the cadres of the Youth League of proletarian, farm labourer and poor-peasant elements, by intellectualist and petty-bourgeois elements who adapt themselves more easily to the requirements of arm-chair administration, but are much more remote from the mass of workers and peasants at the grass roots".¹

Consequently, on the Komsomol and on the role and character of the trade unions, the opposition saw eye to eye with the Menshevik *Sotsialistichesky vestnik*, which claimed that young peasants were being enlisted in the Komsomol as a result of the pressure brought to bear with the aid of the state apparatus on the young and politically ignorant peasant. Like the Mensheviks, the oppositionists slandered the Leninist Komsomol, depicting it as a bureaucratic organisation devoid of principles and dominated by decay and careerism. The opposition tried to spread doubt and scepticism among the young people about the success of socialist construction.

The opposition bloc's slanderous platform met with a fitting rebuff from the Komsomol organisations. In the struggle with the opposition, the Komsomol displayed a high level of ideological maturity and political steadfastness, and acted as the Party's militant assistant. Especially great activity in

¹ Fifteenth Conference of the CPSU(B)..., p. 687.

exposing the Trotskyite-Zinovievite opposition was displayed by the young Communists of Moscow, Leningrad, Kharkov and other proletarian centres. Despite the opposition's efforts, the Trotskyite idea that active young Communists of working-class stock were being ousted by intellectualist and petty-bourgeois elements was not confirmed anywhere. The facts testified that there was in fact a promotion of numerous activists of proletarian origin, and this applied to the whole range of Young Communist organisations, from top to bottom. In its political and class tasks, the Komsomol was and remains a proletarian organisation.

While working to build up the proletarian core of the Komsomol, the Party did a great deal to enlist for Komsomol membership the best young men and women in the countryside, in order to ensure a sound alliance between the proletarian and the peasant sections of the Komsomol. Thanks to the Party's correct policy, the Komsomol gave a lead to the working young people in town and country. Komsomol organisations played an important role in socialist construction, with its members working actively in industry, agriculture, the Soviets, the co-operatives, and cultural and educational establishments.

The Party concentrated its efforts on educating the young in a spirit of Marxism-Leninism, proletarian internationalism, implacable attitude to the class enemy, and loyalty to the socialist country. The tasks of the communist education of the rising generation demanded that an end should be put once and for all to the Trotskyite-Zinovievite opposition's effort to set up a petty-bourgeois organisation of young people. The Party helped the Komsomol and young people in every way to see the true face of the opposition and to discern behind its "Leftist" revolutionary talk the danger for the cause of the proletarian dictatorship and the education of young people in the Soviet Union.

The Komsomol had big and responsible tasks in the country-wide drive to fulfil the First Five-Year Plan of Economic Development. The directives for drawing up the Plan, approved by the Party's Fifteenth Congress, emphasised that the "Komsomol must be one of the Party's main assistants in conducting its policy in the struggle to overcome technical, economic and cultural backwardness. The Komsomol must serve as the main lever in re-educating the broad masses of proletarian and poor and middle-peasant youth in the spirit of

building socialism and defending it against all enemies at home and abroad".¹

The oppositionists used every means to discredit the Party leadership and destroy the Party so as to deprive the Soviet people of their leading force in the struggle for the victory of socialism. Under the pretext of combating bureaucratic practices, the opposition sought to discredit the Party cadres, accusing them of degeneration, so as to denigrate the Party apparatus as a whole and to incite the Party masses against it. In his attacks, Trotsky made no distinction between revolutionary Bolshevik cadres and the opportunist-minded cadres of the Second International, an approach that threatened to weaken the Party's leading role in the state, and to destroy it.

In their attacks on the Party, the opposition bloc leaders put forward the slanderous assertion that the Party was ruled by a harsh regime which suppressed Party democracy. Falsifying Lenin's ideas, Zinoviev argued that the dictatorship of the proletariat had boiled down to a dictatorship of the Party. The same idea was put forward by the leader of the Georgian Mensheviks, Andronikashvili, who was convicted of counter-revolutionary activity. Replying to a question from a German workers' delegation, he declared: "Neither in Russia nor over here is there any democracy or proletarian dictatorship, but only a dictatorship of the Communist Party alone."² Lenin had exploded such slander in his polemics with the SRs and the Mensheviks, who had accused the Bolsheviks of exercising a dictatorship of the Party alone. He said: "Yes, it is a dictatorship of one party! This is what we stand for and we shall not shift from that position because it is the Party that has won, in the course of decades, the position of vanguard of the entire factory and industrial proletariat."³

By the "dictatorship of one party" Lenin meant the leading role of the Party as the vanguard of the working class, but in none of his works had he ever said that the dictatorship of the proletariat was tantamount to the dictatorship of the Party. Lenin regarded the Party as the leading force within the system of the proletarian dictatorship. The Party

¹ CPSU in the Resolutions and Decisions... Part II, p. 467.

² Fifteenth Conference of the CPSU(B)... p. 650.

³ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, p. 535.

was sensitive to the mood of the masses, putting its policy to the test of their practical revolutionary struggle. It has always seen its main task in being the leader and teacher of the working class and of all working people in the revolutionary transformation of social life and in building a communist society.

The Party joins together the work of the Soviets, the trade unions, the Komsomol and other mass organisations of the working people, and directs their efforts towards the common goal of building a communist society. The Party has won its authority among the masses not through a dictatorship or the use of coercion, but by persuasion and by explaining its policy to them. Any attempt to identify Party leadership with the proletarian dictatorship meant a violation of the most important Leninist demand that correct relations should be established between the Party and the people, and mutual confidence "between the vanguard of the working class and the workers' mass".¹

Being unable to convince the masses that its policy was correct, the Trotskyite-Zinovievite opposition slandered the Party apparatus and the Party central institutions. At a joint CC and CCC Plenum, in October 1927, Trotsky declared that "through the present apparatus, through the present regime, pressure is being exerted on the proletarian vanguard by the entrenched bureaucrats, including worker-bureaucrats, administrators, petty owners and newly fledged proprietors, privileged intellectuals from town and country, all those elements who are beginning to shake their fist at the proletariat, saying: 'Watch it, this is not 1918'".²

Trotsky accused the Central Committee and the whole Party of degenerating and abandoning the proletarian policy. In that same speech he said: "Behind the backs of the extreme apparatchiks stands the resurgent domestic bourgeoisie. Behind its back—the world bourgeoisie. All these forces are exerting pressure on the proletarian vanguard, preventing it from raising its head or opening its mouth. The more the CC's policy goes away from the class course, the more efforts have to be made to impose this policy on the proletarian vanguard from above—by coercive methods. There is the gist of the present disgusting regime." Without bothering

to back up his declaration by any facts—there were no such facts—the leader of the opposition slanderously proclaimed: "The whole policy of the Party leadership is expressed in the Party regime. In the last few years, this policy has moved its class pivot from left to right: from the proletariat to the petty bourgeoisie, from the worker to the specialist, from the rank-and-file Party member to the apparatchik, from the farm labourer and poor peasant to the kulak."¹ This was echoed by the other oppositionists who claimed that "ours is a peasant, petty-bourgeois, and not a proletarian party".²

Trotskyite turncoats, like Ossovsky, launched downright counter-revolutionary attacks against the Communist Party, declaring that it had come to express the interests of three classes, including the bourgeoisie. This, they argued, called for the establishment of a new party. Such a party would have clearly had nothing in common with the working class, but would have been a party for restoring capitalism. Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev and other anti-Party bloc leaders saw eye to eye with Ossovsky, and came out in his defence at the July (1926) Plenum of the CC and the CCC. Moreover, during a discussion by the Politburo of Ossovsky's Party membership, Trotsky and Kamenev voted against his expulsion from the Party.

Juggling the facts and figures, the opposition organised a number of actions over the alleged change in the Party's proletarian make-up and the bourgeois degeneration of Bolshevism. The Trotskyite Bakayev accused the CC of violating a decision of the Party's Thirteenth Congress on regulating the Party's social composition. Distorting the decisions of the Fourteenth Congress, he exaggerated the Party's growth from an influx of peasants and office workers, arbitrarily and tendentiously using statistical data given in Rizel's article, "The Party's Changing Social Composition in 1926 and in the First Quarter of 1927", which said that "the number of Communists in village cells continued to grow faster than the Party's membership as a whole.... Within the year, there was a drop in the percentage of workers in the Party, and an increase in the percentage of peasants and partly of office workers.... Of the candidate-members on January 1,

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, p. 212.

² Fifteenth Congress of the CPSU(B)... Vol. I, p. 392.

¹ Fifteenth Congress of the CPSU(B)... p. 393.

² Fifteenth Conference of the CPSU(B)... p. 650.

1926, 51 per cent were workers, and 31 per cent peasants, and on January 1, 1927, 43 per cent were workers and 37 per cent peasants".¹

Making use of the fact that the article did not give the reason for some decline in the percentage of workers, Bakayev put an arbitrary interpretation on this fact to promote the interests of the anti-Party bloc. He took an even more biased approach in assessing the results of a Party census taken in early January 1927. He asserted that 80,000 members had left the Party, 80 per cent of them skilled, advanced workers, in place of whom 100,000 office workers had been taken in. On the strength of this he insistently proposed inclusion on the agenda of the July-August (1927) Plenum of the CC and the CCC of the question of the Party census results. Quoting Molotov, Bakayev further declared that on the eve of the Fourteenth Congress, 42 per cent of Party members had been shopfloor workers, and that by the Fifteenth Congress, the figure had declined to 31 per cent.

These assertions were all gross falsifications and were resolutely refuted by the Party's Central Committee. A thorough check-up established that no one had violated or rescinded the decision of the Thirteenth Party Congress. Its resolution, "On the Immediate Tasks of Party Construction", said: "Our slogan should be: to secure that within the year ahead more than one-half of the Party membership should consist of shopfloor workers. This slogan must in the main determine the tasks of all our Party work over the immediate period ahead."²

In implementing this decision of the Thirteenth Congress, the CC had firmly and consistently followed the line of consolidating the Party's proletarian core. Only in 1924 and 1925, more than 400,000 shopfloor workers were admitted into the Party. Altogether, starting from the Lenin Enrolment, up to January 1, 1927, 488,000 production workers were admitted into the ranks of the Party.

The Fourteenth Congress, while taking steps to extend the proletarian section of the Party, rejected a proposal put forward by Sarkis, representing the "New Opposition", to bring the total of shopfloor workers in the Party's ranks to 90 per cent by the Fifteenth Congress. The Congress said

this was a proposal in the spirit of the Menshevik Axelrod, that is, an attempt to dissolve the Party within the working class, and to obliterate the line of distinction between the working class and its vanguard.

Sarkis's semi-Menshevik proposal was rejected as one leading to "an excessive swelling of the Party ranks and their filling with semi-proletarian elements who had not gone through the schooling of the trade unions or proletarian organisations in general".¹ The Congress qualified the opposition views on this question as attempts "which have nothing in common with Leninism, which deny correct relations between the Party (the vanguard of the class) and the class, and which make communist leadership impossible".²

Another statement by the oppositionists which was completely at variance with reality was that the Fourteenth Congress had issued instructions to admit more peasants than workers into the Party. Let us recall that the CC's political report to the Fourteenth Congress said that the Party ranks in the countryside were growing at a very slow rate. It was precisely for the purpose of intensifying Party work in the countryside and strengthening the alliance between the workers and the peasants that the Congress had deemed it necessary to concentrate attention on the enlistment to the Party of farm labourers, agricultural workers and peasant-poor activists.

At the same time, the Fourteenth Congress emphasised that in regulating the composition of the Party there was need to pursue a "policy aimed at improving the qualitative make-up of the Party organisations, at increasingly enlisting workers in the Party and at constantly increasing the weight of the proletarian core of the Party".³ Its resolution, "On the Work of the CCC and the WPI"⁴, invited local Party organs to "see to it that the cells fully understood the decisions of the Thirteenth Party Congress on the question of enrolment in the Party".⁵ In fulfilment of the Fourteenth Congress decisions, Party organisations enrolled 64,000 peasants in 1926, and 39,000 in 1927, and started work to enlist for Party membership workers from production, above all those from the big enterprises. Between the Fourteenth and Fifteenth

¹ Ibid., p. 201.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Workers' and Peasants' Inspection.—Ed.

⁵ CPSU in the Resolutions and Decisions..., Part II, p. 209.

¹ Fifteenth Congress of the CPSU(B)..., Vol. I, p. 376.

² CPSU in the Resolutions and Decisions..., Part II, p. 16.

congresses, 71,000 workers were admitted into the Party, and together with the October 1927 enrolment this brought the number of workers in the Party to 750,000. In that period, the number of newly admitted office workers dropped from 16.5 per cent to 8.5 per cent, i.e., down to one-half.¹

According to the Party census, the following changes occurred in the Party's core in 1927 (per cent):

	Shopfloor workers	Farm labourers and agricultural workers	Peasants	Office workers
January 1, 1925	40.8	0.5	8	35.8
January 1, 1926	40.8	1.2	11.4	36.1
January 1, 1927	38.1	1.3	11.7	37.5

This table shows that the percentage of shopfloor workers declined from 40.8 per cent in 1925 to 38.1 per cent in 1927, while the number of office workers went up from 35.8 to 37.5 per cent, changes due to the fact that the Party census was carried out under the new regulations issued by the Statistical Department of the Party's Central Committee.

In accordance with the census, several categories of workers (junior technical personnel at enterprises, team leaders, production instructors, foremen, storekeepers, service personnel in offices, firemen, and so on) were transferred from the category of shopfloor workers to that of office workers. A section of the production workers had gone to institutes and workers' colleges or had been registered under other categories. This regrouping had produced some, purely formal, reduction in the number of Communists designated as shopfloor workers.

The results of the Party census exploded the oppositionists' inventions about a massive exodus of forward-looking workers from the Party. The census established that 35,000 members, including 20,000 production workers, had left the Party from 1924. Of the 488,000 factory workers enrolled in the Party from 1924 to 1927, 8,000 were expelled, 27,000 had voluntarily or automatically dropped out by January 1, 1927, and another 20,000, during the census, a total of 47,000, and not 100,000, as the Trotskyite Bakayev claimed.

¹ See *Fifteenth Congress of the CPSU(B)*..., Vol. I, p. 390.

Another thing that should be taken into account was that with the massive enrolment in the Party a certain percentage of the workers was bound to drop out. But it is indisputable that 90 per cent of the workers admitted into the Party at the time were active, steadfast Communists, making up its strong proletarian core.

After its crushing rebuff over the Party's social make-up, the Trotskyite-Zinovievite opposition once again started a drive against the Party under the pretext of working for inner Party democracy. Having broken with Leninist doctrine, the Trotskyites defined inner Party democracy as freedom to set up factions and groups. Behind a screen of loud talk about unfolding inner Party democracy, the opposition was in fact paving the way for the establishment of a new party hostile to Leninism. In his articles, Ossovsky openly urged the need to set up such a party. The oppositionists' practical efforts were all aimed at establishing such a party, a party of capitalist restoration. Consequently, having discarded Leninist organisational principles, the oppositionists moved from factionalism to the establishment of a Trotskyite party with its own central committee, regional, gubernia and district centres, technical apparatus, membership dues and periodicals.

The Central Committee of the CPSU(B) roused all the Party organisations in defence of the Leninist unity of Party ranks, for unfolding inner Party democracy and enhancing the Communists' vanguard role in socialist construction. The Party committees explained to the Communists the meaning of Lenin's warning about "the danger of factionalism from the standpoint of Party unity and implementation of the unity of purpose of the proletarian vanguard as the basic condition for the success of the proletarian dictatorship".¹

In full conformity with the principles of Marxism-Leninism, the Party Central Committee saw inner Party democracy from the standpoint of increasing the activity of the Party masses, strengthening conscious proletarian discipline, eradicating factionalism and consolidating the Party's unity, and extending its ties with the masses. On the basis of developing the methods of inner Party democracy there was a vast growth in the numerical strength of Party activists at the grass roots, the main thing being the switch of the pivot

¹ *CPSU in the Resolutions and Decisions*..., Part I, p. 528.

of Party organisational work to the shops, and the establishment of the institutions of shop and group organisers. In some cities (Moscow, Leningrad, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Lugansk, Artyomovsk, Tula, Tver, Vladimir and Bryansk) the number of group and shop organisers increased from 4,900 in 1925 to 15,000 in 1927, or more than threefold. A. A. Zhdanov, Secretary of the Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia Party Committee, told the Fifteenth Congress that as a result of the CC's correct policy, the previous two years had seen a considerable increase in the activity of the proletarian mass and an unfolding of proletarian democracy. He said: "... I do not think I am making a mistake when I say that within our Party as well we have achieved an unfolding of inner Party democracy on the greatest scale, and that those who are trying to prove that the working class and its activity are being folded up are quite wrong, are making a big mistake."¹

When defining the tasks of the Party organisations, the Fifteenth Congress made a point of stressing that "the guiding role of the CPSU(B), as the main lever of the dictatorship, can be preserved, ensured and strengthened only on the basis of Leninist cohesion and proletarian discipline in the Party's ranks, with a steady raising of its members' ideological, theoretical and cultural level, consistent practice of inner Party democracy and systematic improvement of the Party's social composition through continuous enlistment for the Party of men and women working in production".²

In relentless struggle against the Trotskyite-Zinovievite opposition, the Central Committee strengthened the Leninist unity and leading role of the Communist Party in building socialist society.

**The Party's Struggle Against the
Trotskyite-Zinovievite Bloc's Adventurist Platform
on International Relations and
Soviet Foreign Policy**

In pursuing its line of socialist construction, the Party attached much importance to various aspects of the international situation and the USSR's foreign policy. The Fifteenth

¹ *Fifteenth Congress of the CPSU(B)*... Vol. I, p. 156.

² *CPSU in the Resolutions and Decisions*... Part II, p. 440.

Party Congress stated that a sharpening of the contradictions both within the world capitalist system, and between the capitalist world and the USSR was a characteristic feature of the international situation. The main contradiction was that between the capitalist countries and the USSR. The partial stabilisation of capitalism had merely intensified the contradictions between the imperialist countries and their groupings. The uneven development of the capitalist countries had been increased by the growth of world production, a revival of trade, and some progress in technology and capitalist rationalisation.

The centre of the capitalist world's financial power had moved from Europe to the USA. In 1927, the United States turned out 60 per cent of the world's steel, 72 per cent of its oil, 53 per cent of its copper and 43 per cent of its coal. It was making almost 20 million of the 24 million cars manufactured throughout the world, and held more than one-half of the world's gold stock. That, too, was sharpening the contradictions between the imperialist countries.

The imperialists believed that the way to iron out the highly acute contradictions within the world capitalist system was to prepare and start a new war, above all against the USSR. The bourgeoisie refused to be reconciled with the fact that the Soviet Union was gaining in economic, political and military strength, that it had become the centre of attraction for the revolutionary elements of the world, and that its achievements were undermining the foundations of capitalism.

In their fight against the growing proletarian and national liberation movement, the imperialists used the opportunist leadership of the Second International and the Amsterdam Trade Union Federation. The Right-wing Social-Democratic and trade-union leaders had openly abandoned the class struggle and had gone over entirely to the side of the bourgeoisie, working to inject into the minds of workers the idea of class collaboration, and hoping to deceive them with the prospect of a transition to socialism through "economic democracy" within the capitalist countries.

The successes of socialist construction in the USSR and the collapse of the world bourgeoisie's hopes for a degeneration of the proletarian dictatorship led to a sharp worsening of relations between the capitalist countries and the Soviet Union. At the time, the British bourgeoisie and its headquarters, the Conservative Party, were the most active in

trying to set up a united imperialist front against the USSR. On May 27, 1927, with the backing of the USA and France, the British Government broke off diplomatic and trade relations with the Soviet Union, a step that went considerably to intensify the interventionist tendencies in the imperialist camp, and to revive subversive, terroristic activities on the territory of the USSR.

In face of the growing threat of war, the Communist Party and the Soviet Government firmly and consistently pursued a policy of peace, giving resolute rebuffs to aggression and building up the country's economic and military strength. In its relations with the capitalist countries, the Soviet Government acted on the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems. This foreign policy was aimed at averting fresh wars, combating the interventionist tendencies of imperialism, and maintaining the atmosphere of peace as the most important external political condition for socialist construction.

In view of the mounting danger of military attack, the Fifteenth Party Congress set the task "in working out a five-year plan to give maximum attention to the fastest development of branches of the national economy in general, and of industry in particular, which had the chief role to play in ensuring the country's defence and economic stability in wartime".¹ The Fifteenth Congress instructed the Central Committee to continue its struggle to preserve peace, develop economic ties with the capitalist countries, and do everything to strengthen the country's defence capacity and the strength and fighting efficiency of the Red Army, Air Force and Navy.

An integral part of the Party's policy in international relations was the struggle to develop the communist movement throughout the world, consolidate the united workers' front against the capitalist attacks, to strengthen the internationalist solidarity of the working class of the USSR and the proletariat of the capitalist countries, and to increase the links between the Soviet people and the national liberation movement in the colonial and dependent countries.

The Comintern centred its attention on questions of war and peace. The Eighth Plenum of its Executive Committee in May 1927 adopted the theses, "The Tasks of the Communist International in the Struggle Against War and the

War Danger". It made a point of emphasising that the central slogan at that moment should not be the abstract pacifist slogan of peace, but the concrete, militant slogan of defending the USSR. The decisions of the Comintern's Executive Committee said that the attitude to the defence of the Soviet Union was the watershed between revolution and counter-revolution. The Sixth Congress of the Comintern said: "The victory of the Great October Revolution gave the workers of the whole world a socialist fatherland—the Soviet Union. Defence of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics against the international bourgeoisie meets the class interests and is a matter of honour of the international proletariat."¹

In the teeth of the obvious facts, the leaders of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite anti-Party bloc came out against the Politburo's thesis that "war is probable and inevitable". At the July-August (1927) Joint Plenum of the CC and the CCC Zinoviev grossly distorted the Leninist definition of war and claimed that it was not only a continuation of politics by other means but also an "accelerator" of the world revolutionary process.

Thus, Zinoviev argued that the defence of the USSR slogan should be regarded only from one angle, namely, the interests of the international socialist revolution, whose victory, he said, was contingent on a world war.

The opposition slanderously asserted that the Party's Central Committee was to blame for the mounting danger of war. The Trotskyite Rakovsky, addressing the Sixteenth Moscow Gubernia Party Conference and the Fifteenth Party Congress charged that the Party and the Government were pursuing their foreign policy with insufficient resolution, having failed to give the imperialists a fitting rebuff and to declare war on them.

The oppositionists saw the main cause of the war danger as lying in the weakness of the Red Army and the instability of the Soviet state. In his article, "The Contours of the Coming War", Zinoviev made the unfounded statement that the Party and the working class were totally defenceless in face of the looming threat of war. He asserted: "The bourgeoisie is mobilising. Neither the working class nor the peasantry feel the firm hand of leadership on our part. There are signs

¹ CPSU in the Resolutions and Decisions... Part II, p. 452.

¹ Communist International in Documents. 1919-1932, Moscow, 1933, p. 810.

of a chill in our relations with the mass of working people. The Party is disoriented." Similar statements were made by Trotsky, who put forward his Clemenceau thesis, the gist of which was as follows: during the First World War, Clemenceau, representing the most reactionary circles of French imperialism, launched an attack on the government, which he believed to be incapable of defending the imperialist interests of the French bourgeoisie, and secured its removal at a time when the German Army was deployed 80 kilometres from Paris. Referring to this fact, Trotsky nursed the treacherous plan of using the situation of the coming war to overthrow the Soviet Government.

The defeatist ideology of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite opposition was caught up by the Right-wing Social-Democratic leaders and by ultra-revolutionary groups. The Right-wing socialists spread slander about "red imperialism" and about the USSR being a warmonger guilty of breaking the peace. This slanderous propaganda was designed to justify a war by the imperialist bourgeoisie against the Soviet state, and to divert the workers from fulfilling their internationalist duty to the USSR. Ultra-Leftists of the Maslow and Ruth Fischer stripe claimed that the Soviet power had "degenerated", and that the Bolshevik Party was pursuing a kulak policy, their aim being to isolate the USSR from the international proletariat, and to get the working class of the capitalist countries to believe that the Soviet Union was indifferent to the fate of the world proletarian revolution.

Shortly before the Fifteenth Congress, the Trotskyite Pollak issued a pamphlet in Czechoslovakia on the international situation in which he demanded that the Soviet Union should declare instant war in support of the strikers in Britain. He wrote: "Assuming that Soviet Russia in consequence of actual support for the striking and locked-out British workers would enter an armed conflict with Britain and her minions. . . . Let us ask ourselves what the result of such a war would be? At best, there would be a substantial enlargement of the Soviet Union. At worst . . . a technically military (sic!) defeat in a proletarian revolutionary offensive war, which, however, in a historico-dialectical sense would signify a grand victory for the proletariat, i.e., a grandiose step forward in the world revolution".¹ That was downright provoca-

¹ Fifteenth Congress of the CPSU(B) . . . , Vol. I, p. 681.

tion. A defeat for the Soviet Union, the mainstay of the world socialist revolution, would have greatly strengthened the positions of world reaction and blocked the advance of the revolutionary movement for a long time.

In their slanderous statements, the Trotskyites alleged that the Soviet Government was preparing to abolish the foreign-trade monopoly, and repay all the foreign debts, while their supporters abroad, such as Maslow, Ruth Fischer and Souvarine, divulged Soviet state secrets on the pages of their periodicals, and spread anti-Soviet forgeries about hardships and riots in the Soviet Union. All of this merely went to incite the imperialists to aggressive acts against the USSR.

The leaders of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc hoped to use the increasing pressure on the Soviet Union and preparations for a war to promote their factional anti-Soviet aims, so as to remove the Party leadership, which pursued the Leninist line in domestic and foreign policy, and to which they objected.

Consequently, like the "Left Communists", the ultra-Leftist Trotskyite renegades were prepared to see the Soviet power go down, allegedly to secure the triumph of the world revolution. While provoking the Soviet Union into a war against the imperialists, the Trotskyites rejected all Soviet proposals for general and complete disarmament. *Die Fahne des Kommunismus* (Banner of Communism), a Trotskyite newspaper published by Maslow and Co. in Berlin, qualified as a betrayal Maxim Litvinov's statement at the Fourth Session of the Preparatory Committee of the Disarmament Conference in Geneva, when on November 30, 1927, he made public a Soviet Government declaration on general and complete disarmament. The newspaper said that "this farce has nothing in common with Marxism. It is pure twaddle to say that the imperialists can be 'exposed' in this way, and in this period of feverish arming it is not only stupid but downrightly treasonable".¹

The opposition bloc leaders alleged that the Soviet working people did not know why and how a war should be fought. They wrote: "In the event a war really comes, every worker, every farm labourer, every poor peasant, on the one hand, and every kulak, bureaucrat and NEP man, on the other, will ask this question point-blank: what kind of war, for the sake

¹ Fifteenth Congress of the CPSU(B) . . . , Vol. I, p. 684.

of what, by what means and methods is the war to be fought?"¹

Actually, however, nothing like this question had ever arisen. The Communists, who were true to Lenin, were quite sure that wherever the war came from, and whatever the pretext, it could be nothing but a class war against the gains of the October Revolution, against the country building socialism. Whatever the circumstances, it would be a just, liberatory war on the Soviet Union's part. The opposition's ideas poisoned the Soviet people's minds, undermined the Red Army's morale and weakened the Soviet Union's defence capacity.

The anti-Party bloc leaders charged that the Party's CC was undermining the country's defence capacity by recruiting into the Red Army hostile class elements, including rich peasants and kulaks. Zinoviev slanderously spread the idea that the Red Army was full of hostile class elements, which made it incapable of defending the country. Sapronov and V. Smirnov went so far as to declare, without giving any facts, that the Red Army's command echelon consisted largely of old army officers and kulak elements. They said: "The proletariat's influence in the Army is weakening. In the circumstances, there is the danger that the Red Army may be converted into a convenient instrument for Bonapartist-type ventures."

In a speech at a Joint Plenum of the CC and the CCC in August, 1927, K. Y. Voroshilov, Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, resolutely refuted the inventions of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite oppositionists. He gave figures on the social origin of the command echelon, and the growing percentage of Party members in the Red Army. He pointed out that in 1921, 12 per cent of the command echelon were workers, 67 per cent, peasants, and 20 per cent, others; and in 1927, 16 per cent, workers, 59 per cent, peasants, and 25 per cent, others. The percentage of Party members in the command echelon was growing from year to year: in 1920, it was 10.5 per cent; in 1921, 20 per cent; in 1922, 22.5 per cent; in 1923, 29.6 per cent; in 1924, 31.8 per cent; in 1925, 43.3 per cent; in 1926, 47.4 per cent; and in 1927, 54 per cent.

In 1927, 7 of the 9 commanders of military districts, 19 of

¹ *Fifteenth Congress of the CPSU(B)*... Vol. I, p. 183.

the 20 corps commanders, 59 of the 89 division commanders, and 154 of the 286 regimental commanders were members of the Communist Party.

The Trotskyite-Zinovievite oppositionist slanders were also resolutely rebuffed by speakers at the Fifteenth Party Congress. Thus, G. K. Orjonikidze gave convincing data on the growing percentage of proletarians and Party members in the Red Army. He pointed out that in 1927, 18.1 per cent of Red Army men were workers, 71.3 per cent, peasants, and 10.6 per cent others.¹

The steady growth in the number of Communists in the military formations, the rising moral and political level of the Red Army men, and the improvement of their armament showed that the Red Army was a powerful weapon of the proletarian dictatorship and a reliable safeguard of the Soviet Union. It was firmly linked with the working class, with the labouring masses of peasants and with the whole Soviet people. Far from declining, the proletariat's influence in the army was, in fact, steadily increasing. The working class of the USSR was exercising its leading role not only in the economic sphere, but also in strengthening the country's defences. As the danger of war continued to increase, it remained the leading class, marching at the head of broad sections of the working people.

The international proletariat was rallying together on the basis of Leninist united-front tactics, on the platform of defence for the USSR as the outpost of the world socialist revolution. In view of the worsening international situation and the growing threat of war, a broad movement was launched in the capitalist countries in support of the Soviet Union and its foreign policy. A World Congress of Friends of the Soviet Union, attended by 957 delegates from 45 countries, was held in Moscow from November 10 to 12, 1927. It issued an appeal to the working people of the world saying: "Fight for, defend, protect the USSR, the working people's country, the bastion of peace, the centre of liberation, the fortress of socialism, by every means, in every way."²

The fraternal solidarity and the indomitable will of the working class to come out in defence of the socialist country, were expressed in the oath of Germany's "Der Rote

¹ *Fifteenth Congress of the CPSU(B)*... Vol. I, pp. 441-42.

² *Pravda*, November 15, 1927.

Frontkämpferbund" (Alliance of Red Frontline Soldiers). The oath of the German proletariat contained this call: "We must never forget that world imperialism is preparing a war against the Soviet Union, and that the destiny of the working class of the world is indissolubly connected with the Soviet Union.... We must always fulfil our revolutionary duty to the working class and to socialism, always remaining soldiers of the revolution, and acting in all proletarian organisations as pioneers of relentless class struggle... We must always and constantly fight for the Soviet Union and for the victorious world revolution."¹

The opposition leaders sought to frustrate the united-front tactics in the international working-class movement and to prevent the proletariat in the capitalist countries from implementing its "Defend the USSR" slogan. The opposition demanded a revision of the united-front tactics, and a substitution of new "revolutionary organisations of the proletariat" for the trade unions in the Western countries. In a letter carried by *Pravda* on May 26, 1926, Trotsky said the British trade unions and other trade unions in the West were an "apparatus acting as a brake on the revolution". This was a virtual call on the Communists to withdraw from the reactionary trade unions and to set up new "revolutionary workers' unions" in their place, something Lenin had resolutely opposed in his book, *"Left"-wing Communism—an Infantile Disorder*.

Lenin had said as early as 1920 that it was childish for the German "Leftists" to say that the Communists could not and should not work in reactionary trade unions, and that there was a compelling need to set up brand new "workers' unions". Lenin said the call for withdrawal from the reactionary trade unions and establishment of artificial forms of workers' organisations was inexcusable stupidity "that is tantamount to the greatest service Communists could render the bourgeoisie".² That is just the kind of favour the oppositionists were doing the imperialists by blocking the Communists' way to the millions of workers who were members of reactionary trade unions.

The Fifteenth Party Conference rejected the fundamentally incorrect and politically harmful proposals of the opposi-

tion to have the Soviet trade unions take the initiative in breaking with the British trade unions, a step that would have signified orientation towards a withdrawal by the Communists from the trade unions, which is exactly what the leaders of the British TUC and the Amsterdam Trade Union International wanted to help them torpedo the policy of uniting the international trade-union movement. The Soviet Communists pursued flexible tactics, based on the existence of a bloc between the Soviet trade unions and the British trade unions, set up to strengthen ties between the Soviet trade unions and the trade-union movement in the West, and to revolutionise the latter, and also to organise a broad democratic movement of the proletariat in the capitalist countries in defence of the Soviet Republic against imperialist intervention. The Anglo-Russian Committee was wound up in the autumn of 1927 through no fault of the Soviet trade unions, but as a result of the treacherous policy of reactionary British trade-union leaders. By scrapping their agreement with the All-Union Central Trade Union Council, the TUC bosses fully exposed their treacherous role in the British and the international working-class movement.

Under the leadership of the Party's Central Committee, the All-Union Central Trade Union Council exposed the reactionary trade-union leaders and carried on a persistent struggle to unite the international trade-union movement. The Soviet trade unions' efforts were aimed at giving fraternal assistance to foreign workers in their fight against capital, to help them realise their class tasks and escape from the influence of their reformist leaders.

In this effort, special attention was given to strengthening the Profintern (Red International of Trade Unions) which united trade unions in the USSR, China and Indonesia, a part of the trade-union movement in Japan, and some trade-union organisations in France and Czechoslovakia. The trade unions of Finland, Bulgaria, Rumania, Yugoslavia and Greece were not officially affiliated with the Red International of Trade Unions, but in fact took a class attitude and worked for the unity in the trade-union movement. There was a gradual change in the relation of forces between the reformist Amsterdam International and the Red International of Trade Unions, in favour of the revolutionary trade unions. The Red International was becoming not only a European, but an international organisation, with bases in Asia and some

¹ *Pravda*, June 7, 1927.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 52.

Latin American countries. That is why the Fifteenth Party Conference recommended to the Communist group of the All-Union Central Trade Union Council to intensify its "active work in the Red International of Trade Unions and to give every support in extending its activity, vigorously continuing the struggle for the unity of the international trade-union movement".¹

In order to unite all the contingents of the international working-class movement, the Soviet trade unions proposed the convocation of a joint congress of the Amsterdam International and the Red International of Trade Unions. The stand of the Party's Central Committee and the All-Union Central Trade Union Council on the international trade-union movement and their active struggle for working-class unity were approved by the Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International. Its resolution, "The International Situation and the Tasks of the Communist International", said: "Resolutely condemning the policy of withdrawal from the reformist trade unions and insufficiently vigorous work in them, the Enlarged Executive Committee of the Communist International fully adheres to the stand of the CPSU(B), which believes that it would be harmful for the Soviet trade unions to join Amsterdam and which has proposed the convocation of a joint congress of the Amsterdam International and the Red International of Trade Unions."²

The Bolshevik Party and the Communists of other countries saw the task of defending the USSR against the threat of war in the context of the slogan for supporting colonial revolutions. The attention of the Communist Party of the USSR and of the Comintern was centred on the revolutionary struggle of the 450-million strong Chinese people against imperialism. Guided by the tactical principles of Leninism, the Comintern defined the character, the stages and the prospects of the Chinese revolution of 1925-1927. On the strength of a profound Marxist analysis of China's economic and political situation, it was established that the Chinese revolution was bourgeois-democratic. The decisive factor behind the unfolding agrarian revolution was the survivals of feudalism in the Chinese countryside, which were aggravated by the oppres-

sion of the militarist, bureaucratic state machine and the financial-economic domination of foreign capital.

The agrarian-peasant problem was the basis and the content of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in China, which was aimed not only against the survivals of feudalism, but also against imperialism, which was supporting the Chinese feudals and the bureaucratic-militaristic superstructure. That is why the Comintern said that the bourgeois-democratic revolution in China was a confluence of two revolutionary streams, the anti-feudal and the anti-imperialist.

At the first stage of the Chinese revolution, the proletariat had for its allies the peasantry, the urban poor, the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia and the national bourgeoisie. One of the specific features of the Chinese revolution was that, together with the Communists, these classes were represented in the bourgeois-revolutionary Party, the Kuomintang. Within the Kuomintang, the Communist Party retained complete independence. Its policy was to isolate the Right-wing elements of the national bourgeoisie, to impel the petty-bourgeois intellectuals leftwards, and to rally the peasantry and the urban poor round the proletariat. This policy ensured the growth of the forces of the working class and the peasantry.

Lenin pointed out that the Communists must know how to carry the broad masses to new revolutionary positions, and to help them to understand, from their own experience, that the Party's line was correct. There was need for a change of tactical slogans at the second stage of the Chinese revolution, which was started by Chiang Kai-shek's counter-revolutionary putsch, marking the departure of the national bourgeoisie from the revolution and a deal between the Kuomintang Rightists and imperialists. Following Chiang Kai-shek's putsch, there was a turn from the nation-wide front to the unfolding agrarian revolution, of which millions of workers and peasants were the motive force.

At this stage of the Chinese revolution, the Comintern put forward a new tactical line of resolute and relentless struggle by the workers, peasants and petty bourgeoisie against the bloc of imperialists and the Chiang Kai-shek clique. The Communists' tactics were designed to oust the Rightists from the Kuomintang and to turn it into an organ of a democratic-revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. The practical implementation of the new tactics was

¹ CPSU in the Resolutions and Decisions... Part II, p. 328.

² The Communist International in Documents, p. 639.

connected with the further development and deepening of the agrarian revolution, the advance of the working-class movement, the arming of the workers and peasants, the democratisation of the Kuomintang and strengthening of mass organisations—the revolutionary peasant committees and the trade unions—with the Communist Party retaining its independent role.

The Comintern and the Bolshevik Party had to carry through the tactical line on the various aspects of the Chinese revolution of 1925-1927, based on Leninist principles, in relentless struggle against the Trotskyite-Zinovievite opposition. The anti-Party bloc leaders accused the CPSU(B) and the Comintern of weakening the forces of the proletariat by favouring a policy of alliances and agreements with the Chinese national bourgeoisie. The Trotskyites drew a complete parallel between the Chinese revolution and the Russian revolution of 1905-1907, when the Bolsheviks had waged a resolute struggle against any agreements with the liberal bourgeoisie. The oppositionists failed to see any difference between revolutions in the capitalist and in the colonial countries.

The approach taken by Trotsky and his supporters glossed over the distinctions between the imperialist countries and the colonies, and signified a departure from Leninism. The Trotskyite stand on the Chinese question started from a denial of the existence of feudal survivals in China. Trotsky held that it was not feudal and militarist oppression, but China's dependence on the imperialist countries in the sphere of government and tariffs that was behind the Chinese revolution, a view that differed little if at all from that of the Chinese militarists and the Chiang Kai-shek clique, whose sole aim was to secure abolition of the unequal treaties and to give China autonomy in her tariff policy. The gist of the Trotskyite concept of the Chinese revolution was denial of the agrarian movement and underestimation of the role of the peasantry. This was a continuation of Trotsky's Menshevik line with respect to the peasantry, which he had pursued back in 1905, when he helped "the liberal-labour politicians in Russia, who by 'repudiation' of the role of the peasantry understand a *refusal* to raise up the peasants for the revolution",¹ as Lenin put it.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 420.

The Trotskyite-Zinovievite oppositionists confused the bourgeois-democratic revolution with the proletarian revolution. In April 1927, Trotsky and Zinoviev put forward a slogan calling for the immediate establishment in China of Soviets of Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies as centres for organising the revolutionary movement. They ignored the fact that the Soviets were above all organs for an uprising, organs of a new revolutionary power. Russia's historical experience testified that in 1917 the Soviets emerged and developed only when favourable conditions had been created for a direct transition from the bourgeois-democratic revolution to a proletarian revolution and the establishment of a proletarian dictatorship. In 1925-1927, the bourgeois-democratic revolution in China was still to win out, so that there were no conditions for the Soviets taking over as organs of a proletarian dictatorship. That is why the Trotskyite slogan for instant establishment of the Soviets was put forward in disregard of the concrete historical conditions and was reckless.

The Comintern's documents spoke of Soviets in China as a future prospect. It held that the Communists of China could put forward their slogan for forming the Soviets only when there was a fresh upsurge in the revolution. Until then, they were advised to work systematically to expose Chiang Kai-shek's betrayal, develop the agrarian movement, arm the workers and peasants, lay the foundation for a revolutionary workers' and peasants' army and spread the idea of the Soviets.

The resolution of the July-August (1927) Plenum of the CC and the CCC of the CPSU(B) said: "If the Communist Party's efforts to revolutionise the Kuomintang do not succeed, and if it turns out to be impossible to democratise this organisation, by transforming it into the broadest massive organisation of workers and peasants; if, on the other hand, the revolution is on the upgrade, the *propaganda* slogan of the Soviets must be turned into a slogan for *immediate struggle* and a start should be made on *organising* the Soviets of Workers, Peasants and Artisans."¹

The Comintern resolutely rejected the reckless Trotskyite line on the Chinese question, helping the Chinese Communists to unite their forces in the struggle for the victory of the Chi-

¹ CPSU in the Resolutions and Decisions..., Part II, p. 372.

nese revolution. The Central Committee of the CPSU(B), the fraternal Communist Parties and the working class of the capitalist countries unconditionally rejected the anti-Party platform of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc on the international situation. A resolution of the Fifteenth Party Conference emphasised that the opposition bloc's platform "marks a departure ... from the class line of proletarian revolution on the most important aspects of international and domestic policy".¹

**The Main Stages in the Party's Struggle
Against the Trotskyite-Zinovievite Bloc.
Its Ideological, Political and Organisational Defeat**

The history of the Party's struggle against the Trotskyite-Zinovievite opposition consists of several stages. The first of these was the April (1926) Plenum of the Party's Central Committee, which condemned the Trotskyite economic line designed to frustrate the Party's victory-of-socialism policy, and to disorganise the Party and the Soviet government apparatus. The second stage was the July (1926) Joint Plenum of the Party's CC and the CCC, at which the anti-Party bloc took final shape. By then it had become clear that in violation of the decisions of Party congresses, including the resolution of the Tenth Congress, "On Party Unity", the Trotskyite-Zinovievite oppositionists were staging illegal meetings, reprinting secret Party documents and circulating them in Moscow, Bryansk, Saratov, Vladivostok, Pyatigorsk, Omsk, Gornel, Odessa and other towns with the aim of discrediting the CC's general line. They sent their agents to many Party organisations to establish factional underground groups.

One step in the opposition's splitting tactics was an illegal meeting held in a wood near Moscow by Gr. Belenky, a functionary of the Comintern's Executive Committee. The meeting heard a report by alternate member of the CC Lashevich, who called for a fight against the Party and its Central Committee. All these disorganising acts by the opposition showed that its leaders had switched from legal methods of maintaining their views to the establishment of a country-wide illegal organisation.

¹ CPSU in the Resolutions and Decisions..., Part II, p. 337.

In secret from the Leninist Party, the Trotskyite-Zinovievite oppositionists set up their own central committee, regional, gubernia and district committees and local groups, and established secret connections between the centre and the outlying districts; they collected membership dues, held illegal meetings of their supporters, and trained them to use double-dealing and deceit in the event of exposure. The opposition's factional activity led to a revival of anti-Party groups, which had been defeated earlier, like the "workers' group" and "workers' truth". Members of these anti-Party groups reprinted secret Party documents, held illegal meetings and carried on anti-Soviet agitation among specialists.

The July (1926) Joint CC and CCC Plenum put direct political responsibility for the factional struggle on Zinoviev, a member of the CC's Politburo and Chairman of the Comintern, whose associates used the Comintern apparatus for participating in the anti-Party activity.

The Plenum expelled Zinoviev from the Politburo, issued a severe reprimand and warning to Lashevich, who was removed from the post of Vice-Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council, and also reaffirmed the decision of the CCC Presidium of June 12, 1926, imposing Party punishment on G. Y. Belenky, I. S. Chernyshov, B. G. Shapiro, M. V. Vasilyeva, N. M. Vlasov, and K. A. Volgina, warning these oppositionists that unless they stopped their factional activity they would be duly subjected to organisational measures. The July Plenum called on all Party members to give the factionalists a resolute rebuff, to unite and to display Bolshevik discipline, because "monolithic unity and iron discipline, real unity of views on the basis of Leninism have always been the main premise for all the successes of the Bolshevik Party".¹

The Party organisations came out vigorously in defence of the Leninist Party's unity and cohesion. The Plenum decision was unanimously approved by the Party organisations of the Ukraine. Thus, a unanimous resolution of the Plenum of the Lugansk Area Party Committee said that the Central Committee must "eradicate any further attempts, whatever their origin, to disrupt the unity of our ranks".² A meet-

¹ CPSU in the Resolutions and Decisions..., Part II, p. 285.

² Ocherki istorii Kommunisticheskoi partii Ukrainy (Essays on the History of the Communist Party of the Ukraine), Kiev, 1964, p. 354.

ing of Party activists in Zaporozhye said in its decision that "the Zaporozhye Party organisation will carry on a resolute struggle against all sorts of attempts to revise Leninism, to undermine the Party's unity, attempts at splitting and factionalism, and will work for the monolithic unity of the Leninist Bolshevik ranks".¹ The Party organisations of the Ukraine gave a resolute rebuff to the activity of the all-Ukrainian underground factional centre, among whose members were N. Golubenko, Y. Livshits and P. Rozengauz, who had established connections with the Trotskyites of Moscow, Kiev, Odessa, Nikolayev, Dnepropetrovsk, Kharkov and Kherson.

A joint sitting of the Transcaucasian Territorial Committee of the Party, the Territorial Control Commission, the CC and the CCC of the Communist Parties of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia met in Tiflis in August 1926 and adopted a decision condemning the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc, and on behalf of the Communist organisations of the Transcaucasia declaring their "determination to stand foursquare on guard of the Party's Leninist unity, and to combat any distortions of Leninism".²

A general meeting of the Communist cell No. 3 in Dushanbe adopted a resolution on August 3, 1926, giving full endorsement to the decisions of the July CC and CCC Plenum, which it regarded as "the only correct ones in the cause of preserving the unity of the Leninist Communist Party of Bolsheviks, and in building a socialist economy, on the basis of the decisions of the Fourteenth Party Congress and the April CC Plenum".³

The Seventeenth Party Conference of Ivanovo-Voznesensk Gubernia stressed in its resolution that all the Communists had come out "against the opposition and in support of the CC, in defence of Party unity".⁴

In September and early October 1926, the opposition leaders mounted a direct attack on the Party. They arranged for

¹ *Essays on the History of the Communist Party of the Ukraine*, p. 354.

² *Ocherki istorii Kommunisticheskoi partii Azerbaidzhana* (Essays on the History of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan), p. 420.

³ A. V. Makashov, *Partiinaya organizatsiya Tadzhikistana v 1924-1926 godakh* (Tajikistan's Party Organisation in 1924-1926), Dushanbe, 1964, p. 141.

⁴ *Ocherki istorii Ivanovskoi organizatsii KPSS* (Essays on the History of the Ivanovo CPSU Organisation), Part II, Ivanovo, 1967, p. 171.

speeches by their representatives at Party meetings at a number of enterprises, mainly in Moscow and Leningrad.

In an effort to win over broad masses of workers, the oppositionists slanderously asserted that the Party and the state apparatus were infected with bureaucratism, allegedly the cause of the continuing crises in the Party. A leaflet written by Trotsky was illegally circulated in the Moscow organisation, urging "the need for radical struggle against the tendencies of petty-bourgeois degeneration in the ranks of our own Party", and alleging that the CC was sliding down into the petty-bourgeois quagmire. The Trotskyites demanded "a return of the Party regime to the Leninist line of inner-Party democracy".¹

The disorganising speeches by the opposition leaders were sharply condemned by Party meetings. On October 1, 1926, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Pyatakov and Radek tried to foist on a meeting of the Party cell at Moscow's Aviapribor Works their own resolution criticising the Central Committee's line. This attempt was indignantly rejected by a majority of the Communist workers; by 78 votes to 21, the cell condemned the oppositionists' anti-Party activity and demanded that the Party's Moscow Committee should carry on a resolute struggle against the splitters. Fulfilling the will of the Communists, the Moscow Committee's Bureau adopted a resolution on October 2, 1926, urging the Moscow Party organisation to give a resolute rebuff to the opposition's slanderous charges. On October 7, 1926, the Communists of the Leningrad Krasny Putilovets Works made Zinoviev discontinue his anti-Party speech and leave the rostrum. The oppositionists' speeches in other cities had similarly lamentable results.

The opposition's attempts to stampede the Party into a discussion were a complete fiasco. A communique issued by the Central Committee said: "This defeat is all the more significant because the members of the Politburo and the majority of the Central Committee, abiding by the decisions of the Party organs that a discussion was inappropriate, did not take part in it."² Of the 53,208 Party members attending meetings in Moscow, 52,950 voted for the Party's general line and condemned the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc, and only 171 votes were cast for the opposition; 87 abstained. Of

¹ *Fifteenth Conference of the CPSU(B). . .*, p. 627.

² *Pravda*, October 17, 1926.

the 34,180 members taking part in the discussion in Leningrad, 33,729 condemned the opposition, which was supported only by 325; 126 abstained.¹ Faced with this solid rebuff by the Party organisations in industry, the opposition leaders were forced, on October 16, 1926, to submit a statement to the Central Committee promising to stop their factional fight and to abide by the rules of Party discipline.

The most telling defeat was inflicted on the Trotskyite-Zinovievite anti-Party bloc by the Fifteenth Party Conference, at which the opposition failed to win a single vote, and found itself totally isolated. On the eve of the conference, the October (1926) Joint Plenum of the CC and the CCC adopted a decision "On the Situation Within the Party in Connection with the Factional Efforts and Breaches of Party Discipline by a Number of CC Members". For breaches of Party discipline warnings were issued to CC members Sokolsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Pyatakov, Yevdokimov, Sokolnikov, Smilga and alternate member Nikolayeva. The CC declared that it was impossible for Zinoviev to continue his work in the Communist International, because he did not express the line of the CPSU(B), and because, by reason of his factional, splitting activity in the Comintern, he had lost the confidence of a number of Communist Parties. Trotsky was relieved of his duties of Politburo member, and Kamenev, of alternate member of the Politburo.

The Fifteenth Party Conference unanimously adopted the theses of J. V. Stalin's report, "On the Opposition Bloc Within the CPSU(B)", which characterised the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc as a Social-Democratic deviation within the ranks of the Communist Party, and as an auxiliary detachment of the Second International. Let us recall that Trotskyism's slide-down to the Social-Democratic deviation had been noted by the January (1925) CC and CCC Plenum, whose resolution said: "Present-day Trotskyism is essentially a falsification of Communism in the spirit of approximation to the 'European' specimen of pseudo-Marxism, i.e., ultimately in the spirit of 'European' Social-Democracy."² Confirming this assessment, the Fifteenth Party Conference stated that on the questions of the nature and the prospects of the October Revolution, and the evaluation of the peasantry's

¹ *Pravda*, October 17, 1926.

² *CPSU in the Resolutions and Decisions...*, Part II, p. 108.

role in socialist transformations, the Trotskyite-Zinovievite anti-Party bloc had switched to the West European Social-Democratic stand.

Through their leader, Otto Bauer, the Social-Democrats were saying that the proletariat of Russia, a minority of the population, had established its domination only temporarily, and would inevitably lose its power as soon as the peasant mass became more mature. The substance of this Social-Democratic idea was that "only with the conquest of political power by the proletariat of the industrial West can the rule of industrial socialism be durably established" in Russia.¹ This political credo of scepticism about the victory of socialism in Russia was at the basis of all the activity of the Second International.

As early as 1917, Otto Bauer was forecasting the inevitable destruction of the proletarian power in Russia. In his pamphlet, *The Russian Revolution and the European Proletariat*, he wrote: "The Russian revolution cannot end in a proletarian dictatorship; it cannot establish a socialist social system. Even if the Russian revolution were to overcome all the dangers threatening it, it can produce nothing but a bourgeois-democratic republic."² The Social-Democratic leaders used all this talk to cover up their departure from Marxism and switch to reformist positions.

The Social-Democratic prophecies about the USSR's inevitable capitalist degeneration were incorporated into the capitulationist platform of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite anti-Party bloc. Although Trotsky tried hard to prove that he had no links with Western Social-Democracy, there were incontrovertible facts to show a complete identity of views and action between the opposition and the opportunist Second International.

It was no accident, therefore, that the leaders of international Social-Democracy and the Mensheviks declared full support for the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc. Paul Levi wrote: "Our views are identical with those of the opposition. ... It is a fact that an independent anti-capitalist movement is once again starting in Russia under the banner of the class struggle." Dan, leader of the Menshevik émigrés, who campaigned

¹ J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 8, p. 230.

² Ernst Thälmann, *Reden und Aufsätze zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung*, Bd. I, Berlin, 1955, S. 527.

for a restoration of capitalism in the USSR, wrote with unconcealed delight on the pages of *Sotsialistichesky vestnik*: "By its criticism of the existing system, which repeats the Social-Democratic criticism almost word for word, the Bolshevik opposition is preparing the people's minds ... for the acceptance of the propositions of the Social-Democratic platform." He praised the opposition for "fostering not only in the midst of the workers' masses, but also in the midst of Communist workers, the shoots of the ideas and feelings which, given the right approach, could very well yield Social-Democratic fruits".

The newspaper *Posledniye novosti*, the central organ of the counter-revolutionary Cadet Party, also displayed full solidarity with the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc, which it said was the mouthpiece of "broad sections of the politically dissatisfied population". It added that "the Soviet power's most terrible enemy now is the one that creeps up to it imperceptibly, spreads its tentacles around it on every side, and eliminates it before it becomes aware that it has been eliminated. That is precisely the part that is being played by the Soviet opposition, a part that is inevitable and necessary in the preparatory period, from which we have not yet emerged".

Consequently, the logic of the factional struggle had led to a situation in which the opposition's views were objectively identical with the views of the avowed enemies of the proletarian dictatorship.

The Fifteenth Party Conference fully exposed the Trotskyite-Zinovievite Social-Democratic platform and resolutely condemned the oppositionists' splitting activity aimed at destroying the Party's Leninist unity. The Conference issued a stern warning to the Trotskyite-Zinovievite oppositionists to the effect that any further splitting activity would result in their expulsion from the Party. Speakers at the Conference also condemned the opposition leaders' anti-Party work in the Comintern, and gave full backing to the decisions adopted by a number of fraternal parties to have Zinoviev released from the duties of Comintern chairman.

The Conference ended in a victory for the Leninist general line. It summed up the results of the internal Party struggle after the Fourteenth Congress, rallied the Party and all the Soviet people for socialist construction in the USSR, and prepared the conditions for the triumph of the Leninist

ideas in the ranks of the international proletariat. The Conference demonstrated the great ideological growth, the high level of activity and consciousness of the Party masses and their cohesion round the Central Committee. Delegates urged all Communists to carry on a resolute struggle against the Social-Democratic deviation, giving special attention to exposure of its "Leftist" pseudo-revolutionary camouflage and opportunistic practices, and cutting short any attempt at resumption of factional activity and breaches of discipline.

The Fifteenth Conference decisions met with unanimous approval by the Party organisations and the whole Soviet people. They were endorsed by the Moscow, Leningrad and other Party organisations. A district Party conference in Zlatoust wrote in its resolution: "We demand an end to and a resolute curb on the factionalists' attacks. We oppose any revision of Leninism, and stand for the Leninist Party and for relentless struggle against those who violate the Party's unity. We promise full and unanimous support to our Central Committee and the Comintern in their fight against the opposition."¹ The Chelyabinsk Regional Committee noted that Party organisations "stand firm on guard of Lenin's precepts, condemn the disorganising activity of the opposition and insist on a resolute struggle against the opposition splitters, including their expulsion from the ranks of the CPSU(B)".² Similar decisions were adopted by many other Party organisations.

However, contrary to the decisions of the Fifteenth Conference, the Trotskyite-Zinovievite oppositionists did not cease their anti-Party activity. Their declaration of October 16, 1926, turned out to be a hypocritical manoeuvre, a double-dealing act designed to keep their men within the Party. The oppositionists deceived the Party and in actual fact continued their subversive activity in the Party organisations and among the non-Party workers.

The Trotskyite-Zinovievite anti-Party bloc became the centre of attraction for all the ultra-Leftist renegades from Communism, and extreme Right Souvarine-type opportunists intent on eroding the proletarian dictatorship and overthrow-

¹ *Ocherki istorii Chelyabinskoi oblastnoi partiinoi organizatsii* (Essays on the History of the Chelyabinsk Regional Party Organisation), Chelyabinsk, 1967, p. 171.

² *Ibid.*

ing the Soviet power. "The Trotskyites", M. A. Suslov, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, said in 1964, "coalesced not only with the small factionalist groupings within the Comintern, but with organisations, groups and individuals who had never been members of any Communist Party and also with enemies and traitors expelled from their ranks."¹

Trotskyite splinter groups were doing great harm to the Communist Parties of Germany, France, Italy, Bulgaria, Poland, Czechoslovakia and other countries. In France, Boris Souvarine and his handful of supporters started a slanderous campaign against the CPSU(B), the French Communist Party and the Comintern. Souvarine based himself on the platform of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc and called for a "new revolution" against the Soviet power and the Secretariat of the CPSU(B) Central Committee. The Trotskyite-Zinovievite opposition also gave support to Suzanne Girault, an alternate member of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, who had switched to the positions of the Souvarine opportunist group. In order to cut short the corrupting influence of Trotskyite followers in France, the Fourth Plenum of the Comintern Executive approved a French Communist Party decision in 1924 expelling Souvarine from its ranks. Suzanne Girault was recalled from the Comintern Executive Committee.

Among the branches of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite anti-Party bloc were the ultra-Leftist Trotskyite groups in the Communist Party of Germany, which had several subgroups: the ultra-Left group of Urbahns, Maslow, Ruth Fischer, Scholem and Schwan; the Korsch group which published a special *Information Bulletin* in Berlin; the Wedding opposition and the Katz group, all of which received directives, material and instructions from the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc. With the tacit consent of the opposition leaders, German "Left" renegades slandered the USSR and called for an armed rebellion against the proletarian dictatorship. What they said boiled down to the assertion that the Party's domestic policy was entirely an expression of the interests of

¹ M. A. Suslov, *O borbe KPSS za splochnost mezhdunarodnogo kommunisticheskogo dvizheniya. Doklad na Plenum TsK KPSS 14 fevralya 1964 goda* (On the CPSU Struggle for the Cohesion of the International Communist Movement. Report at a Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee on February 14, 1964), Moscow, 1964, p. 88.

the kulaks, who were seeking to eliminate the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc, the real champions of the proletariat's interests. The oppositionists held that the USSR's foreign policy was leading to a coalescence with imperialism and that, consequently, defence of the Soviet Union against the threat of war and intervention would mean a rehearsal of the ignominious behaviour of the Social-Democrats in 1914.

The ultra-Leftist elements were deliberately trying to put a break on the growing support of the USSR among the workers' masses in Germany by casting doubt in their periodicals on the reports given by members of German workers' delegations returning from the USSR and describing the Soviet people's successes in socialist construction. The "Leftists" claimed the delegates' accounts of their visit to the Soviet Union to be lies and fraud, because they wanted to prevent revolutionary-minded workers who supported the Social-Democrats from switching to Marxism-Leninism, and to block the establishment of a united front under the Communist Party's leadership.

Trotsky's and Zinoviev's allies in the German Communist Party speculated on the difficulties of socialist construction in the Soviet Union. However, after an exhaustive discussion on the economic and political problems of the proletarian dictatorship in the USSR, the overwhelming majority of the cells of the Communist Party of Germany resolutely came down on the side of the Bolshevik Party. An intense struggle was started in the Communist Party of Germany to eradicate the anti-Soviet ideas spread by the ultra-Leftist renegades from communism.

There was a radical advance in the elimination of the ultra-Leftist groups with the assumption of leadership in the Communist Party of Germany by Ernst Thälmann in October 1925. He was a fiery and dedicated friend of the Soviet Union, and made a tireless study of the experience of the Great October Revolution and socialist construction in the USSR. He was the first in Germany to start the systematic propaganda of the principal problems of socialist construction in the Soviet Union.

Thälmann was one of the foreign Communists who at once saw through the dangerous and hostile character of the Trotskyite platform, and unhesitatingly came out in defence of the Central Committee of the CPSU(B). His speeches and articles showed the German working class the anti-Soviet

character of Trotskyism, and emphasised the correctness of Lenin's idea that socialism could win in one country. He expressed profound conviction that socialism would inevitably triumph in the USSR and laid bare the organic ties between the Trotskyite-Zinovievite opposition and the ultra-Leftist groups in the Communist Party of Germany. Thälmann said that all these anti-Party groups were of similar origin: they all sprang from the petty-bourgeois lack of confidence in the strength of the working class, and denied that socialism could win in one country. The Trotskyite and other anti-Party groups, he said, were accomplices of capitalist agents in the working class camp.¹

In 1925 and 1926, many German Communists believed that the greatest danger came from the Right-opportunist group of Brandler and Thalheimer. Thälmann explained: "You are apprehensive of the Rightist danger in the Party, and you have good reason to be. But you must realise that this Rightist danger is best averted when all comrades regardless of the group they had belonged to earlier, come out against the immediate danger of 'ultra-Leftist' sectarianism, and unite on the basis of Leninism."²

The rout of the ultra-Leftist groups was completed under Thälmann's leadership. Following their expulsion from the Communist Party of Germany in 1926, the Communists' prestige among the German workers was considerably enhanced.

The Trotskyite-Zinovievite oppositionists were inflicting great harm on the Communist Party of Italy, which had to work underground because of the fascist domination of the country. Making use of the experience of the opposition bloc, the extreme "Leftist" elements came out against the Communist Party's leading role, played down the part of the peasantry and objected to any solution of the agrarian question in Southern Italy, which they said was a bourgeois invention. In their efforts to disrupt the international ties between the Italian Communists and the proletariat in other countries, the Left extremists put forward the idea that Italy was moving along a way of her own and that fascism would collapse of itself; they helped the bourgeoisie to spread slan-

¹ See Ernst Thälmann, *Reden und Aufsätze zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung*, Bd. I, Berlin, 1955, S. 527-28.

² *Deutschlands unsterblicher Sohn. Erinnerungen an Ernst Thälmann*, Berlin, 1961, S. 75-76.

ders about the Italian Communist Party being a tool of Moscow.

The Italian fascists used Trotskyite writings in their fight against the Communist Party. While the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin were banned, Trotskyite writings were being extensively translated into Italian. Resorting to slander and demagoguery, the fascists sought to mislead the revolutionary working-class movement in Italy. The fascist secret police used the Trotskyites in their attempts to influence political prisoners, including Antonio Gramsci, leader of the Italian Communists. When Gramsci learned of this, he said: "Trotsky is a prostitute of fascism."¹

In his politically incisive writings, Gramsci exposed the Trotskyite "permanent revolution" doctrine. He refuted Trotsky's views and stood up for Lenin's idea that national and international tasks are indivisible and constitute a single whole. In his *Prison Notebooks* he wrote: "It is safe to say that Bronstein [Trotsky], who may have outwardly appeared as a 'Westerner', was in fact a cosmopolitan, passing superficial judgement both on national and on Western or European problems. As for Ilyich [Lenin] he was, by contrast, profoundly national, while at the same time having a deep understanding of the situation in other European countries as well."²

The Communist Parties were greatly aided in their struggle against the Trotskyite-Zinovievite opposition bloc and its supporters by the decisions of the Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International held in Moscow from November 22 to December 16, 1926. One of the main items on the Plenum's agenda was J. V. Stalin's report, "Inner Party Questions of the CPSU(B)", which was published under the title, "Once Again on the Social-Democratic Deviation in Our Party".

The report stressed that the opposition bloc's platform was one of Social-Democratic deviation, a platform of Rightist deviation in the Party, a platform rallying all kinds of opportunist trends to organise a fight against the Party, against its unity, against its authority.

The participants in the Plenum declared the Communist Parties' wholehearted support of the Leninist policy pursued

¹ L. Lombardo Radice, G. Carbone, *Vita di Antonio Gramsci* (The Life of Antonio Gramsci), Roma, 1952, p. 123.

² *Ibid.*

by the CPSU(B). Thälmann declared: "Kamenev stands up here today, and is brazen enough to talk about the national limitation of the CPSU(B), about how it formulates its tasks, how it carries out socialist construction; but we see here in the whole development of the CPSU(B), especially today, that it is doing everything possible to arouse the forces not only in its own country but, as it has proved, also in connection with all international struggles, with all other revolutionary tasks; that it is a real international Party."¹

Luigi Longo, representing the Executive Committee of the Communist Youth International, declared that "to reject the possibility that Socialism can be built in one single country, is equivalent to a liquidatory attitude towards the Russian revolution. To maintain that the Russian proletariat cannot march forward to Socialism unless the revolution is victorious in the other countries, means sowing distrust and confusion, means withdrawing broad strata of workers from their active struggle for the dictatorship and the upbuilding [of socialism] in Russia... means doing direct harm to the labour movement of the world".²

Having heard Stalin's report, the Plenum adopted a resolution on the "Russian" question, motioned by the German, French, British, Czechoslovak and American delegations. It said that "the CPSU(B) in its past as well as in its present work has proved its internationalism not in words, but by deeds, and has set a magnificent example of internationalism".³ It went on to say that the Trotskyite-Zinovievite opposition was, in ideological content, essentially a Rightist danger in the CPSU(B), sometimes camouflaged with "Leftist" talk. The Plenum put the duty on all the sections of the Comintern to wage a determined struggle against any attempt by the opposition in the CPSU(B) and its supporters in other Communist Parties to disrupt the ideological and organisational unity of the Comintern and the Leninist Party, which was leading the world's first proletarian state. The Plenum endorsed the resolution of the Fifteenth Party Conference, "On the Opposition Bloc Within the CPSU(B)", and

¹ *The Ways of World Revolution. Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International. Verbatim Report*, Vol. II, p. 242.

² *International Press Correspondence*, Vol. 7, No. 6, 20th January 1927, p. 124.

³ *Ibid.*, No. 11, 3rd February 1927, p. 238.

deemed it necessary to incorporate it with the Plenum's other decisions as its own. In addition, the Plenum adopted a number of decisions aimed at defeating the Trotskyite groups in the fraternal Parties.

All the decisions of the Enlarged Plenum of the Comintern Executive Committee were designed to enhance the activity and fighting efficiency of the Comintern's sections, to eradicate factionalism, consolidate the Communist Parties' unity, and ensure the pursuance of a firm Leninist line in the international communist movement. The Plenum's documents were unanimously approved by the Communists of the Soviet Union and the fraternal Parties. In a joint statement, the delegations of the Belgian, Dutch and Swiss Communist Parties declared that "by the lack of faith which the Opposition reveals with regard to Socialist construction in the Soviet Union it not only tries to hinder the Russian proletariat from building Socialism, but also helps the Social-Democratic leaders successfully to continue among the working class their counter-revolutionary propaganda against the Soviet Union".¹

Equipped with the decisions of the Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the Comintern's Executive Committee, Party organisations intensified their struggle against the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc, which became especially acute in the spring and summer. In early June 1927, the opposition leaders sent in to the Party's Central Committee the "Statement of 83", openly demanding a Party-wide discussion. They claimed to be the "Left proletarian Leninist wing of the Party" and paid lip-service to observance of Party decisions, Party discipline and the unity of Party ranks, but were in fact working to destroy the Party.

The Trotskyites' "Statement of 83" slandered the Soviet Government, alleging that it was preparing to abolish the foreign-trade monopoly, abandon the nationalisation of land, and agree to repay the tsar's prewar debts contracted under foreign loans.

The West European Social-Democratic leaders at once backed up the "Statement of 83", and gave it resolute support. *Vorwärts*, the central organ of the Social-Democratic Party of Germany, wrote: "The Russian opposition platform, issued by Znamya Kommunizma Publishers, is a staggering document because of the facts about the situation in Russia

¹ *Ibid.*, No. 6, 20th January 1927, p. 133.

which it gives. When you read the passages about the condition of the agricultural workers you feel that you are reading about a condition unworthy of man". By publishing the "Statement of 83", the renegades from communism gave the capitalist governments the pretext to use the Trotskyite slanders to intensify their pressure on the Soviet Union.

Within a few weeks, on June 27, 1927, the anti-Party "Group of 15", headed by Sapronov and V. Smirnov, sent in its own platform to the Party Central Committee, maliciously slandering the Party's policy.

On June 29, 1927, Trotsky, Zinoviev and Yevdokimov sent a letter to the Central Committee of the Metal Workers' Union, in an effort to win over the trade unions. In their reply, the Metal Workers' Union Central Committee declared that "the opposition, far from meeting with support among the trade-union vanguard of the metal workers, will in fact be given a vigorous proletarian rebuff".¹ The Metal Workers' Union resolutely condemned the anti-Leninist "Statement of 83". Protesting against the slanderous attacks on the Party, the metal workers said that "our Party's history has never seen a more pessimistic and defeatist document than this one".²

Having been repulsed in their factional activity, the Trotskyites increasingly appealed to the mass of non-Party people. Thus, in May 1927, speaking before an audience of Party and non-Party people, who met at Trade Union House to mark *Pravda's* 15th anniversary, Zinoviev allowed himself to make slanderous attacks against the Party's Central Committee and *Pravda*. On June 9, 1927, Trotsky and Zinoviev participated in an anti-Party demonstration organised by the opposition at the Yaroslavl railway station in Moscow under the pretext of giving a send-off to the Trotskyite Smilga. Trotsky addressed the audience, consisting of oppositionists and people who happened to be at the station, in a speech abounding in slanderous attacks against the Party's policy.

In the streets of Moscow, Leningrad and other cities, the oppositionists paraded with the slogan: "Down with the Thermidor!" This counter-revolutionary slogan was a cov-

¹ *Voprosy istorii KPSS* (Questions of CPSU History), No. 7, 1966, p. 115.

² *Ibid.*

er-up for the charge that the CC was allegedly pursuing a policy designed gradually to transform the Soviet system into a conventional bourgeois republic.

The Trotskyite-Zinovievite opposition bloc mounted its factional operations in cities throughout the country. In April 1927, a governing centre was set up in Baku, grouping local Trotskyites D. Sarkis, A. Mamedlinsky, A. Skublinsky and F. Shebarshev among them. At the end of June, 1927, they came out with a "Statement of 44" in defence of Trotsky and Zinoviev.

This slanderous document aroused deep indignation in the Party organisations of Azerbaijan. The Party cell of the rotary drilling department of Baku's Bailov District, where D. Sarkis was registered, issued a strict reprimand and warning over his anti-Party activity. Its unanimous resolution said: "We categorically condemn the statement by the Baku oppositionists and request the Baku Committee and the CCC of the Azerbaijan Communist Party(B) to take stern measures to cut short any oppositionist vacillations and factional appeals."¹

A meeting of the Baku organisation activists in August 1927 once again warned the oppositionists that "continuation of their factional activity will entail measures of the most resolute Party influence".² On October 4, 1927, in view of the continuing anti-Party activity, the CCC of the Azerbaijan Communist Party(B) expelled from its ranks the Trotskyites A. Mamedlinsky, A. Skublinsky, F. Butov, D. Sarkis, V. Gavrilov, A. Babayev, M. Popov, Yar-Mamed and others. The Baku Party organisation activists approved the CCC decision and adopted a resolution urging the Communists of Baku to administer a "solid and resolute Bolshevik rebuff to the pathetic group of Baku oppositionists hoping to demoralise and disrupt the steeled ranks of the always united and always solidly welded Leninist Baku organisation".³

On the eve of the August (1927) Joint Plenum of the CC and the CCC of the CPSU(B), Trotsky and Zinoviev sent a letter to their supporters in Baku saying that they pinned great hopes on the opposition in the Baku organisation. They advised the oppositionists to make common cause with the

¹ *Essays on the History of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan*, p. 421.

² *Ibid.*, p. 422.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 432.

nationalistic group in the Azerbaijan Communist Party(B), headed by E. Khanbudagov, and with bourgeois-nationalistic elements outside the Party, in a joint struggle against the Party leadership.

With the support of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite oppositionists, national-deviationists became active in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia and other republics. In Azerbaijan, the Trotskyite A. Akhmedov had ties with the Mussavat bourgeois-nationalist party, and took part in subversive activity against the Soviet power. In Georgia, the Trotskyite-Zinovievite oppositionists acted in close contact with national-deviationists (Mdivani, Okudzhava, Tsintsadze, Kavtaradze), who were also Trotskyites, and with illegal Menshevik organisations in the Northern Caucasus. These elements pinned their hopes for a restoration of capitalism on the anti-Party activity of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc.

Consequently, the Trotskyite-Zinovievite opposition, the national-deviationists and the Mensheviks had a common platform of fighting the Party and the Soviet power, tried to inflame hostility between nationalities and to clear the way for a restoration of capitalism in the country. G. Musabekov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan Republic, exposed the underhand schemes of the opposition when he told the Baku Party Conference: "It is nothing but political prostitution, political quackery to harp on the strings of national feelings, and to issue slogans to sow dissension within the trans-Caucasian proletariat."¹

To realise their factional designs, the opposition leaders helped the anti-Soviet forces in the USSR to step up their activity, and cleared the way for foreign counter-revolutionaries. Menshevik émigré organisations were hoping that the activity of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite opposition would result in a disintegration and collapse of "world Bolshevism". On June 20, 1927, their mouthpiece, *Sotsialistichesky vestnik* wrote: "...The opposition's subversive activity, long since carried beyond the boundaries of Soviet Russia, in fact accelerated the disintegration and collapse of 'world Bolshevism'."

Having in vain tried every means of caution, a Joint Plenum of the CC and the CCC of the CPSU(B) on August 9, 1927, adopted a resolution entitled "On Breaches of Party Discipline by Zinoviev and Trotsky". The Plenum stated

that the opposition bloc leaders had been systematically committing breaches of Party discipline, and were clearly working to split the CPSU(B) and the Comintern, thereby confronting the Party with the necessity of applying to them the resolution of the Party's Tenth Congress. In view of the threat of Zinoviev's and Trotsky's expulsion from the Party's CC, the oppositionists sent in a statement to the CC and the CCC on August 8, 1927, promising to stop their factional struggle and to abide by all Party decisions. The Plenum once again took the opposition promises into consideration, and let Trotsky and Zinoviev stay on in the CC, administering a stern reprimand and warning. At the same time, the Plenum demanded that oppositionists should dissolve their factions and urged all Party organisations to take steps to eliminate these factions.

However, soon after the Plenum the opposition leaders broke their promises. In September 1927, there appeared the "Platform of 13", an anti-Party document signed by Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Yevdokimov, Pyatakov, Bakayev and Rakovsky among others. It repeated the slanderous assertions contained in the "Statement of 83", and added inventions about the Central Committee planning to extend the political rights of the urban and rural bourgeoisie, and to cease supporting the Chinese revolution.

The oppositionists followed this up by mounting a slanderous campaign against the Party and its leadership. For that purpose they set up secret printing shops in Moscow, Leningrad and Kharkov to publish and circulate among the population secret Party documents and factional material. One such printing shop was run by a man called Fischelev, once an active Menshevik. He printed the text of the Trotskyite platform and published it in the cover of Furmanov's pamphlet, *The Way of Struggle*. Altogether, 12,000 copies of this Trotskyite document were published.¹ On Sunday, the Trotskyites tried to take over a printing shop in Moscow in order to publish one of their appeals. However, they were not only prevented from doing so, but were detained by non-Party working men and women.²

The Trotskyites shunned no means in their efforts to obtain equipment for their underground printing shops. Thus,

¹ *Essays on the History of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan*, p. 424.

¹ See *Pravda*, November 27, 1927.

² *Ibid.*

K. Gryunshtein and Y. Fyodorova stole about 150 kg of type and a printing press from the Central House of Educational Workers.

In setting up their illegal printing shops, the Trotskyites established contacts with bourgeois intellectuals, who were connected with former Kolchak officers. When the OGPU agencies discovered an illegal printing shop set up by the Trotskyite Mrachkovsky and found out that some of those working there were connected with counter-revolutionary elements, Mrachkovsky was also arrested.

The leaders of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc came out in defence of those arrested for anti-Soviet activity and expressed their solidarity with them. Y. Preobrazhensky, L. Serebryakov and Y. Sharov wrote: "We declare that we the undersigned are the organisers of this undertaking and are politically responsible for it, and not the non-Party men casually connected with it." They demanded the immediate release of everyone arrested in the case.¹

The counter-revolutionaries abroad applauded these actions of the Trotskyites. The Cadet newspaper, *Posledniye novosti*, published Trotskyite material printed in underground shops on the territory of the Soviet Union and once made the ironical quip that it was implementing "freedom of the press" for Trotsky. The paper added: "We expect no gratitude, but express our satisfaction at the fact the 'Bolshevik opposition' has entered the stage of underground printing. We hope that this will be followed by subsequent stages."

The whiteguards were right in their expectations: the Trotskyite opposition went even further, on to downright anti-Soviet acts. In view of this, the October (1927) Joint Plenum of the CC and the CCC once again considered the question of the opposition bloc leaders' behaviour. It heard irrefutable evidence that Trotsky and Zinoviev had again deceived the Party and had grossly defaulted on their promises—far from eliminating the "elements of factionalism" they had, in fact, carried their factional fight to a stage verging on the establishment of an anti-Leninist party. In view of this, the Plenum decided to expel Trotsky and Zinoviev from the CC, and to lay before the Fifteenth Party Congress the facts about their splitting activity.

In full conformity with the Party Rules, the Plenum al-

¹ See *Pravda*, October 13, 1927.

lowed, a month before the regular Fifteenth Congress was to open, the announcement of a Party-wide discussion on the items of the Congress agenda. Let us recall that the August Joint CC and CCC Plenum had adopted a decision to have *Pravda* regularly publish a *Diskussionny Listok* containing critical remarks, amendments, addenda and concrete proposals on the agenda of the forthcoming Congress.

In the course of the discussion, the Party organisations resolutely rejected the anti-Leninist platform of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite opposition, and rallied round the Communist Party's general line. Conferences in the Krasnaya Presnya, Zamoskvorechye, Bauman and other districts of Moscow were held under the slogan "For Leninism, against Trotskyism". The Communists of the capital did not elect a single oppositionist as delegate to these district Party conferences. Party organisations in Leningrad, Baku, Kiev, Rostov, Yerevan, Minsk and other cities demanded an end to the opposition's splitting activity.

Of the 3,316 Communists taking part in the discussion in the Chelyabinsk District Party organisation, 3,277 voted for the Party's CC line, 13 against, and 26 abstained.¹ Of the 147,970 Communists in the Ukraine who took part in pre-Congress meetings only 741 voted for the opposition. Of the 14,438 members of the Baku Party organisation who took part in the discussion only 72 (0.5 per cent) voted for the opposition, and 87 (0.6 per cent) abstained. Of Baku's 250 Party cells, 198 unanimously endorsed the CC Theses. In the Saratov City Party organisation, 98.88 per cent of the Communists voted for the Party's policy. The Communists of Saratov asked the CC "to take the most vigorous measures, right up to organisational conclusions, against the increasingly insolent opposition leaders, who are in breach of Party discipline and who have been trying to frustrate the construction of socialism".² During the discussion, exceptional steadfastness, cohesion and ideological seasoning were displayed by Party organisations in the Red Army. In the civilian cells the opposition won 0.5 per cent of the votes, whereas in the Army cells it got 60 per cent less, in the bluntest rebuff yet.

¹ See *Essays on the History of the Chelyabinsk District Party Organisation*, p. 171.

² *Ocherki istorii Saratovskoi organizatsii KPSS* (Essays on the History of the Saratov CPSU Organisation), Part II, Saratov, 1965, p. 217.

Throughout the country, the draft decisions of the forthcoming Fifteenth Congress were approved by a total of 724,000 Communists. The Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc platform received support from only 4,000 Party members. The oppositionists' attempts to win over the Leninist Komsomol ended in complete failure. During the discussion, 99 per cent of the Young Communists voted for the Party's Leninist general line.

The Trotskyites had trumpeted throughout the world that the CC was out of touch with the Party, and the Party out of touch with the working class. However, the facts proved beyond any doubt that in the struggle against the Trotskyite-Zinovievite opposition the working class gave unconditional support for the Party. During the discussion, non-Party workers and peasants were invited to attend Party meetings to express their views in speeches and by casting their votes. Of the 27,800 non-Party workers who attended open Party meetings in Moscow, only 88 (0.3 per cent) voted for the oppositionists.

Working men and women expressed their affection for the Party and loyalty to it by a massive enrolment in its ranks. In November 1927 alone, 70,430 working men and women filed applications for Party membership.¹ By the end of the Fifteenth Congress, applications for membership had come in from 92,977 working men and women.

"When the Party carries on a struggle for the unity of the Leninist line," wrote a worker of the Leningrad Mechanical Works, in his application, "I consider it my proletarian duty to take part in strengthening the Party and in building socialism."² Similar views and feelings were expressed in other applications from prospective Party members.

The discussion demonstrated the triumph of the Communist Party's Leninist policy and provided clear evidence of the collapse of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite anti-Party bloc. During the discussion, the opposition was not only defeated politically, but also crushed ideologically. Objectively, it became a tool of the third force, the bourgeoisie.

Faced with the fact that they had been utterly routed, the opposition leaders resorted to every means in an effort to discredit the Party and the organs of the Soviet power. In a speech delivered on the eve of the tenth anniversary of the

¹ See *Pravda*, December 2, 1927.

² *Fifteenth Congress of the CPSU(B)*... Vol. 1, p. 321.

Great October Revolution, Zinoviev expressed what amounted to solidarity in assessing the Party's activity with the Menshevik Abramovich, who insisted that the Party's direction of the country had been a succession of mistakes, defeats and political failures. Kamenev spoke out in the same vein, and said that the Party's CC was the grave-digger of the revolution.

The opposition objected to the assessment of the ten-year history of the world's first workers' and peasants' state as given in a Manifesto of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, "To All Workers, Labouring Peasants and Red Army Men of the USSR. To the Proletarians of All Countries and to the Oppressed Peoples of the World", which was adopted by its anniversary session in October 1927. This document set out a number of measures to improve the working people's material conditions and raise their cultural level, including the introduction within the next few years for all workers, without reduction in wages, of the seven-hour working day, exemption of another ten per cent of peasant households from agricultural tax, and more vigorous construction of schools and homes.

At a sitting of the Communist group of the anniversary session, the Trotskyites tried hard to discredit the Manifesto. They countered the seven-hour working day idea by insisting on an immediate increase in wages.¹ That was a demagogic demand designed to cause dissatisfaction among the workers with the Soviet Government's policy. It was generally known that the level of labour productivity did not yet allow any increase in wages. V. V. Kuibyshev said that the Trotskyite attacks on the Manifesto were a crime. He added: "The voting against this Manifesto is a disgrace and an instance of degradation unprecedented in the history of the working-class movement."²

While criticising the Manifesto, the leaders of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite anti-Party bloc simultaneously engaged in downright fraud. They spread the idea that the working people of Leningrad, who had staged a demonstration on October 17, 1927, to mark the anniversary session of the USSR Central Executive Committee, had voiced approval and support for the opposition. This was based on the fact that together with other participants in the session Trotsky and Zinoviev had been on the reviewing stand past which

¹ See *Pravda*, November 2, 1927.

² *Voprosy istorii KPSS* No. 11, 1963, p. 124.

the demonstrators, marched. A resolution adopted by 6,000 Communists at a meeting of the Leningrad organisation's Party activists on October 26, 1927, rejected this slander and exposed Zinoviev and Trotsky.

The oppositionists published appeals and leaflets slandering the Soviet power and its achievements. On the eve of the tenth anniversary of the October Revolution, the opposition published a leaflet entitled *To the November 7 Demonstration* which was circulated not only among the workers of the plants, but also in canteens and pubs. It was signed by Zinoviev, Bakayev, Yevdokimov, Radek and Peterson, and amounted to a directive to stage an uprising against the Soviet power. At the same time, a group styling itself "true Leninist-oppositionists fighting for the truth" published and distributed among non-Party workers at the enterprises a leaflet containing a call to action against Communists holding economic posts, who allegedly "personified nothing but the slavedrivers and hounds of the old Romanov regime sucking your last drops of blood".¹

Apart from the publication of anti-Soviet leaflets and appeals, the opposition leaders made fresh attempts to split the CPSU(B) and to establish a Trotskyite party. On November 4, 1927, they took over a hall of the Moscow Higher Technical School to arrange a secret city-wide meeting of their supporters, who heard reports by Kamenev and Trotsky. Despite a written protest, members of the CC and the CCC were not allowed to attend.

On November 5, 1927, the Trotskyite Rakovsky delivered a speech at a ceremonial meeting at the Kharkov City Soviet to mark the tenth anniversary of the October Revolution. The audience, indignant over his slanderous statements, demanded that he be removed from the floor. As he walked out, Rakovsky appealed to the foreign delegates, among whom were also Social-Democrats and non-Party people. He exclaimed: "See how freely representatives of the working class are allowed to express themselves in this country; this is social-fascism."²

On November 7, 1927, at a signal from their leaders, Trotskyite-Zinovievite oppositionists in Leningrad and Moscow staged demonstrations with anti-Party slogans, and tried to circulate leaflets smearing the Party's Central Com-

¹ *Fifteenth Congress of the CPSU(B)*... Vol. I, p. 328.

² *Ibid.*, p. 152.

mittee and its policy. However, this adventurist enterprise was a resounding flop. The Trotskyite-Zinovievite demonstrators were scattered, their placards and slogans destroyed, and their leaders had to flee to safety. The same thing happened to the oppositionists in Kharkov and other cities. The anti-Soviet manifestations by the oppositionists in the streets of Leningrad, Moscow and other cities were an indication that the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc had completely broken not only with Marxism-Leninism and the Bolshevik Party approach, but also with the Soviet regime.

The anti-Soviet manifestations by a handful of oppositionists and their few supporters were swept away by a powerful tide of working people's demonstrations. The oppositionists tried in vain to prove that their defeat was due to the "apparatchiks forcibly separating the opposition leaders from the masses".¹ Actually, it was not the "apparatchiks" but the people in their millions, who swept the participants in the anti-Soviet demonstrations as an obstacle on the revolutionary path.

The mass meetings and rallies to mark the tenth anniversary of the October Revolution became a striking expression of the Soviet people's cohesion round the Communist Party. The massive demonstrations across the country on November 7, 1927, were the way millions of proletarians and peasants voted for the Central Committee's policy and against the opposition. That day the Party won a vote of confidence from the working class and the labouring peasantry in the country and from the whole international proletariat.

The Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc's transformation into an underground anti-Soviet organisation forced the Communist Party to take strict measures with respect to its leaders. On November 14, 1927, a Joint CC and CCC Plenum expelled Trotsky and Zinoviev from the Party. Other oppositionists were expelled from the CC and the CCC, and the question of their Party membership was submitted for consideration by the Party's Fifteenth Congress.

Party organisations unanimously approved the Plenum's resolution. The Sixth All-Caucasus Party Conference held from November 15 to 23, 1927, declared that it "brands as ignominious the opposition's splitting and anti-Soviet activity, especially its manifestation on November 7, designed to upset the proletariat's international holiday, fully adheres to

¹ *Fifteenth Congress of the CPSU(B)*... Vol. I, p. 174.

the CC decision to expel these Menshevik splitters from our Party's ranks, and considers it necessary to expel all stubborn oppositionists".

The Tenth Congress of the Communist Party(B) of the Ukraine, held from November 20 to 29, 1927, assured the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) that the Communist Party of the Ukraine would "as in the past continue to stand on guard of the Bolshevik Party's solid unity and Leninist policy, acting as a most reliable support of the Leninist CC in its consistent and resolute struggle against the opposition, which has in fact already become a new Menshevik party hostile to Leninism and the proletarian revolution".¹ Delegates to the Eleventh Congress of the CP(B) of Byelorussia, held from November 23 to 30, 1927, declared that they considered "the expulsion of Trotsky and Zinoviev from the Party unquestionably correct. The Fifteenth Party Congress must expel the Trotskyites from the Party. Trotskyism in our Party must be totally destroyed".²

The expulsion of Trotsky and Zinoviev from the CPSU(B) was also unanimously approved by Communist Parties abroad. The Central Committees of the Communist Parties of Austria, Britain, Germany, the USA, France and other countries passed resolutions expressing unconditional support for the Bolshevik Party. A resolution of the Communist Party of Germany's CC Politburo said: "The Party and communist-minded workers believe that Trotsky, Zinoviev and their supporters, whom the Social-Democrats have been using as the 'chief witnesses' in their anti-Communist policy, which is hostile to the working class, have become an auxiliary detachment of international Menshevism and the bourgeoisie in the mounting struggle carried on by the latter against communism, the Comintern and the Soviet Union."³

In response to the resolution of the Joint CC and CCC Plenum, the opposition leaders stepped up their destructive work. They continued to issue anti-Party leaflets and to organise secret meetings which were attended by non-proletarian elements and people hostile to the Party and the working class. A "Leninist opposition group" in Leningrad published a leaflet in defence of Trotsky and Zinoviev, and this was pasted up at factories and on street lampposts. The

¹ *Pravda*, November 23, 1927.

² *Pravda*, November 26, 1927.

³ *Pravda*, November 20, 1927.

authors of this dirty sheet insisted on the re-admission of Trotsky and Zinoviev into the Party and demanded: "Down with the Central Committee!"

Having been given a resolute rebuff by the Party organisations, the Trotskyite-Zinovievite oppositionists stepped up their anti-Party activity among non-Party workers and peasants. In a speech before a group of non-Party people in the Urals, the Trotskyite Mrachkovsky alleged that the Central Committee had arranged a bloc with the Right-wing SR's, that it was pursuing a policy in the interests of the bourgeoisie, and so on. However, these slanderous statements missed their mark. Across the country, workers and peasants drove out the slanderers and expressed their support for the Communist Party. On November 9, 1927, 4,000 workers of the State Electrical Works in Kharkov said in a resolution: "We industrial and office workers of the SEW fully support our Leninist Party and resolutely condemn all those who are trying to split up the unity of the working class and the Leninist Party."¹ The workers of Moscow, Leningrad, the Urals, the Donets Basin and other cities and areas in the country gave a resolute rebuff to the Trotskyite-Zinovievite opposition.

Realising that they were totally isolated from the Party organisations, the working class and the labouring peasants, the opposition leaders broke their last ties with the Party and turned for assistance to the petty-bourgeois, the bourgeois intellectuals, the kulaks and all anti-Soviet elements. They started to recruit all kinds of riff-raff for the illegal Trotskyite party. In the Urals, for instance, the Trotskyites accepted membership dues "from people showing the most liberal sympathies".

On the eve of the Fifteenth Party Congress terroristic schemes were already afoot in the Trotskyite underground. One district organiser of the opposition, Popelov, was arrested in Rostov-on-Don after he had discussed the preparation of terroristic acts.² The Presidium of a Party conference in Sokolniki District in Moscow, held in November 1927, received an anonymous note saying that the opposition would respond to persecution with a reign of terror against Party leaders.³

The Trotskyite-Zinovievite oppositionists strove to push the counter-revolutionary elements into fighting against the

¹ *Fifteenth Congress of the CPSU(B)*... Vol. II, p. 1631.

² See *Fifteenth Congress of the CPSU(B)*... Vol. I, pp. 328-29.

³ See *Pravda*, November 26, 1927.

Soviet power, to set one nation against another, and to sow hostility between the working class and the intelligentsia. The counter-revolutionary "Programme of the Communist Party of the Working Class of the USSR", circulated by the anti-Soviet underground in Odessa, carried an extensive comment on the Trotskyite theses about the "Thermidor" and "degeneration" of the Party. It made use of the opposition bloc platform and quoted statements by Zinoviev and Ter-Vaganyan on the nationalities question.

The whiteguard plotters involved in the secret Trotskyite printing shop, which had been set up by the Trotskyite Mrachkovsky, were seriously discussing the extent to which the opposition could, directly or indirectly, participate in a counter-revolutionary plot.¹ They considered Trotsky's Clemenceau idea from every angle, but their real "hero" was Pilsudski, who had just staged a military coup in Poland.

During the preparation for the Fifteenth Party Congress it became known that a secret Trotskyite party had been in existence virtually since 1926, and that it had its own CC, regional committees, district committees and cells whose members paid special membership dues. Although it had not convened any all-Union congresses, it had regularly held its own conferences parallel with the plenary meetings of the Central Committee of the CPSU(B).

V. I. Zof, who had broken with the opposition, told the Sixteenth Moscow Gubernia Conference in November 1927 that within three months of the Fourteenth Congress the opposition had already had its own political and organising bureau, and had set up regional, uyezd and district committees on the basis of local factional groups. Pikel, who had been in charge of Zinoviev's secretariat, likewise confirmed that by August 1926 the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc had had its own committees and propaganda groups, and had been collecting special membership dues.

Former secretary of the Uralsk Regional Committee of the Trotskyite party, Kuzovnikov, reported that at the beginning of 1926 the Trotskyites had set up a joint CC, which included Trotsky and Zinoviev, among others. It had appointed a five-man group, including Kuzovnikov, to run the regional committee. These five men appointed groups of five to the districts to carry on illegal work, and city

¹ See *Pravda*, October 27, 1927.

agents. The regional five-man group had at its disposal equipment to print leaflets. The group and the activists had been meeting regularly over a long period.¹

In the Ukraine, a Trotskyite group calling itself "Group of old Leninist Bolsheviks"—although the average age of its members was 26—issued a leaflet urging the workers to move towards "re-establishment of the Leninist party through organisational underground work using the old methods of 1907-1911", and calling for "work in the underground for the freedom of factions and shades of opinion in the party".²

In early 1926, a seven-man Trotskyite underground centre was established in Kharkov with the task of maintaining contacts with the Moscow centre, organising regional three-man groups in Kharkov and district five-man groups in the outlying areas, directing anti-Party activity in the Ukraine and controlling fulfilment of assignments from the centre. Four regional three-man groups were set up in the city. In addition, there were organisers in the cells. Ties were established with Kiev, Odessa, Nikolayev, Dnepropetrovsk, Zaporozhye and Kherson. The Trotskyites had their own typewriters, duplicating equipment and even city archives. However, despite the efforts of the Ukrainian and even of the Moscow centre not a single cell was set up in the Donets Basin.

Mrachkovsky travelled to Kharkov after the August (1927) CC Plenum to issue instructions to the Trotskyite underground. He held district and city meetings of Trotskyites, at which he explained the need to intensify the subversive activity against the Party.

The Ukrainian centre was engaged in strictly conspiratorial work among Communists in the Red Army. In early 1927, the Trotskyites set up an all-Ukrainian Komsomol centre in Kharkov, with its own outfits in the provinces organised on the same principle as the underground Trotskyite party. The connections with the Moscow centre ran only through Rozengauz, secretary of the Ukrainian centre. In Moscow, the oppositionists were received by I. N. Smirnov, Mrachkovsky and Alsky.

At the end of 1926, the Trotskyites set up their own centre in Transcaucasia headed by M. Okudzhava. The underground opposition centre in Baku, uniting a small number of non-

¹ See *Pravda*, November 20, 1927.

² *Fifteenth Congress of the CPSU(B)*. . . , Vol. I, p. 551.

proletarians, was also set up at the time. It was directed by Mdivani, Sarkis, Ter-Vaganyan, Oganezov and other leaders of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc.

Apart from their underground centres, the Trotskyites had their own "Red Cross", an illegal organisation whose task was to provide material assistance to oppositionists who "suffered" for their anti-Soviet activity, and to their families. Its Rules specified the sources of its funds, the items of their expenditures, and its elaborate organisational structure. The Rules recommended the holding of paid lectures and concerts, and soliciting "donations under every possible pretext".¹

On instructions from the leaders of the opposition, this organisation also started a campaign in November 1927 for the release of the Trotskyite Mrachkovsky, who had been arrested for anti-Soviet activity. The Trotskyites called for meetings in the workshops and factories to demand the release of Mrachkovsky, a "steadfast champion of Lenin's cause". Following the expulsion from the Party and arrests of some oppositionists who had taken the anti-Soviet way, the leaders of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc made unsounded assertions that the CCC had become a purely administrative agency exercising punitive functions.

These assertions were in fact a rehash of the writings in the Menshevik *Sotsialistichesky vestnik*, which had said that the "CCC has become inside the Party what the GPU is for the rest of the population, i.e., an organ of ruthless terrorism".² This slander was fully exploded by the practices of the CCC. It will be recalled that in the period from the Fourteenth Congress to November 15, 1927, 2,031 persons, or 0.17 per cent of the Party membership, had been faced with Party charges, and only 970 persons had been expelled from the Party. Of the 4,000 members who had voted for the opposition, less than one-half faced Party charges, and of these 35 per cent were office workers and 13-14 per cent, students. The CCC made a practice of reducing the penalties. For instance, of the 146 persons who had filed appeals with the CCC, only 47 were expelled from the Party.³ The CCC carried on a relentless struggle against the anti-Leninist groupings, but it showed consideration for those who admitted their mistakes and returned to the ways of the Party.

¹ *Pravda*, November 27, 1927.

² *Fifteenth Conference of the CPSU(B)*..., p. 643.

³ See *Fifteenth Congress of the CPSU(B)*..., Vol. I, p. 480.

Steadily extending the scale of their factional activity, the leaders of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc were planning to call a congress of the Trotskyite party parallel with the Fifteenth Congress of the CPSU(B). They abandoned the idea only because the Trotskyite party membership was extremely small (about 2,000). However, the opposition bloc leaders were hatching plans to build up their strength and continue their factional fight after the Fifteenth Party Congress. The oppositionists were instructed strictly to abide by the Trotskyite-Zinovievite platform. Trotsky announced with self-assurance that "after the Fifteenth Congress the opposition within the Party will become much stronger than it is at present".¹ This empty boast was not to be fulfilled. The Communists' indomitable will and firm determination to put an end to the Trotskyite-Zinovievite opposition were expressed in decisions adopted by Party meetings and in mandates to delegates elected to the Fifteenth Party Congress. Here is what 16,000 metal workers of the Prioksky mining district wrote: "We request the Fifteenth Congress to sweep out with an iron broom all the opposition splitters from our CPSU(B); the splitters' place is not in *Lenin's* Party, but in the dustbin of history."² A meeting of Party activists of the Bryukhovetskaya district in the Kuban area said in their decision: "The Fifteenth Congress of the Party must confront the opposition with this choice: either Bolshevism or Menshevism."³ Similar proposals were made by other Party organisations.

With the support of the working class, the labouring peasantry and Communist Parties abroad, the Fifteenth Congress of the CPSU(B) completed the ideological and organisational defeat of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite anti-Party bloc. The CC's report and speeches by delegates gave an in-depth exposé of the opposition's anti-Leninist views and splitting activity. The Congress stated that the Trotskyite-Zinovievite opposition had "ideologically broken with Leninism, degenerated into a Menshevik group, taken the way of capitulation to the forces of the international and internal bourgeoisie and objectively become a tool of the third force against the regime of proletarian dictatorship".⁴

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 387.

² *Fifteenth Congress of the CPSU(B)*..., Vol. II, p. 1285.

³ *Ocherki istorii Krasnodarskoi organizatsii KPSS* (Essays on the History of the Krasnodar CPSU Organisation), Krasnodar, 1966, p. 321.

⁴ *CPSU in the Resolutions and Decisions*..., Part II, p. 441.

A. A. Andreyev, alternate member of the CC Politburo, exposed Trotsky's adventurist pretensions to the role of leader of the world revolution. Andreyev mustered incontrovertible facts to show that Trotsky had left the Communist Party for good, returning like the prodigal son to Menshevism, and that "having ended his excursions into the Communist Party, he returned to his shell, to his own element".¹ Andreyev motioned a resolution by the Congress to expel the oppositionists from the Party.

Similar proposals were expressed by other delegates and written into the numerous messages of greetings and reports sent to the Congress by factory collectives. On behalf of the Tula metal workers and gun-smiths, delegate V. P. Pushkarev said: "I think that the Party Congress will not only clip the opposition's wings, that it will not only give it a thorough cleaning with emery paper, but ... that it will also give it a most fundamental boiling so as to remove from our Party's ranks all the opposition growths and so that there should be no more opposition mildew in our Party ranks."²

The metal workers of the Krasny Oktyabr in Stalingrad handed a gift to the Congress—a steel broom to sweep out the opposition. More than 10,500 workers of the shipbuilding and the mechanical works in Nikolayev said this to their delegate: "Leave behind your vice and your bench, go to Moscow and tell them this: 'Let everyone know, here and there and everywhere, that the Communist Party is not alone, that it is ringed by a closely-knit army of iron and steel.'"³ Delegate Hassan-Said declared on behalf of the Azerbaijan workers: "Azerbaijan is a fortress of the Azerbaijanian proletariat, which is a Leninist fortress; it has always been impregnable to the opposition or any anti-Soviet elements. In this fortress we stand firm and intend to go the Leninist way."⁴ The 16,000 workers of the Krasny Treugolnik Works said in their message to the Congress: "*As one man, we shall march solidly, with measured step, in proletarian battalions, behind the Leninist Party and on to the triumph of socialism in our country, against Mensheviks, old and new, who are undermining our socialist construction and the dictatorship*

¹ *Fifteenth Congress of the CPSU(B)*... Vol. I, p. 228.

² *Ibid.*, p. 273.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 242.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 764.

of the proletariat, we shall march for a world-wide October Revolution."¹

The delegate of the Party cell and the workers of the Dynamo Works said: "At their meeting, our workers said that they had tested the Party in the flames of the uprising, in the ordeal of the Civil War, and now, in the frontlines of socialist construction; that they trust only the Communist Party, the united and only Party in our country.... The workers declared that they would follow only the Party, only the one Leninist CC, and that our workers—Communists and non-Party men—will never follow the political speculators who are haggling among themselves and trading their principles."² A message of greetings from 12,000 workers of the Krasny Putilovets Plant said: "We Krasny Putilovets workers are profoundly indignant over the actions of a handful of factionalists, personified by the bankrupt 'leaders', who have recently made repeated attempts to split our militant, Bolshevik vanguard, which has been tempered in battle, by resorting to unheard-of, foul slander of the Leninist headquarters of our united CPSU—the Central Committee—under whose leadership the working class and its Party have been honourably fulfilling the precepts of our never to be forgotten V. I. Lenin.... Down with the new Mensheviks, down with the apostates from Leninism!"³

An address read out at the Congress on behalf of 11,787 metal workers of the Makeyevka Works in the Donets Basin, said: "We have drawn conviction from our own practice at the plant that our Party and its Central Committee have been pursuing the correct Leninist policy designed to carry on socialist construction and improve the material conditions of the working class.

"The opposition does not enjoy any success either in the Party or in the working class. That is because the opposition's false talk is exploded by our reality.

"We are sure that the Congress will put an end to all Trotskyite opposition activity. We for our part will give every possible support."⁴

On the basis of a thorough study of the material of the anti-Party bloc, the Congress adopted, on a report by

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

² *Ibid.*, p. 13.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 16-17.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

G. K. Orjonikidze, a resolution "About the Opposition", which said that on every question of theory, programme, tactics and organisation, the anti-Party bloc had slid down to Menshevism. From differences in the ideological sphere, the opposition had gone on to programme differences, and revised the Leninist doctrine about the possibility of building socialism in the USSR, switching the countryside to the socialist way of development and consolidating the alliance between the working class and the peasantry. In the tactical sphere, the oppositionists had gone beyond the bounds not only of the Party Rules, but also of Soviet laws (illegal meetings, illegal printing shops, illegal periodicals, and so on). In the organisational sphere, the Trotskyites had moved factionalism to the establishment of their own party.

It was fully established that the opposition had its own central committee, regional, city and district centres, technical apparatus, membership dues and periodicals. Opposition statements were at once caught up by counter-revolutionaries abroad. Orjonikidze said in his report: "All the bourgeois and Social-Democratic and also émigré publications abroad, when carrying the speeches of Trotsky, Zinoviev and other oppositionists, make a point of saying that they themselves had been saying the same things all along, and that now this is being borne out by the speeches of Zinoviev, Kamenev and Trotsky."¹

The Congress summed up the incontrovertible evidence that the Trotskyite-Zinovievite opposition had degenerated into a Menshevik organisation and an auxiliary detachment of the international counter-revolution. It approved the decision of the November (1927) Joint CC and CCC Plenum expelling Trotsky and Zinoviev from the Party, and the other oppositionists from the CC and the CCC. The Congress declared membership of the Trotskyite opposition and propaganda of its views to be incompatible with Party membership. It demanded that the opposition should disarm itself ideologically and organisationally and undertake undeviatingly to abide by the Party's decisions.

While the Congress was in session the oppositionists sent in (on December 3 and 10, 1927) three documents alleging that they had no policy differences with the Party. But behind a barrage of empty phrases about an end to the factional struggle the opposition declared that it was unable to abandon its earlier platform. The Congress exposed this

¹ Fifteenth Congress of the CPSU(B)... Vol. II, p. 1390.

Trotskyite manoeuvre and decided to expel 75 active opposition leaders and the 23-man Sapronov group as anti-revolutionary. At the same time, it instructed the CC and the CCC "to take all measures of ideological influence on rank-and-file members of the Trotskyite opposition for the purpose of their persuasion, while purging the Party of all patently incorrigible elements of the Trotskyite opposition".

Thus, the Fifteenth Congress of the CPSU(B) completed the ideological, political and organisational defeat of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc. This meant that the long struggle against Trotskyism within the Party had ended in a full victory for Marxist-Leninist ideology. A most important result of the defeat of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite oppositionists was stronger unity of the Party's ranks, the influx of fresh revolutionary forces into the Party, and the cohesion of the Soviet people round the Party.

Having purged the Party of petty-bourgeois adventurers, the Fifteenth Congress instructed the CC to continue steadily to advance along the Leninist path, "to rally under the banner of socialist construction ever greater masses of the working people in the country, to strengthen the fraternal ties of solidarity with the proletariat of all countries, and from year to year to build up the USSR as an ever mightier outpost of the world socialist revolution".

The defeat of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite anti-Party bloc played a great part in uniting the Communist Parties of all countries, and in exposing bourgeois ideologists, Right-wing Social-Democrats and "Left" opportunists. The collapse of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc accelerated the Bolshevisation of the Communist Parties in the West and in the East. The Ninth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International in 1928 declared membership of the Trotskyite opposition to be incompatible with membership in the Communist International. This decision was a crushing blow at the Leftist, adventurer splinter groups within the ranks of the communist movement.

A study of the historical experience of the Bolshevik struggle against Trotskyism and for the purity of Marxist-Leninist theory has helped the Communist Parties in other countries to strengthen the unity of their ranks, to get rid of Social-Democratic ideology, the vestiges of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois influence, and adventurism which opens the way for provocations and treachery.

CONCLUSION

The Fifteenth Congress concluded the struggle against the Trotskyite opposition inside the Party by inflicting on it a total ideological and organisational defeat. However, Trotsky and the men of his immediate entourage continued to attack the Party and the Soviet power. The opposition's anti-Party activity was assuming an ever more blatant anti-Soviet character. In October 1928, Maslow's newspaper and the Cadets' newspaper in Berlin, *Rul*, simultaneously carried a letter from Trotsky, characterising the regime in the USSR as "a Kerensky regime inside out", and calling for the staging of strikes in the Soviet Union, frustration of the campaign for collective agreements, and the training of opposition cadres for a future civil war.

In line with Trotsky's directive, his supporters slandered the Party, its leaders and the Party apparatus, and demanded the establishment of their own party, making efforts to arrange regular communications with their associates in various parts of the country. They jumped at every difficulty faced by the Soviet Union—such as interruptions in the supply of bread and other foodstuffs to the population and agricultural raw materials to industry in 1928—to launch counter-revolutionary attacks. During the renewal of the collective agreements at enterprises in Moscow and other cities, the Trotskyites circulated anti-Soviet leaflets calling for strikes. In order to keep his supporters inside the Party, Trotsky instructed them to use double-dealing tactics, regarding this as a "temporary retreat" dictated by the unfavourable political situation.

In 1929, for his anti-Soviet activity, Trotsky was expelled from the country. Abroad he at once joined the slander campaign against the Soviet Union and the CPSU(B). His

articles, brimming with hatred for the country building socialism, and containing malicious slander against it and straightforward calls for a fight against the Soviet power, appeared on the pages of bourgeois and Social-Democratic newspapers. Adapting himself to the requirements of his masters, the imperialists, he began to "criticise" the policy of the Party and the Soviet power in another plane, accusing it not of being less than revolutionary, but, on the contrary, of being ultra-revolutionary.

In 1926 and 1927, Trotsky had accused the Party of not showing enough resolution in conducting the policy of industrialisation, of not showing enough concern for finding the necessary resources for industrialisation, and for accelerating the pace of industrial development; he had accused it of failing to fight the kulaks and had proposed his own adventurist recipes for boosting the national economy. Once abroad, he accused the Party of adventurism in industrialising the country and collectivising agriculture, and said the pace of economic development was excessive and back-breaking. His charges were essentially not different from those earlier made against the Party by a group of Right-wing capitulationists, headed by Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsy. Evidence of this comes from the secret talks between Bukharin and Kamenev in the summer of 1928 with a view to uniting the Rightists and the Trotskyites for a joint fight against the Party leadership. Consequently, the division of the oppositionists into "Leftists" and Rightists was rather arbitrary.

The high rate of economic development had been dictated by internal and international conditions and had been based on the real possibilities latent in the Soviet system. In the teeth of the facts Trotsky proposed that "in the sphere of industry the obstacle race for prizes should be stopped," and the "five-year plan in four years" slogan discarded.¹

That would have meant abandoning the idea of the earliest possible elimination of the country's technical and economic lag, just when the imperialists were trying hard to embroil the Soviet Union in a war. This would have played into the hands of international imperialism. In spite of Trotsky and his friends in the imperialist camp, the five-year plan was fulfilled in four years and three months.

¹ XVI syezdz Vsesoyuznoi Kommunisticheskoi partii(b) (Sixteenth Congress of the CPSU(B). Verbatim Report). Vol. I, Moscow, 1935, p. 576.

In agriculture, the Trotskyites strove to hold back any further collectivisation, telling the peasants that the country's resources were limited and that these had to be concentrated on the collective farms which were already best supplied. Somewhat later, Trotsky proposed that the collective farms should be disbanded altogether.

On the eve of the Sixteenth Congress, the opponents of the Party's policy once again tried to organise action against the Party and its CC. The Trotskyites' *Opposition Bulletin*, published in Paris, slanderously accused the Communist Party of violating democracy, and tried to counterpose its apparatus to the working class.

The Trotskyites in the USSR also became more active. In a letter to the Congress Presidium, Rakovsky, Aussem, V. Kosior, Gryunshtein, among others, demanded the rehabilitation of all the Trotskyites and a return of their leader from abroad. These claims were condemned by the Congress delegates. In its resolution, the Congress emphasised that although Trotskyism had been completely exposed, there continued to be in the Party "attitudes conciliatory to Trotskyism, and this was expressed above all in an underestimation of the alliance between the working class and the middle peasantry. The Party will continue to wage a most resolute struggle against these attitudes".¹

In the 1930s, Trotsky forecast the Soviet Union's inevitable defeat in an imminent war against nazi Germany, adding that this defeat would be "only a short episode, in case of a victory of the proletariat in other countries". He declared that "no military victory can save the inheritance of the October Revolution if imperialism holds out in the rest of the world".² His stand was that of the worst enemy of the Soviet people, intent by every possible means to provoke nazi Germany into a war against the USSR. By his statements about the Soviet Union's alleged weakness, Trotsky was pushing nazi Germany into an attack on the USSR. Here is what he wrote: "Can we expect that the Soviet Union will come out of the coming great war (as he called the USSR's future war against nazi Germany—*Author.*) without defeat? To this frankly posed question we will answer as

¹ CPSU in the Resolutions and Decisions. . . , Part III, Moscow, 1954, p. 21.

² R. Palme Dutt, *The Internationale*, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1964, p. 248.

frankly. If the war should remain only a war, the defeat of the Soviet Union would be inevitable. In a technical, economic and military sense imperialism is incomparably more strong. If it is not paralysed by revolution in the West, imperialism will sweep away the regime which issued from the October Revolution."¹

An analysis of Trotsky's statements from 1936 on warrants the conclusion that the main task of his supporters in that period was to set up an illegal organisation on Soviet territory, forcibly to overthrow the Soviet government, and use the "inevitable defeat" of the Soviet Union in the coming war against fascism to build up Trotskyist positions throughout the world. However, Trotsky's expectations were overthrown by the moral and political unity of Soviet society, the courage and steadfastness of the peoples of the Soviet Union, and the might of the Soviet Army, which crushed nazi Germany.

Abroad, Trotsky put forward the idea of establishing an international Trotskyite centre in opposition to the Third, Communist International. Defeated Trotskyite groups from 11 countries cobbled the so-called Fourth International, which set itself the task of fighting the Marxist-Leninist Parties, communism and the Soviet Union. In this context, Trotsky boasted: "Within the next ten years, the programme of the Fourth International will win over millions."² In that period, the Trotskyites asserted, through their leader, that "the Fourth International already has in the USSR its own organisation, which is the strongest, the most numerous and the most seasoned".

That was more than 30 years ago, but the "Fourth International", far from securing any influence on the masses, has in fact moved to the verge of total political bankruptcy. The Trotskyite groups, which have adhered to the "Fourth International", ceaselessly war with each other, mainly over ways of fighting communism. Only in June 1963, separate Trotskyite groups once again formally united at the Seventh Congress of the "Fourth International".

Today, the Trotskyites no longer say that socialism cannot be built in one country, but merely throw doubt on the victory of communism in the USSR. They do not dare to declare

¹ Ibid., p. 247.

² *Uoprosy istorii KPSS* No. 12, 1965, p. 50.

that the collective farms have failed or that the Soviet power is bound to collapse. However, Trotsky's present-day followers have been spreading essentially the same ideas, resorting to lies, slanders, unprincipled statements and double-dealing tactics, hypocrisy, political adventurism and ultra-revolutionary catchwords. In extending the scale of their political and ideological struggle against the socialist countries and the international working-class and communist movement, the imperialists have been using Trotskyite elements and their reckless concepts to promote their own ends.

The publications of the West German press baron, Adolf Springer, which abound in malicious attacks against the Soviet Union and communism, have been carrying more and more items on the revival of Trotskyism, allegedly enriched with modern phenomena and facts coming to light as industrial society develops. But Trotskyism, even "enriched", continues to be a set of theoretical propositions clashing with the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism. In theory and in practice it serves to disarm the working class and its Party in their struggle against reaction.

In recent years, Trotsky's writings have been published and widely circulated in the USA, West Germany, Italy, France, Japan and other capitalist countries. Using Trotskyite sources, Leonard Schapiro has published his fraudulent book, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, in London and New York. It is a gross distortion of the essence and meaning of the CPSU's struggle against the Trotskyite-Zinovievite opposition as a supposed alliance "between all communists opposed to the régime of authoritarianism in the party..."¹

Twisting the historical facts, Schapiro presents the Trotskyite-Zinovievite oppositionists as champions of Party unity. He expresses extreme dissatisfaction over the opposition leaders' statement sent in to the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) in October 1926, but he is not indignant over their hypocrisy or the fact that they had failed to live up to their promises, but that their "action... both futile and dishonourable" led to "reprisals" against the supporters of the opposition.

Furthermore, Schapiro complains that the opposition leaders were not allowed to state their views at the Fifteenth

¹ L. Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, p. 297.

Party Conference, views that had been "dishonestly" juggled in the theses of the report. He ignores the decisions of the Fifteenth Conference, which condemned the Trotskyite-Zinovievite anti-Party bloc as a Social-Democratic deviation, but he speaks at length that after the Fifteenth Conference there was "a move to compromise by the opposition", that "once again it was an event in international communism which precipitated action". Schapiro presents the opposition leaders as true champions of world revolution and the international proletariat. He says that the opposition, standing up for world communism, started an extremely denunciatory campaign against the Party leadership, and it was the opposition's accusatory tone that was the cause of its obliteration, although its theoretical conceptions were borne out by the course of events.

The book gives a biased and distorted picture of the Party's struggle against the anti-Party bloc in 1927, alleging that the Central Committee had crushed the opposition under the pretext of a non-existent threat of war against the USSR. Schapiro has no use for any scientific analysis of the facts but resorts to slander in an effort to prove that it was not the Party organisations, not the workers' masses but the OGPU agencies that carried on the drive against the opposition, having been empowered to arrest oppositionists and force them to make admissions of traitorous activity. He draws the slanderous conclusion that the proletariat remained an impassive on-looker while the two sides—the Party organisations and the opposition groups—fought it out.

This latter-day advocate of Trotskyism recounts with a great feeling of regret the defeat of the opposition bloc at the Fifteenth Party Congress. He waxes especially indignant over the fact that "in the course of the Congress a series of declarations by various other groups of oppositionists protested their intention to remain loyal to the decisions of the Congress, and petitioned either for readmission to the party, if already expelled, or the remission of the sentence if not".¹ However, Trotsky, who had signed a number of similar statements, "did not... sink as low as Zinoviev and Kamenev, who not only petitioned for readmission, but renounced their views as 'anti-Leninist'".²

Schapiro fully backs Trotsky's statement that the opposi-

¹ Ibid., p. 306.

² Ibid.

tionists were defeated because the "bureaucracy" had triumphed over the masses. He repeats Trotsky's thesis that "in Lenin's time Bolshevism was a mass movement, but after the civil war 'the masses were pushed away gradually from participation in the leadership', and the 'bureaucracy ... conquered the Bolshevik Party'".¹ This falsifier of CPSU history rebukes Trotsky for the mistake he made after 1922, when he tried "to compromise with an opponent whose sole aim was political annihilation of all who stood in the way".²

All of Schapiro's efforts are aimed at justifying the Trotskyite-Zinovievite oppositionists and smearing the CPSU's activity and its domestic and foreign policy during the period of socialist construction. Schapiro's fraudulent book is being widely used by present-day Trotskyites, and ideologists of anti-communism in their fight against the Soviet Union.

The revisionists have now been spreading the Trotskyite idea that Leninism is nothing but the practice of Marxism, that it can be applied to backward countries only, and that it is irrelevant to the developed capitalist states. The denial that Leninism is a further development of Marxism in the new historical epoch and is its higher stage means refusal to recognise its international character and significance. In this connection, there is need to look at a book entitled *The Russian Revolution* published by the Czechoslovak historian M. Reiman on the eve of the 50th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. There is good ground to say that it has been written in the light of Trotskyism. It is not based on such sources as the Bolshevik Party's documents, but testimonials from SR and Menshevik newspapers and books. There is an attempt to minimise the importance of the October Revolution, and to present it as a "nationally limited" revolution, whereas in fact it was a turning point in the historical destinies of mankind, opening a new era in world history and inaugurating the period of transition from capitalism to socialism.

Reiman tries to revise the history of the Great October Revolution, to play it down and to throw a false light on the role of the heroic working class of Russia and its Leninist Party, in order to whitewash Trotsky, together with the Mensheviks and SRs, and to prove that the experience in the

struggle for the establishment of the proletarian dictatorship and socialist construction in the USSR is irrelevant to other countries.

Reiman draws the conclusion that the experience of revolution in a backward country, with an immature working class and a similar party, cannot be of the epoch-making importance which the international working-class and the communist movement have always attached to it. Had Reiman been an honest writer, he would have turned to Lenin's works, Bolshevik Party documents and studies by Soviet economists and historians. However, he was writing a biased book designed to blacken the Soviet Union, its working class and its Leninist Party, a new-type party, and that is why he was not concerned with authentic documents. In fact, he used the same methods as those used by Right-wing Social-Democrats.

Falling back on Trotsky's *Lessons of October*, Reiman tries to revive the myth of Trotsky's leading role in the October armed uprising. A study of the authentic documents leaves no doubt at all that Trotsky had never been a leader of the Bolshevik Party and had never played the part in the October Revolution which Reiman tries to ascribe to him. Trotsky had always been an opponent of Marxism-Leninism and his actions have done great harm to the Bolshevik Party, the Soviet Union and the whole international communist movement.

Present-day revisionists, who attack the principle of democratic centralism, urge freedom of factions and groupings, oppose a one-party and demand a multi-party system, have been making wide use of Trotsky's writings. Shortly before his death, he wrote a libellous book entitled *The Revolution Betrayed*. It contains open slander against Lenin, the Bolshevik Party and the Soviet state, and declares that up to a point there was freedom of factions and groupings within the Bolshevik Party, which held its existence to be inconceivable without them. Only the Tenth Congress of the Party deemed it necessary to ban factions because of the complex internal situation in the Soviet Republic. However, this measure was allegedly a temporary one and was to have been revoked as soon as there were signs of a marked improvement in the situation. Trotsky regarded the ban on factions and groups as an extension of the political regime in the country (prohibition of anti-Soviet parties) to the

¹ L. Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, p. 307.

² Ibid.

Party's internal life. These slanderous assertions are refuted by the fact that the CPSU and all the Communist Parties are based on the principle of democratic centralism, which is incompatible with freedom of factions and groupings. This freedom of factions and groupings also clashes with the spirit and essence of the new-type party.

Trotsky took the same attitude to the problem of the one-party and the multi-party system. He insisted that the Bolshevik Party had allegedly wanted to retain the multi-party system, but that the Civil War had fundamentally altered these intentions. The opposition parties were banned one after another. Trotsky said these measures had been a violation of Soviet democracy. He took a hostile attitude to the one-party system, which he said was a monopoly exercised by "an uncontrolled bureaucracy". Actually, however, there is historical evidence to show that the one-party system emerged in Soviet Russia because all the petty-bourgeois parties had openly sided with the counter-revolution. Only under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party was the working class, in alliance with the labouring peasantry, capable of safeguarding the freedom and independence of the Soviet Republic and securing a victory for socialism.

Anti-communist propaganda has been using the long-exposed Trotskyite inventions about a "bureaucratisation of the Bolshevik leadership" and the "bourgeois degeneration of the USSR". The ideologists of imperialism see the present positions of the USSR in the light of Trotskyism and have been urging the need for "another political revolution" in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries so as to restore the capitalist order. They have been attacking the Leninist doctrine of the hegemony of the proletariat in the world revolutionary process, declaring that it is not the world socialist system, but the national liberation movement in the Asian, African and Latin American countries that is the chief revolutionary force of our day.

Present-day Trotskyites have been spreading the slander that after the Second World War the Communist Parties of the capitalist countries "abandoned the class struggle". They continue to oppose the united front tactics and an anti-monopoly drive, reject the Leninist doctrine of the leading role of the Communist Parties, and seek to dissolve them in the trade-union movement or to dismantle them altogether.

Trotsky's followers flatly reject the policy of peaceful

coexistence of states with different social systems, saying that it is a "betrayal" of the socialist revolution and a deal with imperialism. The wildest Trotskyite adventurists declare that the peaceful coexistence policy should give way to a strategy of propelling the world revolution. On January 24, 1963, *El Frente Obrero*, a newspaper of the Uruguayan Trotskyites wrote: "A strategy for the workers' state means: acting to propel the world revolution, to make the masses of the world feel that the propulsion of the world revolution, the propulsion of the socialist revolution is the best and only way of eroding the capitalist countries." War, the Trotskyites believe, is the best way of propelling the world revolution. The same paper remarked that the Trotskyite "Fourth International" has based its entire activity "on a programme for taking power, overthrowing capitalism, preparing for atomic war or preparing for a preventive war before it is unleashed by imperialism".¹ The Trotskyites in France, the USA, Italy, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile and other countries have spoken out in similar vein.

No wonder then that the "Fourth International" was so enthusiastic about the Chinese leaders' departure from the common line of the international communist movement. The European Trotskyites in every way emphasise not only their ideological kinship with the Peking leaders, but also the possibility of practical co-operation with them in organising a factional struggle against the Marxist-Leninist Parties. One leader of present-day Trotskyism wrote: "We note the actual formation of a united front with the Chinese comrades not only because the Chinese are moving over to our positions, but also because all pro-Chinese tendencies and groups are forced to seek co-operation with the Fourth International, the policy of the Fourth International, the leadership of the Fourth International. . . . The united front is already there."²

Present-day Trotskyism has found its fullest and most concentrated expression in the anti-Leninist, nationalistic and anti-Soviet line of the Chinese leaders. An editorial in *Pravda* said: "In the person of the Chinese leaders the international communist movement is confronted with a special trend which

¹ *Voprosy istorii KPSS* No. 12, 1965, pp. 51-52.

² *Protiiv raskolnikov, za yedinstvo kommunisticheskogo dvizheniya* (Against the Splitters, for the Unity of the Communist Movement), Moscow, 1964, pp. 12-13 (hereafter—*Against the Splitters, for the Unity of the Communist Movement*).

is petty-bourgeois in social origin, nationalistic in political aim, and Left-opportunist, assimilating many Trotskyite propositions, in ideological tenet."¹

The Chinese leadership has adopted Trotskyite methods as the basis for its domestic and foreign policy. It was announced in China that the main ideological and political task of the "cultural revolution" was to carry Mao Tse-tung's thoughts into the minds of the broad masses of the population. The newspaper *Jenminjhpao* wrote: "The great proletarian cultural revolution is a great revolution designed to make the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung the only thoughts of the whole people. The thoughts of Mao Tse-tung must rule 'everything'."² The efforts to substitute Maoism for Marxism-Leninism are being camouflaged by the announcement that Mao Tse-tung's thoughts are the "summit of Marxism-Leninism in the modern epoch". Chinese propaganda has been trying to convince the peoples of the world that Mao's thoughts are "much higher than those of Marx, Engels and Lenin", and that leaders like Mao "arise in the world and in China once in a thousand years".³

In domestic policy, the Mao group has been applying the Trotskyite ideas of militarising the party, the state and social organisations, and relies on the establishment of the military-bureaucratic dictatorship in China. In early May 1968, Mao wrote that "the whole country must become a big military camp".⁴ The army has been declared the main instrument of the regime of military-bureaucratic dictatorship. The army is used to militarise the plants, factories, people's communes, schools, shops, service enterprises, and Party and government establishments, and to set up so-called revolutionary committees, which are military-bureaucratic organs of power.

The spread of the cult of violence and war is the main line of the Chinese leadership's foreign policy. War is regarded as the highest form of class struggle and revolution, and as the only means of resolving the contradictions between capitalism and socialism. The Chinese press has given great play to Mao's statements dating back to the 1930s when he said

¹ *Marksizm-Leninizm—internatsionalnoye ucheniye kommunistov vsekh stran* (Marxism-Leninism—the Internationalist Teaching of Communists of All Countries), Moscow, 1964, p. 30.

² *K sobytiyam v Kitaye* (On the Events in China), Moscow, 1967, p. 32 (hereafter—*On the Events in China*).

³ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

⁴ *Pravda*, June 22, 1968.

that "the world can be rebuilt only with the aid of the gun" and that "a war waged by the overwhelming majority of mankind... will become a bridge along which humanity will move into a new historical epoch".

Back in 1957, Mao Tse-tung resorted to ultra-revolutionary catchwords in his speech at the Moscow Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, when he urged them to accept the idea that while one half of mankind might die in a world thermonuclear war, imperialism would be destroyed and socialism would triumph throughout the world. This irresponsible statement ran counter to the Leninist view of world war. As early as 1918, Lenin pointed out that a world war involving the use of mass destruction weapons was not only the greatest crime, but a direct threat to "undermine the very foundations of human society".¹

The Chinese leadership has in fact been calling for the export of revolution and trying to start a world thermonuclear war as a means of overthrowing capitalism and establishing socialism on the whole planet. This is clearly a repetition of the views expressed by the Trotskyites, the "Left Communists", whom Lenin exposed in these words: "Perhaps the authors believe that the interests of the world revolution require that it should be *given a push* and that such a push can be given only by war, never by peace, which might give the people the impression that imperialism was being 'legitimised'? Such a 'theory' would be completely at variance with Marxism, for Marxism has always been opposed to 'pushing' revolutions, which develop with the growing acuteness of the class antagonisms that engender revolutions."²

Following in the wake of the "Fourth International", the Chinese leaders have opposed the policy of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems, and have rejected the programme of general and complete disarmament, proclaiming China to be the centre of the world revolutionary movement, and the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America the "main area of storms and revolutions"; they have denied the leading role of the world socialist system and its transformation into the decisive factor of present-day social development.

Peking's theoretical conceptions on questions of war and

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, p. 422.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 71-72.

peace are designed to "back up" and "justify" the Chinese leadership's great-power nationalistic line, and to promote its hegemonistic aspirations. These have been even more clearly revealed in the course of the "cultural revolution". Chinese propaganda declared Mao Tse-tung to be "the leader of the peoples of the whole world", and China, the centre of world revolution and the main anti-imperialist force. Chinese young people are being taught that their main task is "to rebuild the world" on the basis of Mao's thoughts. In their leaflets, the hungweipings declare: "The banner of Mao Tse-tung will fly over the whole world."¹

These ultra-revolutionary propositions on questions of war and peace testify to the fact that the Chinese leadership has lost faith in the strength of the masses and in the possibility of socialism winning without war between states, without world war. This line keeps away millions of people from the communist movement; tends to isolate the Communists, and slow down the whole process of the peoples' liberation struggle. It was quite natural that these adventurist Maoist views and propositions on questions of war and peace met with a resolute rebuff from the international communist movement and broad circles of world progressive opinion.

The Chinese leadership has been fiercely attacking the gains of world socialism, concentrating its fire not on the imperialists but mainly on the CPSU and the Soviet Union. The Chinese press, radio and the whole propaganda machine are geared to spread malicious slander about the CPSU and its domestic and foreign policy. In the slant, scale and subtlety of its slanderous attacks, Chinese propaganda can be ranked with the most reactionary anti-communist organs of the imperialist circles.

Anti-Sovietism has become an organic part of the Chinese leaders' great-power line. In this way they have been trying to isolate the Chinese people from the socialist countries, to keep it away from the influence of the international communist and working-class movement, to justify the military dictatorship and the country's militarisation, and to create conditions for unhindered implementation of their hegemonistic plans. The CPSU and the fraternal Parties resolutely condemn the Maoist great-power policy because it has been doing great harm to the interests of socialism, the interna-

¹ *On the Events in China*, p. 54.

tional working-class and the national liberation movement and to the Chinese people's own socialist gains, and has been objectively helping imperialism.

The Chinese leadership's main strategic aim is to subordinate the communist and national liberation movement to their narrowly egoistic interests. To achieve this, Mao's followers have discarded the principles of proletarian internationalism; they have betrayed Marxism-Leninism and have adopted as their own the ideals of nationalism, Trotskyism and the most unscrupulous demagoguery and slander.

Subversive activity within the world communist movement is a component part of the Maoists' great-power nationalistic line. In their efforts to weaken the unity and cohesion of the socialist community and the world communist movement, the Chinese leaders have been using not only Trotskyites' ideas but also their factional, splitting methods of struggle against Marxist-Leninist Parties. *Neues Deutschland* was right in saying that "the policy of the CPC leaders signifies an unprincipled, petty-bourgeois, nationalistic departure from Marxism-Leninism, which is Trotskyite in content and method of struggle".¹

In the last few years, the Chinese leaders have markedly intensified their subversive activity in the world communist movement. They have sought at all costs to discredit the most authoritative contingents of the international communist movement, and to undermine the massive influence of the true Marxist-Leninist Parties.

Following the line of splitting the world communist movement, the Chinese leaders are trying to set up factional groups hostile to Marxism-Leninism within the Communist Parties. As a rule these groups are small, consisting of all sorts of renegades, careerists and rascals. These groups receive money from Peking to publish and spread all kinds of slanderous writings, setting up shops for the sale of Chinese propaganda material. The Chinese leadership has been using renegades from communism in its effort to disrupt the work of trade-union, youth, women's, students' and other international organisations, to disrupt the alliance between the socialist countries and the national-liberation movement, and to weaken the common front of struggle against imperialism.

¹ *Against the Splitters, for the Unity of the Communist Movement*, p. 22.

At the height of class battles in France in May and June 1968, ultra-Leftist Maoist-Trotskyite groups tried to divert the working-class and democratic movement onto the way of anarchism and adventurism. They tried to provoke students and workers into armed action against the government. During a million-strong working-class demonstration in France in support of the students' legitimate demands in May 1968, the ultra-Leftist leader, Cohn-Bendit, a 23-year-old West German, with a handful of his supporters—Trotskyites, anarchists and Maoists, issued this provocative slogan: "Let us go and storm the Elysée Palace!" The ultra-Leftists urged violence against the Communists, asserting that without them it would be possible to bring about social change and advance to socialism. The Leftist elements put forward the demand for the establishment of a "revolutionary party" of Trotskyites, anarchists and other renegades. Their inflammatory slogans, blind violence and seditious behaviour did a great deal of harm to the democratic forces of France.

A characteristic feature of the ideological and political attacks of the Maoists, Trotskyites and other ultra-Leftist groups against the present-day communist movement is that they are becoming akin to those of the Right-wing opportunists and all the anti-communist forces. Anti-Sovietism is the common platform of the revisionists. The imperialist ideologists, the Right and "Left" revisionists have aimed their main attacks against the CPSU and the Soviet Union. Their aim is to deprive the working class and its vanguard—the Communist Party—of their leading role in the states of the socialist system, to undermine the proletarian dictatorship and to do away with the gains of socialism. The class adversaries of communism have been trying ideologically to corrupt the working class, to throw its ranks into disarray, to embroil the workers with the intelligentsia and the peasantry, so as ultimately to wrest power from the hands of the working class and to push the working-class and the communist movement onto the way of surrender to imperialism.

All true followers of socialism, proletarian internationalism and Marxism-Leninism are engaged in a relentless struggle against modern Trotskyism and other manifestations of opportunism, exposing the petty-bourgeois revolutionarism, great-power chauvinism, nationalism and reactionary ideology and practices of the Chinese leaders.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, together with

other fraternal Parties, has been taking all measures to consolidate the positions of socialism, and to strengthen the unity and cohesion of the world communist movement on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. The Communist Parties, resolutely defending the Marxist-Leninist line of the world communist movement, are rallying the revolutionary forces of our time in the fight against international imperialism, and for peace, democracy and socialism.

The International Meeting of 75 Communist and Workers' Parties, held in Moscow in June 1969, worked out a militant platform for joint action in the struggle against imperialism, and unanimously came out for the cohesion of the world communist movement. Its main document also emphasises that the Communists will struggle against the Right- and Left-opportunist distortions of theory and policy, against revisionism, dogmatism and Left-sectarian adventurism.

The Meeting adopted an Address, *On the Centenary of the Birth of V. I. Lenin*, which called for a fitting celebration of the great anniversary. The fact that this document has been adopted is of fundamental importance. Lenin's name has become a symbol of the victory in the Great October Revolution, and of the outstanding revolutionary achievements, which have fundamentally changed the social face of the world, signifying that mankind has taken a turn towards socialism and communism.